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The Battle For Okinawa
Critical acclaim for The Battle for Okinawa
"An indispensable account of the fighting and of Okinawa's role in the Japanese defense of the home islands." — The Wall Street Journal
"A fascinating, highly intelligent glance behind the Japanese lines." — Kirkus Reviews
"The most interesting of the 'last battle of the war' books." — The Washington Post
"A fascinating insider's view of the Japanese command." — Dallas Morning News
A Military Book Club Main Selection
"An indispensable account of the fighting and of Okinawa's role in the Japanese defense of the home islands." — The Wall Street Journal
"A fascinating, highly intelligent glance behind the Japanese lines." — Kirkus Reviews
"The most interesting of the 'last battle of the war' books." — The Washington Post
"A fascinating insider's view of the Japanese command." — Dallas Morning News
A Military Book Club Main Selection
272 pages, Paperback
First published July 14, 1995
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Displaying 1 - 21 of 21 reviews
February 15, 2020
Col Yahara's book, a nice addition to the Okinawa battle history. 3 Stars (because it is a staff officer's view) His account from the other side showed the Japanese had developed strategy and tactics that would bleed the attacking forces terribly. Thankfully, his superiors couldn't stop themselves from reverting back to Banzai-style offensives that wasted irreplaceable manpower. The consensus style of management resulted in many lost opportunities to mount effective defensive efforts. But the Allies had no illusions that the coming invasion of Japan was going to be an excessively bloody affair based on the Okinawa experience.
Col Yahara was a visionary and accurately predicted how the Okinawa battle would be fought by the US. He was angry at Imperial HQ for taking away veteran units to Taiwan that were key to his plans. At one point, the staff guys were saddened by the loss of a Mixed Independent Brigade whose transport was torpedoed with a loss of over 5.000 men (this was in fall of 1944). But I was also struck at how many had been lost due to the US submarine forces:
Col Yahara describes that aftermath of the failed Japanese attacks of May 4. Luckily for the US, a large number of Japanese forces were destroyed in the open:
Col Yahara, ever the faithful staff officer, began his assessment of future options based on the dreadful (for the Japanese) results of the early May offensive.
It was a favorable outcome for the Americans, who would have suffered unaccountably more casualties had those experienced troops not been sacrificed.
Col Yahara was a visionary and accurately predicted how the Okinawa battle would be fought by the US. He was angry at Imperial HQ for taking away veteran units to Taiwan that were key to his plans. At one point, the staff guys were saddened by the loss of a Mixed Independent Brigade whose transport was torpedoed with a loss of over 5.000 men (this was in fall of 1944). But I was also struck at how many had been lost due to the US submarine forces:
Col Yahara describes that aftermath of the failed Japanese attacks of May 4. Luckily for the US, a large number of Japanese forces were destroyed in the open:
Col Yahara, ever the faithful staff officer, began his assessment of future options based on the dreadful (for the Japanese) results of the early May offensive.
It was a favorable outcome for the Americans, who would have suffered unaccountably more casualties had those experienced troops not been sacrificed.
February 18, 2015
The battle for the island of Okinawa was the bloodiest of the whole Pacific War. From the opening bombardment in April through to July, much of the island became an inferno of fire, explosive and steel, in which both sides took staggering casualties, and the Japanese Thirty-Second Army was destroyed. The battle saw the first widespread use of Kamikaze tactics, and was the also the first time that Japanese soldiers were taken prisoner in any sort of numbers.
One of those prisoners was the author of this book. Col. Yahara was not just any prisoner, he was a senior staff officer of the Thirty-Second Army, so his views on the battle are worth having - and we so nearly didn't have them at all. Not only did he survive the fighting - his commanding officer denied him the right to commit suicide by ordering him to report to Tokyo - he got captured trying to escape the island. He went through a crisis once in custody, but, through his realization that the government wasted the lives of all those on Okinawa and was going to do the same in Japan, he decided that the Empire was not worth dying for after all.
This refusal to succumb to that prevailing ethos damaged Yahara's post-war life and career, and he didn't write this book until 1973, near the end of his life. It was his attempt to set the record straight after years of myth-making by both sides.
The book as we have it here consists of two sections: the first dealing with the creation of the Thirty-Second Army and preparations for the battle, and the second dealing with the last phase of the battle, Yahara's attempted escape and eventual capture.
Yahara was a clear-sighted and rational man, and so knew even before he set about planning the defence of Okinawa that the Japanese would lose the battle. He knew that, despite the regime's trumpeting of the indomitable will of the Japanese soldier, the Allies overwhelming superiority of men and material meant that there could only be one outcome. Yahara did, however, believe his superiors when they told him that the invasion force would be met with a heavy air response in the initial hours and days. Therefore he developed a battle plan that focused on attritional warfare, with troops well dug in to fortified positions, instructed to wait for the Americans to come on to them.
Yahara's strategy was probably the correct one, but he was overtaken by events, and his superiors. The envisaged air attack on the landing never eventuated, and, his superior officers being of the old school, many troops were wasted in futile frontal attacks. When Yahara picks up the story again in the second half of the book, the troops are retreating to their final positions, and are running low on food and ammunition. This section of the book becomes hard to read, as more and more people are sacrificed for no reason, as the following extract demonstrates - "Our new infantry units were poorly trained. For want of antitank weapons, we had to use Okinawan conscripts armed with bamboo spears. They were all destroyed in one day....It was frustrating to see our men being killed by a well-equipped enemy, while we had nothing left to fight with."
There is no thought of surrendering, even when General Buckner asks them to - it was not the way of the Samurai. Yahara had a more nuanced view of such a proposal - he had spent time in the USA in the thirties, and knew the horror stories spread by high command about the treatment of prisoners by the Americans were not true. He expands somewhat on this in his text: "Indeed, it is a high ideal to fight to the end to maintain national morale. But were our leaders worth the sacrifice of an entire people? With the end of the war in sight, they shout at us: " Millions of people must die for our nation." Why? ...It was foolish to force everyone to die, simply because Japan had never before loast a war."
At the time Yahara could not bring himself to espouse this view, and the battle raged on until nearly all the Japanese were dead. Yahara stayed on in the headquarters cave until his superiors committed Seppuku, and then got into civilian clothes and tried to escape. He caught up with a group of other civilians hiding in a cave, and helped them surrender to the Americans rather than get killed. He then tried to get to the north of the island to find a ship to Japan, but was betrayed by another Japanese soldier.
The book has insertions from Frank Gibney, who was in Okinawa working for US Army intelligence. He sets the scene for readers of the book, and includes a transcript of Yahara's interrogation, which took place in August (on the day of the Hiroshima bombing), and focussed more on preparations for the invasion of Japan, which is fascinating in itself.
While the first half of Yahara's book covers the poor preparation for the invasion of Okinawa - not enough munitions, the inability of the navy and air force to get troops to the island without being shot down or sunk - his idea to run a battle of attrition had a big effect on US strategy. The enormous losses suffered by the US on Okinawa, combined with the fact that the main islands of Japan only offered a few places to mount an invasion, led the Army to predict a million casualties from such a landing.
Faced with this horrendous prediction, the new President, Truman, made the fateful decision to use the atomic bomb, which led to a quick surrender by the Japanese.
A fascinating read, this book is one for aficionados.
Check out my other reviews at http://aviewoverthebell.blogspot.com.au/
One of those prisoners was the author of this book. Col. Yahara was not just any prisoner, he was a senior staff officer of the Thirty-Second Army, so his views on the battle are worth having - and we so nearly didn't have them at all. Not only did he survive the fighting - his commanding officer denied him the right to commit suicide by ordering him to report to Tokyo - he got captured trying to escape the island. He went through a crisis once in custody, but, through his realization that the government wasted the lives of all those on Okinawa and was going to do the same in Japan, he decided that the Empire was not worth dying for after all.
This refusal to succumb to that prevailing ethos damaged Yahara's post-war life and career, and he didn't write this book until 1973, near the end of his life. It was his attempt to set the record straight after years of myth-making by both sides.
The book as we have it here consists of two sections: the first dealing with the creation of the Thirty-Second Army and preparations for the battle, and the second dealing with the last phase of the battle, Yahara's attempted escape and eventual capture.
Yahara was a clear-sighted and rational man, and so knew even before he set about planning the defence of Okinawa that the Japanese would lose the battle. He knew that, despite the regime's trumpeting of the indomitable will of the Japanese soldier, the Allies overwhelming superiority of men and material meant that there could only be one outcome. Yahara did, however, believe his superiors when they told him that the invasion force would be met with a heavy air response in the initial hours and days. Therefore he developed a battle plan that focused on attritional warfare, with troops well dug in to fortified positions, instructed to wait for the Americans to come on to them.
Yahara's strategy was probably the correct one, but he was overtaken by events, and his superiors. The envisaged air attack on the landing never eventuated, and, his superior officers being of the old school, many troops were wasted in futile frontal attacks. When Yahara picks up the story again in the second half of the book, the troops are retreating to their final positions, and are running low on food and ammunition. This section of the book becomes hard to read, as more and more people are sacrificed for no reason, as the following extract demonstrates - "Our new infantry units were poorly trained. For want of antitank weapons, we had to use Okinawan conscripts armed with bamboo spears. They were all destroyed in one day....It was frustrating to see our men being killed by a well-equipped enemy, while we had nothing left to fight with."
There is no thought of surrendering, even when General Buckner asks them to - it was not the way of the Samurai. Yahara had a more nuanced view of such a proposal - he had spent time in the USA in the thirties, and knew the horror stories spread by high command about the treatment of prisoners by the Americans were not true. He expands somewhat on this in his text: "Indeed, it is a high ideal to fight to the end to maintain national morale. But were our leaders worth the sacrifice of an entire people? With the end of the war in sight, they shout at us: " Millions of people must die for our nation." Why? ...It was foolish to force everyone to die, simply because Japan had never before loast a war."
At the time Yahara could not bring himself to espouse this view, and the battle raged on until nearly all the Japanese were dead. Yahara stayed on in the headquarters cave until his superiors committed Seppuku, and then got into civilian clothes and tried to escape. He caught up with a group of other civilians hiding in a cave, and helped them surrender to the Americans rather than get killed. He then tried to get to the north of the island to find a ship to Japan, but was betrayed by another Japanese soldier.
The book has insertions from Frank Gibney, who was in Okinawa working for US Army intelligence. He sets the scene for readers of the book, and includes a transcript of Yahara's interrogation, which took place in August (on the day of the Hiroshima bombing), and focussed more on preparations for the invasion of Japan, which is fascinating in itself.
While the first half of Yahara's book covers the poor preparation for the invasion of Okinawa - not enough munitions, the inability of the navy and air force to get troops to the island without being shot down or sunk - his idea to run a battle of attrition had a big effect on US strategy. The enormous losses suffered by the US on Okinawa, combined with the fact that the main islands of Japan only offered a few places to mount an invasion, led the Army to predict a million casualties from such a landing.
Faced with this horrendous prediction, the new President, Truman, made the fateful decision to use the atomic bomb, which led to a quick surrender by the Japanese.
A fascinating read, this book is one for aficionados.
Check out my other reviews at http://aviewoverthebell.blogspot.com.au/
November 19, 2018
This is a rather unique book on World War Two Pacific campaign since it is written by a higher up military officer in the Japanese Imperial Army. The author Colonel Hiromichi Yahara is the strategic mind behind the battle of Okinawa and his book is largely his account of that battle from the perspective of a senior staff officer for the leading generals of the Okinawa’s defense. Yahara is actually the strategist behind much (not all as readers will learn) of Japanese Army’s fight against the American forces. I think this book is quite unique given that there’s few books from the perspective of the Japanese side and also even further rare since he’s a higher level officer that survived the war in a conflict that often witness Japanese officers commit suicide or engage in final futile suicidal attacks on the enemies.
Readers must keep in mind Colonel Hiromicki Yahara’s agenda in writing this book. Having survived the war and living in a Japanese culture that look down on prisoners Yahara is writing this book with a chip on his shoulder. He’s trying to explain why he didn’t commit suicide. But most of his writing is also trying to explain the clash of strategies between the leadership of the 32nd Army in which on the one hand Yahara held to the strategy of committing attrition against the American forces as much as possible versus the prevalent strategy of massive suicidal attacks for the sake of honor. One strategy involved being bunkered down in the long run, slowly having the US military take the burden of clearing out the Japanese forces one cave at a time. The other strategy call for massive frontal attack and charges with numerical factors against the Japanese soldiers. Yahara led the former view while the latter view was popular among many including General Cho who was the chief of staff of the Army in Okinawa. Following Cho’s view and suffering greatly for it the leading general Lt. General Mitsuru Ushijima finally gave in to Yahara’s strategy but by then it was already too late and the remaining forces and military capability of the 32nd Army was greatly depleted.
What I found further fascinating is Yahara’s perspective of the war. I’ve never heard the war from the perspective of the Japanese before. Yet reading this made me realize his views are also a bit different from that of other Japanese officers. For one thing Yahara spent two years in America and his view of Americans were a bit more realistic than some of his peers. He also understood more how Americans thought and operated which of course is a big asset for Japan’s war against the Americans.
Sadly I wished Yahara would have also discussed more about his life and other military involvement throughout his career. The book is quite modest and humble in tone. Yet one feels a great pain and bitterness in the author. I also appreciated that the American translation of this book also feature an introduction and commentary by Frank Gibney; he was one of the Naval officer that interrogated Yahara after the war. This puts some things in context and also gives a third person perspective of Yahara’s war. Also quite fascinating to me is the two prisoner of war interrogation reports at the end of the book. It is a fascinating primary source for readers.
One last note: I enjoyed the author’s description of how the American military treated him and the Okinawan people. I think the American military is overall more compassionate than most in the world. As a US Marine I’m biased of course. Still it is fascinating to read this first-hand account for myself. I also have read enough about the Japanese in World War Two to know that the Japanese military didn’t operated like the Americans. Especially painful for me is reading stories of Prisoners of War under the Japanese and also the Japanese military in China. The ending of the book reminded me personally why I’m glad Yahara’s side lost. That doesn’t mean though I didn’t benefit and gain insight from his book. I recommend this work for mature readers.
Readers must keep in mind Colonel Hiromicki Yahara’s agenda in writing this book. Having survived the war and living in a Japanese culture that look down on prisoners Yahara is writing this book with a chip on his shoulder. He’s trying to explain why he didn’t commit suicide. But most of his writing is also trying to explain the clash of strategies between the leadership of the 32nd Army in which on the one hand Yahara held to the strategy of committing attrition against the American forces as much as possible versus the prevalent strategy of massive suicidal attacks for the sake of honor. One strategy involved being bunkered down in the long run, slowly having the US military take the burden of clearing out the Japanese forces one cave at a time. The other strategy call for massive frontal attack and charges with numerical factors against the Japanese soldiers. Yahara led the former view while the latter view was popular among many including General Cho who was the chief of staff of the Army in Okinawa. Following Cho’s view and suffering greatly for it the leading general Lt. General Mitsuru Ushijima finally gave in to Yahara’s strategy but by then it was already too late and the remaining forces and military capability of the 32nd Army was greatly depleted.
What I found further fascinating is Yahara’s perspective of the war. I’ve never heard the war from the perspective of the Japanese before. Yet reading this made me realize his views are also a bit different from that of other Japanese officers. For one thing Yahara spent two years in America and his view of Americans were a bit more realistic than some of his peers. He also understood more how Americans thought and operated which of course is a big asset for Japan’s war against the Americans.
Sadly I wished Yahara would have also discussed more about his life and other military involvement throughout his career. The book is quite modest and humble in tone. Yet one feels a great pain and bitterness in the author. I also appreciated that the American translation of this book also feature an introduction and commentary by Frank Gibney; he was one of the Naval officer that interrogated Yahara after the war. This puts some things in context and also gives a third person perspective of Yahara’s war. Also quite fascinating to me is the two prisoner of war interrogation reports at the end of the book. It is a fascinating primary source for readers.
One last note: I enjoyed the author’s description of how the American military treated him and the Okinawan people. I think the American military is overall more compassionate than most in the world. As a US Marine I’m biased of course. Still it is fascinating to read this first-hand account for myself. I also have read enough about the Japanese in World War Two to know that the Japanese military didn’t operated like the Americans. Especially painful for me is reading stories of Prisoners of War under the Japanese and also the Japanese military in China. The ending of the book reminded me personally why I’m glad Yahara’s side lost. That doesn’t mean though I didn’t benefit and gain insight from his book. I recommend this work for mature readers.
May 25, 2016
I have read a couple of books by American soldiers about the bloody battle for Okinawa in WWII that many suggest was the catalyst for dropping atomic bombs on Japan to prevent a contracted war of attrition in Japan after invasion. So it was an interesting to get the perspective of a high ranking Japanese officer who was leading the Japanese forces in the battle of Okinawa in The Battle For Okinawa (1995 originally written in Japanese in 1972) by Colonel Hiromichi Yahara with an introduction and commentary by Frank B. Gibney (a former WWII POW interrogator). In many ways the memoir is self-serving, Yahara has an agenda to set two things straight: 1) that he was not a coward for not killing himself and allowing himself to be captured and 2) that he was one of the few commanding officers who rejected the banzai attack offensives and wait for air power approach to save the day strategy. Furthermore, he was correct in thinking that Okinawa would probably be the next target rather than Taiwan as many of his peers thought. The defeat in that the the strategic defensive (attrition warfare) and all-out offensive (direct confrontation) plans constantly collided leaving them without a consistent war plan. Some other trends appear throughout the memoir, the utter disregard for the lives of Okinawans: "For want of antitank weapons, we had to use Okinawan conscripts armed with bamboo spears. They were destroyed in one day." Yahara didn't seem to lose much sleep over civilian causalities or deaths of comfort women and nurses that he witnessed. In fact he mentions that he had studied in America for two years and found the propaganda spread among the Okinawans about the brutal nature of their enemy would result in widespread rape, torture, and death. A policy that hey sometimes enforced with force. He knew it was absurd but did nothing to stop the spread of such nonsense. Here's a sample of the mentality of the high command, when the commanding General Cho wrote his last orders he added this postscript: "Do not suffer shame of being taken prisoner. You will live for eternity." Yahara saw the folly of such an order and muses about this concept and ask serious questions such as: must one hundred soldiers die because of this tradition of avoiding shame? He suggests that their leaders only seemed to care about preservation of their own status, prestige, and honor. All in all a fascinating account of one of the bloodiest battles of the Pacific theater in WWII.
October 21, 2020
This book is from the perspective of the Japanese senior staff officer of the 32nd Army at Okinawa. Colonel Hiromichi Yahara left the island before the rest of his fellow officers committed suicide as the battle was ending. He reported the events of the battle to the higher ups in Tokyo, and later wrote this account. It is an interesting view of the strategy and tactics of the Japanese 32nd Army in the last, and bloodiest, battle of the Pacific Theater in World War Two.
My grandfather Otto Steinhauser fought in this battle, and I read his personal copy of Yahara's account, which made the experience of reading the book even more enjoyable.
My grandfather Otto Steinhauser fought in this battle, and I read his personal copy of Yahara's account, which made the experience of reading the book even more enjoyable.
August 31, 2023
It was okay. Skips large sections of the battle, and does the backbiting so typical of German post-war perspectives. Often their way to expressing frustration is by describing the mistakes of their fellow staff officers and high command. These memoirs often express a type of 'secular', almost apolitical feeling that the war could have been won (without any discussion of the implication of that victory) if there had just been a different strategy (usually the one suggested by the author).
This fellow does a lot of backbiting, but also has a deep respect for his fellow soldiers and officers on the island itself. He at no point talks about a possible winning of the war, or how it could have been won. He's almost totally committed to the idea of how exactly the martyrdom strategy occured. This can be noted most clearly by the fact that he skips almost the entire battle, until the last sections when the idea of a last stand is almost the only thing anyone can think about. Where should the last stand be? How can we fight maximally?
The prose is nice, and the number of poems scattered throughout, plus a sort of respectful approach to the suicidal/martyrdom oriented approach of the Japanese armed forces in this conflict I think adds a lot of context to what is often a very orientalist understanding of 'incomprehensible' Japanese tactics when battles are lost.
He doesn't mention anything outside of Okinawa really, but has a lot of sympathy for civilians and conscripts who had no choice but to be involved in the battle.
I'd say this book is roughly a 3.5-4 stars. Could be more detailed in sections of the battle, but I think the constant vignettes about what's going on in the command posts, plus a somewhat distant approach to the battle itself show a really interesting perspective.
This fellow does a lot of backbiting, but also has a deep respect for his fellow soldiers and officers on the island itself. He at no point talks about a possible winning of the war, or how it could have been won. He's almost totally committed to the idea of how exactly the martyrdom strategy occured. This can be noted most clearly by the fact that he skips almost the entire battle, until the last sections when the idea of a last stand is almost the only thing anyone can think about. Where should the last stand be? How can we fight maximally?
The prose is nice, and the number of poems scattered throughout, plus a sort of respectful approach to the suicidal/martyrdom oriented approach of the Japanese armed forces in this conflict I think adds a lot of context to what is often a very orientalist understanding of 'incomprehensible' Japanese tactics when battles are lost.
He doesn't mention anything outside of Okinawa really, but has a lot of sympathy for civilians and conscripts who had no choice but to be involved in the battle.
I'd say this book is roughly a 3.5-4 stars. Could be more detailed in sections of the battle, but I think the constant vignettes about what's going on in the command posts, plus a somewhat distant approach to the battle itself show a really interesting perspective.
November 16, 2020
The Battle for Okinawa by Hiromichi Yahara is the account of the Battle of Okinawa by the highest ranking Japanese officer to survive the battle but that does very little to capture all the book is. Much of the insight the book offers comes from Yahara’s attitude toward the battle and the war, his decision to write this account nearly 30 years after the battle, and the bizarre entertainment value of his tale.
Yahara’s job was to devise and implement strategy for the Japanese defense of Okinawa. Given Yahara’s responsibilities, he is well positioned to give insight into the movements of the Japanese defenders and the rationale for those movements. While dedicated historians may be able to mine this book for those details, the verbal description of the geography, battle lines, and troop movements can get pretty confusing and difficult to follow. I listened to the book on audiobook so I did not have the benefit of maps of the island but I understand from other reviews of the book that the dead tree version also lacks maps.
Yahara’s strategy was to draw the American forces into a battle of attrition. This was a significant departure from previous Japanese battle plans because of a cultural preference for aggressive action and placing honor and national prestige over one’s own wellbeing. Yahara’s strategy was born of a dispassionate accounting of his military assets and how they might best be used to achieve his military goals. While Japanese doctrine favored aggression, Yahara believed that aggressive action against a numerically, technologically, and materially superior opponent would be wasteful. Instead, he favored a more asymmetrical approach that would spend Japanese lives more cautiously in hopes of exacting a greater cost on the American attackers.
Yahara is bitter about broader Japanese military strategy. The racist and militaristic indoctrination of the military and political leadership made it difficult for the Japanese to adapt to the changing realities of the war. When the racist conviction that Japanese soldiers were simply better failed to deliver wins on the battlefield, there was no plan B. Yahara was trying to construct a plan B but changing the defensive battle plan on a single island was itself inadequate to alter the course of the war and Yahara seemed to despair that even his best efforts were likely to amount to no good.
American students of military history seem to celebrate Yahara for this more “western” attitude toward conflict. Western military leaders, at the time, were quicker to celebrate adaptation and success in the field than to rely on a more jingoistic belief in the inherent superiority of their soldiers. I think this misses the mark though. Yahara does lament that the lives of the soldiers in his command are being wasted. He remarks several times about Okinawan conscripts with little military training and no weapons to speak of were being thrown, as cannon fodder, at the Americans but he is not troubled by these things in and of themselves. He does not fret that the Okinawan conscripts are basically civilians thrown into the maw of the American martial engine, he only frets that those lives do not advance the Japanese cause. If a total disregard for human life could purchase Japanese success, Yahara seems willing to pay that price. His enlightenment only extends as far as what he perceives to be expedient.
The Battle for Okinawa was published about 28 years after the battle occurred. Yahara seems at least somewhat motivated to publish the book as a retort to his critics. A Major in the Japanese army tasked with coordinating air power in the defense of the island was evacuated to the Japanese home islands during the battle. Apparently, he became a vocal critic of Yahara after the war. The book then is a salvo in a debate about the conduct of the battle that lasted much longer than the battle did. The major in question, argues that Yahara’s defensive strategy, ie his abandoning of a more aggressive battle plan, was the cause of the Japanese defeat on Okinawa. He was also critical of Yahara for having survived since he not only failed to take his own life but was captured by the Americans to boot.
Among Yahara’s beefs with the narrative others, this Major in particular, had floated in the years following the war, was the inadequacy of the air defense of Okinawa. It is hard to discern whether this is a legitimate grievance or a direct retort to the Major’s assertion that the loss of Okinawa was the fault of the land forces on Okinawa. Regardless, it can be hard to dismiss the possibility that Yahara is engaged in self-serving revisionist history. Is his account an earnest attempt to set the record straight or a cynical play at bolstering his own reputation?
It seems likely that Yahara’s intentions are fairly honorable. Yahara details a great number of grievances with the conduct of his superiors, none the less, he speaks of them endearingly. If there are errors in Yahara’s recollection, it feels likely that it is more a function of the passage of time than the fabrication of more flattering account of events.
In fact, I was left with a bizarre impression of Yahara by the end of the book. Yahara seems to have been an insightful and effective staff officer. He also comes off as amiable, seeming to have little animosity for anyone, even those whose opinions are in opposition to his own. In fact, his greatest moral failing seems to be conflict aversion to the point of comporting himself in a seemingly unprincipled way. While he is competent and insightful, he is willing to do unconscionable things at the behest of others even if he disagrees with those actions perhaps for no other reason than to just get along.
Much of the book covers the relationships he had with the officers he served with on Okinawa. He talks about kindnesses, shared meals, subtle manipulations, confessed apprehensions, and bravado as the army fights a protracted and losing battle with daring night time retreats and dashes between subterranean hideouts. At times, The Battle for Okinawa reads like a bad Robert Lewis Stevenson book only with large caliber naval guns, fast gun boats, mortars, fighter bombers, and grenades in lieu of mutinous pirates. This second rate adventure tale may be the most endearing part of the book for me. It may also best encapsulate the book’s weakness. Having read the book, I feel more personally acquainted with the author and his cohort on Okinawa than I do the battle they participated in.
Yahara’s job was to devise and implement strategy for the Japanese defense of Okinawa. Given Yahara’s responsibilities, he is well positioned to give insight into the movements of the Japanese defenders and the rationale for those movements. While dedicated historians may be able to mine this book for those details, the verbal description of the geography, battle lines, and troop movements can get pretty confusing and difficult to follow. I listened to the book on audiobook so I did not have the benefit of maps of the island but I understand from other reviews of the book that the dead tree version also lacks maps.
Yahara’s strategy was to draw the American forces into a battle of attrition. This was a significant departure from previous Japanese battle plans because of a cultural preference for aggressive action and placing honor and national prestige over one’s own wellbeing. Yahara’s strategy was born of a dispassionate accounting of his military assets and how they might best be used to achieve his military goals. While Japanese doctrine favored aggression, Yahara believed that aggressive action against a numerically, technologically, and materially superior opponent would be wasteful. Instead, he favored a more asymmetrical approach that would spend Japanese lives more cautiously in hopes of exacting a greater cost on the American attackers.
Yahara is bitter about broader Japanese military strategy. The racist and militaristic indoctrination of the military and political leadership made it difficult for the Japanese to adapt to the changing realities of the war. When the racist conviction that Japanese soldiers were simply better failed to deliver wins on the battlefield, there was no plan B. Yahara was trying to construct a plan B but changing the defensive battle plan on a single island was itself inadequate to alter the course of the war and Yahara seemed to despair that even his best efforts were likely to amount to no good.
American students of military history seem to celebrate Yahara for this more “western” attitude toward conflict. Western military leaders, at the time, were quicker to celebrate adaptation and success in the field than to rely on a more jingoistic belief in the inherent superiority of their soldiers. I think this misses the mark though. Yahara does lament that the lives of the soldiers in his command are being wasted. He remarks several times about Okinawan conscripts with little military training and no weapons to speak of were being thrown, as cannon fodder, at the Americans but he is not troubled by these things in and of themselves. He does not fret that the Okinawan conscripts are basically civilians thrown into the maw of the American martial engine, he only frets that those lives do not advance the Japanese cause. If a total disregard for human life could purchase Japanese success, Yahara seems willing to pay that price. His enlightenment only extends as far as what he perceives to be expedient.
The Battle for Okinawa was published about 28 years after the battle occurred. Yahara seems at least somewhat motivated to publish the book as a retort to his critics. A Major in the Japanese army tasked with coordinating air power in the defense of the island was evacuated to the Japanese home islands during the battle. Apparently, he became a vocal critic of Yahara after the war. The book then is a salvo in a debate about the conduct of the battle that lasted much longer than the battle did. The major in question, argues that Yahara’s defensive strategy, ie his abandoning of a more aggressive battle plan, was the cause of the Japanese defeat on Okinawa. He was also critical of Yahara for having survived since he not only failed to take his own life but was captured by the Americans to boot.
Among Yahara’s beefs with the narrative others, this Major in particular, had floated in the years following the war, was the inadequacy of the air defense of Okinawa. It is hard to discern whether this is a legitimate grievance or a direct retort to the Major’s assertion that the loss of Okinawa was the fault of the land forces on Okinawa. Regardless, it can be hard to dismiss the possibility that Yahara is engaged in self-serving revisionist history. Is his account an earnest attempt to set the record straight or a cynical play at bolstering his own reputation?
It seems likely that Yahara’s intentions are fairly honorable. Yahara details a great number of grievances with the conduct of his superiors, none the less, he speaks of them endearingly. If there are errors in Yahara’s recollection, it feels likely that it is more a function of the passage of time than the fabrication of more flattering account of events.
In fact, I was left with a bizarre impression of Yahara by the end of the book. Yahara seems to have been an insightful and effective staff officer. He also comes off as amiable, seeming to have little animosity for anyone, even those whose opinions are in opposition to his own. In fact, his greatest moral failing seems to be conflict aversion to the point of comporting himself in a seemingly unprincipled way. While he is competent and insightful, he is willing to do unconscionable things at the behest of others even if he disagrees with those actions perhaps for no other reason than to just get along.
Much of the book covers the relationships he had with the officers he served with on Okinawa. He talks about kindnesses, shared meals, subtle manipulations, confessed apprehensions, and bravado as the army fights a protracted and losing battle with daring night time retreats and dashes between subterranean hideouts. At times, The Battle for Okinawa reads like a bad Robert Lewis Stevenson book only with large caliber naval guns, fast gun boats, mortars, fighter bombers, and grenades in lieu of mutinous pirates. This second rate adventure tale may be the most endearing part of the book for me. It may also best encapsulate the book’s weakness. Having read the book, I feel more personally acquainted with the author and his cohort on Okinawa than I do the battle they participated in.
April 8, 2018
Indeed this is an important book for the study on the subject of Operation Iceberg; no doubt about that. However, by comparing with the original Japanese version, paragraph by paragraph, sentence by sentence, I have found many problems in this book. The most obvious type of problem is omission. Many paragraphs written by Yahara were omitted in the English version. There are also many questionable translations that can be misleading. One climax of the Campaign is the Yaeju-Yuza-Kunishi line in Kiyan Peninsula (I use place names shown on the original US military maps, not the names used in this book). The Japanese version gives better details about how Japanese failed to hold this line, while the English version somewhat simplified the same process. That said, the English version has something that Yahara's Japanese version doesn't have - supplementary comments from Gibney. Very valuable. I wish Gibney could give more. In the final analysis, if you simply want to have a better but still general understanding about Operation Iceberg, this English version does the job. If you are into academic research and demand more precise details and facts, and not yet able to read Japanese language, you should be be aware that this English version has problems of omission from the original, somewhat misleading translation on some turning points and confusion in names of places.
October 7, 2025
An extremely interesting book written from the Japanese perspective on Okinawa. Filled with Japanese bias but surprisingly reflective and logical, yahara’s account makes for great reading. He is a bit self aggrandizing, and I am sure he did play a major role in operational planning but at times it feels like all the great ideas made by the Japanese he credits to himself. I also did not like how he spoke about the tragedy for the Okinawans. It was the Japanese army he helped command that enslaved them, exploited them, forced to fight, and did not allow them to surrender. He also holds an oddly rosy view of the ritualistic suicide that many in his command performed but also states such suicide is pointless. He is critical of Japanese society, but still reveres it in a way. Despite these contradictions His story of battle and escape is a worthwhile read all on its own. Japanese records are scarce, and his is very well written. I also found his explanation and inner turmoil associated with his capture to be very interesting. If you are a ww2 buff you should read this book. But keep in mind Yahara comes from a Japanese society steeped in shame and social pressure, and that continues to refuse to admit some of the atrocities they performed, which shows through in his writing from time to time.
April 19, 2018
I found this to be a mediocre book. While I do like reading books written by the other side in a conflict, I didn't learn much about the Okinawa campaign. Having only previously read Operation Iceberg by Gerald Astor, I still haven't read a title on the Okinawan campaign that appeals to me. Among my problems with this title is while it has a few maps, they are virtually useless as the text is very small and the resolution is average at best, awful at worst. Of course, the author mentions many places on Okinawa which I could not place on the maps due to the quality. There are a couple of insignificant minor factual errors. They don't detract from the narrative. Something that does detract from it though was introducing several generals and admirals and only giving their surnames. The index doesn't provide and one admiral mentioned, Shimba, I could not locate in other sources.
March 21, 2019
This book was written by the architect of the Japanese defense in depth found by the American forces on the southern half of the island of Okinawa. It thoroughly explored the Japanese code of Bushido but what it lacked was the perspective of the Japanese soldier who fought the battle; and it did not detail the defensive structures that proved so costly in terms of both American and Japanese lives. It did explore the tremendous sacrifices made by the ordinary citizens of Okinawa and that this battle was one that the Japanese could not possibly win. Colonel O'Hara's plan was to make the Americans believe that an invasion of the Japanese home islands would prove too costly in terms of American lives. Inadvertently, he succeeded and helped the American high command decide to use atomic weapons to end the war without invading Japan.
August 1, 2024
I found the book very interesting and informative. I was stationed on Okinawa in the late 70’s while serving in the Marine Corps as a Military Police Officer. At that time there I was stationed there the base was within the area where the major battles took place. The terrain was as rough as described. Just thinking about what the Okinawans went through and are still being unsettle when unexploded ordinance is found (which occurred while I was there when a 500lb bomb was uncovered at a construction site).
This was a very good read if you are into military history and the battles our military had fought and the hardships they went through.
This was a very good read if you are into military history and the battles our military had fought and the hardships they went through.
October 20, 2020
Fascinating. Col. Yahara was the highest ranking Japanese officer to survive Okinawa at the end of Pacific War. He wrote this book in 1972 to "set the record straight." It contains a lot of very interesting detail about the thinking of the Japanese leadership, including of course Yahara himself who ponders over the madness of the samurai spirit that commanded the Japanese to sacrifice themselves to the Emperor and to save face for the national leaders. This book also contains extensive commentary by Frank B. Gibney who interrogated Yahara after he was captured and met him again in the 1970s.
August 21, 2020
Interesting read but as expected sad.
March 11, 2017
It was interesting to see the battle from the perspective of one of the few high ranking officers who survived. The insightful thoughts about how and why the Japanese fought a war of attrition, as opposed to a suicide charge was laid out for the reader. A great read for those looking to balance out what they know from most American leaning sources.
March 3, 2014
I see this as an essential book for someone who wants to know about the Battle of Okinawa, as it is one of the few books available that tells the story of the battle from the side if the Japanese. The edition with a few notes of commentary written by one of Col. Yahara's interregators is even more interesting, as it allows an instant look back and forth between what the Japanese saw and thought and what the Americans were doing in the other side if the Shuri Line. Yahara's progressive (for a Colonel in the Japanese military) viewpoint on things is very interesting, and he writes very beautifully. That being said, it is a lot of detail about troop movements and the like, so this would not be a good first introduction into the Battle. And what is it about WWII books with few or only very rudimentary maps? Strange.
September 21, 2015
Always interesting to read about a war from the other side, this one is written by the Japanese Operations Officer (equivalent to a J-3 or G-3 for the US).
My only complaint is the lack of readable maps. This book could be much better simply by adding numerous maps to help the reader follow the various troop movements and locations of defensive positions. Several maps were included that were so badly printed and had such miniscule type that even with a magnifying glass I couldn't even make out what they were attempting to portray.
My only complaint is the lack of readable maps. This book could be much better simply by adding numerous maps to help the reader follow the various troop movements and locations of defensive positions. Several maps were included that were so badly printed and had such miniscule type that even with a magnifying glass I couldn't even make out what they were attempting to portray.
July 15, 2008
A really intriguing account of the battle for Okinawa from the point of view of one of the main Japanese Army officers. Having just been to Okinawa and seeing some of the very locations mentioned in the book really made this come alive for me. I'll be reading more books on that crucial battle.
September 23, 2013
This book provides a fascinating insight into the Japanese mindset, however it is very sanitized and lacks the visceral horror that E B Sledge provides in his classic "With the old breed: at Peleliu and Okinawa", thus I only gave it 4 stars
July 30, 2011
It provided a greater understanding by examining both sides
August 19, 2015
Great reviews on the book jacket raised my hopes, but in the end it is short on details, long on commentary, and too much Imperial Army back-stabbing decades after the war.
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