Washington Rules: America's Path to Permanent War

by Andrew J. Bacevich

The bestselling author of The Limits of Power critically examines the Washington consensus on national security and why it must change For the last half century, as administrations have come and gone, the fundamental assumptions about America's military policy have remained American security requires the United States (and us alone) to maintain a permanent armed presence around the globe, to prepare our forces for military operations in far-flung regions, and to be ready to intervene anywhere at any time. In the Obama era, just as in the Bush years, these beliefs remain unquestioned gospel. In a vivid, incisive analysis, Andrew J. Bacevich succinctly presents the origins of this consensus, forged at a moment when American power was at its height. He exposes the preconceptions, biases, and habits that underlie our pervasive faith in military might, especially the notion that overwhelming superiority will oblige others to accommodate America's needs and desires—whether for cheap oil, cheap credit, or cheap consumer goods. And he challenges the usefulness of our militarism as it has become both unaffordable and increasingly dangerous. Though our politicians deny it, American global might is faltering. This is the moment, Bacevich argues, to reconsider the principles which shape American policy in the world—to acknowledge that fixing Afghanistan should not take precedence over fixing Detroit. Replacing this Washington consensus is crucial to America's future, and may yet offer the key to the country's salvation.

Genres: Politics, History, Nonfiction, Military Fiction, War, American History, International Relations

304 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 2010

About the author

Andrew J. Bacevich, a professor of history and international relations at Boston University, retired from the U.S. Army with the rank of colonel. He is the author of Washington Rules: America's Path to Permanent War and The Limits of Power: The End of American Exceptionalism and The New American Militarism. His writing has appeared in Foreign Affairs, The Atlantic Monthly, The Nation, The New York Times, The Washington Post, and The Wall Street Journal. He holds a Ph.D. in American Diplomatic History from Princeton University, and taught at West Point and Johns Hopkins University prior to joining the faculty at Boston University in 1998. He is the recipient of a Lannan Award and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

http://us.macmillan.com/author/andrew...

Reviews

[Trevor · Rating 5 out of 5]

Someone here on Good Reads suggested I read this. It is probably getting a bit old now, and if you were to read something this old, perhaps I would suggest you get Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire, or How to Hide an Empire: A History of the Greater United States, or The Jakarta Method: Washington's Anticommunist Crusade and the Mass Murder Program that Shaped Our World. The advantage of this book over those is that it is short. Apparently, this was a best seller in 2011, but I often miss best sellers.

What I particularly liked about this book was that it made it very clear that the person most Americans seem to think has the most power in their country (the President) is ultimately powerless if they want to challenge the military industrial complex, which actually holds the most power. The clearest example of this in recent history was Obama. He came to power saying he would get the US out of Afghanistan and, once in power, almost immediately sent an additional 33,000 troops there. He won a Nobel Peace Prize, mostly on the basis of a speech he made calling for the world to give up its addition to nuclear weapons. His call for disarmament didn’t last until the end of his presidency, however. By then he had committed to spending a trillion dollars over 30 years to upgrade the US nuclear arsenal. You might call this a lot of things, but disarmament isn’t one of them. You might wonder how these two facts could have been possible. I want to say that I don’t think Obama was a hypocrite, despite the evidence to the contrary I’ve just provided. Rather, he was up against forces well beyond his powers.

And I think that is perhaps one of the problems with this book. The basic thesis is that the military industrial complex in the US has so much power that even presidents end up doing the opposite of their core beliefs when confronted by it. Americans in particular are obsessed with the individual, especially an individual with a gun, and so they prefer individuals to be the motive force of history, rather than faceless forces such as the military industrial complex. But that isn’t quite how things play out. The problem with this book is that after setting up this thesis, it then spends the rest of the book discussing various individuals who are presented as being the faces behind the faceless. People who turned the history of the country against the will of the people and even against the will of various presidents. This surprised me while I was reading it, but individualism runs deep in the US, so I guess the book just plays that myth out for all it is worth.

Perhaps the most interesting part of this book is the discussion of the US post 9/11. It really is fascinating reading the lines by Donald Rumsfeld or George Bush from the time. I saw an amusing snippet of a speech by Bush the other night were he said “the decision of one man to launch a wholly unjustified and brutal invasion of Iraq…I mean, of Ukraine." But Freudian hand-jobs aside, what is clear from what they were saying at the time of the invasion of Iraq (and this was confirmed by the rather premature ‘Mission Accomplished’ banners) was that invading countries using the much superior intelligence, equipment and mobility the US possessed would mean certain victory, surgical precision and hardly any damage to civilian population or infrastructure. The fact the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq went on to prove endless and then were given up as if they had achieved something perhaps says more about our growing need for a free press than anything else.

America is perpetually at war. It has been since the end of World War Two. It is also impossible for me to not to see the current war in Ukraine as anything but a proxy war between the US and Russia. When the US sends billions of dollars of military equipment to a war, it is hard to say the US is not ‘fighting’ that war. Whether that war is justified or not, the US has taken sides and the only people I can see benefiting from that fact are the faceless oligarchs in the US military industrial complex. I don’t suspect they will be seeking a truce in that war any time soon – as the old song goes, “Rolls in, rolls in, by Christ how the money rolls in…”

Like I said, there was a time when this book was a best seller. One of the best things about the US system, particularly when compared to countries where governments seek to suppress counter opinions, is that the US knows that books like this change nothing at all. And so, banning such books could only ever be counterproductive. Let people have their rants, let them rave as much as they like, let them highlight many of the awful things that are done in their name and using their tax dollars – but then release the new series of ‘Married with The Simpsons’ or ‘How I Broke Badly Your Mother’ and people go peacefully back to sleep. Oh well…

[Larry Bassett · Rating 4 out of 5]

I am a pacifist. That makes life easy for me. I do not have to decide which wars I support. It also makes me just as powerless as the jerk who thinks the solution to a problem is to bomb the enemy “into the stone age.” My “War is Not the Answer” is meaningless to the vast majority of Congress and probably meaningless to the majority of people in the world.

The era of American statecraft during the era that began with the U.S. entry into World War II and that culminates today with the Long War does not easily reduce to a simple report card. Overall that record is mixed, combining wisdom with folly, generosity with shortsightedness, moments of insight with periods of profound blindness, admirable achievements with reckless misjudgments. The president who devised the Marshall Plan also ordered the bombing of Hiroshima. The president who created the Peace Corps also dabbled in assassination plots. The president who vowed to eliminate evil secretly authorized torture and then either could not bring himself to acknowledge the fact or simply lied about it.

Author Bacevich is my hero. But I seem to read his books about five years after the fact. This book was published in 2010. In the years since then the U.S. has gotten out of Iraq and, stunningly, back in. And we have similarly failed to even detach ourselves from Afghanistan temporarily. The status of the country as a continuing participant in the Long War and firmly on the path to permanent war seems assured.

For some, isolationist is a dirty word. Mr. Bacevich is a strong anti-interventionist. He has been a career military officer and had a son killed in Iraq. He has paid his dues as a patriot and been there, done that. I am not quite smart enough to take in all that he has to offer in his books. But I accept the validity of most of his conclusions. I do not believe that the U.S. can take care of the entire world without neglecting ourselves. I think there is a choice to be made between guns and butter. My vote is with Mr. Bacevich for a lot less guns and for a lot more butter.

Reading Washington Rules: America’s Path to Permanent War makes me want to stand up and cheer. Is it possible for the U.S. to make some tough choices NOT to get involved militarily? What is the purpose of having hundreds of military bases all over the world?

Bacevich has a solution: Pull back. Take care of ourselves. A simple prescription:

With resources currently devoted to rehabilitating Baghdad or Kabul freed up, the cause of rehabilitating Cleveland and Detroit might finally attract a following.

Our politicians have actually heard our demand that we take care of ourselves first. That is why we are being told that ISIS in the Middle East somehow directly threatens us at home. We have to think about that and judge the truth of what the politicians are telling us. And I need to catch up with Bacevich in 2015 instead of being five years behind.

Four stars for this offering but maybe five stars for helping me to think that I am not so far off the wall with my anti-interventionist thinking.

[Naeem · Rating 4 out of 5]

The main contribution of this book is the continuity that Bacevich shows in US foreign policy from Eisenhower to Obama, from Vietnam to Afghanistan, from Westmorland to Petraeus. The "Washington Rules" are designed to police the world regardless of which party is in power or which president is in the white house. This is what he wants us to see.

Bacevich is a former colonel turned academic. His interpretations of various generals, various policies, and various wars have the ring of an insider's interpretation. The book's usefulness is in its liberal tones. Bacevich's recommendations are not far from those of Ron Paul or Dennis Kucinich. He wants the US to stop policing the world, to stop creating the conditions that require such policing, to reduce the size of military spending and for the US to return its focus to "tending its own garden."

Bacevich does not have the analytic chops or structural understanding of a Chomsky, a Parenti, or a Naomi Klein. But his heartfelt if clunky prose is likely to reach his US liberal audience. I might use his book in a class for just this reason. His work might might be a good basis by which to reach a deeper analysis.

[Darwin8u · Rating 5 out of 5]

I'm in danger of becoming a serious Bacevich acolyte. There are few books I feel everyone needs to read. If you are Christian, sure probably a good idea to read the Holy Bible: King James Version. If you are Mormon, I'd imagine there should exist a certain amount of social pressure to read The Book of Mormon: Another Testament of Jesus Christ. If you are an atheist, you need to at least be familiar with Dawkins, Hitchens, etc. If you give a crap about our country, this little book, along with Bacevich's previous The Limits of Power: The End of American Exceptionalism are (in my humble opinion) mandatory.

[Murtaza · Rating 3 out of 5]

This could be read as a 21st century update to Smedley Butler's famous broadside, "War is a Racket." Bacevich is also a former military officer and his indictment of the military-industrial-political complex here is no less stinging. He writes in a lucid and frank manner, something that I always enjoy about his work and which is surprisingly rare. This is a short volume and has many good insights, but reading it a few years after publication it does feel slightly dated. There is not so much new to people already deeply steeped in the subject. Nonetheless its a good primer for the average reader to get a handle on the "Washington Rules" that continue to drive America down the path of imperialism; at great cost to its own citizens and the world.

[David · Rating 4 out of 5]

A brief history of the national security state since 1945, with a strongly amti-interventionist view.

Briskly written and heartfelt, this book by a retired West Pointer is a non-leftist indictment of armed missionary folly.

An important book.

[J. Gibson · Rating 4 out of 5]

Bacevich's exploration of contemporary American foreign policy and its surprising consistency over the past 70 years makes this book an important read for anyone interested in understanding the United States in relation to the broader world today (and yesterday). Bacevich does an excellent job in demonstrating how our world today is filled with problems that the American credo of world leadership is ill-equipped to face. We are dire need of thorough self-reflection and critical examination of the principles which underlie the notion that we have extensive responsibilities abroad. My only complaint with this book is that it lingers mostly on outlying the faults of the American credo and does little to offer alternatives. Bacevich does outline three revised principles of what he calls the "new trinity," but it is up to the reader to apply them to our present world--only then can readers (citizens and Washington alike) imagine how policies should look moving forward.

[Eat.Sleep.Lift.Read. · Rating 2 out of 5]

Doesn't come close to scratching the surface of the deceit and lies in Washington.

Maybe it's a good intro into the scam they call politics, for the liberal/leftist loon.

[Diogenes the Dog · Rating 5 out of 5]

Bacevich can be hit and miss, but this one is a lot of hit.

[Randy · Rating 5 out of 5]

Andrew Bacevich has paid his dues to the flag as a West Point graduate, career army officer and father of a son killed in Iraq. He writes books critical of American foreign policy, in this case a set of "Washington Rules" which dictate the creepy way that we behave around the world which has been consistent since the end of WWII and has been supported by all Presidents from Harry Truman to Barrack Obama.
Here are the Washington Rules:
1. The world must be organized (shaped) or chaos will reign.
2. The United States is the only country that possesses the capacity to enforce a global order, to organize the world to avoid this chaos.
3. America is in charge of defining the principles that define international order and the most recent American articulation of these principles is the only one that counts.
4. The world wants the US to lead.

As a result of the Washington Rules our national treasure is expended around the world with a military budget that exceeds the combined military budgets of the entire rest of the world. Including our ships at sea, we have nearly 400,000 troops garrisoned overseas (and thousands more of military contractors) at 761 sites in 39 countries. We have divided the world into military "commands" including a Space Command plus a Strategic Command which owns a force of missiles and bombers always on alert with enough force to blow up the planet many times over.
Mr. Bacevich writes that his own education began as an army colonel when he finally had a chance to observe, first hand, Soviet Army forces in East German and realized that the great threat posed by the Cold War was a sham. The Soviet Army was weak and poorly equipped.
But when the Cold War ended, when we had "won" Washington Rules did not change. The military industrial complex that Ike warned us about (after his term was over) came up with new threats (China, terror, drugs) for us to fear and to justify the enormous cost of Washington's Rules.
Sadly, there is no real public discussion. We accept Washington Rules and they are supported by a vast network of media, lobbyists, and think tanks in addition to the Pentagon and defense contractors. The few who advocate closing down the empire (Ron Paul and Dennis Kucinich, for example) are marginalized as cranks and not serious. Democrats are no better than Republicans as evidenced by Obama's immediate acquiescence to the general's request for 40,000 additional troops in Afghanistan.
"At one level, we can with little difficulty calculate the cost of these efforts: The untold billions of dollars added annually to the national debt and the mounting toll of dead and wounded US troops provide one gauge. At a deeper level, the costs of adhering to the Washington consensus defy measurement: families shattered by loss; veterans bearing the physical or psychological scars of combat; the perpetuation of ponderous bureaucracies subsisting in a climate of secrecy, dissembling, and outright deception; the distortion of national priorities as the military-industrial complex siphons off scarce resources; environmental devastation produced as by-product of war...; the evisceration of civic culture that results when a small praetorian guard shoulders the burden of waging perpetual war, while the great majority of citizens purport to revere its members, even as they ignore or profit from their service. Furthermore, there is no end in sight..."

So until we decide as a national community that rebuilding Detroit is more important than investing in Kabul the Washington Rules will rule us, our wealth will go into an imperial foreign policy instead of building and supporting infrastructure needs.
We all tacitly support Washington Rules. Often it is through the litmus test of "supporting the troops," through honoring the service of vets, as with the upcoming Veterans Day celebration at our local school and at schools around the country. I'm a vet with more than twenty years of service but find it hard to get behind these celebrations that, in their small way, perpetuate Washington Rules. It might be more productive for the kids to write letters to all the family practitioners in the area begging them to take Tricare patients (that's the military's medical insurance which doesn't pay enough to interest most doctors).

[Randall Wallace · Rating 3 out of 5]

The Washington Rules and the National Security State were in place were in place by the end of the Eisenhower administration. Kennedy then spends 15% more on the military than Eisenhower. Diem’s removal from power was a huge mistake, he was critical to keeping South Vietnam under control. The Vietnam War reveals the U.S. signature technique where the “only permissible response to violence was more violence.” For Andrew, the Vietnam War was “fought to sustain the Washington consensus” and the failure of the Vietnam War, threatened that consensus. Senator Fulbright rightfully stated that U.S. obsession with communism forced the U.S. “to see principles where there are only interests, and conspiracy where there is only misfortune.” He also wrote, “bellicosity is a sign of weakness and self-doubt rather than strength and self-assurance.” David Shoup followed squarely in the footsteps of Henry Wallace when he told students, “Help people to get things and the idea of communism will strangle by its own umbilical cord.” The days of Strategic Air Command and other Cold War movies were replaced in the public consciousness by the insanity of Dr. Strangelove. Senator Mansfield could not comprehend why U.S. troops are needed in Europe; a valid unanswered question decades later. Both Germany and the U.S. made huge rebounds fifteen years after losing badly in a war. The U.S. makes a comeback under Reagan by replacing the Vietnam Syndrome with the quickly adopted myth that all U.S. attempts at diplomacy are henceforth somehow acts of appeasement – think Munich and Neville Chamberlin. President Carter (considered a national treasure for showing a real conscience after being office) started the permanent Middle East troop presence we have now; before him the U.S. only had a light physical presence in the Middle East. Interesting fact: “No U.S. carrier has been engaged in battle since World War II. Here’s Andrew’s great quote of just how off-the-charts extreme today’s bipartisan permanent war state is: “Not even the most hawkish proponent of American global leadership – not Allen Dulles or Curtis LeMay, not Maxwell Taylor or McGeorge Bundy – had ever proposed committing the United States to a policy of war without a foreseeable end.” Wow…

[Maria · Rating 3 out of 5]

Bacevich traces the beginnings of the idea that American National Security necessitates a large military, foreign bases and the willingness to fight on distant shores. The United States got this habit after World War II and neither the Democrats or the Republicans vary far from it. He argues that we can no longer afford these policies and that we need to retrench and reevaluate our priorities.

Why I started this book: I'm on a professional reading kick, slowly crossing books off my list.

Why I finished it: His frustration at political elites sings to my American soul... and if we weren't suffering from eight months of crazy with Trump, I would be more sympatric to his arguments. And it I hadn't just finished The Accidental Superpower: The Next Generation of American Preeminence and the Coming Global Disorder which argues that capitalism and globalism is possible because of America's military and warned about what drawing down and retrenching will do to the world economy.

Read along: Bacevich attributes malicious and selfish motives to the power elites of Washington for the status quo and for the U.S. constant military presence despite protestations of good will and a desire for peace. The Accidental Superpower: The Next Generation of American Preeminence and the Coming Global Disorder argues that Bretton-Woods economic system that was established after World War II to further American interests was a historical change in world politics that allowed countries and economies like Europe, Japan and China to move beyond their historic defensive military policies and focus on trade and commerce. And that ending this economic experiment will have far more consequences than Bacevich realizes.

[Marcus · Rating 3 out of 5]

An expose of the Military Complex that President Eisenhower warned America about. This is a serious book that is well documented and written by a form Colonel of the US Army. It should be required for all high school students.

The book is part history, part political and part economic. I particularly enjoyed the historical section where Bacevich discusses the creation of Strategic Air Command and the CIA. He explains how they grew out the end of World War II and during the cold war to proportions that were way out of line with what was required for national defense. In 1980 Strategic Air Command identified over 10,000 targets in the Soviet Union that must be targeted for destruction in the event of a nuclear war. (this list was 600 target in 1947). Unchecked growth, which includes many private enterprises had fundamentally shaped America's defense industry.

This book helps explain why the US continues it's involvement in Iraq and why President Obama could not do an about face in Afghanistan. Unfortunately, the end of continuing these Washington Rules is financial ruin and possibly a curtailment of the freedoms that American hold so dear.

[Jonathan · Rating 5 out of 5]

As someone who identifies with a non-interventionist foreign policy I was initially surprised to find out that Dr. Bacevich was one as well. And quite a forceful one at that.

Having not only read this particular selection but also dissecting and writing specific points for future reference. The point behind this book as well as Bacevich's other books is to shed light on our foreign policy, in particular our foreign policy since the end of the Second World War. He criticizes our need to exercise power projection via the militarization of diplomacy and the cavalier use of military power at a moment's notice.

The Washington Consensus, as he cites, represents the underlying "rules" or "philosophy" to preserving American dominance in world affairs. Bacevich also draws strong reference from the Vietnam War and its architects (Kennedy, Johnson, McNamara, Bundy, Taylor, etc.) and makes comparisons to the present day conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq.

All in all, this is arguably one of the strongest non-interventionist/anti-war books of my generation and I strongly recommend it for my progressive, libertarian, anarchist/anarcho-capitalist, and voluntaryist friends.

[John · Rating 3 out of 5]

Both historical and polemical, the book focuses on U.S. national security policy, which, no matter the president, has remained fundamentally unchanged since the end of WWII. The book argues that our policy was and is: 1) a worldwide military presence; 2) armed forces configured not for defense but for global power projection; and 3) a tendency for overt or covert interventionism in the affairs of other countries. (The current incursion into Libya is a good example of the policy in practice.)

Bacevich argues that this policy is not only not very smart, but is unsustainable--that we are borrowing against and spending our national resources in a way that will lead to economic collapse. That our military budget is more than that of all the other countries of the world combined is a telling data point of this policy. We should set more realistic "defense" goals and spend more of our resources on improving our education system and economic conditions at home--lead by example rather than by force.

[Jeremy · Rating 5 out of 5]

A very good aggressive critique of the foreign policy norms of American politics. Bacevich writes extraordinarily well about how America has evolved from a Republic in which a standing army and navy were anathema to most leaders and the public to a nation that casually tolerates lengthy wars and constant interventions abroad, along with a military budget larger than the rest of the world's. There are holes in his logic--he is so busy arguing that America is on the wrong path that he largely fails to note the major accomplishments of our foreign policy since 1945. But make no mistake--this is a book that should be widely read. It is readable, and asks penetrating questions. It reexamines Vietnam, the Cold War, and the global war on terror in ways that will make both Republicans and Democrats uncomfortable. Indeed, the greatest target of this book is the foreign policy elite of the Democratic Party, who are revealed to have, at their fundamental core, the same military/foreign policy of the Republican Party. Not without flaws, but a trenchant, important book.

[Ian Divertie · Rating 5 out of 5]

An older book but very relevant to right now and Trumps ascedancy. The first chapter is a must, the last chapter an eye opening review of both the military and econonomic results if we continue as we are. Let me remind you this is a book of the "American Empire" series and although still very powerful it faces an economic decline over the next 20 to 40 years it can't avoid. Further, the problems of the "Long War" taking place in the Middle east currently are estimated to last 50 to 100 years. That doesn't even factor in the migration effects of global warming during that 50 to 100 year period. So America needs to decide how much and at what level it wants to be involved in a 50 to 100 year war it can't possibly afford. If you've got a good answer how we make that work out let me know, I'm just reporting what I read in the book.

[Bob Mayer · Rating 5 out of 5]

The reality of the ruling elite of our country. They care only about making money. We are in a perpetual state of war. Ask yourself, really, what are we going to accomplish in Afghanistan? What did we accomplish in Iraq? No WMDs. But oil. But where are the profits we were supposed to get off that oil? No one speaks of that any more. We paid off the bad guys and they waited for us to leave. Unfortunately, the same won't be true in Afghanistan. Just more death and more profits for the warmakers.
We owe our soldiers more.
Eisenhower warned us and was ignored. We spend more in Afghanistan than we spent in all previous wars in our history combined. Who profits from it? Why wouldn't they want to see it continue?

[Richard · Rating 3 out of 5]

Similar message as Bacevich's earlier book, "The Limits of Power, " that the US is overextending itself, to catastrophic fanancial and moral effect. Somehow it seems more repetitive here, though no less convincing.

[Jenny · Rating 2 out of 5]

Just like the subtitle says, this is an overview of how the US reached a place of being in perpetual war. While it was somewhat interesting to learn how the current hawkish reality began, I was hoping for an expose of who is benefiting financially, which this did not explore.

--"The persistence of these rules has also provided an excuse to avoid serious self-engagement. From this perspective, confidence that the credo and the trinity will oblige others to accommodate themselves to America's needs or desires--whether for cheap oil, cheap credit, or cheap consumer goods--has allowed Washington to postpone or ignore problems demanding attention here at home. Fixing Iraq or Afghanistan ends up taking precedence over fixing Cleveland and Detroit. Purporting to support the troops in their crusade to free the world obviates any obligation to assess the implications of how Americans themselves to choose to exercise freedom." (p 17-18)

--"James Forrestal, the first person to serve as secretary of defense, coined a term to describe this permanent crisis. He called it semiwar. Conceived by Forrestal at the beginning of the Cold War, and reflecting his own anticommunist obsessions, semiwar defines a condition in which great dangers always threaten the United States and will continue doing so into the indefinite future. When not actively engaged in hostilities, the nation faces the prospect of hostilities beginning at any moment, with little or no warning. In the setting of national priorities, readiness to act becomes a supreme value." (p 27-28)

--"When some event disrupts the American pursuit of peace--the missile crisis of 1962, the overthrow of the Shah of Iran in 1979, Saddam Hussein's assault on Kuwait in 1990, or the terrorist attacks o 9/11--those exercising power in Washington invariably depict the problem as appearing out of the blue, utterly devoid of historical context. The United States is either a victim or an innocent bystander, Washington's own past actions possessing no relevance to the matter at hand." (p 85-86)

--Quote from Senator J. William Fulbright, Arkansas Democrat, chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from 1959-1974: "Maybe we are not really cut out for the job of spreading the gospel of democracy... Maybe it would profit us to concentrate on our own democracy instead of trying to inflict our own particular version of it" on others. "If America has a service to perform in the world," he continued, "it is in large part the service of her own example. In our excessive involvement in the affairs of other countries we are not only living off our assets... we are also denying the world the example of a free society enjoying freedom to the fullest." (p 113)

--On the rise of counterinsurgency (COIN) as the dominant emphasis: such a military "has abandoned war as its principal raison d'etre. In doing so, it forfeits any claim to singularity. Rather than exercising exclusive control over a specific, clearly distinguishable realm of human activity, the army becomes but one institution among many attempting to temper the world's most grievous political and economic failures. Having dispensed with the pursuit of victory, such an army devotes itself to social work with guns. As with such work undertaken in places like Los Angeles or Chicago, the social work inherent... to the problem of global insurgency promises to be a project literally without end." (p 201)

--Quotes from President Eisenhower, reflecting on the first decade of the Cold War: "What can the world, or any nation in it, hope for... if no turning is found on this dread road?"... "The best would be this: a life of perpetual fear and tension; a burden of arms draining the wealth and the labor of all peoples; a wasting of strength that defies the American system or the Soviet system or any system to achieve true abundance and happiness for the peoples of this earth. Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed... The cost of one modern heavy bomber is this: a modern brick school in more than 30 cities. It is two electric power plants, each serving a town of 60,000 population. It is two fine, fully equipped hospitals. It is some fifty miles of concrete pavement. We pay for a single fighter pan with a half million bushels of wheat. We pay for a single destroyer with new homes that could have housed more than 8,000 people. This is, I repeat, the best way of life to be found on the road the world has been taking. This is not a way of life at all, in any true sense. Under the cloud of threatening war, it is humanity hanging from a cross of iron." (p 225-226)

--"Not only war itself, but the preparation for, preoccupation with, and casual acceptance of war all serve today to enhance state power." (p 241)

[Neil · Rating 2 out of 5]

The book was okay. I had to read it for an online course I was taking. I might have read it at some future point in time, had I come across it at the library or a used bookstore. It had a lot of verbiage and emotional language, but I felt the author did a poor job citing throughout the book (I only say that because I have read other books where authors kept the citations separate from their opinions, and he did not always do that). It also felt like the expectation was that the reader should just trust him and his opinions, despite his not providing much in the way of "supporting citations" as he expressed himself.

However, I think, beneath all of the verbiage and emotionalism, the author did make some valid points. One of his "primary" points was that if a place was not strategically necessary for the United States military to be, then it should not be there. He did not feel like we should have been in Vietnam (strategically unnecessary for the United States even though it was more strategic for a warm-water port for the Russians); neither does he feel like we should be in Iraq or Afghanistan (again, strategically unnecessary). While I did not necessarily agree with how he went about interpreting events, looking at it in terms of 'strategic necessity' the United States probably really should not be in Iraq or Afghanistan.

The main “premise” of the book is that the United States is now involved in a “war without end” in its “Global War on Terror” (or whatever it has morphed into now). He feels that in order for the situation to change, the United States needs to withdraw US forces from their overseas bases, to disassemble its world-wide system of bases, and reduce US forces to the size and force structure needed for the defense of the United States proper. He feels the United States does not need to have a “global footprint” with its military; neither does he believe the United States military needs to be involved in policing the planet or “nation-building” (something current politicians love to talk about).

Personally, I disagree with his three-point solution on how things can change. The change needs to first take place in the “hearts and minds” of the politicians. Instead of being a “weapon of last resort” used in the defense of the United States, the American military has become more offensive in nature and is used more offensively around the world. This “change in mission priorities” is a result of politicians elected to office (especially the Presidency) who see the military as a means by which the American lifestyle can be forcefully imposed upon other nations (especially Third World nations). The President (pick any of the last four Presidents) needs to stop believing the United States can “police the world” and “(re)build nations” (especially as their plans involve the American military). Every President wants to leave his mark upon history; the easiest way to do so is through the American military, whose “primary mission” has changed from waging wars of defense on behalf of protecting the United States to being used offensively throughout the world.

He does not say that he believes a strong military used primarily for defense is a “bad thing;” he just does not feel that the US military needs to be as strong as it is. I do not necessarily agree with him on the size and strength of the US military; the US does have interests abroad and it is the United States’ prerogative to protect those interests. I think I do “get it” in terms of what he is saying about the size and cost of the United States military, though. I think I also understand the point he is trying to make when he talks about the hypocrisy of the United States when it dictates terms and expectations to another nation on how the nation is “acting” on the international stage, yet Americans would decry knuckling under the demands of a foreign power.

It was an interesting book to read; as I said, I did feel the author made some valid points. However, I did not like the presentation of the material. I felt the citations were shoddy and lazy. There would be sections where there were numerous citations, and then whole stretches where there could have been (and should have been) citations to back up his statements, his opinions, and there were not. He included his opinions as a part of some of his citations, and I also felt that was wrong. So the mechanics, verbiage, and format of the book really “ruined’ it for me and bumped it from 3.0 – 3.5 stars down to 2.7 – 2.9 stars, and the amount of “emotional sensationalism” (for lack of a better word; that is just how it felt to me) dropped it even lower (down to 2 stars). All the same, I am glad I read the book.

[Steven Hull · Rating 4 out of 5]

Andrew Bacevich is a well known historian and foreign policy commentator. Following a career as an Army officer, he joined the ranks of academia, teaching for many years at Boston University. A critic of militarism in general, and the overuse of the American military in particular, Bacevich in Washington Rules, chronicles the historical roots and current status, as of the publication of the book, of the American military and militarism.

The American military and how it is used today would shock those born and raised before 1941. Until then, culture and tradition demanded the United States avoid foreign entanglements. Of course there had been exceptions—the Spanish American War, the Quasi-War with France, small scuffles in Central America, a major war with Mexico, and World War I. But the Mexican War, although controversial at the time, evolved into a major land grab and World War I, despite its ferocity, was short and ended in victory.

Following victory in World War II, America’s foreign policy strategy was radically altered. What Bacevich calls a new Credo was created, and with it a Trinity for the positioning and use of American military force. Whereas previously the use of the military had been limited geographically and by self-imposed time constraints, following 1945 these limits were first relaxed and then abandoned. This led to what we have today, a state of permanent readiness and permanent war.

Henry Booth Luce first enunciated the Credo in 1941. He claimed American had been uniquely positioned to influence the world as it saw fit. The inherent goodness and unassailable values of America demanded this—by any means so chosen by the United States. The Trinity described the military and its location. It would be deployed all over the world in support of the American way of life and friends abroad. It would be offensive in nature. And, it would be used—anywhere and any time in support of the Credo.

With this strategic framework established at the beginning of the book, Bacevich proceeds to revisit major military events post-1945, showing how the Credo has been continually enforced through the employment of the Trinity. At each failure point, such as Vietnam, Iraq, or Afghanistan, the Credo, nevertheless, remained in place and new realities are created to preserve it the Trinity. Thus, Vietnam was documented as a ‘one-off’—a totally unique war where the Credo didn’t fail itself, but the country’s allegiance to it did. As for the Vietnam-era Trinity, the wrong strategy, flexible response and counter insurgency, had been used. Conveniently forgot was Westmoreland’s employment of World War II land and air battle tactics, all which failed miserably at home. By 1968 and Tet, support for the war fell suddenly and permanently.

In Iraq and Afghanistan, the Credo was eventually abandoned because it wasn’t working. It was replaced with the goal of getting internal stability established in those countries. The Trinity morphed from network centric warfare back to counter insurgency, with constraints on time of involvement removed, thus leading to the new descriptor of these conflicts as the Long War.

Amid these smoke screens, lies, and convenient set asides, the Credo today lives on firmly entrenched in our psyche. No politician dare challenge the Credo and its insistence on American exceptionalism; or the Trinity with its forward deployed military that aggressively defends that exceptionalism. What remains is an America driven to maintaining a military that is expensive, overly large, and offensive in nature. The nation that supports it is paranoid about being weakened or attacked and presumes its right to shape its enemies into forms that ensure the continuance of the Credo and Trinity. According to Bacevich, with a Praetorian Guard of an all-voluntary military, a massive military-industrial complex, and a bureaucracy of politicians, lobbyist, academicians, and active and retired military, the Credo and Trinity will continue to chart an expensive and minimally effective course of violence and militarism.

[M.R.K M.R.K · Rating 5 out of 5]

The US engagement in several wars over decades was clearly illustrated in throughout the book chapters, stating the fact that even though it has been given different shapes or justified warfare interventions as a method to peace around the world, or defending against terrorism, and saving the nation from conflicts.
The book successfully detailed the process of developing the foreign policy in the US and illustrated the constraints/pitfalls of implementing the US policy, especially in growing of America as a militant power hunting for war everywhere. Andrew Bacevich had well-criticized the US systems and the challenges that resulted from the election of presidents, Congress decisions were not always right, the concept of building the policy based on its militant aspects had also been well analyzed thoroughly.
In Bacevich as his previous position in the US military tries to explain through his book the bitter reality of the civil security procedures and policy that follows the rules precisely and perform war actions based on groupthink decisions. Nevertheless, the fact that there are many debates on the efficiency of the groupthink principle, it is crucial in the majority of the Congress to follow the orders and produce the procedures that follows the authority priorities (even with Congress ability to disagree on following the leadership, however, there is an explicit scene of obedience overall).
Of course, War is not the only answer that should be integrated to fulfill national security purposes; the US foreign policy ought to begin finding alternatives to engaging in violent actions and warfare even if it is meant for a defensive reason. Previous engagement in warfare was not successful all the time, with many human losses that occurred, there ought to be a better implementation of the peacemaking interventions or reconciliation as an alternative solution. Besides,
Peace has many enemies around the world; those “War Traders” their purpose is to promote business and manipulation of markets during the conflict. Reveals the truth about the US foreign policy that is a policy of war, capitalism, and materialism.
“PERMANENT WAR” was the essential concept of the book, but Bacevich has not argued enough the foreign policy of the US about Russia and China but focused his argument on the history of America developing the foreign policy and engaging in aggressive actions only. Though this book Bacevich presented a decent argument of the US foreign policy, it may be yet considered a basic introduction to the foreign policy as it still lacks in depth detailed analysis of the different decades and global influence.
Finally, Bacevich succeeded in summarizing his life experience as his previous position in the US with an excellent critique of the US policy overall unfolding the human mind to understand the consequence of the past with current situations. By reading this book, I was able to enrich and learn several new understandings about US foreign policy and history.

[Andy · Rating 4 out of 5]

In a recapitulation of the role of the military in US foreign policy since WWII, Mr Bacevich puts meat on the bones of Eisenhower's 1961 farewell address warning: "In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist."

Also in his farewell, though, the President & General acknowledged that the march of time requires changes in America's military posture: "American makers of plowshares could, with time and as required, make swords as well. But now we can no longer risk emergency improvisation of national defense; we have been compelled to create a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions...We recognize the imperative need for this development." Mr Bacevich does not appear to make a similar acknowledgement.

Washington Rules paints a disturbing picture of foreign policy run amok. Mr Bacevich credits the siren song of power and cash for the rising influence of the military-industrial complex in policy circles, and the pressure on elected leaders to propagate the status quo. While this seems too simple and cynical to me (is there not also a legitimate defense angle here?), it is Mr Bacevich who has done the research; it is Mr Bacevich who has made this scholarly area his later life's pursuit. Most importantly it is Col. Bacevich who was there - not I.

Alternatives to the status quo, however, are investigated minimally in this work. To be fair, this is a book of our journey to the current state, rather than a prescription for fixing what's broken. That said, since solutions are offered (minimally), suggestions to fall back to a simpler, more insular era don't seem pragmatic, and were rejected by Eisenhower who spoke about the need to balance security with liberty, and who was also there - in the top echelons of both military and civilian leadership.

Mr Bacevich lays an appropriate level of cause and effect for our current situation at the feet of We, the People. Ultimately it is our votes that determine who holds the reins of power. The fact that the leaders we entrust with our votes choose to further the status quo rather than to find the balance President & General Eisenhower sought - and implored his successors to find - are the leaders we ask for. Change can't happen unless We, the People insist on it, and we're simply too comfortable with the status quo.

"As we peer into society's future, we - you and I, and our government - must avoid the impulse to live only for today, plundering for, for our own ease and convenience, the precious resources of tomorrow. We cannot mortgage the material assets of our grandchildren without asking the loss also of their political and spiritual heritage. We want democracy to survive for all generations to come, not to become the insolvent phantom of tomorrow."
- President Dwight D Eisenhower, Jan 17, 1961

[Ed · Rating 5 out of 5]

Six-word Review: Another compelling wake-up call from Bacevich.

A number of years ago, I read "The Limits of Power, The end of American exceptionalism." It blew my mind. I had doubts at the time that the U.S. was practicing foreign relations in our own best interest but had no facts or arguments to back up what was just a sense. "The Limits of Power" provided me with the information I needed to solidify my opinion.

12 years ago Bacevich wrote another critique of U.S. foreign relations that I missed seeing. I just now picked it up and finished reading it in a short time. In it, he continues to illustrate how our government, no matter who's in office and most of us voters have bought into the idea that we are the world's policeman and have a duty to bring the benefits of democracy to any country that displeases us even if it destroys the target country in the process.

This comes from a retired career officer and Colonel in the U.S. Army. Yes, he lost his son in Iraq and could be accused of bitterness but the opening piece in the book, "Slow Learner" puts his growing disquiet in context. He was a true believer throughout the Cold War and only started to see the dangers in the United States' strategy after the Berlin Wall came down. Yes, we "won" the Cold War but we are still pretending that we are under attack everywhere we turn.

This attitude provides the rationale for maintaining a bloated defense budget and interfering whenever we decide that a government is a danger to the spread of democracy. It's ironic that we appear to promote democracy overseas with military force while ignoring its vulnerability here in the U.S. This strategy serves what Bacevich calls the semi-warriors of the Washington political class, the defense industries, an ever-growing number of "contractors" and the rest of the so-called "Beltline Bandits".

He traces the growth of this consensus from the end of WWII to the present day. Even Vietnam, a tragic failure, did little to change the "hearts and minds" of politicians, bureaucrats, or the bulk of the electorate. 9/11 only served to reinforce our sense that we not only had a responsibility but also a necessity to punish those who would hurt us while providing the benefits of our enlightened point of view to others, mostly now in the Middle East. We obviously have not learned from our 20-year war in Afghanistan that this strategy doesn't work.

I find little to disagree with in Bacevich's arguments as he works hard to show how the illusion of this failed strategy has continued using many historical examples. He's written five books since this one and I plan to read them all. I feel bad that I haven't kept up with his output and can only plead the same kind of self-satisfaction that he points out has become the American Way and has led us, voters, to accept the conventional wisdom that has ruled U.S. Foreign Policy for 77 years.

[Jacob]

While I largely sympathize with much of what Bacevich is arguing here, the book has some severe limitations, including:
--A clumsy review of postwar American foreign policy which puts emphasis in strange places and largely fails to account for the limited perspective of the decision-maker. I am still astounded that the book argues for Allen Dulles and Curtis LeMay as the seminal foreign policy figures of the early Cold War. I find this to generally be a problem with all accounts which seek to "retell" history through a specific lens (to be clear, Bacevich doesn't explicitly advertise this), that they gloss over important pieces of the story and leave a very limited picture in their wake.
--A loss of direction as the book transited the twenty-first century. Bacevich has strong feelings on the people who directed the GWOT, especially Gen Patraeus, which in my view limits his analysis. Much was lost as more and more pages were devoted to the demerits of counterinsurgency strategy. The book was, however, published in 2010, so this could have been important then. How should I know? I was 12. Which brings me to my next point...
--The misfortune of being written before cataclysmic world events which have occurred in the last decade. How should US military policymakers have responded to the failures of the Arab Spring? How can we argue that US forces are unnecessary in Europe after Russian intrusions in Ukraine? Can we really feel secure retreating to a so-called 'city on a hill' when China destroys democracy in Hong Kong and is poised to do so again in Taiwan?
--(minor point) The overreliance in the conclusion on the so-called 'correct' idea of US foreign policy, outlined in G Washington's farewell address (beware foreign entanglements) and J Q Adams' speech to the House ("we do not go abroad in search of monsters to destroy"). Never mind that these reflected a pragmatic cautionary assessment of the insignificance of antebellum American power.

Largely, the book is correct (I think) in its argument that US military policy needs a broad, comprehensive reassessment with STRICT and ACTIVE scrutiny from the American 'people' (of which I, in Bacevich's definition, am no longer one of), who really couldn't care less -- particularly in light of the looming national debt.

But the result of that, I think, might actually be more Hegelian than what the book suggests...

[RBSProds · Rating 5 out of 5]

AN OUTSTANDING ASSESSMENT OF THE "WASHINGTON RULES": USA WARTIME POLICIES & ACTIONS, May 31, 2015


Five ENGROSSING Stars!! This is Andrew J Bacevich's outstanding, deeply-researched, hard-hitting work of scholarship, assessing America's national and foreign policies as well as the personalities and groups that have led us into the business of confrontation, power projection, and war, time and time again. Essentially this book is the outgrowth of Mr. Bacevich's 20 year self-education, which began at the age of 41 as a military officer who began to see the international world in a new light based on an epiphany at Berlin's Brandenburg Gate. Looking at well over six decades of wartime policy and actions in the "American Century", Mr Bacevich discloses the "Washington Rules" and the credo wherein the USA has assumed the mantle of attempting to "lead, save, liberate, and transform" the world to assure international order and peace. He takes us from the Truman-era administrations to the Obama administration, detailing how the "sacred trinity" of global military presence, global power projection, global interventionism is used to achieve those ends, using his "Washington Rules" as the template. The Jimmy Carter segment was particularly eye-opening. Mr Bacevich shows that regardless of whether Republicans or Democrats are in power, the US has had an attitude that we are uniquely qualified to take on the worldwide foes of peace and democracy, forgetting, revising, or ignoring the painful lessons of World War II, Vietnam, and beyond that might have taken the USA into periods of unprecedented peace, instead of numerous conflicts. Lessons that the author shows President Obama is clearly in the midst of learning, using a modified sacred trinity. Written in engaging prose, this is a very absorbing work of research with sections that some may find very troubling based on the decisions of our leaders. If I could recommend one book that President Obama and the Congress should read, this is it. But it should also be read by those who were and were not alive during our 20th Century to 21st Century wars and military encounters. My Highest Recommendation! Five ABSORBING Stars!! (This review is based on a Kindle download in iPhone mode and Kindle text-to-speech mode.)

[FellowBibliophile KvK · Rating 1 out of 5]

One outright falsehood. He says that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are impotent and have no impact. This is directly contradicted by General Tony Zinni who reports in Before The First Shots Are Fired that the REMF Joint Chiefs of Staff bullied Congress into cancelling funding for joint operations training, unlike the Rhodesians who effectively pulled off the joint ops Operation DINGO (see Dingo Firestorm ) and unlike Hans Ulrich Rudel and Wolfram von Richtoffen who both emphasised close cooperation with the army.

He also attacks Allen Dulles for being an "indifferent father" when he founded a think tank named after John Quincy Adams, well known for being an indifferent father--and when he himself, although being a panzer officer, gallivanted about writing the biography of a REMF who Peter principled his way to the top, while ignoring that South Africa at the time had invented ways of dealing with IEDs. As a result, his son, thanks to the fact that pappy was chasing a REMF instead of studying Ratels and Casspirs like a responsible panzer officer would have done, was killed by an IED since his unit hand no Ratels.

Here, he continues the theme he started in The New American Militarism that reached its apogee in Breach Of Trust ; namely, it is the American people (as opposed to incompetents like his and Gentile's hero Westmoreland) who are responsible for the ills of the military. In this regard, Andrew Bacevich is just America's answer to Erich Ludendorff in that he perpetuates his slickly reformulated version of the Dolchstosselegend.

[Todd Martin · Rating 3 out of 5]

“We must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex.”
- President Dwight D. Eisenhower

“Maybe it would profit us to concentrate on our own democracy instead of trying to inflict our own particular version of it” on others.
- J. William Fulbright

The late half of the 20th century was, in the words of magazine magnate Henry R. Luce, “the American century”. A time characterized by the global primacy and peak influence of the U.S. around the globe. This has led many in the U.S. to develop an unquestioning belief in American exceptionalism, including the idea that it is the country’s responsibility to serve as leader / policeman of the free world through the use of hard power (i.e. military intervention). Bacevich dubs this approach the ‘sacred trinity’ of U.S. military policy:
- global presence
- power projection
- interventionism

Although some differences exist between democrat and republican administrations, these underlying premises have remained largely unquestioned by either party since WWII. Thus we are told:
1. As the sole global superpower, the U.S. has the right and the duty to intervene militarily throughout the world.
2. Military capability far beyond that required for self-defense is necessary to further our national security interests.

Andrew Bacevich, a former Army colonel turned historian and Professor Emeritus of International Relations and History at Boston University, calls these suppositions the Washington Rules (which is, not coincidentally, also the title of the book) and traces the historical origins of these ideas as well as their costs and consequences (particularly now that U.S. global influence is waning).

The U.S. spends more on defense than the next 8 highest countries combined. We have more troops stationed abroad than the rest of the world combined. The country expends huge resources to maintain its military while spending at home languishes. To take but one example, the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) estimates that the nation faces a $2.2 trillion infrastructure backlog. Even if you support lavish military spending you certainly would not support the staggering amount of waste and fraud that can be found in the military budget.

In addition to the cost, Bacevich argues that our military ventures overseas have actually made us more vulnerable, rather than more secure. Thus, after 9/11 instead of bolstering lax airport security that allowed hijackers to take control of three planes, the U.S. instead needlessly and misguidedly invaded Iraq … a country that had nothing to do with the attacks. The consequences of this action destabilized the region, spawning ISIS and other ongoing threats to U.S. security.

The reality is that, while the U.S. military is the most powerful in the world, the projection of force abroad is not one to be undertaken lightly. Like a tool specialized for a very specific task, military force is effective only in very limited and specific circumstances. Its use in the wrong situations invariably has unintended negative consequences. Unfortunately, presidents and politicians who lack the necessary judgement and understanding of history, seem irresistibly drawn to its use. The consequences of these bad decisions will be with us for quite some time.

Bacevich chronicles the historical origins of the Washington Rules and, in particular, their effect on U.S. policy during WWII, Vietnam War the Cold War and today. One would have thought that the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 would have led to a scaling back in military spending. But politicians are endlessly creative when it comes to dreaming up threats and stoking irrational fears. The upshot is that the U.S. now finds itself in a state of constant semi-war in which great dangers are perceived as threatening the country, dangers that continue in perpetuity.

Both political parties tacitly accept this premise, while those who give voice to the idea that our military exploits are an extravagant waste of blood and treasure are trivialized as cut-and-runners and isolationists. But this begs the question, how would removing troops stationed in Europe (an artifact of a war that ended more than half a century ago) make us less safe given that the region is capable of defending itself? How would military spending in excess of the next 3 highest countries combined (as opposed to the next 8) compromise national security? If our nuclear arsenal were scaled back to the point where it was capable of destroying the planet 10 times over (instead of many hundreds of times), would this somehow embolden our enemies? Is the idea of limiting the role of the Department of Defense to that of ‘defense’ of the U.S. and its vital interests such a radical idea? And finally … is it unreasonable to think that the U.S. could make a more convincing case for freedom and democracy by leading through example, rather than compelling countries to submit to democratic rule at the point of a gun?

As to the book, the bulk of the text consists a history of the military and the prevailing attitudes towards the use of military force. Unfortunately I found the bulk of the text to be rather dry, though the message is spot on.

Perhaps it takes a military expert to truly appreciate the problem. If so, we’ll wrap this up with the words of Dwight D. Eisenhower:
“The cost of one modern heavy bomber is this: a modern brick school in more than 30 cities. It is two electric power plants, each serving a town of 60,000 population. It is two fine, fully equipped hospitals. It is some fifty miles of concrete pavement. We pay for a single fighter plane with a half million bushels of wheat. We pay for a single destroyer with new homes that could have housed more than 8,000 people. This is, I repeat, the best way of life to be found on the road the world has been taking. This is not a way of life at all, in any true sense. Under the cloud of threatening war, it is humanity hanging from a cross of iron.”

If you're interested in this topic, but don't want to read this book, I'd recommend the film American Umpire which I saw on PBS.

[Candy · Rating 3 out of 5]

Okay - professionally: 2.99 stars but personally: 7 stars

First, glad to read something that stimulates critical thinking.

Second, mildly put this is an incandescent piece of writing for all Americans.

Even if you do not agree with what he is saying, take the time to analyze how he arrived at those viewpoints and what he is able to see that shapes his paradigm. <- That concept is called adulting because there’s nothing wrong with seeing things from a different pair of shoes. Towards the end, my man practically attacked the entire institution - have mercy! He really did come to publicly stomp on necks in "the imperial city on the Potomac."

This book goes on my wishful list of required reading for young adults because they keep up with and question nothing of actual long lasting importance unfortunately. When my eyeballs processed the words “American insolvency” I about lost it because the notion of leaving the generations behind us to deal with/ figure out our current spending habits is preposterous, irresponsible but more specifically flat out SELFISH. In order to have that conversation there are more economic factors at play which I thought was glossed over but tomato/ToMatO. However, EXCELLENT and honest topics for discussion that were brought to light affecting American society.

As much as I would like to include my favorite quotes, find the treasure on your own, it's worth it.