A West Point graduate, a former star quarterback who carried Army to its first bowl victory, and a courageous warrior who had proven himself on the battlefield time and again, Lt. Col. Nathan Sassaman was one of the most celebrated officers in the United States military. Commanding over 800 soldiers in the heart of the insurgency-ravaged Sunni Triangle in Iraq, his unit’s job was to seek out and eliminate terrorists and loyalists to Saddam Hussein, while simultaneously rebuilding the region’s infrastructure and introducing democratic processes to a broken people. Sassaman’s tactics were highly aggressive, his methods innovative, and his success in Iraq nearly unparalleled.
Yet Sassaman will always be known for a fateful decision to cover up the alleged drowning of an Iraqi by his men, in which they forced two detainees to jump into the Tigris River. Sassaman’s decision led to the downfall of his impressive career and sent shockwaves through the American military. Warrior King is the explosive memoir of one of the most deeply involved members of the U.S. military in Iraq. This is the first audiobook to take readers from the overnight brutality of combat to the daunting daytime humanitarian tasks of rebuilding Iraq to the upper echelons of the Pentagon to show how and why the war has gone horribly wrong.
4.5 stars. This is an incredible story, articulate, intense, emotional, tragic. Real combat leadership under the most extreme circumstances. Ten million decisions under duress are wiped out (in the brigade commander’s mind) because of one decision made under extraordinary conditions. Made after a long emotional and intense day and a long drive cross country enroute to an ordered meeting. One decision, on a surprise topic, made late at night after a ten-minute conversation, immediately preceding a potentially contentious conversation with “his next higher,” on another topic. Really hard to see how even a superman could retain crystal clear focus to be able to consider all of the ramifications, all of the pitfalls, all of the consequences of the issue and then wargame all of his own possible replies instantaneously. His decision was quick and he replayed this to his higher even though his higher already had more information about the incident than Sassaman did. Not only that the brigade commander had the luxury of considering his own options in the relative peace and quiet of his cushy CP. And those options included malevolent ones, as the story relays.
Sassaman admits he should not have said anything about holding back comments about the water and that he should have called his Division CG once he realized something was fishy about the brigade commander’s actions. Given all of the circumstances – and a commander must consider all of the circumstances surrounding the “why” of the accused’s actions – and the apparent animosity and enmity of the brigade commander toward Sassaman – this did not play out as it should have. Those who sent the Iraqis into the water should have received some punishment but not court-martials. Sassaman did not impede an investigation of which he had no knowledge. That’s my opinion based upon the evidence provided in this book and my 30 years of dealing with the military justice system.
The larger tragedy in this story is the strategic one – of America invading Iraq and doing so in a manner that did not consider what Colin Powell so eloquently warned “you break it (a country) and you buy it.” Sassaman very accurately describes the failures and their impact. Donald Rumsfeld (Rummy) directed a blitzkrieg to topple and capture Hussein followed by a quick and total withdrawal from Iraq. Read “Cobra II” by Michael R. Gordon for the details. The quick victory emboldened Rummy probably to have recommended to President Bush that he make a ill-advised “mission accomplished” speech, which came back to bite both of them. Sassaman could see that there was no plan to adequately secure Iraq against collapse and no commitment on the part of the State Department to handle reconstruction. This is no surprise given Rummy’s public rebuke of GEN Shinseki, over the latter’s estimate (answering a quick question – again the dangers of a quick response – asked by SEN Warner at a hearing) of how many troops it would take to occupy Iraq. Shinseki had been the SFOR CG in Bosnia in the 1990’s and I’m sure he used the metric of how many NATO troops it took to keep that place properly policed. He applied a land mass comparison and replied “a couple hundred thousand,” a ballpark figure that anyone (like myself) who sent time in Bosnia would agree. Rummy was incensed because this did not go with his preconceived notions, which he stuck with and which cost us dearly.
Sassaman talks of West Point (I’m also an alum), its mission, of military leadership, and military history. I can relate to all of that firsthand. What he doesn’t mention are the parallels to two other Army officers who over who faced the same frustrations. One is Allen West, a contemporary of Sassaman’s who was disciplined over an incident in Iraq (see “Guardian of the Republic”). The other David Hackworth who was considered by the brass to be such a pain in the ass over how to conduct the war in Vietnam that he was sent there to command the worst battalion they could find. Hackworth turned this unit (4-39 Infantry) into the finest and most successful in-country – a very clear parallel with Sassaman’s 1-8 Infantry. Hackworth’s writings (“About Face” is the most comprehensive) detail many of the same complaints about peacetime versus wartime commanders, discipline, REMFs (FOBBITS), commitment to victory, civil involvement, and other operational issues that Sassaman brings up. There is a systemic problem with America’s worldview, politics, civilian attitudes, of the officers the president appoints to lead our armed forces, and how we conduct ourselves – and our consistent disregard for history.
Sassaman’s narrative about his people, his friends, and family I can only describe as genuine and heartfelt. I have come close to death but never in combat or this close to feeling what others have felt when they lose soldiers in a fight. The personal regret for not being able to bring them home safely, of losing a friend to violence, and for no apparent purpose (we were not there to win it but to survive and go home). Then there are the grieving families of – what does one say to them? I found the testimonials and ceremonies Sassaman provided after returning to home station as most poignant, respectful, and appropriate. Aside from that there are no words for anyone who hasn’t experienced it firsthand, myself included.
This is a book I should have read when it was published but did not merely because of the negative publicity that the media and some in the Army hierarchy shrouded it with. Perhaps the delay was proper because I have had the opportunity to read a lot of background material before digesting this book.
His criticisms of higher command are thought-provoking, and it bears mentioning that the two commanders he singled out as “political” and “timid” each were selected for a third star (one lost it over a stupid remark). And it reads like it was written by a grunt, with all the semi-contradictory- and partially true - canards about Iraq and Afghanistan. But it was also remarkably self-serving and dedicated to vindicating his bad decisions, especially as regards the incident that cost him his career. His broad-brush comments on the early Iraq War read as very 07-08, when they were written.
I knew Nate Sassaman before his military career. Seeing this book about his time in Iraq made me want to read a first person account. Worth the time to read. Honest. Revealing. Disappointing. Sad. Disturbing, are a few if the terms I'd use to describe the book.
The author, an all-American West Point quarterback turned commander of the 1-8 Infantry in Balad, in the Sunni Trangle, makes his case for how ineptly the war was handled. Mincing no words, he excoriates his immediate superior as a coward who wanted nothing more but to establish a policy of retreat from battles and refrain from going on patrol “so nobody gets hurt.” Sassaman paints himself in stark contrast as a go-get-‘em commander who always retaliated for attacks and brooked no “open defiance” of American rule. His results --- only two deaths in the 1-8 under his watch and a relatively stable area of operations --- speak for themselves. His career, however, is overshadowed by the alleged drowning of an Iraqi ordered to jump into the Tigris. While Sassaman was not at the incident and doesn’t believe that anyone even died, he was accused of covering up for his men, and the investigation led to the end of his Army career.
The book is then equal parts apologia for the actions of his men and himself, and the aforesaid attack on the higher-ups who approached the war in a half-hearted, weak-willed manner. He makes an excellent argument that the US is currently engaged in law enforcement and not warfare, and thus will never win. He also makes a good case that the Tigris incident was overblown. Of course, this is only one side of the story; whether his superior Col. Rudesheim was as clueless as he charges is impossible to tell from just Sassaman’s version. Sassaman’s final point is that war is a terrible (if sometimes necessary) thing. Three scenes stand out depicting the insanity of the Iraq war. One, a baby starving to death because its mother was killed by Americans, and the family refusing to care for her baby. Two, a woman coolly getting water from a well in the middle of a firefight. Three, a girl being paralyzed and her mother killed by inadvertent US fire, the father being paid $15,000, and using this money to buy himself a new, fourth, wife and a car instead of helping his family. Is this a culture that can ever be westernized? It seems unlikely.
Warrior King has the unpleasant under taste of an ‘it’s not my fault’ whine. Still, the depiction of a leader bravely out of step with his commanders keeps the interest. The man even criticizes (lightly) George W. Bush.
I do not like war and I most especially do not like the phony war with Iraq. I recognize, however, that war is sometimes necessary and that even if the war is a counterfeit, if you send men over to fight, then you must let them fight to win. Anything else is suicide. In this, I agree with Lt. Col (RET.) Nathan Sassaman.
An eye-opening account of the war in Iraq! This book reads a bit like fiction;; however, it has a powerful point to make. From someone outside of the military, it amazed me how much politics are involved in a military command. Another surprise was how the Bush 'policy' impacted the battlefield. Lastly, to see the ramifications of the philosophy of winning the hearts and minds of the Iraqis and how ineffectual and wasteful that policy was.
I took from this novel that war now is more complicated than ever. It no longer is two opposing forces fighting their known enemy. In todays war, we are told what actions we can or cannot take in order to accomplish our mission. At many times it feels as though are hands are tied and we must let the enemy get away. That is not what a soldier is trained to do.
This book was a grim reminder that war really is hell. I have a new found or deeper respect for the men and women fighting overseas. Regardless of the outcome this war will really have no winner.