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Social upheaval in early 20th-century Europe is the historical setting for this seminal study by the Spanish philosopher, José Ortega y Gasset. Continuously in print since 1932, Ortega's vision of Western culture as sinking to its lowest common denominator and drifting toward chaos brought its author international fame and has remained one of the influential books of the 20th century.
209 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1923
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About the author
José Ortega y Gasset
604 books761 followersJosé Ortega y Gasset was a Spanish liberal philosopher and essayist working during the first half of the 20th century while Spain oscillated between monarchy, republicanism and dictatorship. He was, along with Kant, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche, a proponent of the idea of perspectivism.
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March 27, 2008
I first read this for a political theory class as an undergrad; at the time I pestered everyone around me with recitations of Ortegan thought. The more I re-read it, the more I'm convinced that Ortega's ideas are still applicable, even though the book came out in 1930. (If only my roommates had listened, they'd be so much smarter now.)
Basically, Ortega says that the central feature of modernity is an unwillingness by the mass (which included people from all social classes) to pay deference to people, culture, institutions he termed 'select'. In a democratic society, we'd say a healthy sense of skepticism for authority is a good thing, but that's not what he was writing about.
Instead, Ortega's mass-man was supremely self-centered, threatened by greater intellect or knowledge, refinement, superior skill, etc. Rather than respecting people with such attributes, the mass feels compelled to ridicule them and tear them down. One can hear echoes of this attitude in the phrase, 'Sure he's smart, but it's all from books. He has no common sense.'
The mass-man isn't content to wallow in pop culture and kitsch (and who doesn't love a good wallow?), but he feels compelled to ridicule anyone who might enjoy high culture. (As someone who has taught high school students, I can tell you that the adolescent who loves literature, likes classical music, or appreciates art probably needs to develop a thick skin. Or keep those enthusiasms a secret. This is especially true for boys.)
Ortega was a liberal republican who was opposed to the political tendency to cater to people's base emotions.
His special target was the señorito satisfecho (satisfied little gentleman), educated, bourgeois (or petit bourgeois), smug, mistaking specialized knowledge for expertise in all things. Ortega saw this social type as marked by a self-satisfied ignorance that they fought hard to maintain. As a group, they turned out to be some of the most ardent supporters of the fascist movements that dominated Europe in the 1930s and into the 40s.
One of the great things for the casual reader of philosophy is that Ortega was committed to widely disseminating ideas and wrote in an accessible style. The downside of this book is that one goes away from it with the sense that the situatuion Ortega describes isn't going to get better.
Basically, Ortega says that the central feature of modernity is an unwillingness by the mass (which included people from all social classes) to pay deference to people, culture, institutions he termed 'select'. In a democratic society, we'd say a healthy sense of skepticism for authority is a good thing, but that's not what he was writing about.
Instead, Ortega's mass-man was supremely self-centered, threatened by greater intellect or knowledge, refinement, superior skill, etc. Rather than respecting people with such attributes, the mass feels compelled to ridicule them and tear them down. One can hear echoes of this attitude in the phrase, 'Sure he's smart, but it's all from books. He has no common sense.'
The mass-man isn't content to wallow in pop culture and kitsch (and who doesn't love a good wallow?), but he feels compelled to ridicule anyone who might enjoy high culture. (As someone who has taught high school students, I can tell you that the adolescent who loves literature, likes classical music, or appreciates art probably needs to develop a thick skin. Or keep those enthusiasms a secret. This is especially true for boys.)
Ortega was a liberal republican who was opposed to the political tendency to cater to people's base emotions.
His special target was the señorito satisfecho (satisfied little gentleman), educated, bourgeois (or petit bourgeois), smug, mistaking specialized knowledge for expertise in all things. Ortega saw this social type as marked by a self-satisfied ignorance that they fought hard to maintain. As a group, they turned out to be some of the most ardent supporters of the fascist movements that dominated Europe in the 1930s and into the 40s.
One of the great things for the casual reader of philosophy is that Ortega was committed to widely disseminating ideas and wrote in an accessible style. The downside of this book is that one goes away from it with the sense that the situatuion Ortega describes isn't going to get better.
December 19, 2016
[Like in my other Spanish reviews, the English translation is below. This review should be more or less free of errors, since I asked someone to help me with it, but if anyone finds a mistake feel free to let me know!]
La rebelión de las masas es probablemente la obra de filosofía más conocida de España. Pero no lo he leído solo por eso. Lo he leído porque—como dejaré claro—este libro vuelve a ser ahora quizás tan relevante como lo fue en el momento de su publicación.
El mensaje de Ortega es difícil de creer ahora, en nuestra época de igualitarismo. Como Ortega es elitista, no estamos de acuerdo con él, y el lector tiene que resistir su impulso de condenarlo con asco sin entender lo que Ortega está diciendo. Palabras como «mejor» y «peor», «superior» e «inferior», «elite» y «masa» son casi tabú actualmente. Por lo menos, no vamos a hacer amigos con este vocabulario.
¿Cuáles son sus argumentos? Es difícil explicarlos, por dos razones: la más obvia es que no hablo bien español; la más importante es que Ortega no está muy preocupado con ser coherente ni sistemático. Una explicación parcial de la última es el origen de este libro. Antes de ser libro, fue una serie de artículos publicados en el diario El Sol. Por eso sus capítulos son cortos y su lenguaje es, además de ser elegante y erudito, directo y sencillo. (Si un guiri como yo puede entenderlo, no es muy difícil.) Para él es muy importante conocer su audiencia; y su audiencia es el público culto, no especialista en filosofía.
Según él, en sociedad hay siempre dos tipos de hombre: el hombre-masa, y la minoría excelente. Avisa de que no habla sobre clases económicas ni sociales. Tampoco la división es una cuestión de inteligencia en sí. La división se basa, más bien, en la personalidad y la voluntad. La minoría excelente no está satisfecha consigo misma; no está segura de que tiene razón, y no puede aceptar las opiniones convencionales, ni el sentido común. Tiene que pensar por sí misma y cambiar su carácter y su mundo.
El hombre-masa está, por el contrario, muy satisfecho con su mundo y con sí mismo. Con un poco de humor, Ortega le llama «señorito satisfecho». Para un «señorito satisfecho», lo importante no es tener sus conclusiones propias, sino estar de acuerdo con todo el mundo. (Y en «todo el mundo» no está incluido la minoría excelente, porque son raros.) No quiere cambiar y mejorar el mundo porque el mundo ya tiene todo lo que necesita. La masa exige el derecho de no tener razón, el derecho de no pensar ni aprender; en sus palabras, «el derecho de la vulgaridad, o la vulgaridad como derecho.»
La diferencia principal entre el mundo pretérito y el mundo actual no es la existencia de las masas, sino su potencia. Esto es una consecuencia de la mayor riqueza de la sociedad y de la democracia liberal. Los dos son productos de la Ilustración, su ciencia, industria, ingeniería, liberalismo, capitalismo, y sus principios de igualdad. El mundo es ahora tan rico que las masas pueden olvidar la lucha que ha sido necesaria, los hombres que han dedicado sus vidas para mejorar el mundo, y han olvidado cuán difícil, frágil, y reciente es la civilización contemporánea.
En opinión de Ortega, los movimientos más característicos de las masas son el fascismo y el comunismo. Lo dice porque ninguno de los dos entiende la Historia; sus partidarios no pueden dudar de sus principios, sino que todo el mundo tiene que creer en la misma cosa. Ortega está en contra de estos movimientos; es un liberal. Para él, la libertad es fundamental, y los individuos excelentes valen más que ideologías o movimientos.
Su concepción de «razón histórica» significa que cada situación en la historia es única, y cada individuo tiene una porciúncula de la verdad. No hay ninguna solución definitiva, ni un gobierno perfecto. Por eso, ningún sistema puede explicar todo. Y un gobierno que quiere controlar todo y gobernar de manera estática no puede tener éxito. La vida cambia, o no es la vida.
El estilo de Ortega me recuerda al de Montesquieu o de Rousseau. Sobre todo, es epigramático. Tiene los vicios y las virtudes de ese estilo. La virtud principal es su fuerza; cada frase se queda en tu mente; y el efecto acumulativo es como una serie de golpes. Ortega es el boxeador de los escritores. Pero el defecto de este estilo también es grave. Un epigrama puede resumir un argumento y hacer una conclusión. Sin embargo, si cada frase es un epigrama, no puedes hacer un razonamiento muy sensato. Se pierde la lógica de sus conclusiones. El resultado es como un castillo de naipes dorados: cada parte es precioso, pero la estructura es frágil.
Como no hay mucha evidencia ni lógica en sus conclusiones, parece que son productos de prejuicios y no de razonamientos. Y probablemente sea así. Ortega perteneció a una familia rica, culta, y refinada. Por eso, la subida de la cultura popular le da asco. En este aspecto, Ortega es similar a Nietzsche, un consumado elitista. Es obvio ahora que su disgusto nubla su juicio. Pensó, por ejemplo, que la manía del deporte físico y los baños de sol desaparecerían. Actualmente el gusto de Ortega nos parece anacrónico.
O quizás no. Cuando artículos falsos pueden cambiar una elección, y cuando una estrella de telerrealidad es elegido presidente, y cuando los nacionalismos están creciendo en el mundo occidental, su análisis parece profético. Nuestra incapacidad de tener un debate, el escepticismo de la ciencia (contra el cambio climático y la evolución) y anti-intelectualismo en general, no son buenos presagios. Y la opinión, cada año más popular, de que estamos en una época de decadencia, evidencia que hay un gran problema en el sistema mundial. Pero ¿qué debemos hacer? Ortega no lo ha dicho, y seguro que yo no lo sé.
English:
«El espacio y el tiempo físicos son lo absolutamente estúpido del universo.»
La rebelión de las masas es probablemente la obra de filosofía más conocida de España. Pero no lo he leído solo por eso. Lo he leído porque—como dejaré claro—este libro vuelve a ser ahora quizás tan relevante como lo fue en el momento de su publicación.
El mensaje de Ortega es difícil de creer ahora, en nuestra época de igualitarismo. Como Ortega es elitista, no estamos de acuerdo con él, y el lector tiene que resistir su impulso de condenarlo con asco sin entender lo que Ortega está diciendo. Palabras como «mejor» y «peor», «superior» e «inferior», «elite» y «masa» son casi tabú actualmente. Por lo menos, no vamos a hacer amigos con este vocabulario.
¿Cuáles son sus argumentos? Es difícil explicarlos, por dos razones: la más obvia es que no hablo bien español; la más importante es que Ortega no está muy preocupado con ser coherente ni sistemático. Una explicación parcial de la última es el origen de este libro. Antes de ser libro, fue una serie de artículos publicados en el diario El Sol. Por eso sus capítulos son cortos y su lenguaje es, además de ser elegante y erudito, directo y sencillo. (Si un guiri como yo puede entenderlo, no es muy difícil.) Para él es muy importante conocer su audiencia; y su audiencia es el público culto, no especialista en filosofía.
Según él, en sociedad hay siempre dos tipos de hombre: el hombre-masa, y la minoría excelente. Avisa de que no habla sobre clases económicas ni sociales. Tampoco la división es una cuestión de inteligencia en sí. La división se basa, más bien, en la personalidad y la voluntad. La minoría excelente no está satisfecha consigo misma; no está segura de que tiene razón, y no puede aceptar las opiniones convencionales, ni el sentido común. Tiene que pensar por sí misma y cambiar su carácter y su mundo.
El hombre-masa está, por el contrario, muy satisfecho con su mundo y con sí mismo. Con un poco de humor, Ortega le llama «señorito satisfecho». Para un «señorito satisfecho», lo importante no es tener sus conclusiones propias, sino estar de acuerdo con todo el mundo. (Y en «todo el mundo» no está incluido la minoría excelente, porque son raros.) No quiere cambiar y mejorar el mundo porque el mundo ya tiene todo lo que necesita. La masa exige el derecho de no tener razón, el derecho de no pensar ni aprender; en sus palabras, «el derecho de la vulgaridad, o la vulgaridad como derecho.»
La diferencia principal entre el mundo pretérito y el mundo actual no es la existencia de las masas, sino su potencia. Esto es una consecuencia de la mayor riqueza de la sociedad y de la democracia liberal. Los dos son productos de la Ilustración, su ciencia, industria, ingeniería, liberalismo, capitalismo, y sus principios de igualdad. El mundo es ahora tan rico que las masas pueden olvidar la lucha que ha sido necesaria, los hombres que han dedicado sus vidas para mejorar el mundo, y han olvidado cuán difícil, frágil, y reciente es la civilización contemporánea.
En opinión de Ortega, los movimientos más característicos de las masas son el fascismo y el comunismo. Lo dice porque ninguno de los dos entiende la Historia; sus partidarios no pueden dudar de sus principios, sino que todo el mundo tiene que creer en la misma cosa. Ortega está en contra de estos movimientos; es un liberal. Para él, la libertad es fundamental, y los individuos excelentes valen más que ideologías o movimientos.
Su concepción de «razón histórica» significa que cada situación en la historia es única, y cada individuo tiene una porciúncula de la verdad. No hay ninguna solución definitiva, ni un gobierno perfecto. Por eso, ningún sistema puede explicar todo. Y un gobierno que quiere controlar todo y gobernar de manera estática no puede tener éxito. La vida cambia, o no es la vida.
Reducir a formula tan simple la infinitud de cosas que integran la realidad histórica actual, es sin duda e en el mejor caso, una exageración, y yo necesitaba por eso recordar que pensar es, quiérase o no, exagerar. Quien prefiera no exagerar tiene que callarse; más aún tiene que paralizar su intelecto y ver la manera de idiotizarse.
El estilo de Ortega me recuerda al de Montesquieu o de Rousseau. Sobre todo, es epigramático. Tiene los vicios y las virtudes de ese estilo. La virtud principal es su fuerza; cada frase se queda en tu mente; y el efecto acumulativo es como una serie de golpes. Ortega es el boxeador de los escritores. Pero el defecto de este estilo también es grave. Un epigrama puede resumir un argumento y hacer una conclusión. Sin embargo, si cada frase es un epigrama, no puedes hacer un razonamiento muy sensato. Se pierde la lógica de sus conclusiones. El resultado es como un castillo de naipes dorados: cada parte es precioso, pero la estructura es frágil.
Como no hay mucha evidencia ni lógica en sus conclusiones, parece que son productos de prejuicios y no de razonamientos. Y probablemente sea así. Ortega perteneció a una familia rica, culta, y refinada. Por eso, la subida de la cultura popular le da asco. En este aspecto, Ortega es similar a Nietzsche, un consumado elitista. Es obvio ahora que su disgusto nubla su juicio. Pensó, por ejemplo, que la manía del deporte físico y los baños de sol desaparecerían. Actualmente el gusto de Ortega nos parece anacrónico.
O quizás no. Cuando artículos falsos pueden cambiar una elección, y cuando una estrella de telerrealidad es elegido presidente, y cuando los nacionalismos están creciendo en el mundo occidental, su análisis parece profético. Nuestra incapacidad de tener un debate, el escepticismo de la ciencia (contra el cambio climático y la evolución) y anti-intelectualismo en general, no son buenos presagios. Y la opinión, cada año más popular, de que estamos en una época de decadencia, evidencia que hay un gran problema en el sistema mundial. Pero ¿qué debemos hacer? Ortega no lo ha dicho, y seguro que yo no lo sé.
English:
October 31, 2021
La vara de medir - lo actual en lo anticuado
Este ensayo del intelectual español José Ortega y Gasset se centra en la emergencia de un nuevo tipo social, que él llama 'hombre-masa'. El propósito del ensayo principal es definir este tipo sociológico, su genealogía y las posibles condiciones para su superación.
Este texto está precedido por un un prólogo para franceses (1937) tratando del caracter dinámico del equilibrio europeo, del origen de los derechos colectivos e individuales, del 'derecho a la continuidad', del peligro de las revoluciones, del estatismo, de la uniformizacion general de los modos de vivir entre otros,
y un epílogo para ingleses (1938), sobre el genio británico, su pragmatismo, la superioridad de su organización social y los defectos de los Británicos como individuos.
Siguen un ensayo sobre el pacifismo en Europa escrito en 1937, y textos sobre el papel desempeñado por las generaciones y los sexos en el perfil psicológico y conductual de una época.
Entre los puntos fuertes del ensayo, yo pondría:
1. El análisis de los factores sociológicos que causan los cambios sociales.
2. La definición rigurosa de los conceptos de convivencia, sociedad, opinión pública, costumbres y derecho, estado, aristocracia, hombre-masa, aglomeraciones y sus orígenes.
3. En cuanto al hombre de masas: ¿por qué y cómo apareció esté tipo de ciudadanos tan ensimismados e incapaz de poner simplemente sus propios puntos de vista en tela de juicio?
4. Reflexiones sobre lo que la Sociedad de las Naciones y Europa eran en su día, por qué fracasaron, y lo que deberían ser. Mejor dicho, cuál habría sido el futuro de la ONU y la UE según José Ortega y Gasset. Y por qué estas siguen siendo preguntas cruciales hoy en día.
5. Una apreciación dinámica y dialéctica de las tendencias políticas, de la moda en la ropa y las ideas, de los tipos de personalidad dominantes dependiendo de la época y de qué principios estaban en su apogeo entonces.
Entre las deficiencias o debilidades:
1. Algunas teorías caducadas sobre el origen de la singularidad politica, tecnica y economica europea en el siglo XIX. Me gustaría recomendarles:
Race et histoire
The Theft of History
Capital et idéologie
Le goût de l'Inde
2. Falta de análisis económico en mi opinión, especialmente en lo que se refiere al exodo rural, la división del trabajo (exceptuando la del intelectual o científico), de los efectos mecánicos de tales fenómenos sobre la repartición de la población y sus nuevos patrones de comportamiento.
3. Mientras José Ortega y Gasset se encarga de separar lo que define como 'hombre-masa' de las clases bajas en la aceptación económica, o la aristocracia social de la de nacimiento, afirmando que el individuo excelente es quienquiera reconoce sus limitaciones y no pretende enseñar al maestro—lo que definitivamente parece anunciar una concepción dinámica y de lo que son las élites y las masas respectivamente—, sin embargo, él tiende a moralizar el éxito social y su materialización en posiciones de poder: la de político, la de una buena parte de la antigua aristocracia de nacimiento. Aunque tenga cuidado de dar contraejemplos (el aristócrata hastiado, cuya vida está desprovista de sentido o el demagogo), eso no invalida la proposición anterior de que los que se elevan a tales posiciones son en su mayor parte merecedores, especialmente el político. Esto me parece particularmente cuestionable, especialmente hoy en día...
Sin embargo, por otra parte, la reflexión sobre el papel relativo de las generaciones y los géneros en función de la sociedad en cuestión, o la falsa cuestión del pacifismo absoluto, me pareció de la actualidad más vívida.
Yo disfruté mucho leyendo este ensayo, que me pareczo tan bien inscrito en su tiempo como capaz de estimular una reflexión metódica sobre los acontecimientos políticos, económicos y sociales del siglo XXI.
----
CITAS
Fe, opinión, epistemología :
On Liberty
An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding
Moral :
Thus Spoke Zarathustra
Citadelle
Democracia, Estado y naciones :
De la Démocratie en Amérique, tome I
De la Démocratie en Amérique, tome II
Dieu et l'Etat
Psychologie Des Foules
Propaganda
Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?
Interventionism: An Economic Analysis
L'Homme révolté
Historia internacional, uniformización de las culturas:
Tristes Tropiques
Race et histoire
Le goût de l'Inde
The Theft of History
Le Sanglot de l'homme blanc: Tiers-monde, culpabilité, haine de soi
L'art du roman
La fête de l'insignifiance
Medios :
La Guerre du faux
La Langue des medias : Destruction du langage et fabrication du consentement
Le Déclin du courage
Nacionalismo :
La création des identités nationales. Europe, XVIIIe-XXe siècle
Les anti-Lumières: Une tradition du XVIIIe siècle à la guerre froide
Desigualdad y jerarquías :
Race et histoire
La Révolution Française
Vínculo hacia el texto:
https://webs.ucm.es/info/bas/utopia/h...
Este ensayo del intelectual español José Ortega y Gasset se centra en la emergencia de un nuevo tipo social, que él llama 'hombre-masa'. El propósito del ensayo principal es definir este tipo sociológico, su genealogía y las posibles condiciones para su superación.
Este texto está precedido por un un prólogo para franceses (1937) tratando del caracter dinámico del equilibrio europeo, del origen de los derechos colectivos e individuales, del 'derecho a la continuidad', del peligro de las revoluciones, del estatismo, de la uniformizacion general de los modos de vivir entre otros,
y un epílogo para ingleses (1938), sobre el genio británico, su pragmatismo, la superioridad de su organización social y los defectos de los Británicos como individuos.
Siguen un ensayo sobre el pacifismo en Europa escrito en 1937, y textos sobre el papel desempeñado por las generaciones y los sexos en el perfil psicológico y conductual de una época.
Entre los puntos fuertes del ensayo, yo pondría:
1. El análisis de los factores sociológicos que causan los cambios sociales.
2. La definición rigurosa de los conceptos de convivencia, sociedad, opinión pública, costumbres y derecho, estado, aristocracia, hombre-masa, aglomeraciones y sus orígenes.
3. En cuanto al hombre de masas: ¿por qué y cómo apareció esté tipo de ciudadanos tan ensimismados e incapaz de poner simplemente sus propios puntos de vista en tela de juicio?
4. Reflexiones sobre lo que la Sociedad de las Naciones y Europa eran en su día, por qué fracasaron, y lo que deberían ser. Mejor dicho, cuál habría sido el futuro de la ONU y la UE según José Ortega y Gasset. Y por qué estas siguen siendo preguntas cruciales hoy en día.
5. Una apreciación dinámica y dialéctica de las tendencias políticas, de la moda en la ropa y las ideas, de los tipos de personalidad dominantes dependiendo de la época y de qué principios estaban en su apogeo entonces.
Entre las deficiencias o debilidades:
1. Algunas teorías caducadas sobre el origen de la singularidad politica, tecnica y economica europea en el siglo XIX. Me gustaría recomendarles:
Race et histoire
The Theft of History
Capital et idéologie
Le goût de l'Inde
2. Falta de análisis económico en mi opinión, especialmente en lo que se refiere al exodo rural, la división del trabajo (exceptuando la del intelectual o científico), de los efectos mecánicos de tales fenómenos sobre la repartición de la población y sus nuevos patrones de comportamiento.
3. Mientras José Ortega y Gasset se encarga de separar lo que define como 'hombre-masa' de las clases bajas en la aceptación económica, o la aristocracia social de la de nacimiento, afirmando que el individuo excelente es quienquiera reconoce sus limitaciones y no pretende enseñar al maestro—lo que definitivamente parece anunciar una concepción dinámica y de lo que son las élites y las masas respectivamente—, sin embargo, él tiende a moralizar el éxito social y su materialización en posiciones de poder: la de político, la de una buena parte de la antigua aristocracia de nacimiento. Aunque tenga cuidado de dar contraejemplos (el aristócrata hastiado, cuya vida está desprovista de sentido o el demagogo), eso no invalida la proposición anterior de que los que se elevan a tales posiciones son en su mayor parte merecedores, especialmente el político. Esto me parece particularmente cuestionable, especialmente hoy en día...
Sin embargo, por otra parte, la reflexión sobre el papel relativo de las generaciones y los géneros en función de la sociedad en cuestión, o la falsa cuestión del pacifismo absoluto, me pareció de la actualidad más vívida.
Yo disfruté mucho leyendo este ensayo, que me pareczo tan bien inscrito en su tiempo como capaz de estimular una reflexión metódica sobre los acontecimientos políticos, económicos y sociales del siglo XXI.
----
CITAS
'Cuando se habla de «minorías selectas», la habitual bellaquería suele tergiversar el sentido de esta expresión, fingiendo ignorar que el hombre selecto no es el petulante que se cree superior a los demás, sino el que se exige más que los demás, aunque no logre cumplir en su persona esas exigencias superiores.'Ensayos/ficciones con temas similares :
'La fatalidad en que caemos al caer en este mundo—el mundo es siempre éste, éste de ahora—consiste en todo lo contrario. En vez de imponernos una trayectoria, nos impone varias, y, consecuentemente, nos fuerza... a elegir. ¡Sorprendente condición la de nuestra vida! Vivir es sentirse fatalmente forzado a ejercitar la libertad, a decidir lo que vamos a ser en este mundo.'
'En el sufragio universal no deciden las masas, sino que su papel consistió en adherirse a la decisión de una u otra minoría. Éstas presentaban sus «programas» [...], programas de vida colectiva. En ellos se invitaba a la masa a aceptar un proyecto de decisión.
Hoy acontece una cosa muy diferente. Si se observa la vida pública de los países donde el triunfo de las masas ha avanzado más [...], sorprende notar que en ellos se vive políticamente al día. [...] El poder público se halla en manos de un representante de masas. Estas son tan poderosas, que han aniquilado toda posible oposición. [...] Y, sin embargo, el poder público, el gobierno, vive al día; no se presenta como un porvenir franco, ni significa un anuncio claro de futuro, no aparece como comienzo de algo cuyo desarrollo o evolución resulte imaginable. En suma, vive sin programa de vida, sin proyecto. [...] Cuando ese poder público intenta justificarse, no alude para nada al futuro, sino, al contrario, se recluye en el presente y dice con perfecta sinceridad: «soy un modo anormal de gobierno que es impuesto por las circunstancias». Es decir, por la urgencia del presente, no por cálculos del futuro. De aquí que su actuación se reduzca a esquivar el conflicto de cada hora; no a resolverlo, sino a escapar de él por de pronto, empleando los medios que sean, aun a costa de acumular, con su empleo, mayores conflictos sobre la hora próxima. Así ha sido siempre el poder público cuando lo ejercieron directamente las masas: omnipotente y efímero. El hombre-masa es el hombre cuya vida carece de proyectos y va a la deriva. Por eso no construye nada, aunque sus posibilidades, sus poderes, sean enormes.'
'el hombre que analizamos se habitúa a no apelar de si mismo a ninguna instancia fuera de él. Está satisfecho tal y como es. Igualmente, sin necesidad de ser vano, como lo más natural del mundo, tenderá a afirmar y dar por bueno cuanto en sí halla: opiniones, apetitos, preferencias o gustos.'
'al creerse con derecho a tener una opinión sobre el asunto sin previo esfuerzo para forjársela, manifiestan su ejemplar pertenencia al modo absurdo de ser hombre que he llamado «masa rebelde».'
'No se trata de que el hombre-masa sea tonto. Por el contrario, el actual es más listo, tiene más capacidad intelectiva que el de ninguna otra época. Pero esa capacidad no le sirve de nada; en rigor, la vaga sensación de poseerla le sirve sólo para cerrarse más en si y no usarla. [...] el vulgar crea que es sobresaliente y no vulgar, sino que el vulgar proclame e imponga el derecho de la vulgaridad o la vulgaridad como un derecho.'
'Bajo las especies de sindicalismo y fascismo aparece por primera vez en Europa un tipo de hombre que no quiere dar razones ni quiere tener razón, sino que, sencillamente, se muestra resuelto a imponer sus opiniones. He aquí lo nuevo: el derecho a no tener razón, la razón de la sinrazón.'
'el hombre-masa se sentiría perdido si aceptase la discusión, e instintivamente repudia la obligación de acatar esa instancia suprema que se halla fuera de él. Por eso, lo «nuevo» es en Europa «acabar con las discusiones», y se detesta toda forma de convivencia que por si misma implique acatamiento de normas objetivas, desde la conversación hasta el Parlamento, pasando por la ciencia.'
'no se hallará entre todos los que representan la época actual uno solo cuya actitud ante la vida no se reduzca a creer que tiene todos los derechos y ninguna obligación. Es indiferente que se enmascare de reaccionario o de revolucionario [...] su estado de ánimo consistirá decisivamente en ignorar toda obligación y sentirse, sin que él mismo sospeche por qué, sujeto de ilimitados derechos.'
'Es frívolo interpretar los regímenes autoritarios del día como engendrados por el capricho o la intriga. Bien claro está que son manifestaciones ineludibles del estado de guerra civil en que casi todos los países se hallan hoy.'
'el caso es que el hombre-masa cree, en efecto, que él es el Estado, y tenderá cada vez más a hacerlo funcionar con cualquier pretexto, a aplastar con él toda minoría creadora que lo perturbe; que lo perturbe en cualquier orden: en política, en ideas, en industria.'
'Todo por el Estado; nada fuera del Estado; nada contra el Estado. Bastaría esto para descubrir en el fascismo un típico movimiento de hombre-masa. Mussolini se encontró con un Estado admirablemente construido—no por él, sino precisamente por las fuerzas e ideas que él combate: por la democracia liberal—.'
'Sin mandamientos que nos obliguen a vivir de un cierto modo, queda nuestra vida en pura disponibilidad. [...] De puro sentirse libres, exentas de trabas, se sienten vacías. Una vida en disponibilidad es mayor negación de sí misma que la muerte. Porque vivir es tener que hacer algo determinado -es cumplir un encargo-, y en la medida en que eludamos poner a algo nuestra existencia, evacuamos nuestra vida.'
'resulta muy extraña la obstinación con que [...] se persiste en dar a la nacionalidad como fundamentos la sangre y el idioma. [...] Porque el francés debe su Francia actual, y el español su actual España, a un principio X, cuyo impulso consistió precisamente en superar la estrecha comunidad de sangre y de idioma. De suerte que Francia y España consistirían hoy en lo contrario de lo que las hizo posibles.'
'Es el terminus ad quem, es el verdadero Estado, cuya unidad consiste precisamente en superar toda unidad dada. Cuando ese impulso hacia el más allá cesa, el Estado automáticamente sucumbe, y la unidad que ya existía y parecía físicamente cimentada -raza, idioma, frontera natural- no sirve de nada: el Estado se desagrega, se dispersa, se atomiza.'
'[...] el entresijo esencial de una nación, [...] se compone de estos dos ingredientes: primero, un proyecto de convivencia total en una empresa común; segundo, la adhesión de los hombres a ese proyecto incitativo.'
'La convivencia, sin más, no significa sociedad [...]. Convivencia implica sólo relaciones entre individuos. Pero no puede haber convivencia duradera y estable sin que se produzca automáticamente el fenómeno social por excelencia, que son los usos—usos intelectuales u «opinión pública», usos de técnica vital o «costumbres», usos que dirigen la conducta o «moral», usos que la imperan o «derecho».'
'una sociedad es un conjunto de individuos que mutuamente se saben sometidos a la vigencia de ciertas opiniones y valoraciones. Según esto, no hay sociedad sin la vigencia efectiva de cierta concepción del mundo, la cual actúa como una última instancia a la que se puede recurrir en caso de conflicto.'
'las cosas humanas no son res stantes, sino todo lo contrario, cosas históricas, es decir, puro movimiento, mutación perpetua. El derecho tradicional es sólo reglamento para una realidad paralítica. Y como la realidad histórica cambia periódicamente de modo radical, choca sin remedio con la estabilidad del derecho, que se convierte en una camisa de fuerza.'
'[...]la guerra sólo puede evitarse si se entiende por paz un esfuerzo todavía mayor, un sistema de esfuerzos complicadísimos y que, en parte, requieren la venturosa intervención del genio. Lo otro es un puro error. Lo otro es interpretar la paz como el simple hueco que la guerra dejaría si desapareciese por lo tanto, ignorar que si la guerra es una cosa que se hace, también la paz es una cosa que hay que hacer'
'Si Europa es sólo una pluralidad de naciones, pueden los pacíficos despedirse radicalmente de sus esperanzas. Entre sociedades independientes no puede existir verdadera paz. Lo que solemos llamar así no es más que un estado de guerra mínima o latente.'
'propugno y anuncio el advenimiento de una forma más avanzada de convivencia europea, un paso adelante en la organización jurídica y política de su unidad. Esta idea europea es de signo inverso a aquel abstruso internacionalismo. Europa no es, no será la internación, porque eso significa, en claras nociones de historia, un hueco, un vacío y nada. Europa será la ultranación.'
'si ceden los verdaderos y normales poderes históricos—raza, religión, política, ideas—, toda la energía social vacante es absorbida por él. Diríamos, pues, que cuando se volatilizan los demás prestigios queda siempre el dinero, que, a fuer de elemento material, no puede volatilizarse. O, de otro modo : el dinero no manda más que cuando no hay otro principio que mande.'
'El dinero no es más que un medio para comprar cosas. Si hay pocas cosas que comprar, por mucho dinero que haya y muy libre que se encuentre Su acción de conflictos con otras potencias, su influjo será escaso. [...]
el poder social del dinero—ceteris paribus—será tanto mayor cuantas más cosas haya que comprar, no cuanto mayor sea la cantidad del dinero mismo.'
'Así explica esa nota común a todas las épocas sometidas al imperio crematístico que consiste en ser tiempos de transición. Muerta una constitución política y moral, se queda la sociedad sin motive que jerarquice a los hombres. Ahora bien: esto es imposible. Contra la ingenuidad igualitaria es preciso hacer notar que la jerarquización es el impulso esencial de la socialización.'
Fe, opinión, epistemología :
On Liberty
An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding
Moral :
Thus Spoke Zarathustra
Citadelle
Democracia, Estado y naciones :
De la Démocratie en Amérique, tome I
De la Démocratie en Amérique, tome II
Dieu et l'Etat
Psychologie Des Foules
Propaganda
Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?
Interventionism: An Economic Analysis
L'Homme révolté
Historia internacional, uniformización de las culturas:
Tristes Tropiques
Race et histoire
Le goût de l'Inde
The Theft of History
Le Sanglot de l'homme blanc: Tiers-monde, culpabilité, haine de soi
L'art du roman
La fête de l'insignifiance
Medios :
La Guerre du faux
La Langue des medias : Destruction du langage et fabrication du consentement
Le Déclin du courage
Nacionalismo :
La création des identités nationales. Europe, XVIIIe-XXe siècle
Les anti-Lumières: Une tradition du XVIIIe siècle à la guerre froide
Desigualdad y jerarquías :
Race et histoire
La Révolution Française
Vínculo hacia el texto:
https://webs.ucm.es/info/bas/utopia/h...
June 20, 2010
This is a remarkable extended essay by Ortega, who cast his discerning eye upon Europe in 1930 in an effort to assess a continent that, it was claimed, was transitioning into a decline from its prior global preeminence. Probing this malaise, Ortega proffers in explanation the startling rise of the mass-man, a foreseeable product of the nineteenth century's unprecedented population increase due to its enthusiastic embrace of technicist liberal democracy. This promotion of democracy, capitalism, and science had risen the historic level of Western European society to a domineering height; yet the resultant modernized civilization it created was a state of affairs taken for granted by the mass-man, the coarse majority who passed their days oblivious of their obligation to society even as they demanded of it every right, who reveled in low-culture and the selfish pursuit of pleasure whilst scorning any who attempted to stand out from the crowd through excellence in thought, duty, or deed. Ortega took pains to make clear that mass-man was not a construct of class or money, but crossed all spectrums of society; he existed wherever the base was favored over the noble, the easy over the difficult, sufficient unto himself in his cultural barbarity and lacking any desire (since perceiving no need) for betterment. Without respect for the minorities who formerly guided the great European nations to their advanced achievements, the masses were languishing in countries rudderless and without purpose, while communism and fascism threatened to destroy all that democracy had achieved, if for no other reason than the two systems offered a purpose to capture the apathetic attention of the beleaguered Western countries. In addition to his rumination on the ascendency of the ignoble mass-man Ortega included an extended examination of the creation, and sustaining memes, of the nation state; the rise and fall of the historic level throughout the ages; the perils of compartmentalizing occupations and straitening minds under the rigorous, isolating guise of specialism, a necessary precursor for the ignorance of the masses; and offered an earlier version of the European Union as a project worthy of the cramped genius of the Western European nations and a means to energize the selfish majorities and provoke them into a concerted effort to ensure the continuance of the vitally important modern European culture.
This book has been continuously in print in English since 1932, and it doesn't take long to see why: Ortega writes in graceful-but-clear prose, and his brilliant and thoughtful analysis is engaging and persuasive. Although the mass-man he outlined was a European entity, his existence has continued on through today, as can be determined by a short examination of any community, or fifteen minutes of television. It is curious how, in examining the reasons for mass society's loss of faith in its governing and higher institutions, he spares little attention to the First World War, an extended slaughter that was enacted for such inane and purposeless reasons that they would test the faith of the most ardent believer in European destiny; and his pronouncement of a 1930 US, having never suffered, as being unready and unable to take up the mantle of global leadership was clearly wrong. Other than these points, however, he has proved remarkably prescient in his predictions and cautions, especially of the futility of attempts to reverse-engineer time by voiding liberal democracy, and the necessity of the pursuit of European union as the next logical process in the evolution of civilization on the still-eminent continent - and the mass-man will seemingly always exist wherever modern societies lack a cohesive purpose or direction, and instead allow their citizens to bask in the fruits of society's abundance while demanding naught but calendar-delimited votes and a steady expenditure of their (ofttimes meagre) savings. To paraphrase the great Spaniard, the historic level may be at an all-time high, but life is lived in the valleys where what is sown is reaped.
This book has been continuously in print in English since 1932, and it doesn't take long to see why: Ortega writes in graceful-but-clear prose, and his brilliant and thoughtful analysis is engaging and persuasive. Although the mass-man he outlined was a European entity, his existence has continued on through today, as can be determined by a short examination of any community, or fifteen minutes of television. It is curious how, in examining the reasons for mass society's loss of faith in its governing and higher institutions, he spares little attention to the First World War, an extended slaughter that was enacted for such inane and purposeless reasons that they would test the faith of the most ardent believer in European destiny; and his pronouncement of a 1930 US, having never suffered, as being unready and unable to take up the mantle of global leadership was clearly wrong. Other than these points, however, he has proved remarkably prescient in his predictions and cautions, especially of the futility of attempts to reverse-engineer time by voiding liberal democracy, and the necessity of the pursuit of European union as the next logical process in the evolution of civilization on the still-eminent continent - and the mass-man will seemingly always exist wherever modern societies lack a cohesive purpose or direction, and instead allow their citizens to bask in the fruits of society's abundance while demanding naught but calendar-delimited votes and a steady expenditure of their (ofttimes meagre) savings. To paraphrase the great Spaniard, the historic level may be at an all-time high, but life is lived in the valleys where what is sown is reaped.
May 21, 2025
History is at this point where Europe has two problems to solve: that of the mass man and that of his too much success. The 19th century, by significantly increasing the diffusion of knowledge and industrial production throughout the world, certainly allowed the world to move up a level, but it also produced mass man. Its main characteristic, steeped in civilization as it is, is to believe that egalitarianism is the equivalence of ideas between individuals without suspecting that intellectual investment modulates the value of these ideas. The mass man takes what he is and what he intuitively thinks very precisely as equivalent to the thought and action of anyone and, in return, everything that is on his path for production (intellectual or manufacturing) with no more value than the efforts he puts into producing his thought - that is to say none. Hence, his "clumsiness" means that he imposes his simplistic vulgarity on the world and takes the civilization where he lives for granted. The problem of the mass man is that he is incapable of governing the world and that his mode of action is brutality. We must, therefore, prevent him from taking power and, as quickly as possible, "take back command." The other problem is that Europe has Europeanized the world. Ortega y Gasset notes that what we consider to be an essential characteristic of America, its pragmatism and its technique, were precisely born in Europe in the 18th century, that is to say, at the time of the birth of the United States. So, the problem does not come from there. This problem is because, having internationalized, the bridgeheads of Europe, Germany, England, and France feel cramped within their respective borders, and this causes their demoralization. In short, the only solution is to open the windows, give some air, and create Europe, that is, the ultra-nation.
More than the thesis, I found the colorful, dynamic, and stimulating writing exciting. It should also note that it wrote the text in 1930 and that it mainly intended to evoke Francoism, fascism, and perhaps Ortega already sees it, Nazism. However, since the thesis is sober and rises above its contemporary horrors, it applies well to our current world. It encourages us to reflect on our future as a whole population and the relationship that we can maintain with all these objects that surround us and other innumerable media, the use and frenzied consultation of which certainly assimilate us, at least at times, to this "mass-man"...
More than the thesis, I found the colorful, dynamic, and stimulating writing exciting. It should also note that it wrote the text in 1930 and that it mainly intended to evoke Francoism, fascism, and perhaps Ortega already sees it, Nazism. However, since the thesis is sober and rises above its contemporary horrors, it applies well to our current world. It encourages us to reflect on our future as a whole population and the relationship that we can maintain with all these objects that surround us and other innumerable media, the use and frenzied consultation of which certainly assimilate us, at least at times, to this "mass-man"...
March 16, 2019
291115: this is a later addition: after the election of the orange-skinned hair-challenged man in the United States it is perhaps time to reflect on the current of anti-intellectualism which informs this event and Ortega addresses. there is an aspect neglected in my 'pedagogical theory' of politics. that is, irrespective of quality, sincerity, expertise, of the teacher: not everyone wants to learn and may in fact be hostile to any suggestion that they need learn, or that knowledge, thought, perception may be helpful, useful, practical in any way. that informed thought rather than ignorant emotion is perhaps the best way to deal with complexity...
first review: an interesting series of essays of political philosophy. weighted with history, of its time, of eurocentric heritage, rather elitist conception of values, character, action, that possibly i can sometimes agree with, particularly his concept of 'mass-man'. however, this agreement does not extend to ortega's warnings, laments, solutions. aside from writing of his times, primarily of 'noble' qualities of the 'minority' of 'men', this helps me clarify my own 'polis' attitude...
in pedagogical theory there is the idea that all learners will fit in three classes: those who will learn easily, competent, quick, deep and well- those who will not learn, who are ignorant, uninterested, or likely to learn only superficially- and the great majority who will learn with some help, gradually, sometimes deeply, sometimes not. it is the third students for whom a teacher will be of most use, for the quick will learn themselves well, the ignorant and unmotivated are a waste of any help, but the majority will be in the middle, who can use some help...
now replace the concept 'learn' with 'live' and recognize that any teacher or thinker might also turn some effort to the unmotivated, not charity, not cultish, only generous- also recognize that living as learning is of multiple values, that proficiency in any one 'field' does not guarantee such in all fields, and if that field is 'how to live' even so that determination is individual, not something to choose, to impose on the other... as generals learn after succeeding in coups then struggling to govern, as a parent may tell you what Not to do but not What to do, and at any rate will not live your life... a sense of history is helpful yes, but so is invention, novelty, the new...
i am not myself convinced that any elite is necessarily more moral than the so-called 'mass-man'... i too do not think of the 'mass-man' as of this or that class in society, workers, decadent aristos, directionless bourgeois 'self-satisfied man'- but do not agree with ortega that the answer is for the many to honour the few past who have established your world, for they also may have mistreated you or your world... they came first, they had their own motivations, not only some 'moral code'- but also lust for power, wealth, recognition... this book is history- spain, europe, of 85 years past- and it is interesting to read how a thoughtful man weaned in the 19th century, was seeing the 20th... i keep reading title as 'the revolting masses'...
first review: an interesting series of essays of political philosophy. weighted with history, of its time, of eurocentric heritage, rather elitist conception of values, character, action, that possibly i can sometimes agree with, particularly his concept of 'mass-man'. however, this agreement does not extend to ortega's warnings, laments, solutions. aside from writing of his times, primarily of 'noble' qualities of the 'minority' of 'men', this helps me clarify my own 'polis' attitude...
in pedagogical theory there is the idea that all learners will fit in three classes: those who will learn easily, competent, quick, deep and well- those who will not learn, who are ignorant, uninterested, or likely to learn only superficially- and the great majority who will learn with some help, gradually, sometimes deeply, sometimes not. it is the third students for whom a teacher will be of most use, for the quick will learn themselves well, the ignorant and unmotivated are a waste of any help, but the majority will be in the middle, who can use some help...
now replace the concept 'learn' with 'live' and recognize that any teacher or thinker might also turn some effort to the unmotivated, not charity, not cultish, only generous- also recognize that living as learning is of multiple values, that proficiency in any one 'field' does not guarantee such in all fields, and if that field is 'how to live' even so that determination is individual, not something to choose, to impose on the other... as generals learn after succeeding in coups then struggling to govern, as a parent may tell you what Not to do but not What to do, and at any rate will not live your life... a sense of history is helpful yes, but so is invention, novelty, the new...
i am not myself convinced that any elite is necessarily more moral than the so-called 'mass-man'... i too do not think of the 'mass-man' as of this or that class in society, workers, decadent aristos, directionless bourgeois 'self-satisfied man'- but do not agree with ortega that the answer is for the many to honour the few past who have established your world, for they also may have mistreated you or your world... they came first, they had their own motivations, not only some 'moral code'- but also lust for power, wealth, recognition... this book is history- spain, europe, of 85 years past- and it is interesting to read how a thoughtful man weaned in the 19th century, was seeing the 20th... i keep reading title as 'the revolting masses'...
February 25, 2010
A good analysis of the mass-man mind of intellectual barbarism. You know, the kind of people you see everyday, that feel confident in their ignorance and seek to stomp out any viewpoint that diverges from their safe fantasy world. You know, the majority of the American population that can only see the pseudo-dichotomies of "democrat" and "republican" or "liberal" and "conservative." A great example everyday of the typical mass-minded individual are those people that refuse to watch a film with subtitles and/or that is in black/white. That would be way too big of inconvenience.
Spanish author Jose Ortega y Gasset gave tons of reasons in "The Revolt of the Masses" as to why the mindless masses are taking over. One I found the most obvious and universal (especially on a global scale) is how people take all technology for granted. They have no idea how aspirin or a computer works, but they feel entitled to it and cannot see the world otherwise. They have no idea how civilization and technology have created a completely contrived world of luxury for them. One can only guess what would happen to all the people in the world if electricity and cellphones were to disappear.
If Jose Ortega y Gasset were to see the world now, he would unfortunately realize the world has gotten a lot worse than he could have ever imagined. If he were to see the public school systems, he would be disgusted by how the "schools" indoctrinate the student into being a mass-man. Who doesn't remember the propaganda posters in elementary school that cutely stated "There is no "I" in team."
The mass-man lot of the lowest common denominator, just like the blob, is only growing bigger and bigger....One can only wonder if the mass-man will fully engulf the world until it leads to its total destruction.
Spanish author Jose Ortega y Gasset gave tons of reasons in "The Revolt of the Masses" as to why the mindless masses are taking over. One I found the most obvious and universal (especially on a global scale) is how people take all technology for granted. They have no idea how aspirin or a computer works, but they feel entitled to it and cannot see the world otherwise. They have no idea how civilization and technology have created a completely contrived world of luxury for them. One can only guess what would happen to all the people in the world if electricity and cellphones were to disappear.
If Jose Ortega y Gasset were to see the world now, he would unfortunately realize the world has gotten a lot worse than he could have ever imagined. If he were to see the public school systems, he would be disgusted by how the "schools" indoctrinate the student into being a mass-man. Who doesn't remember the propaganda posters in elementary school that cutely stated "There is no "I" in team."
The mass-man lot of the lowest common denominator, just like the blob, is only growing bigger and bigger....One can only wonder if the mass-man will fully engulf the world until it leads to its total destruction.
March 24, 2018
Oh, but this is a fascinating book. Written in 1930 by the Spanish philosopher José Ortega y Gasset, it is one of those books that is occasionally mentioned, especially recently, but rarely actually read. 1930, in Spain, was the hinge of fate, and it has been nearly a hundred years since Ortega wrote. That means we can see where he was wrong, and where he was right, and what he wrote says to us today.
First, though, we have to hack our way through two misconceptions that both seem to attend any modern mention of "The Revolt of the Masses." The first misconception is that this is a book about class, about how Ortega favors the bourgeois, or the rich, over the working class, or at least that it is an analysis of their conflicts. Given that class was a hot topic in 1930, this is a reasonable guess from the title, but it is totally wrong. This misconception cropped up repeatedly after Trump’s election, and, for example, the review by David Brooks in the New York Times of J. D. Vance’s "Hillbilly Elegy" was titled “The Revolt of the Masses.” But Ortega was a political moderate, and seems to not have been exercised by questions of class at all. Rather, this is a book about human excellence, what it can accomplish, and how it can be destroyed.
The second misconception is that Ortega’s call for excellence is a call for masses to defer to experts—supposedly, according to various chatterers, Ortega’s main point is that experts are ignored. Nothing could be farther from the truth. In fact, Ortega thinks all, or almost all, modern experts are the definition of mediocrity, and the masses deferring to them is like deferring to a mirror. Instead, people should defer to a natural aristocracy, not of blood, but of focus and accomplishment. Those people are not experts, who are narrow, but are instead broad people of taste, judgment, and discipline. We will return to this misconception later, with specific recent examples, but now that we are past the reef, we can sail into the open ocean of Ortega’s thought.
So, if this is not a book about class, who are the “masses”? Ortega divides every society into “minorities,” a small set of people who are “specially qualified,” and the “masses,” everyone not specially qualified. The key question is who is average and who is not. A mass person feels as if he is “just like everybody,” that he is not particularly special, and not only does this not concern him, he celebrates the fact. (Thus, someone who examines his talents and concludes he is mediocre, and feels that is a problem, is not a mass man.) But this, of course, begs the question—what makes a person above average or, in Ortega’s term, “specially qualified”? They are those who make personal demands for excellence upon themselves, and live in that way. This makes them the minority, by definition. They may not fulfil those demands; it is the demand being made, that alone, which makes the person a minority. In contrast, mass men “demand nothing special of themselves, but [ ] to live is to be every moment what they already are, without imposing on themselves any effort toward perfection.”
The minority, the elite, are thus not coterminous with traditional aristocracy or a ruling class. Ortega acknowledges that in traditional social elites excellence is more likely to be found, but mere heredity does not make a person place demands on himself, so an aristocrat by blood can be a mass man just like a peasant or a steelworker—and a peasant or a steelworker can be a member of the minority. The class of intellectuals, in particular, fancy themselves to be above the masses, but are often vulgar pseudo-intellectuals, swept along by lazy, commonplace thinking, and therefore mass men. Children of the excellent frequently ride on their parents’ accomplishments; they thereby become mass men themselves. Ortega wants “nobility” to mean not nobility of blood, but to restore the meaning of “noble” as “well-known, that is, known by everyone, famous, he who has made himself known by excelling the anonymous mass.” Anyone can do this, from any walk of life, but few do, human nature being what it is.
Having gotten definitions out of the way, Ortega’s first substantive point is that in the past, the mass was content to exist in the background, ceding to the minority such higher-level societal functions as art, government and political judgment. No more. Now, the mass assert their right to dictate in all such areas, without having to demand from themselves, much less achieve, excellence. In politics, this is “hyperdemocracy,” and Ortega thinks it a degradation. In other areas, such as philosophy (Ortega’s specialty), it means that readers (and, today, listeners and YouTube watchers), do so “with the view, not of learning from the writer, but rather, of pronouncing judgment on him when he is not in agreement with the commonplaces that the said reader carries in his head.” It’s not that the mass man thinks he’s an expert. “The characteristic of the hour is that the commonplace mind, knowing itself to be commonplace, has the assurance to proclaim the rights of the commonplace and to impose them wherever it will. . . . . The mass crushes beneath it everything that is different, everything that is excellent, individual, qualified and select.” Mediocrity rules, and does not care that it is mediocre.
All this is a new thing in our history, but not in world history. It can be found in the declining years of Rome, among other places. Ortega ascribes its modern growth, though, not to decline, but to liberal democracy, to the discovery of the abstract sovereignty of the individual. He doesn’t dislike liberal democracy—quite the contrary, he thinks both that it’s great, and that it’s inevitable and broadly irreversible, as I discuss further below. But if the individual is sovereign, we should not be surprised if each man treats himself as if he is indeed sovereign.
None of this implies decadence—contra Spengler, Ortega thinks that relative to the nineteenth century, which viewed itself as a time of “plenitude” when the destination of society had been reached, the twentieth century, viewing the future as open-ended and in flux, is in many ways superior. (At this point, you have to remember it’s 1930, look around you at the world of 2018, as well as the past hundred years, then chuckle grimly and draw your own conclusions.) But the twentieth century takes it too far, because the mass men dominate, and they have “lost all respect, all consideration for the past.” Thus, the mass men both see the future as open, but assured, and themselves as perfect and satisfied. That’s a dangerous combination, for it leads to a world “empty of purposes, anticipations, ideals.” It was those things the minority supplied, and it was those things that drove the world forward. Now, with the triumph of the masses, nobody supplies those things. So the twentieth century is an apogee—but the nature of apogees is there is nowhere to go but down.
Thus, the nineteenth century, for all its accomplishments, also gave us the rise of the mass man, and the mass man will, unless his rise is constrained, within thirty years, “send our continent back to barbarism.” (This is a book quite explicitly about Europe. America is treated as close to a non-entity, with thinly veiled contempt. And Europe is defined as France, Germany, and England—it does not, for these purposes, really even include Spain.) The mass man, for example, feels that he himself is qualified to decide, and should decide, political matters, rather than his vote “supporting the decision of one minority or another.” That will lead to the disappearance of liberal democracy, which Ortega regards as man’s highest political achievement (“legislative technique”), but it will also lead to the end of “industrial technique,” since the pursuit of technical excellence by minorities drives industry forward, just like other pursuit of excellence drives political organization forward.
It is this latter “industrial technique,” this combination of “scientific experiment and industrialism,” that Ortega names “technism.” Technism has allowed the mass man to escape the feeling that dominated all prior societies, that of material scarcity and restrictions. At the same time, liberal democracy makes the mass man believe that he is master of his psychic and political destiny. Thus, the mass man feels in his bones that life is now “exempt from restrictions” on every level. That is to say, in modern parlance, he is emancipated. “The world which surrounds the new man from his birth does not compel him to limit himself in any fashion, it sets up no veto in opposition to him; on the contrary, it incites his appetite, which in principle can increase indefinitely.” Ortega’s objection is not that appetites increasing is bad; he did not foresee the logical endpoint of total emancipation, which is total autonomy combined with total tyranny and a denial of basic reality. Instead, his objection is that the mass man fails to appreciate that all this, that benefits him, was created with great toil by the excellence of minorities; he thinks it manna from heaven. What characterizes the mass man is inertia—the opposite of the ceaseless, self-generated search for excellence that characterizes the truly noble. And this failure to understand the sources of the bounty that blesses him, his “radical ingratitude,” combined with the new dominance of the mass man over society, means it will all disappear, and barbarism will return, as excellence flees.
For Ortega, such barbarism isn’t of the type that, looking backward, the twentieth century actually delivered. Rather, “barbarism is the absence of standards to which appeal can be made.” That seems like not a fatal problem, but it is. No standards, no progress, only regress. Certainly, mass men are the creators of such tripe as Syndicalism, Fascism (explicitly in the Mussolini sense) and, Communism (“a monotonous repetition of the eternal revolution,” oblivious to history, like all these movements). They are created by “the type of man who does not want to give reasons or to be right, but simply shows himself resolved to impose his opinions. This is the new thing: the right not to be reasonable, the ‘reason of unreason.’ . . . Hence his ideas are in effect nothing more than appetites in words. . . .” (Ortega would not have enjoyed spending time on Facebook, much less Twitter.) When mass men of politics say they are “done with discussions,” this is what they mean. It implies also that “direct action,” that is, violence, becomes not the ultima ratio, the final argument when all others are through, but the prima ratio, the first argument. This is always true, “at every epoch when the mass, for one purpose or another, has taken a part in public life.” In all areas, what is recognized by the excellent, the minorities, in all times as “civilized,” from literature, to sexual relations, to art, to manners, to justice, decays. It is those standards for those things that make “the community, common life” possible. Result of their end: barbarism, if we don’t change course.
We can certainly see this degradation of all standards today, to a degree that makes Ortega’s prescience startling (although he was far off the mark on one matter, which I talk about last). Not only is the mass man as Ortega defines him far more dominant, over the whole Western world, than in Ortega’s time, but we see the barbarism Ortega identifies has long since arrived. Certainly almost nobody demands excellence in any field; instead, the mass men who rule demand such rubbish as “diversity and inclusion,” the wholesale granting of unearned benefits on the basis of (preferred) immutable characteristics. The very idea that there is such a thing as excellence is denied as a matter of course. Similarly with the political processes Ortega identifies. We hear all the time, mostly from the Left but also from the Right, that the time for discussion is over, and the time for action is here, by which the speaker means “conform to my unreasoned and emotion-driven demands or be crushed.” (Such language is all over the latest push to confiscate firearms, for example, along with other forms of knuckle-dragging political behavior that would have horrified Ortega, with his focus on high rationality and political liberty.) And, more broadly, what characterizes everything in the West is a call for total autonomy implemented, if necessary, by government tyranny, and a rejection of any standards as an offense against emancipation.
Ortega believed that as long as the minority of the excellent dominates, progress is inevitable. And the reverse is also true. Therefore, Ortega would, perhaps, not be surprised by the situation today. Moreover, since barbarism has arrived in the form of the domination of mass men, it is natural that a portion of those mass men hold themselves out as the minority, as the elites. But, of course, they are merely the rulers—they do not actually demand of themselves any pursuit of excellence at all. The names of categories are maintained, in art, politics, and culture, but they are hollow, for the standards are set by mass men clothed in false skins. So, it is entirely possible, if standards have decayed and barbarism returned, for there to be nobody at all to whom the masses can turn for guidance. The polestar may simply have winked out, to, perhaps, be restored at a time to be announced, when the world is remade.
Thus, "The Revolt of the Masses" feels surprisingly fresh, given not only its age but all the water that has passed under the bridge since it was written. Yes, Ortega does display a simplistic, if touching, faith, in liberal democracy, which has since his time shown its deficiency. The Europe of 1930 is the triumph of “liberal democracy and technical knowledge,” shown by, among other things, a tripling of the population of Europe. (Ortega is wrong here, of course—there is no necessary, or actual historical, linkage of liberal democracy with the rise of technical knowledge or its impacts in the Industrial Revolution.) He concludes that “liberal democracy based on technical knowledge is the highest type of public life hitherto known,” and though it might be possible to imagine a better, anything better must continue to embody both liberal democracy and technical knowledge, and that it would be “suicidal” to return to any pre-nineteenth-century form. It is the “truth of destiny.”
That was a supportable argument, maybe, in 1930, but not now. True, the term no longer means what it meant for Ortega. For him, it meant political liberty, “consideration for one’s neighbor,” “indirect action” (i.e., a rejection of violence), and, explicitly, universal suffrage where the mass of voters chose among programs offered by their betters. Today, it means, as Ryszard Legutko says, “coercion to freedom,” where no political liberty is offered to those opposed to unbridled autonomy, and democracy means only being allowed to vote for what today’s elites, who are not Ortega’s minority, allow. Ortega thought liberal democracy “announces the determination to share existence with the enemy.” Those who today howl “I can tolerate anything but intolerance” can have nothing in common with this sentiment. So perhaps we can say that Ortega may have been right, but liberal democracy as he used the term is dead, a casualty of the barbarism he feared, replaced by its zombie equivalent (although probably such zombification was inevitable, in the nature of liberal democracy, as several recent writers have claimed).
As I promised, let’s turn back to the second misconception about Ortega’s thoughts, regarding “experts.” In the past few years, there have been minor outbreaks of renewed interest in Ortega’s thoughts, always facile. For example, in the "Atlantic," a colloquy recently appeared between a staff writer and a reader, where the statement was endorsed by both, that Ortega “describes a movement that appeals to a cross-section of non-intellectual people across class lines that seems to parallel Donald Trump’s cross-cultural appeal. There it seemed to lead to Fascism.” Ortega would have a conniption. His objection is not that the mass man fails to be intellectual; it is that the mass man does not pursue excellence. For the most part, Ortega loathes modern intellectuals as the very worst type of mass man. Nor does he make any suggestion at all that mass men lead to Fascism; rather, he says that the domination of mass men leads to regression in political organization, one possible end of which is Fascism. The "Atlantic" colloquy continues, with such gems as “[T]he digital age seems to have trouble accepting ‘elite’ consensus regarding complex topics such as climate change (and gun control, evolution and tax policy, among many other subjects where the vast majority of scientists, economists, etc., accept certain basic facts that are rejected by large swaths of the public).” Ortega did not care about what scientists and economists had to say. At all. He would call them ignoramuses, narrow men whose narrow learning did not qualify them to say anything at all to society at large, especially about topics not subject to rigid calculation. His “elites” were men of excellence and broad learning, not sophists and calculators.
To Ortega, “special qualifications” are not those of experts. Our experts are scientists and similar types who are narrow and ignorant outside of a tiny area, yet presume to think otherwise. His leaders, to whom the mass should defer, are men of great mind, not technicians. They are aristocrats. In fact, Ortega despises the “ ‘man of science,’ the high-point of European humanity,” as being actually “the prototype of the mass man.” This is because the days of scientific discoveries by generalists, like Newton, are over, and the days of narrow specialization by each scientist are here. Science itself is not specialized, and in fact must be informed by areas outside science—but scientific work, today, must be. The days of encyclopedic minds are gone, and what we have are specialists, each only knowledgeable in “the small corner of which he is an active investigator.” Given this hyper-specialization, men who are overall mediocre, rather than excellent, can actually keep science advancing (this is today called the “Ortega Hypothesis”), because “a fair amount of the things that have to be done in physics or biology is mechanical work of the mind which can be done by anyone, or almost anyone.” But such men think they are excellent, even though each “knows very well his own tiny corner of the universe; [but] he is radically ignorant of all the rest.” He is a “learned ignoramus,” which is bad enough, but worse is in store, for “By specializing him, civilization has made him hermetic and self-satisfied within his limitations; but this very inner feeling of dominance and worth will induce him to wish to predominate outside his specialty. The result is . . . that he will behave in almost all spheres of life as does the unqualified, the mass-man.”
This is what we see, most of the time, when people demand that the public listen to “experts”—that we listen to specialists in one area who are thereby presumed to be competent to lecture us in areas either only loosely related, or, more often, wholly unrelated. The names are endless, but include everyone from Bill Nye to Stephen Hawking. It is these specialists, Ortega says, who exist in a state of “ ‘not-listening,’ of not submitting to higher courts of appeal,” a characteristic of the mass man. That is, the experts we are told today we must listen to are, for Ortega, the archetypical mass men, whom we should ignore, and to whom we listen to at our peril.
[Review finishes as first comment.]
First, though, we have to hack our way through two misconceptions that both seem to attend any modern mention of "The Revolt of the Masses." The first misconception is that this is a book about class, about how Ortega favors the bourgeois, or the rich, over the working class, or at least that it is an analysis of their conflicts. Given that class was a hot topic in 1930, this is a reasonable guess from the title, but it is totally wrong. This misconception cropped up repeatedly after Trump’s election, and, for example, the review by David Brooks in the New York Times of J. D. Vance’s "Hillbilly Elegy" was titled “The Revolt of the Masses.” But Ortega was a political moderate, and seems to not have been exercised by questions of class at all. Rather, this is a book about human excellence, what it can accomplish, and how it can be destroyed.
The second misconception is that Ortega’s call for excellence is a call for masses to defer to experts—supposedly, according to various chatterers, Ortega’s main point is that experts are ignored. Nothing could be farther from the truth. In fact, Ortega thinks all, or almost all, modern experts are the definition of mediocrity, and the masses deferring to them is like deferring to a mirror. Instead, people should defer to a natural aristocracy, not of blood, but of focus and accomplishment. Those people are not experts, who are narrow, but are instead broad people of taste, judgment, and discipline. We will return to this misconception later, with specific recent examples, but now that we are past the reef, we can sail into the open ocean of Ortega’s thought.
So, if this is not a book about class, who are the “masses”? Ortega divides every society into “minorities,” a small set of people who are “specially qualified,” and the “masses,” everyone not specially qualified. The key question is who is average and who is not. A mass person feels as if he is “just like everybody,” that he is not particularly special, and not only does this not concern him, he celebrates the fact. (Thus, someone who examines his talents and concludes he is mediocre, and feels that is a problem, is not a mass man.) But this, of course, begs the question—what makes a person above average or, in Ortega’s term, “specially qualified”? They are those who make personal demands for excellence upon themselves, and live in that way. This makes them the minority, by definition. They may not fulfil those demands; it is the demand being made, that alone, which makes the person a minority. In contrast, mass men “demand nothing special of themselves, but [ ] to live is to be every moment what they already are, without imposing on themselves any effort toward perfection.”
The minority, the elite, are thus not coterminous with traditional aristocracy or a ruling class. Ortega acknowledges that in traditional social elites excellence is more likely to be found, but mere heredity does not make a person place demands on himself, so an aristocrat by blood can be a mass man just like a peasant or a steelworker—and a peasant or a steelworker can be a member of the minority. The class of intellectuals, in particular, fancy themselves to be above the masses, but are often vulgar pseudo-intellectuals, swept along by lazy, commonplace thinking, and therefore mass men. Children of the excellent frequently ride on their parents’ accomplishments; they thereby become mass men themselves. Ortega wants “nobility” to mean not nobility of blood, but to restore the meaning of “noble” as “well-known, that is, known by everyone, famous, he who has made himself known by excelling the anonymous mass.” Anyone can do this, from any walk of life, but few do, human nature being what it is.
Having gotten definitions out of the way, Ortega’s first substantive point is that in the past, the mass was content to exist in the background, ceding to the minority such higher-level societal functions as art, government and political judgment. No more. Now, the mass assert their right to dictate in all such areas, without having to demand from themselves, much less achieve, excellence. In politics, this is “hyperdemocracy,” and Ortega thinks it a degradation. In other areas, such as philosophy (Ortega’s specialty), it means that readers (and, today, listeners and YouTube watchers), do so “with the view, not of learning from the writer, but rather, of pronouncing judgment on him when he is not in agreement with the commonplaces that the said reader carries in his head.” It’s not that the mass man thinks he’s an expert. “The characteristic of the hour is that the commonplace mind, knowing itself to be commonplace, has the assurance to proclaim the rights of the commonplace and to impose them wherever it will. . . . . The mass crushes beneath it everything that is different, everything that is excellent, individual, qualified and select.” Mediocrity rules, and does not care that it is mediocre.
All this is a new thing in our history, but not in world history. It can be found in the declining years of Rome, among other places. Ortega ascribes its modern growth, though, not to decline, but to liberal democracy, to the discovery of the abstract sovereignty of the individual. He doesn’t dislike liberal democracy—quite the contrary, he thinks both that it’s great, and that it’s inevitable and broadly irreversible, as I discuss further below. But if the individual is sovereign, we should not be surprised if each man treats himself as if he is indeed sovereign.
None of this implies decadence—contra Spengler, Ortega thinks that relative to the nineteenth century, which viewed itself as a time of “plenitude” when the destination of society had been reached, the twentieth century, viewing the future as open-ended and in flux, is in many ways superior. (At this point, you have to remember it’s 1930, look around you at the world of 2018, as well as the past hundred years, then chuckle grimly and draw your own conclusions.) But the twentieth century takes it too far, because the mass men dominate, and they have “lost all respect, all consideration for the past.” Thus, the mass men both see the future as open, but assured, and themselves as perfect and satisfied. That’s a dangerous combination, for it leads to a world “empty of purposes, anticipations, ideals.” It was those things the minority supplied, and it was those things that drove the world forward. Now, with the triumph of the masses, nobody supplies those things. So the twentieth century is an apogee—but the nature of apogees is there is nowhere to go but down.
Thus, the nineteenth century, for all its accomplishments, also gave us the rise of the mass man, and the mass man will, unless his rise is constrained, within thirty years, “send our continent back to barbarism.” (This is a book quite explicitly about Europe. America is treated as close to a non-entity, with thinly veiled contempt. And Europe is defined as France, Germany, and England—it does not, for these purposes, really even include Spain.) The mass man, for example, feels that he himself is qualified to decide, and should decide, political matters, rather than his vote “supporting the decision of one minority or another.” That will lead to the disappearance of liberal democracy, which Ortega regards as man’s highest political achievement (“legislative technique”), but it will also lead to the end of “industrial technique,” since the pursuit of technical excellence by minorities drives industry forward, just like other pursuit of excellence drives political organization forward.
It is this latter “industrial technique,” this combination of “scientific experiment and industrialism,” that Ortega names “technism.” Technism has allowed the mass man to escape the feeling that dominated all prior societies, that of material scarcity and restrictions. At the same time, liberal democracy makes the mass man believe that he is master of his psychic and political destiny. Thus, the mass man feels in his bones that life is now “exempt from restrictions” on every level. That is to say, in modern parlance, he is emancipated. “The world which surrounds the new man from his birth does not compel him to limit himself in any fashion, it sets up no veto in opposition to him; on the contrary, it incites his appetite, which in principle can increase indefinitely.” Ortega’s objection is not that appetites increasing is bad; he did not foresee the logical endpoint of total emancipation, which is total autonomy combined with total tyranny and a denial of basic reality. Instead, his objection is that the mass man fails to appreciate that all this, that benefits him, was created with great toil by the excellence of minorities; he thinks it manna from heaven. What characterizes the mass man is inertia—the opposite of the ceaseless, self-generated search for excellence that characterizes the truly noble. And this failure to understand the sources of the bounty that blesses him, his “radical ingratitude,” combined with the new dominance of the mass man over society, means it will all disappear, and barbarism will return, as excellence flees.
For Ortega, such barbarism isn’t of the type that, looking backward, the twentieth century actually delivered. Rather, “barbarism is the absence of standards to which appeal can be made.” That seems like not a fatal problem, but it is. No standards, no progress, only regress. Certainly, mass men are the creators of such tripe as Syndicalism, Fascism (explicitly in the Mussolini sense) and, Communism (“a monotonous repetition of the eternal revolution,” oblivious to history, like all these movements). They are created by “the type of man who does not want to give reasons or to be right, but simply shows himself resolved to impose his opinions. This is the new thing: the right not to be reasonable, the ‘reason of unreason.’ . . . Hence his ideas are in effect nothing more than appetites in words. . . .” (Ortega would not have enjoyed spending time on Facebook, much less Twitter.) When mass men of politics say they are “done with discussions,” this is what they mean. It implies also that “direct action,” that is, violence, becomes not the ultima ratio, the final argument when all others are through, but the prima ratio, the first argument. This is always true, “at every epoch when the mass, for one purpose or another, has taken a part in public life.” In all areas, what is recognized by the excellent, the minorities, in all times as “civilized,” from literature, to sexual relations, to art, to manners, to justice, decays. It is those standards for those things that make “the community, common life” possible. Result of their end: barbarism, if we don’t change course.
We can certainly see this degradation of all standards today, to a degree that makes Ortega’s prescience startling (although he was far off the mark on one matter, which I talk about last). Not only is the mass man as Ortega defines him far more dominant, over the whole Western world, than in Ortega’s time, but we see the barbarism Ortega identifies has long since arrived. Certainly almost nobody demands excellence in any field; instead, the mass men who rule demand such rubbish as “diversity and inclusion,” the wholesale granting of unearned benefits on the basis of (preferred) immutable characteristics. The very idea that there is such a thing as excellence is denied as a matter of course. Similarly with the political processes Ortega identifies. We hear all the time, mostly from the Left but also from the Right, that the time for discussion is over, and the time for action is here, by which the speaker means “conform to my unreasoned and emotion-driven demands or be crushed.” (Such language is all over the latest push to confiscate firearms, for example, along with other forms of knuckle-dragging political behavior that would have horrified Ortega, with his focus on high rationality and political liberty.) And, more broadly, what characterizes everything in the West is a call for total autonomy implemented, if necessary, by government tyranny, and a rejection of any standards as an offense against emancipation.
Ortega believed that as long as the minority of the excellent dominates, progress is inevitable. And the reverse is also true. Therefore, Ortega would, perhaps, not be surprised by the situation today. Moreover, since barbarism has arrived in the form of the domination of mass men, it is natural that a portion of those mass men hold themselves out as the minority, as the elites. But, of course, they are merely the rulers—they do not actually demand of themselves any pursuit of excellence at all. The names of categories are maintained, in art, politics, and culture, but they are hollow, for the standards are set by mass men clothed in false skins. So, it is entirely possible, if standards have decayed and barbarism returned, for there to be nobody at all to whom the masses can turn for guidance. The polestar may simply have winked out, to, perhaps, be restored at a time to be announced, when the world is remade.
Thus, "The Revolt of the Masses" feels surprisingly fresh, given not only its age but all the water that has passed under the bridge since it was written. Yes, Ortega does display a simplistic, if touching, faith, in liberal democracy, which has since his time shown its deficiency. The Europe of 1930 is the triumph of “liberal democracy and technical knowledge,” shown by, among other things, a tripling of the population of Europe. (Ortega is wrong here, of course—there is no necessary, or actual historical, linkage of liberal democracy with the rise of technical knowledge or its impacts in the Industrial Revolution.) He concludes that “liberal democracy based on technical knowledge is the highest type of public life hitherto known,” and though it might be possible to imagine a better, anything better must continue to embody both liberal democracy and technical knowledge, and that it would be “suicidal” to return to any pre-nineteenth-century form. It is the “truth of destiny.”
That was a supportable argument, maybe, in 1930, but not now. True, the term no longer means what it meant for Ortega. For him, it meant political liberty, “consideration for one’s neighbor,” “indirect action” (i.e., a rejection of violence), and, explicitly, universal suffrage where the mass of voters chose among programs offered by their betters. Today, it means, as Ryszard Legutko says, “coercion to freedom,” where no political liberty is offered to those opposed to unbridled autonomy, and democracy means only being allowed to vote for what today’s elites, who are not Ortega’s minority, allow. Ortega thought liberal democracy “announces the determination to share existence with the enemy.” Those who today howl “I can tolerate anything but intolerance” can have nothing in common with this sentiment. So perhaps we can say that Ortega may have been right, but liberal democracy as he used the term is dead, a casualty of the barbarism he feared, replaced by its zombie equivalent (although probably such zombification was inevitable, in the nature of liberal democracy, as several recent writers have claimed).
As I promised, let’s turn back to the second misconception about Ortega’s thoughts, regarding “experts.” In the past few years, there have been minor outbreaks of renewed interest in Ortega’s thoughts, always facile. For example, in the "Atlantic," a colloquy recently appeared between a staff writer and a reader, where the statement was endorsed by both, that Ortega “describes a movement that appeals to a cross-section of non-intellectual people across class lines that seems to parallel Donald Trump’s cross-cultural appeal. There it seemed to lead to Fascism.” Ortega would have a conniption. His objection is not that the mass man fails to be intellectual; it is that the mass man does not pursue excellence. For the most part, Ortega loathes modern intellectuals as the very worst type of mass man. Nor does he make any suggestion at all that mass men lead to Fascism; rather, he says that the domination of mass men leads to regression in political organization, one possible end of which is Fascism. The "Atlantic" colloquy continues, with such gems as “[T]he digital age seems to have trouble accepting ‘elite’ consensus regarding complex topics such as climate change (and gun control, evolution and tax policy, among many other subjects where the vast majority of scientists, economists, etc., accept certain basic facts that are rejected by large swaths of the public).” Ortega did not care about what scientists and economists had to say. At all. He would call them ignoramuses, narrow men whose narrow learning did not qualify them to say anything at all to society at large, especially about topics not subject to rigid calculation. His “elites” were men of excellence and broad learning, not sophists and calculators.
To Ortega, “special qualifications” are not those of experts. Our experts are scientists and similar types who are narrow and ignorant outside of a tiny area, yet presume to think otherwise. His leaders, to whom the mass should defer, are men of great mind, not technicians. They are aristocrats. In fact, Ortega despises the “ ‘man of science,’ the high-point of European humanity,” as being actually “the prototype of the mass man.” This is because the days of scientific discoveries by generalists, like Newton, are over, and the days of narrow specialization by each scientist are here. Science itself is not specialized, and in fact must be informed by areas outside science—but scientific work, today, must be. The days of encyclopedic minds are gone, and what we have are specialists, each only knowledgeable in “the small corner of which he is an active investigator.” Given this hyper-specialization, men who are overall mediocre, rather than excellent, can actually keep science advancing (this is today called the “Ortega Hypothesis”), because “a fair amount of the things that have to be done in physics or biology is mechanical work of the mind which can be done by anyone, or almost anyone.” But such men think they are excellent, even though each “knows very well his own tiny corner of the universe; [but] he is radically ignorant of all the rest.” He is a “learned ignoramus,” which is bad enough, but worse is in store, for “By specializing him, civilization has made him hermetic and self-satisfied within his limitations; but this very inner feeling of dominance and worth will induce him to wish to predominate outside his specialty. The result is . . . that he will behave in almost all spheres of life as does the unqualified, the mass-man.”
This is what we see, most of the time, when people demand that the public listen to “experts”—that we listen to specialists in one area who are thereby presumed to be competent to lecture us in areas either only loosely related, or, more often, wholly unrelated. The names are endless, but include everyone from Bill Nye to Stephen Hawking. It is these specialists, Ortega says, who exist in a state of “ ‘not-listening,’ of not submitting to higher courts of appeal,” a characteristic of the mass man. That is, the experts we are told today we must listen to are, for Ortega, the archetypical mass men, whom we should ignore, and to whom we listen to at our peril.
[Review finishes as first comment.]
December 23, 2013
Started this book with high expectation considering that it is repeatedly called one of the best works of non-fiction in 19th century but was totally disappointed with the book.
The book is nothing but the expression of anxiety of the Europeans (which the elitist author himself defines as Britain, France and Germany) in the post world war I period. The author it seems is heartbroken to see European countries fighting each other when they should be united in their natural and noble quest of civilizing people (or basically expanding frontiers of their colonies). It is just a senseless apologetic defense of European imperialism, their natural right to rule because they are "naturally" superior. He is upset with his generation of the Europeans that they are too busy indulging and enjoying the progress of science and hence civilization and are not demanding enough from themselves. According to author this was going to cost dearly to Europe (and hence humankind, as is implied).
A small excerpt from the book -
"It is serious enough that this doubt as to the rule over the world, hitherto held by Europe, should have demoralised the other nations, except those who by reason of their youth are still in their
pre-history. But it is still more serious that this marking- time should reach the point of entirely demoralising the European himself. I do not say this because I am a European or something of
the sort. I am not saying “If the European is not to rule in the immediate future, I am not interested in the life of the world.”
Europe’s loss of command would not worry me if there were in existence another group of countries capable of taking its place in power and in the direction of the planet. I should not even ask so
much. I should be content that no one rule, were it not that this would bring in its train the volatilisation of all the virtues and qualities of European man. Well, this is what would inevitably happen. If the European grows accustomed not to rule, a generation and a half will be sufficient to bring the old continent, and the whole world along with it, into moral inertia, intellectual sterility, universal barbarism. It is only the illusion of rule, and the discipline of responsibility which it entails, that can keep Western minds in tension. Science, art, technique, and all the rest live on the tonic atmosphere created by the consciousness of authority. If this is lacking, the European will gradually become degraded."
It would have been interesting to know if Ortega would have recognized the irony that the "mass-men" (should add "European" before it) he so condemns (and preaches) in this book are the ones who hold him as one of the most important thinkers of 20th century. No doubt, if such are the important thinkers we witnessed such barbaric century.
And not only in terms of content but in form also, even though it is small, the book drags and bores. Such a waste of time on Saturday morning.
The book is nothing but the expression of anxiety of the Europeans (which the elitist author himself defines as Britain, France and Germany) in the post world war I period. The author it seems is heartbroken to see European countries fighting each other when they should be united in their natural and noble quest of civilizing people (or basically expanding frontiers of their colonies). It is just a senseless apologetic defense of European imperialism, their natural right to rule because they are "naturally" superior. He is upset with his generation of the Europeans that they are too busy indulging and enjoying the progress of science and hence civilization and are not demanding enough from themselves. According to author this was going to cost dearly to Europe (and hence humankind, as is implied).
A small excerpt from the book -
"It is serious enough that this doubt as to the rule over the world, hitherto held by Europe, should have demoralised the other nations, except those who by reason of their youth are still in their
pre-history. But it is still more serious that this marking- time should reach the point of entirely demoralising the European himself. I do not say this because I am a European or something of
the sort. I am not saying “If the European is not to rule in the immediate future, I am not interested in the life of the world.”
Europe’s loss of command would not worry me if there were in existence another group of countries capable of taking its place in power and in the direction of the planet. I should not even ask so
much. I should be content that no one rule, were it not that this would bring in its train the volatilisation of all the virtues and qualities of European man. Well, this is what would inevitably happen. If the European grows accustomed not to rule, a generation and a half will be sufficient to bring the old continent, and the whole world along with it, into moral inertia, intellectual sterility, universal barbarism. It is only the illusion of rule, and the discipline of responsibility which it entails, that can keep Western minds in tension. Science, art, technique, and all the rest live on the tonic atmosphere created by the consciousness of authority. If this is lacking, the European will gradually become degraded."
It would have been interesting to know if Ortega would have recognized the irony that the "mass-men" (should add "European" before it) he so condemns (and preaches) in this book are the ones who hold him as one of the most important thinkers of 20th century. No doubt, if such are the important thinkers we witnessed such barbaric century.
And not only in terms of content but in form also, even though it is small, the book drags and bores. Such a waste of time on Saturday morning.
May 8, 2018
For the most part this book does not live up to it's reputation. I had much higher hopes for it. The first 70% of the book is rather pallid; unfocused; rambling. Gasset covers a too-diffuse mélange of miscellaneous European historical and social topics.
The edges and handles of Gasset's discussion are all very slippery and rubbery, it's really an old-school set of rather vague aesthetic essays the kind bohemians used to enjoy on the Left Bank of the Seine during the age of the Fin de siècle.
Gasset is more of an artist, observer, and philosopher more than he is social scientist; but here he is expounding wildly on social theory.
There are occasional flashes of brilliance and some very 'quotable quotes' sprinkled through the text; but the book doesn't truly assume any power or shape until the final three chapters.
Gasset poses a kind of 'metaphysical' problem which has no ready solution. Of course, knowledge in itself is empowering but there's still nothing to do about the issues Gasset has raised here.
At the end of it all, his analysis of modern European Man is interesting and insightful; it has some beautiful language; but ultimately it is unfruitful; and a slog to read.
This dampness is not at all indicated by the glowing blurbs and ebullient raves on the book's cover. In no way at all, does this tidy little set of ruminations compare to Jean Jacques Rousseau or Karl Marx. It's more akin to something by Henry David Thoreau, Paul Valery, Camus' (nonfiction), Guy DeBord, or Gaston Bachelard.
The edges and handles of Gasset's discussion are all very slippery and rubbery, it's really an old-school set of rather vague aesthetic essays the kind bohemians used to enjoy on the Left Bank of the Seine during the age of the Fin de siècle.
Gasset is more of an artist, observer, and philosopher more than he is social scientist; but here he is expounding wildly on social theory.
There are occasional flashes of brilliance and some very 'quotable quotes' sprinkled through the text; but the book doesn't truly assume any power or shape until the final three chapters.
Gasset poses a kind of 'metaphysical' problem which has no ready solution. Of course, knowledge in itself is empowering but there's still nothing to do about the issues Gasset has raised here.
At the end of it all, his analysis of modern European Man is interesting and insightful; it has some beautiful language; but ultimately it is unfruitful; and a slog to read.
This dampness is not at all indicated by the glowing blurbs and ebullient raves on the book's cover. In no way at all, does this tidy little set of ruminations compare to Jean Jacques Rousseau or Karl Marx. It's more akin to something by Henry David Thoreau, Paul Valery, Camus' (nonfiction), Guy DeBord, or Gaston Bachelard.
January 29, 2021
موضوع زماننا.. دراسة نقدية نشرت عام ١٩٢٣م، مضمونها يكمن في خضوع العقل للحيوية، ووضعه داخل ما هو بيولوجي وتقيده بالذاتية، ولسوف يظهر خلال سنوات قليلة عبث الطلب إلى الحياة بأن يوضع العقل نفسه في خدمة الثقافة.
وأن مهمة "زماننا الجديد" هي تحديداً أن تحول العلاقة، وتبين أن الثقافة والعقل والفن والأخلاق هي من يجب عليه خدمة الحياة.
.
دراسة مكررة بعنوان مختلف
وأن مهمة "زماننا الجديد" هي تحديداً أن تحول العلاقة، وتبين أن الثقافة والعقل والفن والأخلاق هي من يجب عليه خدمة الحياة.
.
دراسة مكررة بعنوان مختلف
September 21, 2021
این کتاب در سال 1929 نوشته شده بعد از گذشت چند سال از انقلاب 1917 روسیه
و به مساله اینکه چرا توده ها هرجا طغیان میکنند نتایج گندی به بار می آورند میپردازد
در کل با حرف هاش موافقم ، کلا هرجا آدم دنبال توده ها راه بیفته نتیجه ای جز معمولی شدن و تحت فرمان ایدئولوژی رفتن به بار نخواهد داشت
حالا چه این ایدئولوژی بخواد بلشوییسم باشه چه ایدئولوژی سرمایه داری حاکم امروز بر دنیا
منو یاد نظر مردم در زمان اکران فیلم طعم گیلاس کیارستمی انداخت
که توده مردم میگفتند این چه فیلم چرتی بود که ساخته!
در کل میتونم بگم این کتاب از چند صفحه از کتاب فراسوی نیک و بد و تبارشناسی اخلاق نیچه که در آن به همین مساله ایرادات توده ای فکر کردن مردم
اشاره کرده ، اقتباس کرده و ملاک سازندگی را نه توده ای بودن بلکه الیت بودن توصیه میکند
منم موافقم ملاک ارزش از دید من برخلاف رای اکثریت مردم معمولی بودنه و این کتاب هم با اینکه مختصر و کوتاه است در این زمینه اتفاقا پیش بینی های خوبی در ارتباط با آینده اروپا ارائه کرده که در حقیقت در فاصله بین دو جنگ جهانی اول و دوم شرح حالی از وضعیت اروپای گیر کرده در میان نیهیلیسم و خواست اکثریت توده های عصیاانگر و به قول کتاب خواست های بعضا نامعقول اکثریت بچه لوس های توده مردم ارائه میده که لزوما همان خواست اقلیت الیت جامعه نیست
و به مساله اینکه چرا توده ها هرجا طغیان میکنند نتایج گندی به بار می آورند میپردازد
در کل با حرف هاش موافقم ، کلا هرجا آدم دنبال توده ها راه بیفته نتیجه ای جز معمولی شدن و تحت فرمان ایدئولوژی رفتن به بار نخواهد داشت
حالا چه این ایدئولوژی بخواد بلشوییسم باشه چه ایدئولوژی سرمایه داری حاکم امروز بر دنیا
منو یاد نظر مردم در زمان اکران فیلم طعم گیلاس کیارستمی انداخت
که توده مردم میگفتند این چه فیلم چرتی بود که ساخته!
در کل میتونم بگم این کتاب از چند صفحه از کتاب فراسوی نیک و بد و تبارشناسی اخلاق نیچه که در آن به همین مساله ایرادات توده ای فکر کردن مردم
اشاره کرده ، اقتباس کرده و ملاک سازندگی را نه توده ای بودن بلکه الیت بودن توصیه میکند
منم موافقم ملاک ارزش از دید من برخلاف رای اکثریت مردم معمولی بودنه و این کتاب هم با اینکه مختصر و کوتاه است در این زمینه اتفاقا پیش بینی های خوبی در ارتباط با آینده اروپا ارائه کرده که در حقیقت در فاصله بین دو جنگ جهانی اول و دوم شرح حالی از وضعیت اروپای گیر کرده در میان نیهیلیسم و خواست اکثریت توده های عصیاانگر و به قول کتاب خواست های بعضا نامعقول اکثریت بچه لوس های توده مردم ارائه میده که لزوما همان خواست اقلیت الیت جامعه نیست
February 21, 2018
A classic piece of thinking from 1930. An often prescient portrayal of mass society, it is often surprising to reflect this was written 90 years ago. If you like intelligent writing, well worth reading.
It is not always the easiest of reads - perhaps 1930s Spanish is just hard to translate into modern English. But I found most insightful and enlightening, even if I did not agree with absolutely everything. I have highlighted lots of parts - as there are many wonderful turns of phrase.
The first 13 chapters are mostly excellent. The long penultimate chapter - chapter 14 I found the least rewarding, although it made me reflect on the recent decision of the UK to leave the EU, which again is an achievement for a book written a decade before WW2.
It is not always the easiest of reads - perhaps 1930s Spanish is just hard to translate into modern English. But I found most insightful and enlightening, even if I did not agree with absolutely everything. I have highlighted lots of parts - as there are many wonderful turns of phrase.
The first 13 chapters are mostly excellent. The long penultimate chapter - chapter 14 I found the least rewarding, although it made me reflect on the recent decision of the UK to leave the EU, which again is an achievement for a book written a decade before WW2.
May 7, 2022
8/10.
What does it mean to be noble? Do any of we moderns even know? We have been so saturated with the sweet rhetoric of "equality" that we have forgotten all concepts of distinction. Yet, forgotten though they may be, they still remain true. Nobility is characterized by a distinct mindset — a mindset that is the great dividing line of mankind. Nobles embrace obligations, in fact require them to live. Without obligations, without an external duty to live up to, those noble in spirit languish in eternal torment. Their consciences do not let them fritter their lives away. Noblesse oblige: the obligations of nobility.
But the higher obligation of nobility — of ordering one's life towards a transcendent goal — is not taken as a burden. It is simply a necessity. Without it, the noble lives in his shadow — a shadow that perenially taunts him about his unfulfilled potential. It is a condition worse than death. It is to be dead — but still continue living.
In opposition to the noble man is the mass-man. Modernity has created a profusion of this type. The great increase of human numbers wrought by the industrial revolution has by necessity created a mass influx of mediocrity. What is mediocrity? It is the carefree lifestyle. "To live as one likes is plebian; the noble man aspires to order and law" (Goethe). The mass-man has desires and immediately acts on them. He osmotically receives ideas from his media masters and enforces them on others through force. Most of all, he recognizes no hierarchy of values and thus is free to do as he wishes. "Freedom" — the opportunity to account to nothing of value.
The mass-man has grown up in a time of mass plenty. He has been fed well his entire life; has been relieved of the cold, ugly privations of nature; and has been given all he wants by his parents. Civilization? "That's always there, and always will be!" (so thinks the mass-man). Not realizing the tremendous intellectual, physical, and technological struggles of his forefathers, the mass-man is fundamentally a spoiled child. Born into an age of mass luxury, he degenerates by accepting civilization as an irrevocable, magic premise.
The state of man before the industrial revolution was one of struggle, of having one's desires stopped by Nature. Food was not always available, storms could come at any moment, and foreign tribes could murder one's family without the slightest warning. But through this struggle man realized that Nature was not one's servant. One could not cry and pout to Mommy Nature for more cookies. No. One needed to accept hunger, thirst, cold, and heat as the premises of life to act upon and overcome.
These conditions steeled the minds and hearts of men. Through sturm und drang arose the noble soul — the soul that accepts struggle as its natural existence. Only through strength, only through courage, only through practical ingenuity could man survive. But through natural superiority, some did not just survive. Some rose out of the homogenous primitivity of man and created something new. Thus came the men who discovered fire, who created the wheel, who founded empires. They were not given these things; no, they conquered nature and their fellow man.
Thus the nobility rise. Through natural excellence and leadership, they bubble atop their societies. Their children are trained to fulfill their noble blood. Born from a line of leaders, of Herculean movers of man and earth, nobles are taught to live up to their ancestors. Grecian and Latin nobility traced their lineages to mystical men who founded their city-states. Preserving their blood was key. But noble blood brought noble obligations such as an obligation to become cultured. Thus the nobility was replenished with nobles in spirit.
Yet with the industrial revolution, this was all changed. The increase in technological ability brought about by entrepreneurs allowed for greater specialization in Europe. The ability for specialization opened up more economic niches, thus allowing for a growing middle class. This was composed of professions like doctors, lawyers, teachers, and industrial managers. Having gained status with their hammer (technical, specialized knowledge), the rising middle class saw everything as a nail. No culture was needed; all that was needed was technik.
From here sprouted forth an ever-growing amount of "experts". These experts, knowing much in their ever-shrinking domain but nothing in any other sphere, did not think their knowledge stopped in their specialty. No. They could apply their smarts everywhere. The greatest of follies was let loose. Feeling strong and dominant in his own domain, the specialist was confident in his abilities in all other domains. The problem? He was an ignoramus. "Men of science" could now determine politics, ethics, art, culture, and religion. Greedy of fame and fortune, the "experts" flooded into public life, ready to apply their pinprick of knowledge to all human problems.
The flood came, and it drowned our culture. Scientists forgot that their discipline was only kept alive through something other than science. It was founded on a noble spirit, the spirit that feels an obligation to find the truth. But as the wide-scoping minds of the Royal Society turned into your average busy-body professor, that noble spirit dissipated. The mass-man rose in science, accepted "the scientific method" as All-Holy and Infallible, and proceeded to devour Science from the inside. Taking the word "science" and throwing it out like magic, he falsified data and applied his conclusions in absurd manners for fame and fortune. What more could he do when his society puts no obligations on his back? With no obligations, man naturally flows downwards like water, pursuing nothing but his self-interest.
But what purpose is self-interest, the fulfilling of one's base desires? Is living like a worm desirable? Squirming around, this way and that, the mass-man has no form and no goal to head to. He wastes his existence in an eternal labyrinth. Where to go, what to do, who to follow? Squirm, squirm goes the mass-man worm. The worm feels desire. It masturbates. The worm gets hungry. It eats an oily burger. The worm eternally squirms towards its nearest desires. It turns round and round in the labyrinth of pleasure and begins to feel alienated from itself. "What am I?" it thinks. No form, no purpose, no goal to progress toward, the worm commits spiritual suicide. Such is the life of the mass-man.
But what are those noble in spirit to do in our age? We hate formlessness and need duty. We despise the low standards and lack of duty of our society after the revolution of mediocre mass-men. Our first step shall be to accept our task, accept our duty. Our duty is to become bodily strong and mentally sharp. We are challenged to live up to our spiritual responsibility. We must accept the burdens of learning, for only through those burdens will we feel satisfied with ourselves. Most complain about their obligations, but we look at each day as a challenge to actualize our potential. Worm or noble? You decide.
What does it mean to be noble? Do any of we moderns even know? We have been so saturated with the sweet rhetoric of "equality" that we have forgotten all concepts of distinction. Yet, forgotten though they may be, they still remain true. Nobility is characterized by a distinct mindset — a mindset that is the great dividing line of mankind. Nobles embrace obligations, in fact require them to live. Without obligations, without an external duty to live up to, those noble in spirit languish in eternal torment. Their consciences do not let them fritter their lives away. Noblesse oblige: the obligations of nobility.
But the higher obligation of nobility — of ordering one's life towards a transcendent goal — is not taken as a burden. It is simply a necessity. Without it, the noble lives in his shadow — a shadow that perenially taunts him about his unfulfilled potential. It is a condition worse than death. It is to be dead — but still continue living.
In opposition to the noble man is the mass-man. Modernity has created a profusion of this type. The great increase of human numbers wrought by the industrial revolution has by necessity created a mass influx of mediocrity. What is mediocrity? It is the carefree lifestyle. "To live as one likes is plebian; the noble man aspires to order and law" (Goethe). The mass-man has desires and immediately acts on them. He osmotically receives ideas from his media masters and enforces them on others through force. Most of all, he recognizes no hierarchy of values and thus is free to do as he wishes. "Freedom" — the opportunity to account to nothing of value.
The mass-man has grown up in a time of mass plenty. He has been fed well his entire life; has been relieved of the cold, ugly privations of nature; and has been given all he wants by his parents. Civilization? "That's always there, and always will be!" (so thinks the mass-man). Not realizing the tremendous intellectual, physical, and technological struggles of his forefathers, the mass-man is fundamentally a spoiled child. Born into an age of mass luxury, he degenerates by accepting civilization as an irrevocable, magic premise.
The state of man before the industrial revolution was one of struggle, of having one's desires stopped by Nature. Food was not always available, storms could come at any moment, and foreign tribes could murder one's family without the slightest warning. But through this struggle man realized that Nature was not one's servant. One could not cry and pout to Mommy Nature for more cookies. No. One needed to accept hunger, thirst, cold, and heat as the premises of life to act upon and overcome.
These conditions steeled the minds and hearts of men. Through sturm und drang arose the noble soul — the soul that accepts struggle as its natural existence. Only through strength, only through courage, only through practical ingenuity could man survive. But through natural superiority, some did not just survive. Some rose out of the homogenous primitivity of man and created something new. Thus came the men who discovered fire, who created the wheel, who founded empires. They were not given these things; no, they conquered nature and their fellow man.
Thus the nobility rise. Through natural excellence and leadership, they bubble atop their societies. Their children are trained to fulfill their noble blood. Born from a line of leaders, of Herculean movers of man and earth, nobles are taught to live up to their ancestors. Grecian and Latin nobility traced their lineages to mystical men who founded their city-states. Preserving their blood was key. But noble blood brought noble obligations such as an obligation to become cultured. Thus the nobility was replenished with nobles in spirit.
Yet with the industrial revolution, this was all changed. The increase in technological ability brought about by entrepreneurs allowed for greater specialization in Europe. The ability for specialization opened up more economic niches, thus allowing for a growing middle class. This was composed of professions like doctors, lawyers, teachers, and industrial managers. Having gained status with their hammer (technical, specialized knowledge), the rising middle class saw everything as a nail. No culture was needed; all that was needed was technik.
From here sprouted forth an ever-growing amount of "experts". These experts, knowing much in their ever-shrinking domain but nothing in any other sphere, did not think their knowledge stopped in their specialty. No. They could apply their smarts everywhere. The greatest of follies was let loose. Feeling strong and dominant in his own domain, the specialist was confident in his abilities in all other domains. The problem? He was an ignoramus. "Men of science" could now determine politics, ethics, art, culture, and religion. Greedy of fame and fortune, the "experts" flooded into public life, ready to apply their pinprick of knowledge to all human problems.
The flood came, and it drowned our culture. Scientists forgot that their discipline was only kept alive through something other than science. It was founded on a noble spirit, the spirit that feels an obligation to find the truth. But as the wide-scoping minds of the Royal Society turned into your average busy-body professor, that noble spirit dissipated. The mass-man rose in science, accepted "the scientific method" as All-Holy and Infallible, and proceeded to devour Science from the inside. Taking the word "science" and throwing it out like magic, he falsified data and applied his conclusions in absurd manners for fame and fortune. What more could he do when his society puts no obligations on his back? With no obligations, man naturally flows downwards like water, pursuing nothing but his self-interest.
But what purpose is self-interest, the fulfilling of one's base desires? Is living like a worm desirable? Squirming around, this way and that, the mass-man has no form and no goal to head to. He wastes his existence in an eternal labyrinth. Where to go, what to do, who to follow? Squirm, squirm goes the mass-man worm. The worm feels desire. It masturbates. The worm gets hungry. It eats an oily burger. The worm eternally squirms towards its nearest desires. It turns round and round in the labyrinth of pleasure and begins to feel alienated from itself. "What am I?" it thinks. No form, no purpose, no goal to progress toward, the worm commits spiritual suicide. Such is the life of the mass-man.
But what are those noble in spirit to do in our age? We hate formlessness and need duty. We despise the low standards and lack of duty of our society after the revolution of mediocre mass-men. Our first step shall be to accept our task, accept our duty. Our duty is to become bodily strong and mentally sharp. We are challenged to live up to our spiritual responsibility. We must accept the burdens of learning, for only through those burdens will we feel satisfied with ourselves. Most complain about their obligations, but we look at each day as a challenge to actualize our potential. Worm or noble? You decide.
July 18, 2020
"Izopačenost i poniženje su samo oblici života koji preostaju čoveku što se odrekao da bude ono što bi trebalo biti. Njegovo izvorno biće time ne zamire, već se pretvara u optužujuću senku, u utvaru, koja ga stalno podseća na nižu vrednost njegovog života spram života koji je trebalo da vodi. Poniženi čovek je preživeli samoubica".
June 30, 2020
Sorprende leer la contundencia con la que Ortega anticipó:
1. La preponderancia del hombre masa en el contexto sociopolítico
2. El fracaso del fascismo y el comunismo
3. La necesidad para el ethos continental de transicionar del colonialismo-imperialismo a la Unión política europea
4. El fracaso de la política pacifista de contención británica.
5. La dimensión elefantiásica y esclerótica que iban adquirir los Estados
6. El cambio que el miedo a los totalitarismos iba provocar en las democracias liberales (para depurarlas y refinarlas)
Todo esto antes de la segunda guerra mundial.
Por descontado hay errores de apreciación y sesgos con los que discrepo, pero la clarividencia del pensador es realmente notable.
mi valoración: 9/10
1. La preponderancia del hombre masa en el contexto sociopolítico
2. El fracaso del fascismo y el comunismo
3. La necesidad para el ethos continental de transicionar del colonialismo-imperialismo a la Unión política europea
4. El fracaso de la política pacifista de contención británica.
5. La dimensión elefantiásica y esclerótica que iban adquirir los Estados
6. El cambio que el miedo a los totalitarismos iba provocar en las democracias liberales (para depurarlas y refinarlas)
Todo esto antes de la segunda guerra mundial.
Por descontado hay errores de apreciación y sesgos con los que discrepo, pero la clarividencia del pensador es realmente notable.
mi valoración: 9/10
January 25, 2020
Ortega egy művelt, morcos elitista.
Legutoljára akkor olvastam ilyen nagy műveltségű, morcos elitistát (TGM), amikor az épp Ortégát támadta morcos elitizmusa miatt. #elitistaception
Ha politikai szempontból kéne értékelni az itt leírt gondolatokat, a besorolás viszonylag egyszerű lenne. Ortega konzervatív-liberális; a 19. századi klasszikus liberalizmus értékeit védelmezni a huszadik századi tömegmozgalmakkal szemben éppúgy lehet konzervatív, mint egy - valamivel arisztokratikusabb - liberális álláspont is. A tömegek vs. kevés kiválasztott elit szembeállítás a sok ismétlés következtében egy idő után ellaposodik a könyvben, ráadásul a tömeg olyan sok értelmet nyer Ortegánál (sokaság, súlyosság/mozdulatlanság), hogy felmerült bennem a kérdés, ő hogyan vonja ki magát a tömegkultúra hatása alól?
De ebben a könyvben azért ennél több van, úgyhogy nagyon hasznos olvasmánynak bizonyult. A szerző izgalmasan és összetetten írja le a modernitás idő- és tértapasztalatát, a történelmi mozgás ellentétét a statikussággal. Ráadásul kifejezetten időtálló gondolatok vannak benne a nemzetek keletkezéséről is (mert Ortega szerint nincs kész nemzet, minden folyamatos alakulástörténet - ezért veti el pl. a "természetes határok" koncepcióját).
Még ha nem is teljesen az én világom, egy nagyon lól megírt és szellemes munkáról van szó.
Legutoljára akkor olvastam ilyen nagy műveltségű, morcos elitistát (TGM), amikor az épp Ortégát támadta morcos elitizmusa miatt. #elitistaception
Ha politikai szempontból kéne értékelni az itt leírt gondolatokat, a besorolás viszonylag egyszerű lenne. Ortega konzervatív-liberális; a 19. századi klasszikus liberalizmus értékeit védelmezni a huszadik századi tömegmozgalmakkal szemben éppúgy lehet konzervatív, mint egy - valamivel arisztokratikusabb - liberális álláspont is. A tömegek vs. kevés kiválasztott elit szembeállítás a sok ismétlés következtében egy idő után ellaposodik a könyvben, ráadásul a tömeg olyan sok értelmet nyer Ortegánál (sokaság, súlyosság/mozdulatlanság), hogy felmerült bennem a kérdés, ő hogyan vonja ki magát a tömegkultúra hatása alól?
De ebben a könyvben azért ennél több van, úgyhogy nagyon hasznos olvasmánynak bizonyult. A szerző izgalmasan és összetetten írja le a modernitás idő- és tértapasztalatát, a történelmi mozgás ellentétét a statikussággal. Ráadásul kifejezetten időtálló gondolatok vannak benne a nemzetek keletkezéséről is (mert Ortega szerint nincs kész nemzet, minden folyamatos alakulástörténet - ezért veti el pl. a "természetes határok" koncepcióját).
Még ha nem is teljesen az én világom, egy nagyon lól megírt és szellemes munkáról van szó.
August 11, 2022
En un punto del ensayo presente se detiene Ortega en los hombres de especial sensibilidad capaces de percibir el trazo de la Historia antes que el resto: los profetas. Los ha habido en todas las épocas, incluida la que nos tocó en suerte. Sin duda profético resulta el ensayo del filósofo español contemporáneo con más proyección internacional junto, tal vez, a Unamuno. Casi cien años antes del momento presente, Ortega esboza el tipo humano que él denomina "hombre-masa", característico de la época actual. Sorprende la frescura de muchos de los pensamientos vertidos en el texto, aplicables sin la menor corrección al presente: el mencionado hombre-masa y su rebelión inacabada, Europa y su unidad de destino, los males de la especialización científica o la supuesta decadencia de la cultura europea.
Siempre es grato encontrar una prosa rica en expresividad que sirve de acomodo a argumentos de impecable factura. Se palpa en el resultado final el proceso razonador del pensador madrileño, una máquina consciente de sus deberes y responsabilidades, forjada en la práctica cotidiana de eso que tanto escasea en la masa: el ejercicio puro del razonar.
El libro, pese a sus luminosas reflexiones, como conjunto aqueja cierto carácter desestructurado, como a medio cocer en lo tocante al afinamiento formal. Cosa esta que no resta validez a su tesis y trascendencia a la justa importancia ganada con los años.
El "Epílogo para ingleses" resultó ser la sección que menos logró captar mi interés, a veces por pura cuestión de lejanía temporal con alguno de los temas tratados, como es el caso del pacifismo británico en las primeras décadas del siglo XX. Otros en cambio, como el de la hegemonía de la juventud, tema aún vigente, fascinan por su clarividente exposición.
Siempre es grato encontrar una prosa rica en expresividad que sirve de acomodo a argumentos de impecable factura. Se palpa en el resultado final el proceso razonador del pensador madrileño, una máquina consciente de sus deberes y responsabilidades, forjada en la práctica cotidiana de eso que tanto escasea en la masa: el ejercicio puro del razonar.
El libro, pese a sus luminosas reflexiones, como conjunto aqueja cierto carácter desestructurado, como a medio cocer en lo tocante al afinamiento formal. Cosa esta que no resta validez a su tesis y trascendencia a la justa importancia ganada con los años.
El "Epílogo para ingleses" resultó ser la sección que menos logró captar mi interés, a veces por pura cuestión de lejanía temporal con alguno de los temas tratados, como es el caso del pacifismo británico en las primeras décadas del siglo XX. Otros en cambio, como el de la hegemonía de la juventud, tema aún vigente, fascinan por su clarividente exposición.
Read
May 28, 2015If Ortega y Gasset was the principled elitist he saw himself as, we would have less of a problem. After all, I'm the sort of bastard who appreciates a certain kind of tirade against the world of mass culture and the stupidity that accompanies a supposedly enlightened era. But, despite his protestations to the contrary, he winds up edifying the pre-democratic past, delivered through a set of proclamations without any accompanying qualifications. For a more vigorous opposition to mass culture written by a more sensitive observer, I have to recommend Adorno instead.
September 4, 2014
Plenty to think on here. The central thesis -- the rise and rebellion of the self-satisfied mass-man -- is compelling. Humbling, too, for the dark glimpses of self you see in this angry Spaniard's mirror.
There's a sharp mind behind this essay, and a wise one:
"To be surprised, to wonder, is to begin to understand. This is the sport, the luxury, special to the intellectual man. The gesture characteristic of his tribe consists in looking at the world with eyes wide open in wonder. Everything in the world is strange and marvelous to well-open eyes."
"That man is intellectually of the mass who, in face of any problem, is satisfied with thinking the first thing he finds in his head. On the contrary, the excellent man is he who contemns what he finds in his mind without previous effort, and only accepts as worthy of him what is still far above him and what requires a further effort in order to be reached."
Also, cutting:
"The psychological structure of this new type of mass-man...is as follows: (1) An inborn, root-impression that life is easy, plentiful, without any grave limitations; consequently, each average man finds within himself a sensation of power and triumph which, (2) invites him to stand up for himself as he is, to look upon his moral and intellectual endowment as excellent, complete. This contentment with himself leads him to shut off from any external court of appeal; not to listen, not to submit his opinions to judgement, not to consider others' existence. His intimate feeling of power urges him always to exercise predominance. He will act then as of he and his like were the only beings existing in the world; and, consequently, (3) will intervene in all matters, imposing his own vulgar views without respect or regard for others, without limit or reserve, that is to say, in accordance with a system of 'direct action.'"
The temptation when reading "The Revolt of the Masses" is to cast yourself as judge of the "mass-man," enjoying Ortega y Gasset's scorn a little too much. His targets begin to take on the faces of those you disagree with, and you find it easy to adapt his criticisms to your own. There's a whiff of the crude pleasures of disdain you find in Ayn Rand. Ortega y Gasset is much more sophisticated, though, and well-worth your time if your approach is honest and self-critical.
There's a sharp mind behind this essay, and a wise one:
"To be surprised, to wonder, is to begin to understand. This is the sport, the luxury, special to the intellectual man. The gesture characteristic of his tribe consists in looking at the world with eyes wide open in wonder. Everything in the world is strange and marvelous to well-open eyes."
"That man is intellectually of the mass who, in face of any problem, is satisfied with thinking the first thing he finds in his head. On the contrary, the excellent man is he who contemns what he finds in his mind without previous effort, and only accepts as worthy of him what is still far above him and what requires a further effort in order to be reached."
Also, cutting:
"The psychological structure of this new type of mass-man...is as follows: (1) An inborn, root-impression that life is easy, plentiful, without any grave limitations; consequently, each average man finds within himself a sensation of power and triumph which, (2) invites him to stand up for himself as he is, to look upon his moral and intellectual endowment as excellent, complete. This contentment with himself leads him to shut off from any external court of appeal; not to listen, not to submit his opinions to judgement, not to consider others' existence. His intimate feeling of power urges him always to exercise predominance. He will act then as of he and his like were the only beings existing in the world; and, consequently, (3) will intervene in all matters, imposing his own vulgar views without respect or regard for others, without limit or reserve, that is to say, in accordance with a system of 'direct action.'"
The temptation when reading "The Revolt of the Masses" is to cast yourself as judge of the "mass-man," enjoying Ortega y Gasset's scorn a little too much. His targets begin to take on the faces of those you disagree with, and you find it easy to adapt his criticisms to your own. There's a whiff of the crude pleasures of disdain you find in Ayn Rand. Ortega y Gasset is much more sophisticated, though, and well-worth your time if your approach is honest and self-critical.
July 29, 2022
Ortega posits that in recent years (this book was published in 1930, so by this I mean the 1910s and the 1920s), Europe was increasingly seeing the emergence of a certain type of social entity: the mass-man. This creature, it is suggested, eschews the advice of the experts and of knowledgeable individuals and promotes his own view, no matter ill-informed (or simply wrong) ahead of theirs. The views of this entity are not to be conceived of as an individual thing, but rather as vast collective feelings. Their views are not necessarily wrong in all cases, but whether wrong or right they seek to dominate social discourse - including by force if necessary.
Specifically the movements which are covered in this analysis are Bolshevism and Fascism (it could also apply to any number of other less successful movements though). These examples are both fundamentally anti-intellectual, positing in that they provide answers to difficult questions which have stumped nebulous 'elites'. And both of them require their subjects to abandon various degrees of critical reasoning and independent thought in order to advance the will of the state as a collective entity. And of course, if needs to be pointed out too, both are happy to liberally employ violent force on their own subjects in order to see that these ends are brought about.
I suppose the reason that this book still has enduring appeal is that many people can see parallels between what Ortega is describing and the modern 'populist' movements. I'm not keen to name specific examples, because I think these parallels don't run all that deep. I'm not, for example, a fan of Marine Le Pen, but I'm also not keen to throw her in the same basket as Joseph Stalin and Adolf Hitler.
But I suppose there's some sense in comparing the anti-intellectualism of some of these movements with the phenomenon that Ortega identifies. I don't know - I'm only half convinced. It's a pretty good analysis of the inter-war emergence of political radicalism though - both Bolshevism and Fascism. And I think most of us now agree that both the Bolsheviks and the Fascists were pretty bad guys.
Specifically the movements which are covered in this analysis are Bolshevism and Fascism (it could also apply to any number of other less successful movements though). These examples are both fundamentally anti-intellectual, positing in that they provide answers to difficult questions which have stumped nebulous 'elites'. And both of them require their subjects to abandon various degrees of critical reasoning and independent thought in order to advance the will of the state as a collective entity. And of course, if needs to be pointed out too, both are happy to liberally employ violent force on their own subjects in order to see that these ends are brought about.
I suppose the reason that this book still has enduring appeal is that many people can see parallels between what Ortega is describing and the modern 'populist' movements. I'm not keen to name specific examples, because I think these parallels don't run all that deep. I'm not, for example, a fan of Marine Le Pen, but I'm also not keen to throw her in the same basket as Joseph Stalin and Adolf Hitler.
But I suppose there's some sense in comparing the anti-intellectualism of some of these movements with the phenomenon that Ortega identifies. I don't know - I'm only half convinced. It's a pretty good analysis of the inter-war emergence of political radicalism though - both Bolshevism and Fascism. And I think most of us now agree that both the Bolsheviks and the Fascists were pretty bad guys.
January 28, 2018
A book that it's prone to misunderstandings (especially with Americans, which is further proof that the USA is a paradise for the masses), yet incredibly relevant to the current age - a historical period not separate from the one Ortega y Gasset originally talked about, in which the same phenomenon thrives. Worth reading not just for the main thesis, but for all of the philosophical underpinnings.
This is a summary that does not in no way do justice to the depth of the book but nevertheless: The central thesis is clearly posed in the title – the rise of the masses . By 'masses’ he defines multitudes of people who think in the same way. The rise of the masses has brought a crisis – it’s the triumph of pseudo-intellecutals doing activities that were the prerogative of qualified minorities before. The dominion of the masses is especially clear in the recent political innovations (a hyperdemocracy in which the mass acts directly, outside the law, imposing its aspirations and its desires by means of material pressure). Now, ‘Anybody who is not like everybody, who does not think like everybody, runs the risk of being eliminated’. By rise, he means appropriation and expansion, sprung from a democratic inspiration but turned in arrogant presumptions, which has led to a levelling of the society. The feeling finds correspondence in the increase in the worlds’ possibilities – more precisely, an increase of vital potentiality in a world of comfort; yet ‘we live at a time when man believes himself fabulously capable of creation, but he does not know what to create’. The current society - The Self-Satisfied Age - looks back on the past with a feeling of superiority, and looks ahead expecting always progress. Yet it is disoriented and does not know how to act. And ‘when the mass acts on its own, it does so only in one way, for it has no other: it lynches. It is not altogether by chance that lynch law comes from America, for America is, in a fashion, the paradise of the masses.’
An interesting parallel to be made, I think, is with Vico’s cycles – with us being the declining end before an new one, just like the end of the Roman Empire declined into the middle ages.
This is a summary that does not in no way do justice to the depth of the book but nevertheless: The central thesis is clearly posed in the title – the rise of the masses . By 'masses’ he defines multitudes of people who think in the same way. The rise of the masses has brought a crisis – it’s the triumph of pseudo-intellecutals doing activities that were the prerogative of qualified minorities before. The dominion of the masses is especially clear in the recent political innovations (a hyperdemocracy in which the mass acts directly, outside the law, imposing its aspirations and its desires by means of material pressure). Now, ‘Anybody who is not like everybody, who does not think like everybody, runs the risk of being eliminated’. By rise, he means appropriation and expansion, sprung from a democratic inspiration but turned in arrogant presumptions, which has led to a levelling of the society. The feeling finds correspondence in the increase in the worlds’ possibilities – more precisely, an increase of vital potentiality in a world of comfort; yet ‘we live at a time when man believes himself fabulously capable of creation, but he does not know what to create’. The current society - The Self-Satisfied Age - looks back on the past with a feeling of superiority, and looks ahead expecting always progress. Yet it is disoriented and does not know how to act. And ‘when the mass acts on its own, it does so only in one way, for it has no other: it lynches. It is not altogether by chance that lynch law comes from America, for America is, in a fashion, the paradise of the masses.’
An interesting parallel to be made, I think, is with Vico’s cycles – with us being the declining end before an new one, just like the end of the Roman Empire declined into the middle ages.
November 24, 2021
As one advances in life, one realizes more and more that the majority of men - and of women - are incapable of any other effort than that strictly imposed on them as a reaction to external compulsion. And for that reason, the few individuals we have come across who are capable of a spontaneous and joyous effort stand out isolated, monumentalized, so to speak, in our experience. These are the select men, the nobles, the only ones who are active and not merely reactive, for whom life is a perpetual striving, an incessant course of training.
- [Author: Jose Ortega y Gasset], [Book: The Revolt of the Masses] (pp. 65-66)
In my reading of The Revolt of the Masses I would emphasize Ortega y Gasset's discussion of the new world (circa 1930) as one of "practically limitless possibilities".(p 61) This is a view that he contrasts with the past where the masses felt themselves limited, and rightly so. If anything, eighty years after the first publication of this book there are even larger groups of people that have the possibility of fewer limits on the progress of their lives. However he does not see any guarantee that progress will be the result and later in his book he discusses the danger of the modern state as a limiting factor. Even in western democracies we have seen the power of the state grow over the past eighty years since Ortega y Gasset's observations. I wonder if the nobility within mankind will be able to continue to move forward and not be limited by the masses of average men.
- [Author: Jose Ortega y Gasset], [Book: The Revolt of the Masses] (pp. 65-66)
In my reading of The Revolt of the Masses I would emphasize Ortega y Gasset's discussion of the new world (circa 1930) as one of "practically limitless possibilities".(p 61) This is a view that he contrasts with the past where the masses felt themselves limited, and rightly so. If anything, eighty years after the first publication of this book there are even larger groups of people that have the possibility of fewer limits on the progress of their lives. However he does not see any guarantee that progress will be the result and later in his book he discusses the danger of the modern state as a limiting factor. Even in western democracies we have seen the power of the state grow over the past eighty years since Ortega y Gasset's observations. I wonder if the nobility within mankind will be able to continue to move forward and not be limited by the masses of average men.
July 31, 2021
No puedo hablar de ensayos de filosofía desde la posición de alguien que sabe, porque solo estoy empezando, pero sí puedo recomendarlo una y mil veces precisamente para gente que esté en mi posición.
Por el estilo del autor me parece muy buen libro para quien quiera leer filosofía y no sepa por dónde empezar. Es ameno, muy bonito y sabe expresar las ideas de forma clara, de manera que es muy difícil perder el hilo.
Pero si algo me ha impresionado es el grado de exactitud con el que Ortega y Gasset entendía a Europa y a los países europeos y sus gentes. Es alucinante cómo lo que escribió hace 90 años se puede ver hoy en día en España y Europa casi palabra por palabra. No sé expresar sufucientemente bien el asombro que me ha producido capítulo tras capítulo.
Por último, creo es muy interesante desde todos los puntos de vista pero, en especial, para aquellos/as que estudiamos ciencia. En ese caso lo considero incluso imprescindible.
No puedo recomendarlo más y tampoco puedo esperar a leer 'La España invertebrada'. Ha sido un 10 rotundo.
Por el estilo del autor me parece muy buen libro para quien quiera leer filosofía y no sepa por dónde empezar. Es ameno, muy bonito y sabe expresar las ideas de forma clara, de manera que es muy difícil perder el hilo.
Pero si algo me ha impresionado es el grado de exactitud con el que Ortega y Gasset entendía a Europa y a los países europeos y sus gentes. Es alucinante cómo lo que escribió hace 90 años se puede ver hoy en día en España y Europa casi palabra por palabra. No sé expresar sufucientemente bien el asombro que me ha producido capítulo tras capítulo.
Por último, creo es muy interesante desde todos los puntos de vista pero, en especial, para aquellos/as que estudiamos ciencia. En ese caso lo considero incluso imprescindible.
No puedo recomendarlo más y tampoco puedo esperar a leer 'La España invertebrada'. Ha sido un 10 rotundo.
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May 6, 2007Not sure what to say about Ortega y Gasset other than that he's a conspicuous elitist, without necessarily being aristocratic or absolutely class-conscious in his elitism; the mass-man is the self-satisfied man, the man who doesn't look beyond himself for meaning or challenge (shades of Lukacs' "transcendental homelessness") -- which is a state of affairs that comes about through the brute fact of plenitude: more people enjoying more goods as their rights (rather than as fruits of their own struggle). Not sure entirely if this will be useful to think about in terms of crowd-theory, but I guess it's nice to see the seething resentment of the crowd in Le Bon become an articulated hope for the coming war with the mass in Ortega y Gasset. (And doesn't that old-style aristo naming convention already makes Jose seem multiple?)
November 2, 2022
Como mis capacidades filosóficas están un poco colganderas, sólo lo puedo calificar según la tabarra que me ha dado. 4/5, más tabarra y menos sexy que Camus pero es de agradecer que te suelta menos chapa que, por ejemplo, Bergson.
August 25, 2007
If you think we live in a world of "us and thems" and enjoy spitting in the air and letting the spit land in your own face, then this book is for you.
December 27, 2023
Brilliantly elitist; a sophisticated and calmly disdainful dissection of npc psychology and the consequences of it’s preeminence in directing society.
“The sovereignty of the unqualified individual, of the human being as such, generically, has now passed from being a juridical idea or ideal to be a psychological state inherent to the average man…[…]… Now the average man represents the field over which the history of each period acts; he is to history what sea-level is to geography.”
- - -
Other gems:
“The evil lies in the fact that this decision taken by the masses to assume the activities proper to the minorities is not, and cannot be, manifested solely in the domain of pleasure, but that it is a general feature of our time.”
“The history of the Roman Empire is also the history of the uprising of the Empire of the Masses, who absorb and annul the directing minorities and put themselves in their place.”
“But the mediocre soul is incapable of transmigrations — the supreme form of sport.”
“The sovereignty of the unqualified individual, of the human being as such, generically, has now passed from being a juridical idea or ideal to be a psychological state inherent to the average man…[…]… Now the average man represents the field over which the history of each period acts; he is to history what sea-level is to geography.”
- - -
Other gems:
“The evil lies in the fact that this decision taken by the masses to assume the activities proper to the minorities is not, and cannot be, manifested solely in the domain of pleasure, but that it is a general feature of our time.”
“The history of the Roman Empire is also the history of the uprising of the Empire of the Masses, who absorb and annul the directing minorities and put themselves in their place.”
“But the mediocre soul is incapable of transmigrations — the supreme form of sport.”
March 17, 2021
Спасибо Виктору Дмитриевичу Бабарико за рекомендацию. Действительно потрясающая книга, которую стоило бы включить в курс философии / политологии в универах.
Поражает в этой книге, написанной между первой и второй мировыми войнами, как автор предвидел многие процессы, произошедшие в Европе десятилетиями позже: кровавый разгул коммунизма и фашизма, а затем и объединение Европы в единое пространство без границ. Жаль только, что в реальном мире эти процессы заняли столько времени и жизней.
Интересно, как относились к книге современники? Возможно, считали её пессимистичной и алармистской, или слишком… спесивой. Ведь по автору человеком массы может быть (стать, оказаться) каждый! Наверняка неприятно читать такое описание себя.
Но время подтвердило многие опасения автора и, что самое дрянное, эти опасения и идеи до сих пор актуальны. И даже более актуальны, чем тогда.
Поражает в этой книге, написанной между первой и второй мировыми войнами, как автор предвидел многие процессы, произошедшие в Европе десятилетиями позже: кровавый разгул коммунизма и фашизма, а затем и объединение Европы в единое пространство без границ. Жаль только, что в реальном мире эти процессы заняли столько времени и жизней.
Интересно, как относились к книге современники? Возможно, считали её пессимистичной и алармистской, или слишком… спесивой. Ведь по автору человеком массы может быть (стать, оказаться) каждый! Наверняка неприятно читать такое описание себя.
Но время подтвердило многие опасения автора и, что самое дрянное, эти опасения и идеи до сих пор актуальны. И даже более актуальны, чем тогда.
November 23, 2020
¿De dónde viene la celebridad de este libro torpe y violento? Eso del yo y las circunstancias lo dijo Ortega en otro ensayo. Y mucho antes lo descubrieron los griegos. Lo pensaron y lo dijeron mucho mejor. Eso del vitalismo es una máscara que no alcanza a cubrir un impulso de muerte mal disimulado. Ortega no piensa, adoctrina. No discute, dictamina. No escribe, vomita. Vomita narcisos. Puede que gane la arrogancia, puede que gane el erotismo de la seguridad en sí mismo, puede que gane ese extraño populismo que supuestamente ataca. No creo que haga falta ser un detective para descubrir en este Ortega al huevo de la serpiente. Se trasluce el horror. No el horror que acusa, sino el que gesta.
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