Makers of Ancient Strategy: From the Persian Wars to the Fall of Rome

by Victor Davis Hanson

In this prequel to the now-classic "Makers of Modern Strategy," Victor Davis Hanson, a leading scholar of ancient military history, gathers prominent thinkers to explore key facets of warfare, strategy, and foreign policy in the Greco-Roman world. From the Persian Wars to the final defense of the Roman Empire, "Makers of Ancient Strategy" demonstrates that the military thinking and policies of the ancient Greeks and Romans remain surprisingly relevant for understanding conflict in the modern world.
The book reveals that much of the organized violence witnessed today--such as counterterrorism, urban fighting, insurgencies, preemptive war, and ethnic cleansing--has ample precedent in the classical era. The book examines the preemption and unilateralism used to instill democracy during Epaminondas's great invasion of the Peloponnesus in 369 BC, as well as the counterinsurgency and terrorism that characterized Rome's battles with insurgents such as Spartacus, Mithridates, and the Cilician pirates. The collection looks at the urban warfare that became increasingly common as more battles were fought within city walls, and follows the careful tactical strategies of statesmen as diverse as Pericles, Demosthenes, Alexander, Pyrrhus, Caesar, and Augustus. "Makers of Ancient Strategy" shows how Greco-Roman history sheds light on wars of every age. In addition to the editor, the contributors are David L. Berkey, Adrian Goldsworthy, Peter J. Heather, Tom Holland, Donald Kagan, John W. I. Lee, Susan Mattern, Barry Strauss, and Ian Worthington.

Genres: History, Nonfiction, Military Fiction, War, Military History, Ancient History, Classics

256 pages, Hardcover

First published March 21, 2010

About the author

Victor Davis Hanson was educated at the University of California, Santa Cruz (BA, Classics, 1975), the American School of Classical Studies (1978-79) and received his Ph.D. in Classics from Stanford University in 1980. He lives and works with his family on their forty-acre tree and vine farm near Selma, California, where he was born in 1953.

Reviews

[S. · Rating 4 out of 5]

after reading Professor Hanson's most read work Carnage and Culture, my initial impression was of an undifferentiated schizophrenic, one whose intellect was so powerful that the mask of sanity he's assumed is actually more intelligent and more coherent than the average person's full brain and personality. in other words, Professor Hanson has like two brains, whereas most of us have one. his inner, real personality is a psychotic schizotype, but on top of this layer, there's this charming, far-right, classics-adoring California professor and landowner.

theory number two is that Professor Hanson is actually completely sane. he is, actually, the George W. Bush / Condoleeza Rice / Donald Rumsfeld Professor of Classics at the Invasion and Hegemony Institute I mean, the HOOVER Institute of Stanford University. isn't this nice? a person picking and choosing ancient classical texts to justify the Iraq surge, probably lend support to a Syria invasion strategy, and quite possibly call for full and immediate combat forces to be airdropped into Iran.



what is this fantastic madman calling for? how much human blood does he drink for breakfast? Hanson keeps muttering about the Anabasis and talking about how like spirit can overcome superior numbers. we can set up bases all throughout the world and flow American culture through them, and Westernize the entire world! it's scary to think how much currency his ideas are given in Grand Strategy sessions at the CFR or at the State Department. I hope some like actual classics professor, one who reads Livy and Hesiod (let alone Cicero), sets up some counter-point essays. the picking and choosing of classical incident to support greater and greater military assertiveness seems a very odd activity. (*cough* Sicilian Expedition)

S P A R T A ! ! !

[Frank · Rating 2 out of 5]

While I am familiar with and respect many of the contributors, I have to question whether these short essays are a sound medium for getting their points across.

Rather too much pious navel gazing (not to mention the naval gazing). Most essays end with a section on "what this teaches me about US policy". This reads like an assignment from the writers' social studies teacher (publisher?). The outcome is trite and misguided. Any fool can draw an analogy between situations. The hard part is to determine which analogies are applicable: Athens' mistakes leading up the the Peloponnesan War teach one lesson. If we consider Sparta's misapprehensions, we draw another. Even the better essays are not immune from superficiality: From the career of Julius Caesar we learn power requires flexible application of magnanimity and brutality. Fine. But which tool for which circumstance?

The best essays are the ones that actively undermine historical orthodoxies, especially those drawing facile analogies between ancient and modern world views. The essay on slave rebellions challenge Marxist and Christian attempts to misappropriate, e.g., the story of Spartacus as an expression of universal egalitarianism.

Yet such an ideology is unlikely, because the .. world of Greece and Rome tended to lack a mobilizing ideologies of universal liberation. Nor did anything in the antiquity combine .. a secular utopian vision with an international ideology.

Or this, challenging the blinkered vision interpretation for the fall of Rome:

So often historians, usually following Roman commentators themselves, have discussed the ultimate fate of the frontier in terms of whether Rome, at different points in its history, found or lost the magic strategic calculus, when in reality, given developing conditions on the ground, the empire’s fate was substantially contingent on what was happening across the frontier. Rome was at heart a Mediterranean-based empire that used those resources to exercise domination over large parts of more northerly Europe. The ultimate reason why the empire fell, and why a Mediterranean-based state has never been so dominant in Western Eurasian history since, lies in the fact that the first millennium marks a crucial watershed in the development of Europe as a whole. New farming techniques generated much larger populations, which were then mobilized by much more sophisticated political structures. The result was a fundamental shift in the strategic balance of power, which meant that Mediterranean resources no longer provided a sufficient power base from which to exercise European domination. The accident of Hunnic intrusion may have dictated exactly how and when the empire fell, but it was the unleashing of forces of development in barbarian Europe that meant that it was bound to fall sometime, and, what’s more, never return.

[Nada Hemida · Rating 3 out of 5]

While this book was quite informative, the title is misleading. The authors set off by explaining that there is little to no reference of ancient military tactics and strategy, so instead the essays would be covering general strategy. However, I felt it was even more general, discussing the politics all together with reference to random events. While there is nothing wrong with the clarity of the writing, the poor structure, the rambling, the arbitrariness of the examples (without rounding up to show a specific point) made for difficult readability. For example, the entirety of essay 3. Why Fortifications Endure could be summed up in a single word: walls. I kept reading, thinking another point would be mentioned, but that was it.
I should also mention the book is very Western-centric with a tone of pride, which personally made me feel that I was getting biased information.
I’m kind of disappointed; I did not receive the knowledge that I expected this book would allow me.

[Thor Toms · Rating 3 out of 5]

Solid book with good chapters but nothing earth shattering.

[James Murphy · Rating 4 out of 5]

The aim of the book is a scholarly discussion of some of the strategic concerns the ancients faced but also how many of these same conditions can be seen to exist today. The book contains 10 essays by several of the most eminent historians of the classical Mediterranean. Their individual studies deal with such topics as Rome's strategic defense of the Germanic frontier, the importance of walls and fortifications in ancient Greece, slave wars in the region, particularly the famous Spartacus war, the difficulties of maintaining empires, and the role of personality in statecraft. I thought the collection for the most part intelligent and learned. I thought the linkage to the contemporary world gave these essays added potency. By pointing out the analogy of the Theban preemptive attack on Sparta in 396BC to the Iraq War or the defensive walls of Athens to the modern barriers between Israel and the West Bank or to that along the U. S.-Mexican border, we can see how today's news registers the past. Despite the impact and improvements of technology, we're told, the strategic calculus of nations and the motivations for warfare remain much the same. A couple of the parallels provided bingo moments for me. The Athenian notion of democracy was seen as the cuckoo in the nest and the terror of its day that other states in the region allied against. Even earlier than that, in the 5th century BC, the Athenian empire is shown to reflect the position of the U. S. at the end of the Cold War when only one state stood at the head of the west and therefore bore the dissatisfactions of governments who resented leadership in a time without a serious military threat. These are matters of perception, of course, but as one of these essayists reminds us, the one predominant truth linking the past to the present and making it possible to learn from the ancient classical societies and their military incentives is that human nature stays the same.

[J. Johanis · Rating 4 out of 5]

I loved this book, but to a certain extent I felt that it could have been more in depth. The title of the text implies a much broader scope than what is covered. Additionally, the organization seemed a little random. Makers of Ancient Strategy includes chapters which focus on particular leaders and their strategies as well as chapters that focus on particular types of strategy. I felt that the author had many good observations but lacked a focused plan for presenting the information. Despite information gaps and organization downfalls, the information presented was certainly of interest. In light of current events, I especially enjoyed the sections dealing with urban warfare in Ancient Greece as well as civil strife in Roman times and how it was countered.

Here is a list of the chapters:
1. From Persia with Love.
2. Pericles, Thucydides, and the Defense of Empire.
3. Why Fortifications Endure.
4. Epaminondas the Theban and the Doctrine of Preemptive War.
5. Alexander the Great, Nation Building, and the Creation and Maintenance of Empire.
6. Urban Warfare in the Classical Greek World.
7. Counterinsurgency and the Enemies of Rome.
8. Slave Wars of Greece and Rome.
9. Julius Caesar and the General as State.
10. Holding the Line.

[Stephen Simpson · Rating 2 out of 5]

The individual essays are too short to offer much in the way of real analysis, so the best I can say about this book is that it's largely just a collection of anecdotes about a few Greek and Roman military leaders.

[James Dueñas · Rating 4 out of 5]

El libro es una recopilación de ensayos sobre las estrategias planteadas por Grecia y Roma para enfrentar las dificultades durante diferentes momentos de su historia.

[Frank Kelly · Rating 5 out of 5]

He is the master. A great and very educational read.