Negative Dialektik.

by Theodor W. Adorno

The major work and Adorno's culminating achievement. Negative Dialectics is a critique of the philosophies of Kant, Hegel, and Heidegger, and a visionary elaboration of the author's own vision of dialectics.

Genres: Philosophy, Theory, Nonfiction, Sociology, Politics, German Literature, Germany

408 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1966

About the author

Theodor Wiesengrund Adorno was one of the most important philosophers and social critics in Germany after World War II. Although less well known among anglophone philosophers than his contemporary Hans-Georg Gadamer, Adorno had even greater influence on scholars and intellectuals in postwar Germany. In the 1960s he was the most prominent challenger to both Sir Karl Popper's philosophy of science and Martin Heidegger's philosophy of existence. Jürgen Habermas, Germany's foremost social philosopher after 1970, was Adorno's student and assistant. The scope of Adorno's influence stems from the interdisciplinary character of his research and of the Frankfurt School to which he belonged. It also stems from the thoroughness with which he examined Western philosophical traditions, especially from Kant onward, and the radicalness to his critique of contemporary Western society. He was a seminal social philosopher and a leading member of the first generation of Critical Theory.

Unreliable translations hampered the initial reception of Adorno's published work in English speaking countries. Since the 1990s, however, better translations have appeared, along with newly translated lectures and other posthumous works that are still being published. These materials not only facilitate an emerging assessment of his work in epistemology and ethics but also strengthen an already advanced reception of his work in aesthetics and cultural theory.

Reviews

[Justin Evans · Rating 5 out of 5]

So, this is great, but the translation is *horrific*. I'm not sure you can read this translation and have any idea what Adorno was getting at. Instead, try this free version:

http://www.efn.org/~dredmond/ndtrans....

which works well enough as is.

Adorno's basic insight isn't even that hard to grasp, though: philosophy fails because it assumes the world must be consistent. But the world is 'contradictory,' or 'antagonistic.' We live in a social world which has been built up to provide humans with what we need, but over time that world itself has come to be an end, rather than a means. Hence, no matter how rational we make things (thankyou, econometricians) the whole is irrational, hence, 'contradictory.' So when philosophy claims that it has understood the consistent world, it is just covering up the antagonism. And this is bad. But it's also good, since it suggests that the world doesn't *have* to be antagonistic.

There's much more to it I guess, but that's good enough for one lifetime. Thankyou, Theo.

[Saul Walt · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is one of those must-read books if you like your philosophy nice and serious and indeed politically potent. Adorno takes Heidegger to the beach and drowns him. He questions the foundations of freedom and individuality, looking to see if there is not a foundation beyond sociality and history, there isn't much. He shits on Schopenhauer and he leaves us with Dialectics as a kind of starting-from-the-middle and clawing your way out by letting the logic of discourse work out its own kinks, leading us to ideas that are refined and perhaps sometimes even true.
Nah dude, this one hits hard, it's a bit dense, but worth it for sure.

[Ian "Marvin" Graye · Rating 5 out of 5]

Yes!

[Ethan]

What is Negative Dialectics about? That is hard to say. In broad strokes it is clearly a critical (in the Frankfurt manner) appreciation of the main strands of German philosophy theretofore: Heidegger, Kant, Hegel, Weber; it is also a theory about fascism, how fascism arises after the enlightenment, how its seeds are not only in bourgeois culture, but in a way of a dominating and totalising thinking (an expansion on a theme in The Dialectic of Enlightenment); it is also a scattered preparatory work on aesthetics, sociology, and psychology, as well as political economy; it's a lot of things, and all of those things are woven sporadically yet sharply.

Adorno is incisive throughout, he maintains a tone that never seems to lighten. He takes the subject matter seriously, a trait of thinking and writing which is perhaps hard to find: despite the occasional humour (perhaps at the expense of Heidegger for the most part), there is no wry irony, no sense in which Adorno backs away and takes shots from a distance under the cover of a false levity. Instead, Adorno respects his subject matter, takes it seriously, and is unrelenting in this commitment. Where one is tempted to hand Heidegger, or Hegel, or Kant at least the smallest concession (such as, "despite my criticisms they are a great thinker!" or some like petty comment) Adorno affords them nothing: where they are right they are right, and when they are wrong, they are raked for it as far as possible.

Yet, it should also be said, the tone is never outwardly angry so to speak, it is firm, strict, and it holds those it criticises to account both internally and on the basis of external criteria which make themselves unignorable. Which criteria? Most obviously the fascism of the 20th century (which never seems to have left, an observation Adorno is vindicated on daily), and, in particular, the horror of Auschwitz. It is this latter subject which lends this text also an unbearably sad quality. The dry philosophising of Kant makes no appearance here. Adorno refuses to expunge the politics which manifest themselves so violently as ramifications of the post-enlightment, dumb (in the most pure sense) ratio.

Adorno's "After Auschwitz" is perhaps the most painful three or four pages of philosophy (or writing in general) I have ever read. It holds nothing back, it exposes ones complicity in the underlying culture that could render such mass violence possible. The indictment of the blind ratio reaches its most urgent expression in the depiction of a world in which man is fungible and dominated by a force which is blind and almost as natural as the (comparatively mentioned) Lisbon earthquake, and yet is wholly man's own generation. Domination of nature, its bifurcation into our raw material and the thing-in-itself (without which Heidegger's philosophy is not truly possible), comes to roost at its origin, and man is left as raw material himself.

Ultimately Negative Dialectics is one of the most painful books I have ever read, and its urgency makes its apparent complexity fall away as inconsequential. The self-imposed infantilism of one who regards the book merely as "hard," especially in the face of the content which demands of us hard work and serious treatement, is simply the manifestation of Adorno's main worry throughout this text. This is a text where one must respect themselves to read it.

[Leo46 · Rating 5 out of 5]

Not only is this the true culmination of Adorno’s thought, but it is also the work that shows--despite many of his flaws--that he was nothing short of genius. I guess we should commend his music teacher for telling him not to pursue his dream of music. Nevertheless, Adorno’s call for the ‘recourse into theory’ (although maybe he personally went too far with it) feels necessary in his context of late-capitalist pessimism in facing the disappointments of its manifestations in fascism, Nazism, and “Soviet Marxism” (which I truly dislike him homogenizing this with “The East” multiple times in the book; it literally sounds racist/orientalist). Still, this work rightfully represents the most ruthless and ardent reworking of dialectics by going back to Hegel, Marx, and other relevant theorists (Heidegger and Kant will be the other two main ‘victims’ of Adorno) to hash out the intricacies of the pertinent logic of contradiction. Dialectics is the logic, for Adorno, that necessarily contains an infinitely expanding (with self-imploding elements, too) amount of ‘opposites’--becoming a ‘constellation’--as we reach the depths of whatever ‘late/post’-ism that continues to produce newly perverse and abortive antinomies of capital. Also, a remark on his style: it is difficult and irritating at times, but I believe it is the most fitting form for Adorno that one must take seriously as a beautifully creative feature of his work (that has been explained best by Fredric Jameson in Late Marxism). As one Marx scholar once told me, weirdly, Adorno doesn’t make arguments at all, i.e., he doesn’t employ the usual rhetoric or techniques of what we would call ‘argumentation,’ and that is most definitely one of the reasons he is difficult to read. However, a brief investigation into his niche influence by the style of journalist Karl Kraus and Jameson’s great explication of his influence by Walter Benjamin--that shows the brilliant inextricable tie between Adorno’s aesthetic theory and his philosophy as the ‘mimetic impulse’--shows both the reason and the merit in Adorno’s style. The most explicit example of this in Negative Dialectics, at least, is the last section on Metaphysics as the only section not written in aphorisms, but instead, it is split into numbered chapters--exactly 12 chapters to reflect the cutting-edge nature of 12-tone music. The first two chapters are absolutely heartbreaking and emotionally crushing, especially after a book-long escapade into the most historically significant figures for dialectics, culminating in “1 AFTER AUSHWITZ” and “2 METAPHYSICS AND CULTURE” (the former being the only theory I’ve ever full-on wept to, and the latter being the famous proclamation of Hitler’s negative categorical imperative). Lastly, of course, there are some annoying bashes on Lenin and Brecht, but they can be easily ignored and Negative Dialectics can undoubtedly be read from a Revolutionary point of view (like that of Jameson’s)

Now, here is a summary of the utmost important concepts of the Negative Dialectics I wrote for a recent paper:
Theodor Adorno famously begins Negative Dialectics with the fact that “Philosophy, which once seemed obsolete, lives on because the moment to realize it was missed.”[1] This simultaneously reveals two integral aspects to his thought and its positionality: (1) the historical context 20 years after the end of World War II that saw the utmost ‘barbarism’ of how reason was yielded in Nazi Germany[2] and the stagnation of Marxist revolution in the Soviet Union and its social repression that upset many intellectuals alike, which connects to (2), the Marxist background of Adorno himself where the ‘moment to realize philosophy’ was Marx’s XIth thesis on Feuerbach (1845)—“The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it”[3]—and it had failed. Thus, Adorno returned to the realm of theory, as philosophy was now relevant again, to refine it in the name of new political praxis. His novel idea of Negative Dialectics did just that, as well as his others, but here the Marxist dialectic, by retrospect analysis of the Hegelian dialectic, was ruthlessly criticized to a new rupture where dialectics was forced to take on an absolute openness—Adorno enforced the primacy of the negative aspect of the dialectic. The positive dialectic as a logic of progress between conflicting ideas (Hegel) or material entities (Marx) as contradictions, in both cases, held on to an ability to be “resolved,” especially in historical epochs. Hegel’s absolute-knowledge (Geist) as the Prussian State and Marx’s communism as the end of history were the utmost examples of a positive resolution in the dialectical method.[4] The Hegelian retrospect echoes in Adorno as “dialectics say no more… than that objects do not go into their concepts without leaving a remainder,” and “contradiction is nonidentity under the aspect of identity.”[5] Thus, the Concept is the fundamental molecule, if you will, that links thought and reality in the dialectical method for Adorno. It is necessary to explicate identity, nonidentity, and the Concept fully.
Simply, identity and nonidentity are the positive and negative attitudes towards objects that the thinking individual has; a=a is the identity that deems “a” as a positive object, while a≠b is the nonidentity or difference that distinguishes the two objects and gives them the potential to be separate identities, which always affects the Concept as such. This is because the Concept by itself is the product of human thought that approaches an object asymptotically but can never reach it—the Concept never fully apprehends its object. [In a Leibnizian sense, the Concept does the job of the Monad in that the object can be defined only by defining the rest of the universe—everything that the object is not. This is the operation of nonidentity] In the aphorism on the disenchantment of the Concept by way of emphasizing its ‘infinitude,’ Adorno says:
No object is wholly known; knowledge is not supposed to prepare the phantasm of a whole. Thus the goal of philosophical interpretation of works of art cannot be their identification with the concept… yet it is through such interpretation that the truth of the work unfolds.[6]
“Works of art” are his arbitrary objects in which he is applying, in preliminary fashion, his negative-dialectical way of thinking in so far as the Concept is not the product of a simple, positive identification of the object, but the sentiment of identification itself is necessary for “the truth of the work.” One may be able to guess at this point that the Concept is thus, on the contrary, only possible by means of nonidentity as there is no such thing as identity without nonidentity—one cannot identify anything as peculiar, special, or unique if there is no notion of difference, of things being nonidentical; without nonidentity everything is one and can never be divided. This ties back to the sentiment of identification above, Adorno’s main compliment of identity:
To define identity as the correspondence of the thing-in-itself to its concept is hubris; but the ideal of identity must not simply be discarded. Living in rebuke that the thing is not identical with the concept is the concept’s longing to become identical with the thing. This is how the sense of nonidentity contains identity.[7]
Thus, the longing of identity with the object is the Concept’s tendency of asymptotically approaching the object. The Concept’s constant “butting heads” against reality—as it cannot be like the smooth, algebraic asymptote—is its primary quality.
Lastly, the issue of this notion of the Concept’s connection with Adorno’s overall project needs
to be tackled; this is the importance of nonidentity with materialism or, as Adorno calls it, “The Preponderance of the Object.”[8] “Nonidentity is the secret telos of identification. It is the part that can be salvaged; the mistake in traditional thinking is that identity is taken for the goal.”[9] This is the upshot of what I meant by identification’s sentiment being important for Adorno, as traditional philosophy has shown, because it tries to define things, delineate objects, or—most importantly—produce concepts. However, this sentiment need not have identity as its end goal, for Adorno, it is clearly the contrary. The goal of nonidentity is that any so-called “resolution” of a dialectical change or clash necessarily has an openness about it—that it is always-already in motion to the next dialectical contradiction; every concept is always-about-to-change. This is the essence of negative dialectics’ methodology, which coincides with his broader philosophical project in critiquing vulgar (Soviet) Marxism that is epitomized by its conception of totality. The totality is simply “Marx’s dictum: ‘The relations of production of every society form a whole’ is the methodological point of departure and the key to the historical understanding of social relations.”[10]
Concrete totality is, therefore, the category that governs reality… viz. capitalist society with its internal antagonism between the forces and the relations of production… we maintain that in the case of social reality, these contradictions are not a sign of the imperfect understanding of society; on the contrary, they belong to the nature of reality itself and to the nature of capitalism. When the totality is known, they will not be transcended and cease to be contradictions. Quite the reverse, they will be seen to be necessary contradictions arising out of the antagonisms of this system of production.[11]
Theoretically, the totality is the sum of all current societal contradictions and antagonisms, with some remnant of openness for change towards the end of the Lukács quote as he was critiquing the vulgar Marxists of the Second International that made the totality static and monolithic.[12] However, most openness was thwarted by Stalin’s dictum in Dialectical and Historical Materialism (1938), but it truly began “in 1936 [when] Stalin made the mistake of proclaiming that classes and class struggle had ceased to exist in the Soviet Union.”[13] As Lukács said about vulgar Marxist Max Adler, we can hear it resound for Soviet Marxism, “by this stroke the objective economic antagonism as expressed in the class struggle evaporates.”[14] Adorno clearly agrees, in the Marxist conception of class struggle as the ‘motor of history,’ that antagonisms have not evaporated and may never if dialectics must always be negative.[15] Thus, Adorno’s negative dialectics is the elaboration of the inner-workings and logic of the open totality—a totality in its Lukácsian novelty of “the proletariat is at one and the same time the subject and object of its own knowledge.”[16] Adorno goes one leg further with ‘the preponderance of the object’ to necessarily have a grounding in concrete-reality within his negative dialectics:
Subjectivity changes its quality in a context which it is unable to evolve on its own. Due to the inequality inherent in the concept of mediation, the subject enters into the object altogether differently from the way the object enters into the subject. An object can be conceived only by a subject but always remains something other than the subject, whereas a subject by its very nature is from the outset an object as well. Not even as an idea can we conceive a subject that is not an object; but we can conceive an object that is not a subject. To be an object also is part of the meaning of subjectivity; but it is not equally part of the meaning of objectivity to be a subject.[17]
This preponderance of the object is one giant leap from Marx, who’s “materialism has nothing to do with reference to matter”[18] and deemed “the subject is nothing other than practice”[19] by the XIth thesis. However, no matter how advanced Adorno’s conception of dialectics became, the long-standing problem in Marxism of any explanation of psychology or consciousness of the subject seems even more obsolete and neglected by this ‘preponderance of the object.’[20]


[1] Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. E. B. Ashton, Reprint edition (New York: Continuum, 1987), 3.
[2] This can almost be directly corelated to his intellectual partner Max Horkheimer’s famous essay “The End of Reason” (1941) but also their combined effort in Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944).
[3] Karl Marx, Theses on Feuerbach (Moscow, Soviet Union: Progress Publishers, 1969), https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx....
[4] Frieder Otto Wolf, “Hegel’s ‘Philosophy of Right’ Lecture and Lecture Notes” (Lecture, “German Philosophy from Kant to Habermas” FUBiS Summer 2023, PPT No. 6, Freie Universität berlin, July 28, 2023). Karl Marx, “Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844,” in The Marx-Engels Reader, Second Edition (W. W. Norton & Company, 1978). Communism as resolution is also tackled by Marx, Engels, and other Marxists as the ‘negation of negation.’
[5] Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 6.
[6] Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 14.
[7] Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 149.
[8] Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 183-186. The title of the aphorism is “The Object’s Preponderance.”
[9] Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 149.
[10] Georg Lukács, “What Is Orthodox Marxism?,” in History and Class Consciousness, Foundations 19 (Paris: Foreign Languages Press, 2021), https://foreignlanguages.press/wp-con.... This chapter as essay was originally written in January 1921. “Marx’s Dictum” is cited as “The Poverty of Philosophy, p. 123” in the text. Lukács is an extremely suitable citation here as not only a foremost Marxist theorist of the early 20th-century but of his contradictory position as the primary influence to the entire Frankfurt School (of Adorno) and the court philosopher of the Soviet Union that Adorno criticized immensely.
[11] Lukács, “What Is Orthodox Marxism?,” 19.
[12] Lukács, “What Is Orthodox Marxism?,” 9-35.
[13] Jose-Maria Sison, On the Philosophy of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, Sison Reader Series, Book 2 (The Netherlands: International Network for Philippine Studies (INPS), 2021), 92.
[14] Lukács, “What Is Orthodox Marxism?,” 21.
[15] “Elitist pride would be the last thing to befit the philosophical experience. He who has it must admit to himself how much, according to his possibilities in existence, his experience has been contaminated by existence, and ultimately by the class relationship.” Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 42.
[16] Lukács, “What Is Orthodox Marxism?,” 31.
[17] Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 183.
[18] Étienne Balibar, The Philosophy of Marx, trans. Chris Turner (London ; New York: Verso, 2007), 23. The rest of the quote reads, “and this will remain the case for a very long time, until Engels undertakes to reunite Marxism with the natural sciences of the second half of the nineteenth-century.”
[19] Balibar, The Philosophy of Marx, 25.
[20] It is worthy to note that Freudo-Marxism and Althusser’s use of Lacanian psychoanalysis can be seen as two major attempts at a Marxist conception of psychology. However, the former was not really the case as it used psychoanalysis as a means towards society’s drives (rather than vice versa), and the latter was short-lived as Althusser only had the time in his career to make his novel discoveries in Ideology and Reproduction, really only leaving notes towards a possible absolute union between Marxism and Lacanian psychoanalysis.

[Adam · Rating 5 out of 5]

Still waiting on this retranslation... I hope all is well with Bob. If you are even mildly interested in this work, read it and read it again. Obviously this is Adorno's most programmatic philosophical statement, a working-through of Kant and Hegel with Marx as analyst and Heidegger as antagonist (cf. Jargon). Impossible to overstate the importance of this tome.

[Christopher · Rating 4 out of 5]

brilliant ignorance

[Pablo · Rating 5 out of 5]

This was definitely the hardest book I have ever read, even though I was lucky enough to have a professor give us commentary on the reading every week, I probably only a grasped a small fraction of the content. Proficiency in German Idealism is required! For those of you who haven't read Heidegger, Hegel, Husserl, Schopenhauer, Kant, Nietzsche, Aristotle, etc. (basically all of the fathers of Western philosophy), let me suggest the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy as your best friend! Nevertheless, I highly recommend this book! This work, along with other of his books, launched the prescient field of critical theory. The current political climate has sparked a resurgence of this field and therefore is a must for any person interested in deep analyses of culture. Good luck!

[Artemis · Rating 5 out of 5]

Really, REALLY bizarre implicit object-normative ontology underlying negative dialectics, especially for someone as post-ontology as Adorno ...
this shit slaps though, the command of yielding to the qualitative aspects of the object and the mimetic elective element entailed rather than mere concept reflection is both necessary for true objectivity AND great therapy. shame about the jazz stuff though :///

[Katie Glanz]

The Redmond translation is basically unintelligible. It seems like a completely literal translation from German. This is great, for accuracy's sake, but not so great for reading. I would stick with the Ashton version. It might not be as true to Adorno, but it would at least be readable.

[Victoria Hawco · Rating 3 out of 5]

Please see my review for “The End of Progress,” by Amy Allen.

[Aron · Rating 5 out of 5]

"In gewissem Betracht ist die dialektische Logik positivistischer als der Positivismus, der sie ächtet: sie respektiert, als Denken, das zu Denkende, den Gegenstand, auch dort, wo er den Denkregeln nicht willfahrt."
- Adorno, Negative Dialektik

Das zentrale Problem sei, dass der Begriff und die Sache niemals deckungsgleich sind: Das Besondere würde durch die Subsumption unter den allgemeinen Begriff unwahr verdinglicht, ihrer historischen Genese wie ihrem Spannungsverhältnis zum erkennenden Subjekt beraubt. Auch die Philosophie treffe - wie einer angehängten Notiz Adornos auf den Punkt gebracht - (ungewollt) stets eine Vorentscheidung für den Idealismus durch ihr Operieren in Begriffen, was ihnen einen Vorrang verleihe ("Selbst Materie ist eine Abstraktion", S.531).

Doch soll man in Anbetracht der Unmöglichkeit positiver Bestimmung einfach schweigen? Die dialektische Denkbewegung könne den Versuch wagen in ihrer Exerzierung den Sachen gerecht(er) werden, indem sie sich bestimmt gegen sich selbst richtet. Negative Dialektik ist die Methode, hier angewandt auf die Metaphysik, den Freiheitsbegriff und auf Reflexion des Denkprozesses selbst vor dem Hintergrund der konstitutiven Charakters sprachlicher Kategorien, der Gravitas eines Ursprungsprinzip, sowie des Drangs der Selbsterhaltung als Momenten der Ideologie.

Die Identifikationsmomente der Oberbegriffe bei Kant, Hegel und Marx werden exponiert und Adorno zufolge als Umschlag der Vernunft in Ideologie überführt. Heidegger, der der Verdinglichung ebenfalls in seiner Seins- und Daseinsphilosophie entgehen wollte, sei hingegen dem Denken als Tautologie und des Mythos schuldig. Das was zwischen Subjekt und Objekt passiert ließe sich als Intersubjektives auch nicht unter die Herrschaft eines positiven Begriffes bringen. Der beigefügte Aufsatz zum "Jargon der Eigentlichkeit" nimmt ihn dann aus allen erdenklichen Winkeln durch den Schredder.

Dringend notwendig ist das, weil die Setzungen des Denkens so tückisch sind. So war auch mir ein metaphysisches Bild vorwiegend, dass die Existenz als ein ontisches Ganzes gegeben sei, welches das Denken zerteile, um anschließend Vorhersagen über den Zusammenhang der Einzelphänomene zu treffen. Unbemerkt blieb dabei, dieses Ganze auch als Erdachtes zu identifizieren. Vielmehr würden Totalität und Fragment als nicht-versöhnbare Endpole nicht nur in konkreten Wirkbeziehungen, sondern auch in gegenseitigen Konstitutionsprozessen gegeneinander gestellt werden müssen, um sie in Interpenetration ihrer fiktiven Setzung zu bereinigen. Dieser Bereinigungsprozess der Reflexion der eigenen Setzung könnte einer sein, dem das dialektische Denken dem systemtheoretischen voraus hat. Allerdings bin ich letzterem auch nicht in Tiefe bewandert.

Die Implikationen - sollte man Adornos Ausführungen überzeugend finden - sind fast endlos, weil die Dialektik jedes Verhältnis des Denkens zu seinen Gegenständen betrifft. Auch wenn in diesem Buch eher ausgespart scheinen mir gerade soziologische Aspekte im Spannungsverhältnis des Individuums und der Gesellschaft fruchtbar, was Adornos soziologische Schriften als nächstes für mich interessant macht.

[Foley Stocks]

Adorno is clearly not interested in vapid intellectualising: he interrogates the material with precision and respects the nuances of his own findings; he doesn’t proclaim them as profundities in a manner alike what he charges Heidegger with. Yet he is not uncommonly charged with this—and why shouldn’t it be so difficult? The times are, by nature, unprecedented, and it would be naive to proceed with clear-cut divisions of philosophy as though these were self-evident fixtures; part of the difficulty is Adorno’s refusal to cleanly pretend to operate on such prefabricated lines. As he is apt to do, there is a kind of openness, in line with his motif of the falsity of the whole, and so the reader isn’t met with a rigid, unfree totality that they can dogmatically “learn,” contrary to the rules of formal logic or the domain of thought experiments that only play-act philosophy. Instead, Adorno forces the philosophies of Kant, Hegel, Heidegger, and so forth, to reckon with their results and deficiencies, and never falters to bring in the historical position it precipitated—the reader has to think along with the text precisely because nothing is left out, and everything is on the line.
Something that makes the reading experience of Negative Dialectics quite different from other, frequently heralded works of philosophy is how Adorno is so acutely attuned to human suffering. Even the seemingly dry analysis is laden with it. As he says, that the “law of value comes into play over the heads of formally free individuals” cannot be ignored. And this consistent return to the fungibility of man—exchangeable quantities within a category—results in the devastating section on Auschwitz, in which man as wholly exchangeable bears a “total nullity,” and can likewise be exterminated like excess in a factory.
As we move further away in time from the Holocaust, such an event becomes increasingly felt by new generations as an “anomaly,” so to speak—an alien event, sidelined to the realm of “history,” that is, a kind of ahistorical history where the relative positions of historical events are equated (markedly a result of the bourgeois tendency to “dehistoricize,” as Adorno himself critiques). It is in such conditions that learning from Negative Dialectics becomes ever more crucial.

[C. Varn · Rating 2 out of 5]

Not for the content, but for the translation of the content. This translation is notoriously bad. It is not a literal translation from the German as is often said, but literally skips explicit references and does not note implicit references to Kant and Hegel nor does the translator use the standard German translations in the scholarly idiom for those terms. A nightmare translation

[Murray Katkin · Rating 5 out of 5]

Just wow… every page is swarming with immense dialectical insight. If you’ve ever wondered what historical-philosophical journey dialectics has taken since Kant, this is the book for you. The added treat is Adorno’s beautiful takedown of 20th century philosophy’s biggest mistake, Heidegger’s philosophic Nazism. Given that this is a text from the Frankfurt School, you may strain to understand the exact meaning of the text without a) knowing Adorno’s style as well as the rest of the IFS b) some level of familiarity with the thought of Kant, Hegel, Marx, Freud, Heidegger, Husserl, Bergson, and Benjamin.

The text, for those reasons, is a great challenge, but it is rewarding to the utmost degree. Adorno’s writing is loaded with meaning, ironies, dialectical twists, flowing from one sentence into another. For this reason, rereading of certain key sections is key for understanding the text.

Also, the way it was divided into smaller sections on top of the chapter structure makes the work more easily digestible.

The critique of the identity-thesis at work in the philosophic tradition of German idealism, from Kant to Hegel serves as the pretext for Adorno’s negatively outlined vision of dialectics: the immanent, radical criticism of the compulsory nature of self-preservation—which to Adorno forms the theoretical substrate of the dialectic of enlightenment. Abandoning the self as we know it is the only way to realize what potential we have within ourselves. He calls dialectical thinking the use of logic’s own immanent laws to break out of the straitjacket of those laws. In this respect, he enriches dialectics by immanent criticism of dialectics.

Very fun, very hard, very good. If I had knowledge of the text in German, I would have more qualms with the translation. I know people dislike it, but it’s one of the many obstacles to Adorno’s being understood, albeit one that isn’t insuperable.

[Illiterate · Rating 4 out of 5]

Concepts aren’t identical with particular objects. Identity is a social illusion and so object of critique. Negative dialectic elucidates difference/nonidentity. It has no end/telos.

[David]

If you aren't intimately familiar with Kant, Hegel, Marx and Heidegger, 75% of Adorno's thinking will pass through you like undigested apple seeds; vast swathes of jargon with very little in the way of concrete oases for the amateur mind to replenish itself. Bits and pieces on free will, metaphysics and death filter through nonetheless, and Adorno's central thesis (namely, Enlightenment's tendency of relegating that which 'rationality' doesn't cover to not just complete irrelevance but epistemological nonexistence, and the way this correlates with our problematic collective vision of death) gradually makes itself clear by way of grinding, pounding repetition: reified identity is a problem, coming to terms with non-identity the way to go.

The final chapter, decreeing ominously to tackle philosophy after Auschwitz, reads like the non-negotiable obituary of 2600 years of philosophy.

It's been suggested (by the book's translator himself, even) that understanding the already very dense text is made even more difficult because of the way German gets mangled when adjusted to (or worse, transliterated to) English's procrustean bed, so take that into account and try some alternative/critical editions.

[Rui Coelho · Rating 4 out of 5]

"Kids, don't do absolute dialetics" - Adorno, maybe
A very usefull lens throught which to look at Hegel and ordinary Marxism. It just happens to be buried in a lot of critique of Kant, Hegel and Heidegger.

[Volbet · Rating 5 out of 5]

Did I understand anything that Theodor W. Adorno has written in Negative Dialectics? No, but that has never stopped me from talking out of my ass before.

This book was released at the tail end of Adorno's life, and it in many ways summarize what Adorno's work as a philosopher was all about. Aiming his intellectual riffel at the Western tradition and firing a shotgun blast, killing anything in its path and maiming anything near his target. And as always, Adorno made sure that Martin Heidegger was proper dead.
But what separates Negative Dialectics from previous works like Minima Moralia: Reflections on a Damaged Life and Ontology and Dialectics 1960-61 is that Adorno is actually constructing something useful out of the pieces left by his carnage.

What Adorno is getting at is that the traditional approach to dialectics, as dialectics have been since Plato and as crystalized by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, have been wrong. Whenever a synthesis is reached, it's not best understood as equal to or greater than the thesis and antithesis. Sometimes negation will lead to a lose, a destruction of the dialectical result. And as Adorno argues, he comes up with this negative approach as being the most logical and epistemologically sound approach to the dialectical method, employing an almost Aristotelian fundamentalism to his logical analysis of not only the examples of dialectics used, but in his approach to dialectics themselves.

Even if Adorno often falters to obscurity for what seems like obscurities' sake, I can't fault the arguments as lacking. Adorno was always a master of showing exactly why his thesis is sound, and Negative Dialectics is no different.

[Mauni · Rating 5 out of 5]

The Hegelian tradition presents us with a comfortable narrative: thesis, antithesis, synthesis. Clean. Satisfying. But what if this very satisfaction is our first mistake? What if the drive toward systematic unity – that peculiarly German philosophical impulse – is itself part of the problem we must confront?

Here's the challenge Adorno presents: The world, in its concrete particularity, resists our attempts at systematic understanding. The point isn't simply that our concepts are inadequate – it's that this very inadequacy must become the engine of our thinking.

The Frankfurt School is often dismissed as merely negative – lacking a positive program for change. But this misses the point entirely. It's an insistence on a more rigorous form of thinking that refuses the false comfort of premature synthesis.

Hence the strength of Negative Dialectics lies precisely in its refusal to resolve into a neat system. It's a philosophy that turns the critical gaze upon philosophy itself, revealing the contradictions inherent in any attempt to fully systematize thought.

The challenge Adorno leaves us with is this: How do we think and act in a world where our conceptual tools are necessarily inadequate? The answer isn't to abandon concepts altogether - and certainly not to become willful ideologues — but to use them (ideas) more consciously, more critically, always aware of what escapes our grasp.

[Schedex]

"Die Negation der Negation macht diese nicht rückgängig, sondern erweist, daß sie nicht negativ genug war; sonst bleibt Dialektik zwar, wodurch sie bei Hegel sich integrierte, aber um den Preis ihrer Depotenzierung, am Ende indifferent gegen das zu Beginn Gesetzte. Das Negierte ist negativ, bis es verging. Das trennt entscheidend von Hegel. Den dialektischen Widerspruch, Ausdruck des unauflöslich Nichtidentischen, wiederum durch Identität glätten heißt soviel wie ignorieren, was er besagt, in reines Konsequenzdenken sich zurückbegeben. Daß die Negation die Positivität sei, kann nur verfechten, wer Positivität, als Allbegrifflichkeit, schon im Ausgang präsupponiert."

[Leo Reinemann · Rating 4 out of 5]

Hätte er nur mal weniger Nebensätze verwendet...

[sardinosaure 🦕 · Rating 4 out of 5]

on prépare des folies avec ad

[Caroline Loftus · Rating 4 out of 5]

Die Welt ist schlimmer als die Hölle und besser

[0:50 · Rating 3 out of 5]

If dialectics is in such a haste to ditch the law of non-contradiction, one wonders why they still stick to the Law of Excluded Middle. Of course, it allows the whole method, reducing everything to same and the other, following the legacy of Stoic Logic here and explaining why it has a certain association, noted by Adorno here too, with positivism and analytic philosophy. Hegelian dialectics is one big analytic statement: it tells us nothing, yet the process is supposed to be everything. Would it be fair to say that dialectics is to philosophy and thought what cryptocurrencies are to speculative asset markets? Whatever the verdict, they certainly seem about equally subversive in the face of the larger system of problems they're facing. But ultimately: if you're going to assume thet Hegel was "necessary" for the development of thought or whatever, you need to refute the possibility of term logic and all the other alternatives to typical propositional logic. A book like Natural History of Negation offers a much better overview of the breadth of this problem.

However, this book does contain some interesting commentaries on Kant, although they're a bit naivé in interpreting Kant at complete face value, reminiscent of Nietzsche's literally quixotic rage against Socrates, and accusing him of tautologies where in fact he endeavoured to show certain results in a negative way with the antinomies, merely referring to them elsewhere. Or else, it's a me-problem of reading stuff Kant didn't intend into Kant: like the necessity of law for freedom, I don't think it was some kind of blunder on Kant's part. Anyway, Adorno does basically refute Heidegger, but that alone doesn't warrant 4 stars.

[Preetam Chatterjee · Rating 5 out of 5]

#Binge Reviewing my previous Reads # The most “difficult” works ever written

Theodor W. Adorno’s *Negative Dialectics* is a work of intellectual audacity, a rigorous philosophical critique of thought, knowledge, and society that refuses to reconcile contradictions neatly.

Published in 1966, it represents a culmination of Adorno’s lifelong engagement with the Frankfurt School, critical theory, and a Marxist-inflected philosophy that insists the world is not reducible to tidy conceptual schemas.

Unlike traditional dialectics, which aim to resolve contradictions into higher syntheses, Adorno’s negative dialectics seeks to preserve the tension, to allow contradictions to persist as a vehicle for thought. It is a philosophy that refuses consolation, insisting that the work of thinking must always contend with the unassimilable, the real that resists conceptual capture.

From the outset, Adorno establishes the stakes: thought, he contends, is always mediated by concepts, yet concepts are inherently inadequate to capture reality. “Concepts are never adequate to what they seek to grasp,” he writes, and this insufficiency is not a flaw but the very condition of critical thought. Unlike a dogmatic system that smooths over gaps, Adorno’s negative dialectics acknowledges them, making the refusal to reduce contradiction the central method. Reality, in its complexity and particularity, continually exceeds conceptual frames.

By insisting on this, Adorno aligns philosophy with ethical responsibility: the thinker must not collapse difference or ignore suffering simply for the sake of theoretical elegance. Here, philosophy becomes not a self-contained enterprise but a moral engagement with reality.

The book’s style mirrors its conceptual rigor. Dense, uncompromising, and at times almost aphoristic, Adorno’s prose refuses to simplify. He interweaves discussions of Kant, Hegel, Marx, and modern empiricism, but always with the insistence that canonical systems have their limitations. Hegelian dialectics, for example, seeks reconciliation of opposites in synthesis; Adorno challenges this teleology, emphasizing the enduring tension and negativity that Hegelian closure elides.

Likewise, Marxist categories—commodity, labour, capital—are treated critically, not as final explanations but as points of departure for rigorous reflection on social reality. The approach is forensic: historical, empirical, and conceptual analysis converge to illuminate the fractures, paradoxes, and injustices of the modern world.

Adorno’s ethical concern undergirds the philosophical argument. Negative dialectics is not merely formal; it is moral. In attending to the non-identity between concept and object, Adorno implicitly advocates for a sensitivity to the other, the non-assimilable, and the oppressed.

Concepts cannot fully encompass the suffering, individuality, or historical particularity of human beings, and philosophy that ignores this is complicit in domination. In this sense, *Negative Dialectics* resonates with his broader critical-theoretical project, including *Minima Moralia*: a call to attentiveness, to recognition, and to the preservation of difference against totalising systems. Thought is never neutral; it carries the weight of ethical responsibility.

The text’s engagement with modernity is particularly striking. Adorno is acutely aware of the way technological rationality, commodification, and mass culture impose homogenising frameworks upon lived experience. In the same period as the postwar reconstruction of Europe, the rise of mass media, and the expansion of consumer culture, Adorno saw reason itself being instrumentalised—subordinated to efficiency, profit, and social control.

Negative dialectics is thus both a method and a critique: a method of thought that refuses totalisation and a critique of the ways systems of power attempt to assimilate difference, silence contradiction, and smooth over social injustice. It is an intellectual resistance to closure, an insistence that reality’s recalcitrance is morally and philosophically instructive.

Adorno’s insistence on non-identity—the gap between concept and object—is both abstract and concrete. He draws examples from art, music, and literature, showing how aesthetic experience models the tension between representation and reality. Beethoven’s late string quartets, for instance, demonstrate a musical thought that refuses facile resolution, embodying non-identity in sound.

Similarly, the horrors of history—the Holocaust, systemic oppression, and the suffering of labour—cannot be fully conceptualised; they resist closure, demanding continual critical attention. Adorno’s negative dialectics is a way to think about these phenomena without reducing them to ideology or a comforting narrative.

The book challenges the reader as much as it challenges philosophy. Its prose is demanding, its sentences layered, and its arguments intricate. Yet the intellectual rigour is inseparable from its ethical force. Each paragraph presses the reader to consider the limits of understanding, the obligations of thought, and the consequences of conceptual complacency. Adorno does not offer easy resolutions; he does not promise synthesis, consolation, or mastery. Instead, he offers a method of engagement with reality that is vigilant, rigorous, and ethically charged.

In sum, *Negative Dialectics* is a work that simultaneously advances philosophy and embodies critique. It insists on preserving tension, acknowledging the insufficiency of concepts, and confronting reality in its full particularity. It is at once formal, ethical, and deeply historical. For readers willing to engage with its density, it offers an extraordinary vision of what philosophy can achieve: a discipline that respects the unassimilable, challenges totalising narratives, and attends to both truth and justice.

Adorno’s negative dialectics is not a comfort, but it is a demanding, profound, and enduring call to critical thought in a world that is always, in some sense, damaged.

[Benjamin · Rating 1 out of 5]

I have the Ashton edition of this book. Despite having read and enjoyed other Frankfurt School texts, and despite having a terminal degree in philosophy, the text of this book is so unreadable that it is borderline offensive. Other readers have asserted that this issues from the inelegance of the translation, so I will suspend judgment about the work itself, except to say that I get nothing whatsoever out of trying to read it in good faith.

[Joshua · Rating 3 out of 5]

Amazing work but the translation is UTTER SHIT. It actually pained me to read it, but I'm holding out for a better edition... why are all the Adorno translations horrible? The recent Stanford publication of Dialectic of Enlightenment is a step up from the 70's Verso one, but parts still read like transliteration.

2 stars for the translation, 5 for the content (I would suppose)

[Foxtail]

Не то, с чего стоит начинать знакомство с Франкфуртской школой.

[Maslan's hierarchy of reads · Rating 4 out of 5]

This was in fact hard to read. My first Adorno experience. I liked it a lot though, especially beginning with the idea that Philosophy can no longer offer a rationalized and totalizing "truth." The bit that I most took away was that in order to understand a reality of an object, one must identify its non-identity. The "non-identity" of the object being what the object might exist as if one stripped away from it all the societal meaning that one has already imbued it in and sat and considered all its many "possibilities." I liked this a lot because I have never really understood the great need humans feel for categories. They bug me. But, Adorno thinks that we can't really think outside of "concepts": that as soon as we begin to look at the object trying to determine its truth, we begin to conceptualize and project concepts on it. The best we can do is engage in a dialectal thought, which requires working in contradiction: we know that we are conceptualizing the truth, seeking to identify it within the walls of our social reality; at the same time, we are trying to divorce ourselves from concept in order to apprehend its "truth." I read this because I am trying to write about how two different types of metaphors (ones that aim at disenchanting and others that aim at enchanting by laying the seeds for conspiracy theory) seek to diagnose "truths" about the functioning of objects, and how one is meant to distinguish between the two. The idea of thinking in contradiction was very helpful for the question of how one can tell one type of metaphor from another! I actually like it a lot in general for thinking about current political things: that which resists letting you think in contradiction or exposing its own, or being bothered by discrepancy, is probably deeply uninterested in truth.