There’s a perspective in this book that other history books about WWII I’ve read don’t have. By the time I finished Rick Atkinson’s three volume history, the war was over and the Allies’ ability to stop their enemies seemed obvious. But you don’t get that feeling from 1942 (though Groom looks ahead optimistically after 1942 was over). At the beginning, reeling from Pearl Harbor, the US didn’t look particularly powerful. The Germans and the Japanese had been planning war for a long time. They had the personnel, the equipment and the plans. The Americans and the British didn’t. Nor did the Russians. Stalin stayed in bed when the Germans attacked, in shock and probably fear. By 1942 Hitler already had a great deal of Europe subdued and countries were still falling. Britain had waited too long to prepare. They won the air war over the Channel at huge cost in lives, planes and bomb damage and at least held off the Germans until they moved on (presumably temporarily) to the Russians. The US was not completely unprepared. Building the Navy in anticipation of trouble in the Pacific had begun and the President was trying to prepare the country for what he saw as inevitable, but that was hard because citizens were unwilling to involve themselves in another war and thought the US was isolated enough to pull off isolationism. Most didn’t care much about Britain and the Irish weren’t really on board—and Irish Americans actively wanted Britain destroyed. The wealth and industrial power of the US was strong enough to meet the challenge, as even far-seeing German and Japanese leaders recognized, but in 1942 that was potential only.
It must have looked to Americans, as 1942 unfolded, like the Germans and the Japanese would win. The losses were tremendous, humiliating, and not easily overcome. Pearl Harbor (that generation’s 9/11) had been shocking, and it was followed by the fall of the Philippines, the major US stronghold in Asia. And slowly the US learned that Japan was an extraordinary enemy, one that literally expected troops to fight to the death and assumed prisoners of war, their own and those of their enemies, were traitors. Japan had not signed the Geneva Convention and treated prisoners abominably. The Bataan Death March occurred in 1942 and those who survived spent the rest of the war in Japanese prison camps where they were starved and egregiously mistreated.
One problem I saw with the book was the emphasis on the war in the Pacific. It wasn’t just that more of the book focused on the Pacific and not Europe (and North Africa where most of the 1942 Western Front action took place) but that the chapters on Pearl Harbor, the Philippines, Midway, Guadalcanal, the war at sea, were more colorful, more emotionally wrenching while the chapters on North Africa seemed a more dispassionate retelling of that history. That More of the book was devoted to the Pacific was reflective of what happened in 1942; Americans fighting at sea in the Pacific and on remote islands WAS the war for most of 1942. The passion in the retelling of the Pacific stories may be related to several things: the isolated tropical environments in which soldiers fought like the jungle of Guadalcanal or the devastating conditions when hundreds or thousands of men died on sinking ships. There were some comparable details in North Africa, like men roasted to death in inferior American tanks, but the overall focus was not so emotional.
Finally, this is primarily an American book. A Russian or a Brit, for example, would focus on different events and have a different emotional focus.