Grasping Gallipoli: Terrains, Maps and Failure at the Dardanelles, 1915

by Peter Chasseaud, Peter Doyle

The failure of the Gallipoli campaign was instantly blamed on a great untruth - that the War Office was unprepared for Dardanelles operations and gave Sir Ian Hamilton little in the way of maps and terrain intelligence. This myth is repeated by current historians. The Dardanelles Commission became a battleground of accusation and counter-accusation. This book, incorporating much previously unpublished material, demonstrates that geographical intelligence preparations had indeed been made by the War Office and the Admiralty for decades. They had collected a huge amount of terrain information, maps and charts covering the topography and defences, and knew a great deal about Greek plans to capture the Gallipoli Peninsula. At least one plan was Anglo-Greek.
Much of this material, which is here identified and evaluated, was handed over to Hamilton's Staff. Additional material was obtained in theatre before the landings, T. E. Lawrence playing a part. This book, which is the first to examine the intelligence and mapping side of the Dardanelles campaign, looks closely at its terrain, and describes the production and development of new operations maps, and clarifies whether the intelligence was properly processed and efficiently used. It also examines the use of aerial photos taken by the Royal Naval Air Service during the campaign, and charting, hydrographic and other intelligence work by the Royal Navy.

264 pages, Hardcover

First published September 1, 2005

About the author

Peter Chasseaud is a British historian specializing in military cartography. He is a fellow of the Royal Geographical Society and a member of the Royal United Services Institute. He also founded the Historical Military Mapping Group within the British Cartographic Society. His book Mapping the First World War showcases rare and previously unpublished maps from the 1914–1918 conflict, offering a detailed visual insight into the Great War.

Reviews

[Dimitri · Rating 3 out of 5]

Does the world need a book to refute that early but small part of criticism levelled at the planners of the abortive amphibious assault on the Turkish peninsula, that there were no good maps?

One battlefield archeologist and a cartophraphy historian with an impressive niche palmares (Mapping the Second World War: The history of the war through maps from 1939 to 1945 & Mapping the First World War: The Great War through maps from 1914-1918) seemed to think so. I must say hey gave it their best, with an amount of detail that will test even the feel for the ground of seasoned Gallipoli students.

What overall lessons stand out ? What can the average Gallipoli aficionado carry away from this ? Certainly the amount of material generated by the long-term Eastern Question was relatively abundant, with contributions by the French allies. The Russians and the (nominally neutral) Greeks, for all their geostrategic interest in the Straits, were curiously passive in the field.

There is no final verdict as such. It serves to direct the historiographic disputes, not to take part in them. For these who need the subject, this is a great book. I don't, so 3 stars.