What is this Thing Called Knowledge?: Second Edition

by Duncan Pritchard

What is Knowledge? Where does it come from? Can we know anything at all? This lucid and engaging introduction grapples with these central questions in the theory of knowledge, offering a clear, non-partisan view of the main themes of epistemology including recent developments such as virtue epistemology and contextualism. Duncan Pritchard discusses traditional issues and contemporary ideas in thirteen easily digestible sections, What is this thing called Knowledge? contains many helpful student-friendly features including study questions, annotated further reading, a glossary and a guide to web resources. Clear and interesting examples are used throughout. This is an ideal first textbook in the theory of knowledge for undergraduates taking a first course in philosophy.

Genres: Philosophy, Nonfiction, Science, Research

200 pages, Paperback

First published September 30, 2006

About the author

Duncan Pritchard FRSE is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh, UK. His main research area is epistemology, and he has published widely in this field, including the books Epistemic Luck (2005), Knowledge (2009), The Nature and Value of Knowledge (with A. Millar & A. Haddock, 2010), and Epistemological Disjunctivism (2012). In 2007 he was awarded a Phillip Leverhulme Prize for his research. In 2011 he was elected to a Fellowship of the Royal Society of Edinburgh

Reviews

[Negarin · Rating 4 out of 5]

کلاس‌های عصر شنبه epistemology برای من جذاب‌ترین بخش ترم اول دانشجویی بود. جایی که داخلش می‌تونستم به معنی واقعی کلمه فکر کنم و باورهام رو به چالش بکشم.

کتاب چیستی معرفت از دانکن پریچارد کتابی بود که از طرف استاد این کلاس، دکتر یغمایی، برای مطالعه بیشتر معرفی شد. خوندنش برای من سراسر شور بود و لذت. نمی‌دونم دقیقا چه مرگمه و داستان چیه که انقدر خودآزارگرانه از رنجی که فلسفه به مغزم می‌ده لذت می‌برم.

چیستی معرفت دانکن پریچارد برای شروع مطالعه در زمینه epistemology کتاب خوبیه. زبان قابل فهمی داره و فهمش برای من که مخاطب بسیار مبتدی فلسفه به شمار می‌آم و قبل از این هم مطالعه‌ای در باب معرفت‌شناسی نداشتم چالشی ایجاد نکرد.

محتوای این کتاب و به طور کلی معرفت شناسی حول این سوال مهم گردش می‌کنه که «دونستن» چیه؟ چه زمانی می‌تونم ادعا بکنم که چیزی رو می‌دونم و بهش معرفت دارم؟ آیا اصلا دونستن حقایق جهان خارج، با توجه به فیلترهایی که مغز انسان داره امکان‌پذیر هست؟ آیا انسان قادره چیزی رو بدونه؟

به نظرم بحث و مطالعه درباره هر کدوم از این سوال‌ها اهمیت خیلی زیادی داره. فارغ از رشته‌ای که در اون تحصیل و فعالیت می‌کنیم، فهم ذات آگاهی به ما کمک می‌کنه به صدق و درستی نزدیک بشیم و تفکر نقادانه‌مون رو تقویت کنیم.

در نهایت امیدوارم این نوشته به دست هم‌کلاسی‌هام نرسه. به طور میانگین کلاس معرفت‌شناسی به خاطر ثقیل بودنش چندان محبوب نیست و این مدحی که نوشتم احتمالا حجم زیادی از ناسزا رو به دنبال خواهد داشت :)))

[Ahmed M. Gamil · Rating 5 out of 5]

كتاب ممتاز لمن لا خلفية لهم عن نظرية المعرفة أو الابستمولوجيا والتي سمعت لفظتها كثيراً خلال متابعاتي لعديد من المناظرات بين الملحدين والمعتقدين.

يتدرج الكتاب مع القارئ باستخدام أهم وأكثر الأمثلة شيوعاً في الابستمولوجيا بأسلوب سلس وسهل لكن لا ينفي ما سبق احتياجك للتركيز الشديد عند تناولك لتلك الأمثلة والتعريفات.

يمتاز الكتاب بوجود ملخص نهاية كل فصل لعمل كبسولة شاملة لأهم التعريفات والمفاهيم الواردة بذلك الفصل مما يضعك دائمة على جادة الإلمام بالمفاهيم دون الحيد عنها أو نسيانها.

كتاب ممتاز للمبتدئين في هذا الفرع من العلم.. أنصح بقرائته بشدة.

[Mohammed Yusuf · Rating 4 out of 5]

قرأته ورقيا ولذا تأخرت في أكماله ، لقد أفسدني الكتاب الالكتروني :)

[Imade (Bridge Four) Iyamu · Rating 4 out of 5]

A short, compact introduction to epistemology & the theory of knowledge. It introduces you the major questions of the field: the definition of knowledge, the value of knowledge, if we can have any knowledge at all and how major philosophers & schools of thought have dealt with these questions from 380BC till today. The most interesting thing to me is the problem of defining knowledge itself. Plato's definition of it as a true belief that is justified has been greatly disrupted by Gettier's famous paper where he shows instances where you can have a true belief that is justified & still not be said to have knowledge. I think there needs to be a better screening of what 'justification' is & not any addition of a 4th requirement of knowledge.

[Abd Al-rahman · Rating 4 out of 5]

أكثر ما خرجت به عمليا :
ان الفلسفة،المنطق،النقد هي ملكات و مهارات ، أي ادوات مساعدة في حياتي الشخصية
ولم يعد لدي رغبة بالتبحر فيها ك علوم مستقلة اتخصص فيها ،
فهي كالملعقة المهمة لتناول الطعام، ولا اظن اني مهتم حقا بدراسة الملعقة و الوصول لمراحل السفسطة والكلام العبثي اللاواقعي.
القراءة في هذه الامور واجب عقلي بين الفترة والاخرى،
لانها ممتعة في ذاتها، وتقوي من هذه الملكات المهمة وتحرضها ليس اكثر.
الكتاب جيد ، واسلوب المراجع والاسئلة والخلاصة كان اكاديميا بنجاح
اخالف بعض ما فيه.

[عمر · Rating 3 out of 5]

الترجمة سيئة مع الأسف

[Bookish Dervish · Rating 4 out of 5]

أول عهد لي بكتاب عن نظرية المعرفة أو الابستيمولوجيا. و الحق أنه بسط الموضوع أمامي بسلاسة و مهد لي الطريق لفهم الموضوع بشكل أعمق في كل مرة أصادف فيها هذه المسائل. لهذا، أظل ممتنا و يحضرني ذكره كلنا قرأت عن المنطق الصوري أو فلسفة المعرفة إجمالا. يحدث هذا مع هذا الكتاب و كتاب آخر لن أنساه أيضا
The Case Against Reality: Why Evolution Hid the Truth from Our Eyes

[عبدالرحمن عقاب · Rating 1 out of 5]

بحث في نظرية المعرفة بشكل سلس ومختصر كما أراد له كاتبه. لم أجد فيه كثيراً من الجديد العميق أو المتميز، وغلب عليه الجدل الذي يمكن اختصاره أكثر وأكثر.

[Henrik · Rating 2 out of 5]

"What is this thing called Knowledge?", eller "What did I just read" för minns absolut inget från denna bok. användbar för teoretiska filosofer och folk med för mycket fritid

[Hussain آل سِنان · Rating 4 out of 5]

كتاب ما المعرفة؟
للكاتب، دنكان بريتشارد

كتاب انيق وجميل من البداية حتى النهاية،
ففي هذا الكتاب يجد القارئ، المعيارية و الرؤى المختلفة في المعرفة، فسير الكتاب ليس بشكل طولي فقط بل عرضي و طولي، والكتاب من ثلاث فصول الاول ما المعرفة؟ و الثاني ما مصادر المعرفة؟ و الثالث هل نعرف اي شيء؟،
ويناقش الكتب المعرفة من اساسها وهو الاعتقاد إلى والنظرة الواقعية، ويرسم حدود كل رؤية بل ويناقش كل مصطلح و معرف باستقلاليتها ويجعل الفرد يفكر في إيجابياتها و سلبياتها وكيف لو راء الفرد بها و بالضد، فيتم مناقشة الاستقراء و الاستبطان و الاستنباط و التماثل وكيفية استعمالهم وبعض ثغرات بعضهم، ويناقش نظريات معرفية مثل نظرية السياق و التأسيسية الكلاسيكية للأخلاق و نظرية مور في المعرفة البديهية، وفي الكتاب يتم تحديد القواعد الأساسية لكل رؤية حتى الروئ الشكوكية من شكوكية جزئية و شكوكية عامة و عن البحث المعرفي عن الحقيقة، وما يجذب في الكتاب هو سرد و ترجمة الكتاب الرائعة وتمكن الكاتب في الغوص في كل الرؤى العقلية و التجريبية و النقلية و الحسية وتفصيل كل من هذه الأمور.
الكتاب بحثي اكاديمي جميل جدا وفيه تاسيس المعرفة.

وقصة الكتاب ،انه كان من الكتب التي اود اقتنائها إلا ان الطبعة من الكتاب كانت ٢٠١٣ وبحثت عنه ولم اعثر عليه، لكن رزق الفرد يجيه لو وين كان، فكنت راحي في العيد مكتبة صوفيا في البحرين فلقيت ان موجود فيه نسخة وحدة وكم من البهجة التي غمرت قلبي حين وجدت ضالتي.

إضافات ،

الفرق بين المنهج و الخصوصية
هو ان المنهج يحتاج إلى التامل و ان الخصوصية يحتاج
الاعتقاد العقلائي غير عن الاعتقاد العقلائي المعرفي
والأول مثال الانسان إلا يقفز من فوق جبل لانه فيه خطر ورائه و المحقق إلا جالس يستنتج جريمة وعنده ادلة عشان يوصل إلى القاتل .

في اعتبارات المعرفة وطبيعة ان العقلانية ما تعطينا اعتقاد واحد تعطينا اعتقادات،

من متطلبات العقلانية الحقيقية زيادة الاعتقادات الحقيقية و تقليص الاعتقادات الزائفة.


المعرفة العقلانية الأخلاقية = مسؤولية = ذاتي الرأي
المعرفة العقلانية الغير اخلاقية = المعايير المعرفية الصحيحة = جمعي

القدرات الادراكية وراثية غالباً توصلنا للحقيقة غير واعية
المهارة المعرفية مكتسبة وواعية.

الظهرانية المعرفية ما يحتاج ادلة كثير.
الباطنية المعرفية يحتاج ادلة كثير .

ظاهرية الامور وواقعيتها .

الواقعية الغير المباشرة .
وكيف ان مستحيل نوصل للشيء بشكل مباشر.

الشهادة و الذاكرة وكيفية التوصل إلى المعرفة بالوثائق.

الاختزالية تقول ان احنا ما نعرف إلا القليل .

الأساسيات و الاستنادات المستقلة مهمة لجعل حجية الذاكرة اكثر وثاقة .

الشهادة غير ذاتية بحيث احد يخبرك بها .
الذاكرة تكون ذاتية وغير ذاتية .

الاستبطان المعرفة الداخلية .
واهمية الاستبطان وكيف انه يقود الفرد إلى معرفة بديهية.
وكيف ان الاستنباط يؤدي إذا كانت مقدماته صحيحة إلى المصداقية المنطقية . وهي تؤدي إلى الرسوخ و الثبوت .

الاستقراء هو قراءات متعددة تؤدي إلى نتيجة صحيحة.
والاستدلال بالاستبعاد، جنون في جنون واحتمال إصابته كبير وكذلك فشله.

فرق بين الاستنباط و الاستبطان وحده من العوامل الخارجية وحده تكون داخل نفس الإنسان .


الثابت و الاسترساخ و المعرفة المنطقية
الثابت هو الشيء الذي لا يتغير ابداً و الاسترساخ هو الاستدلال على ذلك الشيء و المعرفة المنطقية هي الربط بين الثابت و الاسترساخ بشكل صحيح .

بوبر ونظرية الشك وحصريتها المعرفية اكثر ،
والرؤية البرغماتية وكيف انها تشوف الغاية من الشيء اي ما كانت .


التعبيرية الأخلاقية، وكيف انها ما تشوف قانون عام للمعرفة الأخلاقية
التأسيسية الكلاسيكية في الاخلاق= تفسر ذاتها بذاتها بحيث هي تعطي قيمة اساسية.
و الترابطية المنطقية في الاخلاق = تفسر الشيء بالحواس عشان تعطي قيمة لهذا الشيء.
و البستملوجيا المهارة = هي المعرفة الواعية بالتفكير التي تجعل العقل لا يقع في اخطا.
التعبيرية الاخلاقية هي التي ترا ان لا وجود لحقائق اخلاقية.


التماثل =قياس الجزء من الكل . قصورها عكس الاستقراء .

مناقشة الدلالات وبداهتها عند العقلاء، كدلالات لفظية وغير لفظية .

مبدأ الانغلاق ، إذا كنت اعرف فرضية معينة، واعرف ان هذي الفرضية المعينة تستلزم فرضية ثانية، فأنا اعرف فرضية ثانية.

مبدا الحساسية ، إذا كان الشخص المعني يعرف افتراضا معينا، عندئذ يجب أن يتأثر اعتقاده الحقيقي بذلك الافتراض بالحقيقة بمعنى أنه لو كان الافتراض زائفا فهو لا يمكن أن يعتقد به.

نظرية السياق وهي الخاصة باللغة التي تطرح جملة انشائية او خبرية وغالبا هذه الجملة تكون قابلة للاستيعاب بلسان الفرد + قابلة للمعرفة.

معارضية الواقعية، ان الحقيقة لا يمكنها إطلاقا ان تسبق الرأي الافضل الذي نتوصل اليه.

[Rihab · Rating 4 out of 5]

ينقسم الكتاب إلى اجزاء ,كل جزء الى عدة فصول .
تناول في الجزء الاول موضوعات عامة ضمن إطار نظرية المعرفة و طرح فيه جملة من التسأولات مثل ما المعرفة .
اما في الجزء الثاني فيلقي الضوء على الموارد التي تستمد منها المعرفة و يتفحص دور الادراك الحسي و الذاكرة و ينهي الجزؤ بتحليل نمطلامحدد من انماط المعرفة -المعرفة الاخلاقية- و يطرح تسأولا عن مصدر اكتساب هذا النوع من المعرفة.
تناول في الجزء الثالث و الاخير نطاق معرفتنا .
يهني الكاتب كل فصل من فصول الكتاب بخلاصة للنقاط الاساسية مضيفا عدة اسئلة تستوجب الاجابة منا و يرفق بعد كل فصل ايضا مجموعة من المراجع كانت كتب او مقالات او حتى مواقع انترنت .

كتاب في غاية الروعة و يستحق القراءة و اسلوب المترجم رائع و سلس جدا و بسيط رغم عمق الكتاب إلا انه احيانا يتملكك الملل .

[Tarannom]

خوندن پی دی اف کتاب کلا اذیتم می کنه ولی نمی دونم چرا توبه نمی شه برام ، اما در مورد کتاب بیشتر حالت نصیحت داره و جالب نیست در کل چیزی دستگیرم نشد.

[Ege · Rating 3 out of 5]

Book says there are two kinds of knowledge:
- propositional knowledge like 'Earth is round', 'bachelors are unmarried men'...
- ability knowledge like to know how to swim, how to ride a bike...
Book mostly talks about propositional knowledge.
#Ability knowledge seems to me that it is, somewhat, about qualia or our subjective experiences since we cannot construct a sentence that includes the information of riding bike. We can only tell how a person acts when s/he is riding a bike.

What is knowledge? Book argues for one to say 'I know x', he must, at least, believe x and x is true. Then argues these conditions are not enough, for example, suppose a man thinks a horse with name Larry will win the race because its name appeals to him, then Larry really wins the race. Can we say that the man knows Larry will win the game?
#In my opinion, approach in epistemology is trying to find conditions that what we call intuitively knowledge. For instance, one may add the condition of 'justification' for knowledge. However, some may argue these three conditions are also not enough since it faces the Gettier Problem. Secondly, 'justification' itself might be argued since what we call justification may also be argued. For example, suppose a man say temperature of a room is 32 degrees since the thermometer shows 32 degrees. One may say the man is justified to believe in the temperature of the room is 32 degrees. However, one may oppose to this by saying maybe the thermometer is broken, therefore, the man is justified in his belief if and only if he also measures the temperature by other thermometers. One might also argue that if all thermometers on the Earth says the room is 32 degrees, are we justified? I propose it is self-evidently true that it is reasonable to believe the events which occur repeatedly. However, this does not solve our problem since we do not make experiment to see if the thermometer measures the temperature correctly, even though some scientists have done. Moreover, inductive reasoning also has problems.

The author says he accepts the common sense conception of truth which says the truth is objective. This means some propositions are true, though you believe them or not. For example, the Earth is round no matter what you believe. Most of philosophers take this conception as obvious.
#It seems clear to me that we need some metaphysical statements to describe what knowledge is. For instance, we suppose there is something called the truth independently from us to define knowledge.

Why do we need to know or have true beliefs? Something has 'instrumental value' if it enables us to find our something of importance to us. Some true beliefs have this kind of value, however, not all. The author says some beliefs have intrinsic value which mean they are value in themselves. Friendship and wisdom can be given as examples.
Some may ask if we believe a true statement, does it matter if we know it? Actually, yes since true beliefs are unstable unlike knowledge, says Plato in his book 'The Meno'.
#I was very impressed from the Plato's idea about the difference knowledge and true beliefs. As I understand, the author actually puts the condition 'justification' but never tells he does. The person who justifies his/her true belief do not reject his idea immediately, however, if a person has no justification in his belief, he is ready to reject it. This can be a reason why scientists do not reject their theories immediately when an incompatible observation is made.

The authors introduces a difficulty in knowledge that is called 'the problem of criterion' which says, shortly,
1. to be know criteria of knowledge, one must already be able to identify instances of knowledge.
2. However, to be able to identify instances of knowledge; one must already know the criteria of knowledge.
Some philosophers assume that they already know what the criteria for knowledge are, such a stance is called 'methodism' by Chisholm. Chisholm defends 'particularism' against methodism which says one can identify the criteria of knowledge without examining any particular instances of knowledge.
#As far as I can see methodism rejects 1.item and particularism rejects 2.item. I think particularism is better since it allows us to develop our understanding of knowledge. However, I do not reject the 2.item, I only say that particularism works practically better in philosophy. I said it in the beginning of this review that it seems to me that approach in epistemology is trying to find what we (already) intuitively know as knowledge.
#Gradually I get more convinced that the all epistemology - maybe other branches of philosophy as well - is nothing but trying to construct a formal system of our intuitions.

There is one response that is mentioned as a response to Gettier Problem. The response says to say X know S:
1. S is true
2. X believes S.
3. X is justified to believe S.
and
4. Justification of X to believe S does not depend on a false presupposition.
Yet, suppose a girl named Sally looks at a working clock and then believes what time is. However, also suppose she presupposes the clock is regularly maintained which is false. According to the response, we cannot say Sally knows what time is, however, intuitively it seems she knows.

The author gives an interesting historical fact which is that Gettier wrote his very famous paper only to get tenure, though he had no interest in epistemology. He has never published any paper on epistemology but this paper.

Agrippa's Trilemma, which I found very interesting, is introduced in the book. The author gives a reasoning how we get trilemma by continuously asking "How do you know this?". The trilemma gives three possible answers:
1. Infinite chain of justifications (Infinitism)
2. Circular reasoning (Coherentism)
3. Supposing some statements are self-evidently true (Foundationalism)
Part of motivation for Coherentism comes from that the ground for our beliefs comes from other beliefs that we hold, which we can call 'web'. It defends that it is okay if the circular reasoning is large enough. Thus, we understand better why Quine named his book 'The Web of Belief'. Quine rejects that there being claims cannot be revised by future science.
The most popular response, which I also find as the most plausible answer, is foundationalism. The dominant form of it is called 'classical foundationalism' which says there are some self-evident true statements that no need to be justified.
#Particularism makes the kind of same thing as Quine does for science. Secondly, it also seems true to me that laws of logic and empirical data, which Russell calls 'sense data', are self-evidently true.

There is a close relation between justification and rationality. It is plausible to suppose for most cases a justified belief is a rational one. The author considers only type of rationality that is epistemic rationality. Epistemic rationality is aimed at the goal of true belief. How can we maximize our epistemic rationality? One response is that maximizing the number of true beliefs. However, memorizing all the phone numbers in a phone book also maximizes the number of true beliefs, however, a few will consider this as epistemically rational, also if one believes, he will maximize his true beliefs, however, he also have lots of false beliefs. Another response is that minimizing the number of false beliefs. However, the best way to minimize false beliefs is that believing nothing. Yet, it does not seem rational. The author says there must be a balance between two goals.
There are two conceptions of epistemic rationality: deontic and non-deontic. According to deontic conception, one is epistemically rational just so long as one forms beliefs responsibly . On this view, one can form beliefs with wrong epistemic norms. In contrast, a non-deontic epistemic rationality demands that one employs the right epistemic norms. Deontic one is a form of epistemic internalism and non-deontic one is a form of epistemic externalism. Epistemic internalism makes one's epistemic standing something the agent has control over, while epistemic externalism allows one's epistemic standing depend on factors outside one's control.
Note: A norm is a rule guiding your actions. An epistemic norm is a rule guiding your acquisition of beliefs.

It seems deontic epistemic rationality is not necessary for knowledge. For example, consider a child forming a perceptual belief by simply what she seems to see, suppose she sees a toy in front of her and believes there is a toy in front of her and suppose there is nothing to indicate to her that it is not a toy. Therefore, we agree that she 'knows' that there is a toy in front of her, even though we wouldn't regard her responsible for her belief since she isn't paying attention how she formed her belief. Yet, trusting one's senses is a reliable way (#is it?) to gain knowledge? Therefore, we can conclude believing responsibly (so deontic epistemic rationality) is not a condition of knowledge.
# In contrary, in next chapter it is talked about the problem of perceptual knowledge.

We want an epistemic theory that explains knowledge as a cognitive achievement, which means one shall not have knowledge by luck. One though that then knowledge must be reliable. Reliabilism takes knowledge as reliable true belief. Yet, suppose you checking out a temperature of a room sometimes and someone is tricking you by changing the the value on the thermometer that is actually broken so that you believe thermometer shows the temperature of the room. Besides, this is not making the thermometer an unreliable indicator for the simple reason that the hidden person is adjusting the thermometer such that it really shows the temperature when you are looking at it. However, you do not know the temperature of the room since the thermometer is broken and you cannot find the correct temperature by looking at a broken thermometer. This has a similar structure with Gettier case but instead of good luck we have bad luck.
#One may answer to the example we gave for Gettier cases by saying that looking a clock once is not a reliable process. However, if we check the clock more than once at intervals, then the belief we have is reliable. Secondly, I am not sure about the counter-example for reliabilism is sound. Does the fact that the reason for that we believe something is actually wrong show our belief is not knowledge (we have a true belief of what temperature is for the reason that we believe the thermometer is working correctly)?

#An example came to my mind when I was sitting around Dikili harbor. Suppose I turn on my wifi searcher, it finds nothing and suppose there is really no wifi around me. Then, I have a justified true belief but suppose the reason my phone could not find a wifi is that my phone is broken. One may propose I have a wrong presupposition that my phone is working correctly. However, I have another wrong presupposition that does not affect if my belief is knowledge. Some may propose if I searched for wifi with other phones in harbor, I have a more reliable belief that there is no wifi around harbor. Yet, there may be a machine that prevents wifi signals in harbor.

To modify reliabilism, one may say knowledge is true belief that is gained as a result of process of reliable epistemic/intellectual virtues or cognitive faculties. An epistemic virtue is a trait which makes you better suited to gaining the truth. . For example, a conscientious person will be more likely to form true beliefs than an conscientious person. You can check the link for examples of epistemic virtues:
https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Epistemic...
A cognitive faculty is also a trait, though it tends to be natural and innate. Perceptual facilities can be given as examples. 'Virtue epistemology' was advanced by Aristotle. A proponent of the reliabilist virtue epistemology deals with the counter-example by saying the true belief of the person is not a result of cognitive faculties or epistemic virtues but inferences of the person hidden in the room.
However, there is also a counter-example for virtue epistemology. Suppose there is a person who was raised by chickens and he thinks he distinguish between male and female chickens by seeing and touching. However, chickens actually distinguish sexes by their smell, this is also valid for the person. Then, can we say that the person knows the sexes of chickens? In virtue epistemology, the answer is yes since the person gains the knowledge by a reliable cognitive faculty. However, some epistemologists feel uneasy about the situation. For example, an epistemic internalist may also add that one must have a good reason to think that one is reliable. For epistemic externalists, there is no problem since they sometimes allow one to have knowledge while lacking grounds for it.
# I am not quite sure if I understand virtue epistemology very well. What about beliefs we have that we have no justification via our senses. I guess a virtue relabilist do not insist some belief to be knowledge, however, a knowledge gained by our senses will have a more reliable 'degree' than a knowledge that is not.

Kant says "All our knowledge begins with senses, proceeds then to the understanding, and ends with reason. There is nothing higher than reason". Though Kant claims there exists a world independently from our mind, he also claims the world we perceive is not the world itself. What his position is called 'Transcendental Idealism'.
# I still think that putting Kant's position as idealism is wrong.

Reductionism tries to provide some independent grounds for the knowledge from testimony. Credulism, unlike reductionism, proposes one can be justified in believing a testimony-based believe withouth any independent ground. We can accept credulism as an epistemic externalist thesis.
# From Agrippa's Dilemma, we have two options (I eliminated Infinitism). Our knowledge will be circular or grounded on ungrounded beliefs. Why don't we accept testimony-beliefs as our ungrounded beliefs? One may say "then you cannot change your mind about a testimony based belief", however, in the beginning of this review. We said particularism rejects that to be able to identify instances of knowledge; one must already know the criteria of knowledge. Like particularism, we can say also we can identify instances of a true testimony-based belief without knowing the criteria for it.

1. Professor Plum was in the pantry at the time of the murder.
2. If Professor Plum was in the pantry at the time of the murder, then he wasn't in the hallway.
3. Therefore, Professor Plum was not in the hallway at the time of the murder.
1.premise is gained emprically but 2.premise is not obviously empirical since it seems you can discover without an investigation. Thus, we can say 2.premise is a priori knowledge.
# I am not sure If 2.premise is a priori. One can say we intutitively know "an object cannot be simultaneously at different places", I agree with this but I also think we can reject 2.premise if we find a counter empirical eviedence. Like one can propose logic is also empirical by giving an example such as quantum logic.

Introspection is a way to gain a priori knowledge. It is examining our own psychological knowledge.
# It is interesting that though we know our psychological states a priori, we are not always succesful to interpret them.

Abduction (Inference to the best explanation) is non-deductive argument that such as:
1. There are feet exposed under the curtain in the hall.
2. Therefore, there is someone hiding behind the curtain.
# Of course, one can say that "shoes were put under the curtain deliberately to trick the other people or a spesific person". However, 'the most rational' or 'the first conclusion that comes to mind' will be that there is a person behind the curtain.

According to Reichenbach, we face the choice between not using induction and losing all chance of
gaining lots of true beliefs about the world. Therefore, choosing induction is the rational option.
However, in Pascal's Wager, believing in God is also a pragmatic option but a few will accept the Wager. Yet, there is a difference since Pascal's wager does not aim to gain true beliefs about God's existence while induction does.
# There is also another difference such that 'believing in induction' is pragmatic whether induction is a reliable way of gaining true belies, however, 'believeing in God' is pragmatic only if God exists.

1. We are unable to know the denials of sceptical hypotheses.
2. If we are unable to know the denials of sceptical hypoheses, then we are unable to know anything of substance about the world.
3. Then, we are unable to know anything of substance about the world.
It is interesting that 1.premise and 2.premise is intuitive, the logical conclusion is counter-intuitive.

The Closure Principle: If one knows a proposition and knows another proposition that the proposition entails, then one knows the other proposition as well. For example I know 2+2=4, this entails 2+2=/5, then I know 2+2=/5.

The Sensitivity Principle: if an agent knows a proposition, then if that proposition had been false, the agent would not believe it.
# We have accepted this principle from the beginning of the book and it seems to me now that this principle is actually intutively true.

The Safety Principle: If an agent knows something, his belief could not have been easily false.

Objectivism (Epistemic Modesty) says no matter how good your reasons for your beliefs, they still can be wrong. It is not the same with scepticism. It goes hand in hand with a kind of fallibilism such that knowledge requires the elimination of all other possible options.
# I agree with objectivism for most cases.

Anti-realist says there is no distinction between our best option and the truth while realisys says truth in principle is beyond our capacity to know, therefore, our best option can always be false.
As I understand, another understanding of anti-realism is that we cannot tell what truth is, yet, our goal must be to reach the best option.
# I mostly agree with realist view. However, if there is no good reason to think our best option is false, then I think it is rational to think our best option is truth. For example, Newtonian gravity was succesfull till the beginning of 20th century. We saw some observations that do not match with the Newtonian gravity such as Mercury's perihelion. Then, Einstein proposed his own gravity theory. It seems our best option for a theory of gravity is Einstein's theory, yet, there are also some observations that this theory cannot explain, therefore, one is reasonable to think that Einstein's theory is also wrong.

# I've learned lots of good things from this book, the videos of wiphi about epistemology also helped me to understand philosophy. The summary of epistemology: we know/accept somethings intuitively and try to find a reasonable ways/rules that correspond these intuitions. This has made me think that if it is true for the other branches of philosophy.
My response for the question of what epistemology is that S knows P iff
1. S believes P
2. P is true
3. S is justified in believing P
4. S has no 'indispensable' false presupposition for that S believes P
It differs from Clark's No-False-Lemma by putting indispensability condition for the false presupposition. What I mean for an indispensable presupposition is that "X is an indispensable proposition for that S believes P iff S does not suppose X, S is not justified in believing P".

[G.R · Rating 3 out of 5]

Not the most fun read, however it does do a great job at introducing you to the foundations of epistemology and solidifying what you've read with summaries at the end of each chapter. I guess the major downfall is that it basically reads like a school textbook which is fine if you are solely interested in the content of the book as opposed to actually enjoying your time reading.

[محمد حسين ضاحي]

عندما نقول أننا "نعرف" أو عندنا "معرفة"، فماذا نقصد بذلك؟ ما معنى «المعرفة»؟
يعرف الجميع «الفلسفة» معرفة تكاد تكون ضبابية أقرب إلى الجهل، والدليل إذا سألت أحدا: تعرف الفلسفة؟ يقول: بلى، فإذا طلبت تعريفها أو بيان أنواعها أو مباحثها، فغالبا لن تحصل على أكثر من التعريف الاشتقاقي الشهير: أنها مأخوذة من اليونانية بمعنى «حب الحكمة». التفاصيل كثيرة منها أن الفلسفة تنقسم إلى ثلاثة مباحث كبيرة: مبحث الوجود، ومبحث المعرفة، ومبحث القيم. ومن فروع البحث الفلسفي أيضا المنطق، وما وراء الطبيعة (الميتافيزيقا)، والأخلاق والسياسة، والجماليات، وفروع متخصصة منها اللغة والدين والقانون ... إلخ.
ويقصد بـ «المعرفة» نظرية المعرفة فهناك فرق يتضح من اللفظة الإنجليزية- مثلاً- المقابلة فـ «المعرفة» (هكذا كاستخدام اصطلاحي ينبه عليه أحيانا بأقواس أو يفهم من السياق) أو نظرية المعرفة هي (epistemology) أما المعرفة فهي (knowledge)، و في «المعرفة» يحاول البحث الوقوف على: مصادر المعرفة (من أين نعرف؟ أو كيف نعرف؟)، وموضوعاتها (ماذا نعرف؟)، و أهدافها (لماذا؟)، ودرجة اليقين ... إلخ. فنظرية المعرفة تهتم بطبيعة ومصادر المعرفة مثل العلاقات بين الحقيقة، و الاعتقاد، والتبرير.
هذا الكتاب يعتبر مقدمة لمبحث «المعرفة».
في الفصل الأول: يفرق الكاتب بين المعرفة الافتراضية ومعرفة القدرة.
في الفصل الثاني: يفسر أهمية المعرفة وقيمتها، ويطرح فكرة انه ليست كل أشكال المعرفة ذات قيمة فعالة (مثل حفظ أسماء دليل الهاتف)، وأخرى ذات قيمة جوهرية.
في الفصل الثالث: تظهر هنا مشكلة المعايير (خصائص المعرفة، أو متى أقول أن عندي معرفة، وماهية المعرفة؟)، وهناك افتراضان عن معيار المعرفة: هل نُعرِّف المعرفة حتى نستطيع تحديد معايير (أو مؤشرات) المعرفة بطريق تحديد العناصر المشتركة بين الحالات، أم نحدد المعايير ثم نصل منها لتعريف المعرفة؟!
في الفصل الرابع: يقدم هذا الفصل ما يعرف بـ «ثلاثي معضلة أغريبا»، ويستعرض طرفا من فكر ديكارت، ويورد مقولته الشهيرة «أنا أفكر إذا أنا موجود».

(يتبع بقية الفصول)!

الكتاب يستهدف المستوى الأولي أو الدارس المبتدئ، ومقسم لثلاثة أجزاء، ومع ذلك، وكما يقول المترجم ”لن نعتبر أنفسنا طلاب فلسفة حين نقرأ هذا الكتاب“!
والكتاب مقسم لثلاثة أقسام تتضمن مجتمعة أربعة عشر فصلاً، يضاف إليها قسمان:
أحدهما «القراءات المقترحة»،
واﻵخر «ملحق المصطلحات واﻷمثلة الرئيسية».
والكتاب جميل في أسلوبه وتنظيمه، كعادة الكتب اﻷجنبية المعدة أكاديميا، فهي تقدم قسماً للأسئلة لمراجعة واستيعاب ما شُرِح، وقسماً- وهو اﻷهم- للقراءة اﻹضافية يُرشِد إلى كتب أخرى للموضوعات المطروحة، وتوسعات في مستوى القراءة في موضوع الكتاب. والمترجم بذل مجهودا يُشكَرُ عليه، ومع ذلك الترجمة ليست أصيلة، إذ أكون بحاجة لتكرار قراءة بعض النص لاستيعابه، ويشعرني أني بحاجة لمراجعة الكلمات والألفاظ، وتحديدا تلك التي لها صبغة اصطلاحية فلسفية!

[Ahmed · Rating 5 out of 5]

Knowledge is power.............or is it? I can't say this book offers any answer to what 'knowledge' is exactly (if there is any), but it's a good one for anyone who wants to learn about the field of epistemology.

[خالد الديحاني · Rating 2 out of 5]

قبل قراءة هذا الكتاب
قرأت ثلاث كتب مترجمة من قبل مشاريع ترجمة عربية
الأول كتاب الذاكرة ترجمة مشروع كلمات هنداوي مصر
والثاني ايضاً عن الذاكرة ترجمة مشروع كلمة ابو ظبي
والثالث السير على الماء ترجمة المشروع القومي للترجمة مصر
ولاحظت ان اختيار هذه المشاريع للكتب ينم عن ادراك وحسن اختيار لهذه الكتب
بعكس سلسلة عالم المعرفة الكويت
فهذا الكتاب يمكن ان تكون له قيمة عند اصحاب التخصص البحت والذين لا يمكن ان يكونوا الا فئة محدودة جداً جداً
بالاضافة الى ان ربط المعرفة بطرح فلسفي بحت والتفصيل الممل والتوسع بافكار تعتبر من المسلمات
واغلب الناس ينظرون ان طرحها يعتبر من السخف
لقد ابتلي الفلاسفة بالجدل الى مالا نهاية

واستقي من الكتاب هذه الجملة

ان الكثير من المجادلات الفلسفية التي يجري تداولها الآن بين المختصين كان قد سبق لأرسطو أن ناقشها في أعماله ولا تزال وجهات النظر التي طرحها في تلك الأزمنة متداولة في الجدل المعاصر
ص١٠٦

[Alexandru Jr. · Rating 2 out of 5]

am citit-o pentru o prelegere de-a mea - despre epistemologie.
a fost ok, in sensul ca mi-ar placea sa discut eventual asa ceva un timp - cu studenti, colegi sau profi de-ai mei -, dar m-as plictisi fff repede.
asta e senzatia pe care o am de fiecare data cand citesc filosofie analitica.
ca e ceva ce poate fi facut, daca te pregatesti / citesti / discuti, si poate fi facut ok - dar pana la urma te plictisesti, pentru ca nu-ti da mare lucru.
si pentru mine filosofia e ceva care trebuie sa ma transforme :)

[Ziyad Hasanin]

Interesting and engaging book about the main issue of Epistemology; and although sometimes I felt its arguments or discussion is superficial or cut-off, I guess it did a good work relating the concepts to everyday terms and experiences. The latest version with its further readings and internet resources is a big help as well for anyone interested in getting a bit deeper.

Important introductory textbook that builds up the context and relations of different philosophical schools and stances to one another.

[عمرو عبدالحميد · Rating 4 out of 5]

تقديم المحتوي بتاع الكتاب طريقته ممتازة جداً, يا ريت يعمموا الطريقة ديه في كل الكتب عشان نستريح من التشتت وسط كم المعلومات والتعريفات الكتير في الكتب.

لو أنت قارئ عادي ومش مهتم بنظرية (المعرفة)فهتكون استفادتك من الكتاب من 50 % - 40% تقريباً , إنما لو مهتم فالكتاب كويس ومبسط ومجمع حاجات كتير جداً في الموضوع.

[Jens · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is an okay introduction to traditional topics in epistemology, covering a wide ground but staying rather superficial. It does not go deep at all into alternative theories such as virtue epistemology or knowledge-first epistemology etc. Really no prior knowledge of philosophy is necessary in order to read this book, all jargon and every author is explained in simple terms.

[Maryam Talakoob · Rating 3 out of 5]

A very concise and well explained book on philosophy and ideas. This book was really an eye opener to revisit different idealogies developed throughout human history and culture. At times it was riveting and I couldn't put the book down. Great review of epistemology.

[Gektya Pasis · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book was a supplement for my epistemology class but I love it very much. Although sometimes I got lost in translations for my limited english, yet this book still is my favorite source for learning epistemology.

[محمد الخواص · Rating 4 out of 5]

الترجمة محتاجة مراجعة متخصص
بالرغم من ان المترجم بذل جهده بس حسيت انه فى بعض الاحيان بيترجم ترجمة حرفية ويدوخنا معاه

[Mohamed Kanjaa · Rating 5 out of 5]

مدخل مبسط لنظرية المعرفة
يسرد فيه دنكان بريتشارد أهم القضايا المطروحة بصدد المعرفة الافتراضية لدى الانسان

[Jeff Liu · Rating 4 out of 5]

Really beginner friendly book on epistemology. In contrast to many other introductory books to epistemology, this book contains an entire section on exploring the possibility of moral knowledge.

Nonetheless, some parts of the book were really superficial, sometimes to the point of being inaccurate or misleading. One striking example would be that Pritchard stated that those who reject the existence of objective moral facts are usually called moral expressivists. However, moral expressivism is just one metaethical position that rejects objective moral facts. Moral expressivism is part of the broader position of non-cognitivism, which rejects the notion that moral judgements are truth-apt and therefore rejects the existence of moral facts. Other positions that reject moral knowledge is error theory and quasi-realism. The point here is that it is weird to call the rejection of objective moral facts moral expressivism when a) it is not the only position that rejects objective moral facts and b) it is a subcategory of a much broader position that rejects objective moral facts. The term Pritchard should have used to describe those who reject the existence of objective moral facts is moral anti-realists.

I have several other nitpicks about this book, but it is overall a good introduction to the field of epistemology.

[Ammar Eslamkhah · Rating 4 out of 5]

در انتهای صفحه ی اول فصل اول نوشته شده:« در پایان کتاب باید بتوانید خود را یک معرفت شناس به حساب آورید». همین یک جمله باعث شد که کتاب و با دقت بیشتری بخونم.
وقتی در فیزیک که به عنوان علوم دقیقه حساب می شه، نظریه اثر مشاهده گر بر اندازه گیری به صورت جدی مطرح می شه، و همچنین ریاضات که بر مبنای اعداد دقیق پایه گذاری شده، در حالی که خود اعداد حقیقی نیستند و تنها یک قرارداد ذهنی هستند، مطمئنا در فلسفه و در خصوص معرفت، نظریات به شدت متکثر و قابل رد هستند.
نویسنده از ابتدا تا انتهای کتاب، کلیه نظریات در حوزه معرفت شناسی را عنوان می کنه و نظریات نقیض رو هم در انتهای هر بخش می گه.
نکته ای که در مورد نظریه پردازان و حتی نقادان نظریه توجهم و جلب کرد، نوعی مخالفت "شانسی" در نظریات کلان معرفت شناسی هست. مانند نظریه "گتیه" که با نیت غیر علمی و غیر فلسفی، صرفا به خاطر یک امر مادی به نقد نظریه سه جزئی معرفت پرداخت و در کوتاه ترین زمان و متن – مقاله ی سه صفحه ای – به اصل و اساس این نظریه اشکال وارد کرد و البته بعد از استخدام در دانشگاه هم دیگه به این موضوع نپرداخت.
کلیت کتاب یه مجموعه ی متنوع از نظریات فلسفی مانند کتاب "سوفی" هست.

[Philip Taylor · Rating 3 out of 5]

A solid introduction to my favourite philosophy topic. Clear chapters, chapter summaries, review questions, further reading suggestions, glossary etc.

I read the 4th edition (I think there’s a 5th edition out).

All good stuff about defining knowledge, how to attain it, scientific knowledge, religious knowledge, moral knowledge, skepticism, relativism, and many more topics.

Being a beginner in the topic I can’t really offer critique or useful engagement, but the chapters on religious and scientific knowledge seemed a bit less strong compared to the other chapters. Also, nothing yet about AI and how that relates to epistemology.

[Hussam Nabil · Rating 4 out of 5]

A solid 4 stars, not for any fault on behalf of the author or the book.
The book does an amazing job for its intended purpose.
It's conversational tone and crystal-clear style combined with Prof. Pritchard's passion for Epistemology is sure to make this an amazing read.
I only gave it 4 stars because I happen to be familiar with this level of approaching Epistemology, and actually my life would have been a lot easier if I was introduced to Epistemology through this book.

[Lukas op de Beke · Rating 5 out of 5]

Solid introduction, there were some themes I hadn't read about before that are very nicely set out in this book, with just the right measure of detail for an introductory work, such as the value of knowledge, methodism versus particularism, religious knowledge and Platinga's reformed epistemology, and epistemic rationality.