Greek Warfare: Myth and Realities

by Hans van Wees

From the soldier's eye view of combat to the broad social and economic structures which shaped campaigns and wars, ancient Greek warfare in all its aspects has been studied more intensively in the last few decades than ever before. This book ranges from the concrete details of conducting raids, battles and sieges to more theoretical questions about the causes, costs, and consequences of warfare in archaic and classical Greece. It argues that the Greek sources present a highly selective and idealised picture, too easily accepted by most modern scholars, and that a more critical study of the evidence leads to radically different conclusions about the Greek way of war.

Genres: History, Nonfiction, Ancient, Greece, Ancient History, Military History

380 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 2004

Reviews

[Bertie Brady · Rating 5 out of 5]

A stimulating, multilayered, lucid and meticulously researched account on Greek warfare. Despite its simplistic title, Greek warfare covers various aspects and peculiarities of Greek society which are inadvertently yet inextricably tied with warfare. For example, in the first chapter (war and peace), Wees discusses the underlying motivating factors behind warfare in Greece and how ideas of cultural dominance, prestige and religion played a role in the constant fighting between various city-states. However he also shows how this fighting while often brutal was also constrained by seasonal conditions and limitations in supplying and feeding an army in foreign land. As is to be expected, this book is dominated by the Athenian and Spartan Military tradition, highlighting just how different the two states were. For example, in Wees's chapter on military discipline, he explains Sparta's strict policy on desertion with state prosecutions of deserters in which defenders had a high chance of being found guilty. On the other hand, those who deserted an army in Athens rarely faced state prosecution, and it was instead up to individual citizens to prosecute someone they believed had deserted. Entailing all of the fees this brought the prosecutor meant soldiers were rarely convicted of desertion. This is just one example of a litany of diametrically opposing policies taken by Athens and Sparta. This book covers a surprising amount in so few pages yet never felt rushed or condensed; instead, his points and theories were well thought out and carefully constructed with a great deal of citations, adding to the sense of this book being well thought out and highly researched. Of particular interest, in my view, was his account of the Greek hoplite. Surprisingly, despite having studied ancient Greece for many years, I never quite had a clear idea in my head of what exactly a Greek hoplite looked like. Despite our best efforts, I'm sure we all picture fictional representations in movies like 300, which are ingrained into the cultural ethos. Greek warfare describes a far more detailed and historically grounded examination of the hoplite armoury and weaponry. Explaining how the shield would have been positioned so as to rest on the shoulder and be supported by the whole lower arm. Wees also highlights how the Hoplite changed during the transition from Archaic to Classical Greece, such as the segregation of infantry and the increasing reliance on the armoured Hoplite.

Wees also analyses the military through a social lens, particularly the division based on economic status and the sort of bonds which were encouraged by state initiatives such as Sparta's forming of messes to establish friendship and loyalty between soldiers. An area of this book I found particularly interesting was Wees's examination of the so-called 'leisure class' people who could afford to not do manual labour themselves and could devote time to higher learning. Relating to the military, Wees discusses how the leisure class were seen as the ideal soldier due partially to what can only be described as a sense of upper-class snobbishness and to the practical necessity of a soldier being required to provide his own hoplite panoply. This social stratification is similarly discussed in the final chapter on naval warfare, with the fact that most of the navy was comprised of slaves and freemen (due to there being less reliance on private equipment) being a major reason why the navy was looked down upon and hardly features in classical art.

Wees willingness to challenge historical consensus was another upside to this book and in doing this I found he always supports his alternative perspective with facts and overall constructed his points in a convincing manner.

throughout the book, Wees uses Homer to demonstrate certain aspects of Greek warfare. This is mostly quite minimal, but in the middle of the book, such as when discussing the mental effects of warfare, Wees relies heavily on Homeric writing. I don't doubt Homer can be useful to a certain extent in understanding some of the general cultural nuances of Archaic Greece, however being ultimately a work of fiction with many legendary and mythological aspects, I found this to be a slightly unreliable source of information, especially when he used Homer to demonstrate ancient battle formations and tactics. However this is a minor drawback in an otherwise fantastic work on Greek warfare.

My general rational behind rating a non-fiction book five stars is firstly did I find myself re-reading pages to fully grasp the arguments and facts being presented, and secondly, would I realistically read this book for a second time? Greek warfare fulfilled both of these as such, I would highly recommend this to anyone interested in Greek warfare.

[Ryan Schaller · Rating 4 out of 5]

Approachable book that does a good job of explaining various aspects of war in ancient and classical Greece. If you're new to the subject, there is a debate among classical historians as to the exact nature of classical hoplite combat. Wees very much subscribes to the "newer" interpretation. In Wees' analysis, hoplite gear is lighter, hoplites have more flexibility and range of movement, the "push" described by Thucydides, Herodotus, and Xenophon, is meant to be interpreted figuratively and not literally, and that the hoplite formation was looser (i.e. front rank shields did not overlap; there would be gaps between them.)

In addition to Wees, I've also read Victor David Hanson's "The Western Way of War" which seems to be what Wees is responding to in most of his arguments. Having read both Wees and Hanson, I don't think that either of them actually proves the arguments they are making. I don't think we have enough historical information to definitively state that one is wrong and the other is right.

I do recommend this book because it's got a lot of great information and the few chapters on hoplites are the only ones that are arguably controversial or debatable. I also recommend that people pick up Hanson's book (or one of the other historians who subscribes to the traditional theory). I haven't read these specific books, but Wees also cites to Paul Cartledge and Lazenby when citing to Hanson, so presumably they also have books/articles supporting to the traditional view if you'd rather look for one of those over reading Hanson.