What do you think?
Rate this book
Introductory Readings
Drawn from the translations and editorial aids of Irwin and Fine's Aristotle, Selections (Hackett Publishing Co., 1995), this anthology will be most useful to instructors who must try to do justice to Aristotle in a semester-long ancient-philosophy survey, but it will also be appropriate for a variety of introductory-level courses. Introductory Readings provides accurate, readable, and integrated translations that allow the reader to follow Aristotle's use of crucial technical terms and to grasp the details of his argument. Included are adaptations of the glossary and notes that helped make its parent volume a singularly useful aid to the study of Aristotle.
384 pages, Paperback
First published June 1, 1996
42 people are currently reading
279 people want to read
About the author
Aristotle
4,339 books5,600 followersAristotle (Greek: Αριστοτέλης; 384–322 BC) was an Ancient Greek philosopher and polymath. His writings cover a broad range of subjects spanning the natural sciences, philosophy, linguistics, economics, politics, psychology, and the arts. As the founder of the Peripatetic school of philosophy in the Lyceum in Athens, he began the wider Aristotelian tradition that followed, which set the groundwork for the development of modern science.
Little is known about Aristotle's life. He was born in the city of Stagira in northern Greece during the Classical period. His father, Nicomachus, died when Aristotle was a child, and he was brought up by a guardian. At 17 or 18, he joined Plato's Academy in Athens and remained there until the age of 37 (c. 347 BC). Shortly after Plato died, Aristotle left Athens and, at the request of Philip II of Macedon, tutored his son Alexander the Great beginning in 343 BC. He established a library in the Lyceum, which helped him to produce many of his hundreds of books on papyrus scrolls.
Though Aristotle wrote many treatises and dialogues for publication, only around a third of his original output has survived, none of it intended for publication. Aristotle provided a complex synthesis of the various philosophies existing prior to him. His teachings and methods of inquiry have had a significant impact across the world, and remain a subject of contemporary philosophical discussion.
Aristotle's views profoundly shaped medieval scholarship. The influence of his physical science extended from late antiquity and the Early Middle Ages into the Renaissance, and was not replaced systematically until the Enlightenment and theories such as classical mechanics were developed. He influenced Judeo-Islamic philosophies during the Middle Ages, as well as Christian theology, especially the Neoplatonism of the Early Church and the scholastic tradition of the Catholic Church.
Aristotle was revered among medieval Muslim scholars as "The First Teacher", and among medieval Christians like Thomas Aquinas as simply "The Philosopher", while the poet Dante Alighieri called him "the master of those who know". His works contain the earliest known formal study of logic, and were studied by medieval scholars such as Pierre Abélard and Jean Buridan. Aristotle's influence on logic continued well into the 19th century. In addition, his ethics, although always influential, gained renewed interest with the modern advent of virtue ethics.
Little is known about Aristotle's life. He was born in the city of Stagira in northern Greece during the Classical period. His father, Nicomachus, died when Aristotle was a child, and he was brought up by a guardian. At 17 or 18, he joined Plato's Academy in Athens and remained there until the age of 37 (c. 347 BC). Shortly after Plato died, Aristotle left Athens and, at the request of Philip II of Macedon, tutored his son Alexander the Great beginning in 343 BC. He established a library in the Lyceum, which helped him to produce many of his hundreds of books on papyrus scrolls.
Though Aristotle wrote many treatises and dialogues for publication, only around a third of his original output has survived, none of it intended for publication. Aristotle provided a complex synthesis of the various philosophies existing prior to him. His teachings and methods of inquiry have had a significant impact across the world, and remain a subject of contemporary philosophical discussion.
Aristotle's views profoundly shaped medieval scholarship. The influence of his physical science extended from late antiquity and the Early Middle Ages into the Renaissance, and was not replaced systematically until the Enlightenment and theories such as classical mechanics were developed. He influenced Judeo-Islamic philosophies during the Middle Ages, as well as Christian theology, especially the Neoplatonism of the Early Church and the scholastic tradition of the Catholic Church.
Aristotle was revered among medieval Muslim scholars as "The First Teacher", and among medieval Christians like Thomas Aquinas as simply "The Philosopher", while the poet Dante Alighieri called him "the master of those who know". His works contain the earliest known formal study of logic, and were studied by medieval scholars such as Pierre Abélard and Jean Buridan. Aristotle's influence on logic continued well into the 19th century. In addition, his ethics, although always influential, gained renewed interest with the modern advent of virtue ethics.
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 15 of 15 reviews
December 12, 2015
27th time's a charm...
December 6, 2025
The Aristotelian concept that humans aim at the highest good comes from Aristotle’s argument in Nicomachean Ethics 1.7. Throughout the text, Aristotle seeks to identify this good through an analysis of human function. In this investigation, Aristotle claims that the human good is sufficient for the soul’s rational and excellent activity. However, Aristotle’s function argument ultimately fails as he does not justify why rational activity, rather than other distinctive human capacities, should be identified as the sole human function. The strongest objection to this argument, that Aristotle assumes without argument that what is distinctive must be the function, successfully undermines the central inference needed for the argument to work. After reconstructing Aristotle’s function argument, I develop and defend this objection by illustrating how Aristotle lacks a criterion for selecting rational activity over alternative, distinctive human capacities.
In Nicomachean Ethics 1.7, Aristotle presents an argument that to identify happiness and the human good, one must first assess the human function. Aristotle first argues that the good of something, including human beings, depends on its function (1097b26-29). To know the function of a human being, one must also separate the human being’s rational part of the soul from other components of his life, including his life of nutrition, growth, and sense perception (1098a2-3). Aristotle also clarifies that the rational part of the soul consists of two parts: one part obeys reason, and the other has reason or thinks (1098a4-5). Aristotle then goes on to claim that activity is the human soul’s function, and that activity is the part of the soul that expresses or obeys reason (1098a6-7). Perhaps one of the most important parts of this argument is the premise that the excellent man’s function is to perform this activity finely and well, and a function completed well is when its completion expresses proper virtue (1098a14-16). Therefore, Aristotle claims, the human good turns out to be the soul’s activity that expresses virtue (1098a16-17). Aristotle specifies, in particular, that if there are more goods than one, the good will express the best and most complete virtue (1098a18-19). Furthermore, Aristotle believes that the function of a good thing relates to the virtue of that thing. For instance, he argues that the function F for a harpist is the same as the excellent function F for an excellent harpist (1098a8-10). This same logic applies in the case of human beings, where an excellent human being must have an excellent function F. Aristotle uses the general case of a harpist to present an analogical argument that applies in the case of human beings.
Although Aristotle’s argument is sufficient in determining the process of (i) identifying a human being’s good and (ii) demonstrating that a human being’s good is tied to his function, Aristotle fails to establish why a human being’s function is his activity. Aristotle’s justification for linking activity to the complete function of a human being likens the separation of the rational soul into two parts to the separation of human life. Just as the rational part of the soul is in two parts – one as obeying reason and the other as itself having reason – life is also spoken of in two ways: as capacity and as activity (1098a4-9). Specifically, Aristotle argues that activity is a human being’s function because it “seems to be called life to a fuller extent” (1098a7). While Aristotle succeeds in outlining his reasoning for associating human activity with human function, he fails to assess other possibilities for what human function could be. His idea of human function relies solely on the premise that human activity is life to a fuller extent, an unsupported claim. Indeed, it could be argued that human activity is the expression of reason and aligns with the Aristotelian concept of the soul’s parts. This argument, however, overlooks other parts of human life and assumes what is distinctive is automatically the function. This raises the question of why the human function cannot be simply possessing or developing reason. Even apart from the direct cognitive process of expressing reason, other functions require reason in a secondary sense, such as being social, caring for others, or producing culture. Aristotle fails to distinguish these processes from rational activity and does not elaborate on the possibility that other distinctive human traits might be part of a human being’s function. Although reason separates human beings from other living things, this does not necessarily imply that reasoning is the human function. Reason is just one of many distinctive cognitive features that separate humans from other living things, alongside other physical features such as bipedalism or opposable thumbs. From these features, there are other candidates for what the human function could be. For instance, human beings are uniquely tied to the idea of logos. A sufficient argument for what designates a human being as a good human being might be the distinctive expression of believing in divine reason and completing virtuous actions in accordance with this belief. Another possibility for the function of a human being is the superiority of moral agency over other living things. The nature of human beings to track societal norms and obligations is distinctly different from other forms of life. At no point does Aristotle give the argument that these features are secondary rather than primary.
The objection succeeds because it exposes a gap in Aristotle’s inference from what distinguishes humans to what constitutes their function. In searching for the human function, Aristotle focuses on rational activity because it is uniquely characteristic of humans, neglecting mere possession of reason, moral agency, or sociality. Specifically, he assumes that because rational activity is what most fully expresses life, it must be the human function (1098a7-8). He does not consider alternatives in the dissemination of the human function. Aristotle tends to ignore the multiple human capacities that are distinctive relative to other animals, and offers no argument that rational activity is uniquely qualified among these to be the human function. From this, we can conclude the inference from distinctive capacity to rational activity being the sole human function is unjustified. While Aristotle claims that rational activity is the human function based on the assumption that rational activity is life to a fuller extent, this claim is unsupported. His assertions do not address the premise that distinctiveness alone cannot ground function, as these qualifications would render multiple other possibilities for the existence of more human functions. Aristotle’s conclusion is that the human good turns out to be the soul’s activity that expresses virtue (1098a16-17). This conclusion depends on the human function being rational activity. If the human function has leniency to be something else, such as moral agency or possessing logos, then the argument for the human good collapses. Even if rational activity is a distinctive feature, Aristotle does not justify why it is the most essential or primary one. The analogical argument Aristotle presents, based on the excellent function F of an excellent harpist, does not justify why the human function F is rational activity compared to another human role. Even if Aristotle were to acknowledge the existence of multiple distinctive capacities, he owes a criterion for selecting among them, which he never gives. The objection responds directly to the central premise in Aristotle’s argument, destabilizing the argument as a whole. Aristotle might respond to this objection by arguing that what is distinctive about humans is not reason itself but rather the active use of reason and the ability to perform rational action. He might claim that other capacities, such as sociality and moral agency, depend on rational activity, making rational activity more fundamental. Indeed, rational activity is a powerful basis for structuring the rest of human function. If we agree with Aristotle on the premise that sociality depends on reason. This does not show reason is the human function any more than sharp teeth being necessary for biting makes killing the function of a rabid animal. In this case, Aristotle still has not provided a criterion for why the most fundamental distinctive capacity must be the function. Even in the case of other capacities, such as moral agency or the possession of logos, which may depend on reason, Aristotle gives no argument for why they are secondary rather than coequal, and the argument becomes circular. Aristotle assumes rational activity is primary to justify that rational activity is the function. Since Aristotle lacks a justification for treating rational activity as the human function rather than one distinctive capacity among many, the objection succeeds in undermining the foundation of his function argument.
In Aristotle’s function argument, he seeks to establish happiness as excellent rational activity, grounded in the human function. He does this by arguing that the human function is rational activity and, therefore, the human good is virtuous activity. The objection challenges Aristotle’s claim, arguing that distinctiveness alone does not establish function. This objection succeeds because Aristotle does not provide a principle for choosing among distinctive capacities, and the claim that activity represents “life to a fuller extent” is unsupported.
In Nicomachean Ethics 1.7, Aristotle presents an argument that to identify happiness and the human good, one must first assess the human function. Aristotle first argues that the good of something, including human beings, depends on its function (1097b26-29). To know the function of a human being, one must also separate the human being’s rational part of the soul from other components of his life, including his life of nutrition, growth, and sense perception (1098a2-3). Aristotle also clarifies that the rational part of the soul consists of two parts: one part obeys reason, and the other has reason or thinks (1098a4-5). Aristotle then goes on to claim that activity is the human soul’s function, and that activity is the part of the soul that expresses or obeys reason (1098a6-7). Perhaps one of the most important parts of this argument is the premise that the excellent man’s function is to perform this activity finely and well, and a function completed well is when its completion expresses proper virtue (1098a14-16). Therefore, Aristotle claims, the human good turns out to be the soul’s activity that expresses virtue (1098a16-17). Aristotle specifies, in particular, that if there are more goods than one, the good will express the best and most complete virtue (1098a18-19). Furthermore, Aristotle believes that the function of a good thing relates to the virtue of that thing. For instance, he argues that the function F for a harpist is the same as the excellent function F for an excellent harpist (1098a8-10). This same logic applies in the case of human beings, where an excellent human being must have an excellent function F. Aristotle uses the general case of a harpist to present an analogical argument that applies in the case of human beings.
Although Aristotle’s argument is sufficient in determining the process of (i) identifying a human being’s good and (ii) demonstrating that a human being’s good is tied to his function, Aristotle fails to establish why a human being’s function is his activity. Aristotle’s justification for linking activity to the complete function of a human being likens the separation of the rational soul into two parts to the separation of human life. Just as the rational part of the soul is in two parts – one as obeying reason and the other as itself having reason – life is also spoken of in two ways: as capacity and as activity (1098a4-9). Specifically, Aristotle argues that activity is a human being’s function because it “seems to be called life to a fuller extent” (1098a7). While Aristotle succeeds in outlining his reasoning for associating human activity with human function, he fails to assess other possibilities for what human function could be. His idea of human function relies solely on the premise that human activity is life to a fuller extent, an unsupported claim. Indeed, it could be argued that human activity is the expression of reason and aligns with the Aristotelian concept of the soul’s parts. This argument, however, overlooks other parts of human life and assumes what is distinctive is automatically the function. This raises the question of why the human function cannot be simply possessing or developing reason. Even apart from the direct cognitive process of expressing reason, other functions require reason in a secondary sense, such as being social, caring for others, or producing culture. Aristotle fails to distinguish these processes from rational activity and does not elaborate on the possibility that other distinctive human traits might be part of a human being’s function. Although reason separates human beings from other living things, this does not necessarily imply that reasoning is the human function. Reason is just one of many distinctive cognitive features that separate humans from other living things, alongside other physical features such as bipedalism or opposable thumbs. From these features, there are other candidates for what the human function could be. For instance, human beings are uniquely tied to the idea of logos. A sufficient argument for what designates a human being as a good human being might be the distinctive expression of believing in divine reason and completing virtuous actions in accordance with this belief. Another possibility for the function of a human being is the superiority of moral agency over other living things. The nature of human beings to track societal norms and obligations is distinctly different from other forms of life. At no point does Aristotle give the argument that these features are secondary rather than primary.
The objection succeeds because it exposes a gap in Aristotle’s inference from what distinguishes humans to what constitutes their function. In searching for the human function, Aristotle focuses on rational activity because it is uniquely characteristic of humans, neglecting mere possession of reason, moral agency, or sociality. Specifically, he assumes that because rational activity is what most fully expresses life, it must be the human function (1098a7-8). He does not consider alternatives in the dissemination of the human function. Aristotle tends to ignore the multiple human capacities that are distinctive relative to other animals, and offers no argument that rational activity is uniquely qualified among these to be the human function. From this, we can conclude the inference from distinctive capacity to rational activity being the sole human function is unjustified. While Aristotle claims that rational activity is the human function based on the assumption that rational activity is life to a fuller extent, this claim is unsupported. His assertions do not address the premise that distinctiveness alone cannot ground function, as these qualifications would render multiple other possibilities for the existence of more human functions. Aristotle’s conclusion is that the human good turns out to be the soul’s activity that expresses virtue (1098a16-17). This conclusion depends on the human function being rational activity. If the human function has leniency to be something else, such as moral agency or possessing logos, then the argument for the human good collapses. Even if rational activity is a distinctive feature, Aristotle does not justify why it is the most essential or primary one. The analogical argument Aristotle presents, based on the excellent function F of an excellent harpist, does not justify why the human function F is rational activity compared to another human role. Even if Aristotle were to acknowledge the existence of multiple distinctive capacities, he owes a criterion for selecting among them, which he never gives. The objection responds directly to the central premise in Aristotle’s argument, destabilizing the argument as a whole. Aristotle might respond to this objection by arguing that what is distinctive about humans is not reason itself but rather the active use of reason and the ability to perform rational action. He might claim that other capacities, such as sociality and moral agency, depend on rational activity, making rational activity more fundamental. Indeed, rational activity is a powerful basis for structuring the rest of human function. If we agree with Aristotle on the premise that sociality depends on reason. This does not show reason is the human function any more than sharp teeth being necessary for biting makes killing the function of a rabid animal. In this case, Aristotle still has not provided a criterion for why the most fundamental distinctive capacity must be the function. Even in the case of other capacities, such as moral agency or the possession of logos, which may depend on reason, Aristotle gives no argument for why they are secondary rather than coequal, and the argument becomes circular. Aristotle assumes rational activity is primary to justify that rational activity is the function. Since Aristotle lacks a justification for treating rational activity as the human function rather than one distinctive capacity among many, the objection succeeds in undermining the foundation of his function argument.
In Aristotle’s function argument, he seeks to establish happiness as excellent rational activity, grounded in the human function. He does this by arguing that the human function is rational activity and, therefore, the human good is virtuous activity. The objection challenges Aristotle’s claim, arguing that distinctiveness alone does not establish function. This objection succeeds because Aristotle does not provide a principle for choosing among distinctive capacities, and the claim that activity represents “life to a fuller extent” is unsupported.
February 18, 2015
As the title states, this collection of snippets from Aristotle's great oeuvre is a fair introduction to the many areas of thought in which he traversed.
It works to wet one's taste and find out which of Aristotle's works they should read in full (which is necessary for any philosophical work).
Look at it like a signpost for choosing which path to travel down first.
It works to wet one's taste and find out which of Aristotle's works they should read in full (which is necessary for any philosophical work).
Look at it like a signpost for choosing which path to travel down first.
Read
October 30, 2022I am no closer to understanding metaphysics but I do feel aquatinted with Aristotle
July 5, 2013
A delightful struggle.
January 24, 2025
Reading Aristotle right after reading Plato takes some getting used to! But it is elegant in its own way.
Things I liked:
- Posterior Analytics! And the neatness of syllogisms... until you get to the origin of primary premises or first principles.
- Categories: the things being in other things (substances) or of other things is pretty cool. This one was tricky to read though.
Things I found more questionable and brow-furrowing:
- INCONTINENCE (particularly 1147a32-b4).
- Coincidences and luck, from Physics: I'm not sure I agree with the idea that things that always (so far as we know it) come to pass the same way cannot be by chance!
- That we are responsible for our states of character and thus vice and virtue! It just gets circular, and unpredictable (even he admits it, at 1115a).
Wrote a paper on the Nicomachean Ethics. I probably won't do it again, but I will remember it fondly.
Things I liked:
- Posterior Analytics! And the neatness of syllogisms... until you get to the origin of primary premises or first principles.
- Categories: the things being in other things (substances) or of other things is pretty cool. This one was tricky to read though.
Things I found more questionable and brow-furrowing:
- INCONTINENCE (particularly 1147a32-b4).
- Coincidences and luck, from Physics: I'm not sure I agree with the idea that things that always (so far as we know it) come to pass the same way cannot be by chance!
- That we are responsible for our states of character and thus vice and virtue! It just gets circular, and unpredictable (even he admits it, at 1115a).
Wrote a paper on the Nicomachean Ethics. I probably won't do it again, but I will remember it fondly.
Want to read
February 26, 2021I needed to read this for University. I didn't get through all if it (but jumped around), although I found parts very intruging. This is a good place to start if you're getting into Aristotle for sure.
December 14, 2022
Calling this introductory is misleading and i don’t understand this
Read
March 12, 2024school read
Read
March 31, 2024for phil 0110: ancient greek philosophy :)
December 2, 2024
Reread.
July 27, 2008
What I grasped was great, but some parts were worded in such a way that they went over my head before I gave heightened effort.
February 28, 2009
My experience with this book is what has kept me from reading any more Aristotle.
I'll eventually get over it.
I'll eventually get over it.
December 15, 2013
I like Aristotle; I like his ideas. Saying that, we have much to discuss regarding nonhuman animals and our relations with them. Other than that, Aristotle is the bomb.
April 16, 2017
quite confusing reading..
Displaying 1 - 15 of 15 reviews