When Hitler invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, the German Army quickly annihilated a major portion of the Red Army. Yet the Red Army rebounded to successfully defend Moscow in late 1941, defeat the Germans at Stalingrad in 1942 and Kursk in 1943, and deliver the deathblow in Belarus in 1944. Dunn examines these 4 battles while explaining how the Soviets lost a third of their prewar army yet returned to beat one of the most highly trained and experienced armies the world has ever seen. A detailed look at how the Soviet Union created more new divisions in a few months than the U.S. did during the entire war. More than 60 tables list losses, tank and weapon production, and unit formation, with special emphasis on rifle and tank divisions and brigades.
WALTER S. DUNN, JR. had a 40-year career directing museums, including the Buffalo & Erie County Historical Society and the Iowa Science Center. His books include The Soviet Economy and the Red Army, 1930-1945 (1995), Hitler's Nemesis: The Red Army (1994), and Second Front Now, 1943 (1981).
An interesting look at how the Red Army managed to win WW 2. Dunn uses a lot of data to show how the Red Army reorganized and virtually resurrected several times during the war. His approach serves to dispel some myths about the Red Army in WW 2: for instance, he shows that in the later stages of the war, Russian tank production increased sharply, while Russian casualties decreased. The myth of the Russians overwhelming the Germans through sheer weight of numbers is thus proven false; rather, the USSR outproduced Germany.
Dunn writes clearly but a bit lackluster, and the book would have been enhanced by a more thorough discussion of what made the war effort possible: Stalin and the STAVKA are given due credit for adapting their plans and ideas to changing circumstances, but I feel as if more could be said about how the Soviet industry was organized, and how Red Army Doctrine changed.
BLUF: The most complete order of battle for Russia in WWII I have ever seen.
Some great analysis on what units ended up where and why, and how they were designated when the information is unclear. The author refuses to lie (as many authors will make it up) and admits when they do now know.