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960 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 1992
"As a young academic, Kissinger once wrote of Bismarck and his era: 'The new order was tailored to a genius who proposed to constrain the contending forces, both domestic and foreign, by manipulating their antagonisms.' Much the same could be said of Kissinger and his era. And Germany in the 1930s was a good place for a sensitive and brilliant child to learn about contending forces and the manipulation of antagonisms."
"All that the U.S. had left to show for the 58,022 dead were the shreds of credibility that came from having achieved a peace agreement that lasted long enough to disguise the American pullout. Neither the peace nor the honor that Kissinger claimed in January 1973 turned out to be long lasting. But the Paris accords had at least served the purpose of making America's abandonment of its commitment to Saigon, and the resulting loss of credibility, rather ambiguous--another case in which ambiguity was the best Kissinger felt could be achieved."
"So the Chinese happily agreed to help produce the televised spectacle. The handshake, the sight of Nixon on the Great Wall, a Chinese military band playing 'America the Beautiful' at a banquet in the Great Hall of the People--these video images instantly transformed China, in the minds of American viewers and voters, from a forbidding and foreboding land into an enchanting and inviting one, a feat that even the most elegant communique could never have accomplished."
Whenever peace — conceived as the avoidance of war — has been the primary objective of a power or a group of powers, the international system has been at the mercy of the most ruthless member of the international community. [A more proper goal is] stability based on an equilibrium of forces.
If I had to choose between justice and disorder, on the one hand, and injustice and order, on the other, I would always choose the latter.
Here was an example of what would become a pattern in Kissinger’s diplomacy: his attempt to mediate a dispute by finding a semantic formulation to finesse differences. In this case it was devising a phrase that linked the bombing halt to the negotiations, without sounding like a condition. Later, at the end of the war, he would search for ambiguous phrases about the demilitarized zone and South Vietnamese sovereignty that could be read differently in Hanoi and Saigon. Sometimes these word games paid off. But usually they opened Kissinger up to accusations that he had left important disagreements unresolved by talking out of both sides of his mouth.
[during the 1970 election, R v N ] At the convention, the Rockefeller forces, with little to lose, sent Kissinger to talk to the Iowa delegation. “It was so novel to me,” he told a reporter at the time. “I’d never met working politicians before. I didn’t attempt to talk their language. I just talked what I knew.” The Iowa delegation voted overwhelmingly for Nixon.