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ركل السلم بعيدًا: إستراتيجيات التنمية والتطور قديمًا وحديثًا
في ضوء هذه الأدلة المضادة للنظرة التقليدية للرأسمالية, يكون من الإنصاف طرح تساؤل بشأن إمكانية وجود رغبة كامنة لدى الدول الغنية لإخفاء "أسرار نجاحها". الغرض من هذا الكتاب هو تجميع عناصر مختلفة من المعلومات التاريخية التي تناقض هذه النظرة التقليدية لتاريخ الرأسمالية, وتقديم مشهد شامل, ومختصر في الوقت نفسه, عن السياسات والمؤسسات التي استخدمتها الدول المتقدمة حين كانت فى مراحل نموها الأولى. وبمعنى آخر يطرح الكتاب تساؤلاً عن: "كيف تمكنت الدول الغنية من أن تصبح غنية فعلاً؟".
الإجابة المختصرة على هذا السؤال هو أن الدول الغنية لم تصل إلى ما وصلت إليه فعلاً من خلال انتهاج السياسات وإقامة المؤسسات التي توصي بها الدول النامية حالياً. فالغالبية من الدول الغنية استخدمت سياسات تجارية "سيئة" وسياسات صناعية, مثل حماية الصناعات الوليدة ودعم الصادرات, وهى ممارسات ينظر إليها اليوم نظرة متدينة إن لم تكن تحظر تماماً من خلال قواعد منظمة التجارة العالمية.
وإذا كان الحال كذلك, ألا يدفعنا هذا إلى الاعتقاد بأن الدول الغنية تستخدم توصياتها بشأن السياسات والمؤسسات الجيدة كوسيلة لإعاقة الدول النامية عن انتهاج السياسات والمؤسسات التي كانت هى تستخدمها من قبل لتحقيق التنمية الإقتصادية؟ هذا هو السؤال الذى يأمل الكتاب في الإجابة عليه.
الإجابة المختصرة على هذا السؤال هو أن الدول الغنية لم تصل إلى ما وصلت إليه فعلاً من خلال انتهاج السياسات وإقامة المؤسسات التي توصي بها الدول النامية حالياً. فالغالبية من الدول الغنية استخدمت سياسات تجارية "سيئة" وسياسات صناعية, مثل حماية الصناعات الوليدة ودعم الصادرات, وهى ممارسات ينظر إليها اليوم نظرة متدينة إن لم تكن تحظر تماماً من خلال قواعد منظمة التجارة العالمية.
وإذا كان الحال كذلك, ألا يدفعنا هذا إلى الاعتقاد بأن الدول الغنية تستخدم توصياتها بشأن السياسات والمؤسسات الجيدة كوسيلة لإعاقة الدول النامية عن انتهاج السياسات والمؤسسات التي كانت هى تستخدمها من قبل لتحقيق التنمية الإقتصادية؟ هذا هو السؤال الذى يأمل الكتاب في الإجابة عليه.
239 pages, Paperback
First published July 1, 2002
201 people are currently reading
5970 people want to read
About the author
Ha-Joon Chang
39 books1,622 followersHa-Joon Chang is a South Korean institutional economist, specializing in development economics. Currently he is a reader in the Political Economy of Development at the University of Cambridge.
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March 22, 2012
الكتاب فعلاً رائع
بل إنه كتاب فى الإقتصاد يجعلك تبكى
ما أعلمه أن كتب الرعب أو الرومانسية هى التى تجعل الإنسان يبكى
ولكن هذا الكتاب على الرغم من أنه كتاب فى الإقتصاد
إلا أنه يجعلك ترى الأمم هم أبطال الكتاب
الأمم المتقدمة والأمم المتأخرة
ثم يوضح لك كيف ان الأمة التى تتقدم تمحو كل الطرق التى تقدمت بها
حتى تكون هي فى المقدمة وتظل الأمم المتأخرة فى مكانها
الكتاب له أهمية خاصة أخرى أن مقدمة الكتاب كتبها د. مصطفى الرفاعى وهو وزير سابق للصناعة والتنمية التكنولوجية بمصر
رغم أن الكتاب به الكثير من الإحصائيات لا أنه يبسط لك النتيجة
أن كل من يصل للقمة ... يركل السلم بعيداً
الميزة الأخرى فى الكتاب أنه يوضح لك التسلسل التاريخى لكل العوامل الإقتصادية مثل كيف اصبحت الدول الغنية غنية.. وهذافى الفصل الأول
ثم يتابع فى الفصل الثانى عن سياسات التنمية الإقتصادية
والمنظور التاريخي للسياسات الصناعية والتجارية والتكنولوجية
ثم ينتقل بمنتهى السلاسةللفصل الثالث حيث يوضح فيه
المؤسسات والتنمية الإقتصادية من منظور تاريخي
ثم ينهى الكتاب فى الفصل الرابع بعنوان
دروس للحاضر
الكتاب كله فى حدود 200 صفحة ولكنه يؤثر فى كل مشاعرك
حتى إن لم تكن خبير أو لديك دراية بعلم الإقتصاد
وهو كما قلت كتاب رائع يمزج المشاعر بالإقتصاد
ويجعلك ترى الصورة بمنتهى الوضوح
أنصح به لكل من يهتم بمعرفة الجانب الحقيقي وغير المنظور من الإقتصاد
خاصة الفصل الثانى فهو يوضح حقيقة الليبرالية وعلاقتها بالإقتصاد وخطورة ذلك على إستمرار وتزايد الفقر فى العالم ورسم صورة مضللة عن إزالة الفقر من العالم . والفترة التاريخية قبل الحرب العالمية الأولى والتى كان يطبق فيها نظام التجارة الحر بشكل موسع على كل دول العالم بما فيها الصين ( سيام ) وإيران ( بلاد فارس ) وتركيا ( الإمبراطورية العثمانية )
كل الشكر للكاتب فقد قام بعمل يستحق أن يضع عليه إسمه
( ركل السلم بعيداً )
بل إنه كتاب فى الإقتصاد يجعلك تبكى
ما أعلمه أن كتب الرعب أو الرومانسية هى التى تجعل الإنسان يبكى
ولكن هذا الكتاب على الرغم من أنه كتاب فى الإقتصاد
إلا أنه يجعلك ترى الأمم هم أبطال الكتاب
الأمم المتقدمة والأمم المتأخرة
ثم يوضح لك كيف ان الأمة التى تتقدم تمحو كل الطرق التى تقدمت بها
حتى تكون هي فى المقدمة وتظل الأمم المتأخرة فى مكانها
الكتاب له أهمية خاصة أخرى أن مقدمة الكتاب كتبها د. مصطفى الرفاعى وهو وزير سابق للصناعة والتنمية التكنولوجية بمصر
رغم أن الكتاب به الكثير من الإحصائيات لا أنه يبسط لك النتيجة
أن كل من يصل للقمة ... يركل السلم بعيداً
الميزة الأخرى فى الكتاب أنه يوضح لك التسلسل التاريخى لكل العوامل الإقتصادية مثل كيف اصبحت الدول الغنية غنية.. وهذافى الفصل الأول
ثم يتابع فى الفصل الثانى عن سياسات التنمية الإقتصادية
والمنظور التاريخي للسياسات الصناعية والتجارية والتكنولوجية
ثم ينتقل بمنتهى السلاسةللفصل الثالث حيث يوضح فيه
المؤسسات والتنمية الإقتصادية من منظور تاريخي
ثم ينهى الكتاب فى الفصل الرابع بعنوان
دروس للحاضر
الكتاب كله فى حدود 200 صفحة ولكنه يؤثر فى كل مشاعرك
حتى إن لم تكن خبير أو لديك دراية بعلم الإقتصاد
وهو كما قلت كتاب رائع يمزج المشاعر بالإقتصاد
ويجعلك ترى الصورة بمنتهى الوضوح
أنصح به لكل من يهتم بمعرفة الجانب الحقيقي وغير المنظور من الإقتصاد
خاصة الفصل الثانى فهو يوضح حقيقة الليبرالية وعلاقتها بالإقتصاد وخطورة ذلك على إستمرار وتزايد الفقر فى العالم ورسم صورة مضللة عن إزالة الفقر من العالم . والفترة التاريخية قبل الحرب العالمية الأولى والتى كان يطبق فيها نظام التجارة الحر بشكل موسع على كل دول العالم بما فيها الصين ( سيام ) وإيران ( بلاد فارس ) وتركيا ( الإمبراطورية العثمانية )
كل الشكر للكاتب فقد قام بعمل يستحق أن يضع عليه إسمه
( ركل السلم بعيداً )
May 5, 2017
If Bad Samaritans: The Myth of Free Trade and the Secret History of Capitalism is more for general readers, Kicking Away the Ladder is directed towards more professional/academic audience. Highly organized and very clear + concise argument, it provides such a brief but meaningful overview of the history of development, and thus a perfect introduction for economists/policy makers. Ha-Joon Chang is also careful in presenting and interpreting data.
The scope of the book, however, does not allow deep analysis and does not argue about the validity/reliability of its methodology. But I think it does remind readers of a very useful tool often ignored in studying econ: history - such a vast amount of data and lessons should be more valued and learned from more often. Economics has been viewed too much in an abstract manner.
The scope of the book, however, does not allow deep analysis and does not argue about the validity/reliability of its methodology. But I think it does remind readers of a very useful tool often ignored in studying econ: history - such a vast amount of data and lessons should be more valued and learned from more often. Economics has been viewed too much in an abstract manner.
August 3, 2022
La tesis del libro es que los países desarrollados llegaron a ese estatus aplicando una serie de políticas que hoy prohiben a los países en desarrollo. Como dice el título, que parafresea a Frederich List, "patearon la escalera" que les permitió llegar a donde están para que los que venían detrás no pudieran subir.
Hoy la receta económica ortodoxa, impulsada por los países desarrollados e impuesta por los organismos multilaterales como el FMI, el BM y la OMC, habla de que un país necesita "buenas prácticas económicas" (libre mercado) y "buenas instituciones" (democracia, buena burocracia, etc) para desarrollarse. Haciendo uso de un enfoque histórico, Chang muestra que en verdad la mayoría de los países desarrollados lo hicieron aplicando diferentes herramientas de la política industrial (como aranceles altos, protección de industrias jóvenes, etc), muchas de las cuales hoy están prohibidas o desaconsejadas. Es un libro pensado para el público general pero siento que podría haber profundizado un poco más en algunas cuestiones.
Hoy la receta económica ortodoxa, impulsada por los países desarrollados e impuesta por los organismos multilaterales como el FMI, el BM y la OMC, habla de que un país necesita "buenas prácticas económicas" (libre mercado) y "buenas instituciones" (democracia, buena burocracia, etc) para desarrollarse. Haciendo uso de un enfoque histórico, Chang muestra que en verdad la mayoría de los países desarrollados lo hicieron aplicando diferentes herramientas de la política industrial (como aranceles altos, protección de industrias jóvenes, etc), muchas de las cuales hoy están prohibidas o desaconsejadas. Es un libro pensado para el público general pero siento que podría haber profundizado un poco más en algunas cuestiones.
March 7, 2011
This was another great book by Ha-Joon Chang. It covers a lot of the same ideas as "Bad Samaritans", though this one came first. There are some great comparative economic history charts in here. Either book is good for disabusing yourself of the idea that any rich country actually got rich by following the advice they give to poor countries (i.e., Neo-Liberal reforms). This is essential reading if you want to pull the rug out of most American libertarian arguments.
January 2, 2026
Los países prósperos que hoy asociamos al libre comercio(EEUU,R.U, Alemania…) se protegieron, intervinieron y planificaron a través del Estado antes de “liberalizarse”. Luego, una vez arriba, retiraron la escalera al resto. GRAN obra.
April 21, 2025
Esta obra refleja de manera magistral el cinismo de los gobernantes y de ciertas ideologías político-económicas cuando hablan de que el libre mercado es lo que hace grandes a las naciones. Esta obra desmonta totalmente esos argumentos a lo largo de la historia de una manera amena y precisa. El libro se divide en 3 partes:
1) medidas proteccionistas que llevó a cabo cada país a lo largo de su historia para proteger su riqueza e industria.
2) qué hicieron, una vez alcanzado el poderío económico, para que otros países no les alcanzasen.
3) la creación y valor de las instituciones económicas, sociales, financieras que surgieron en los últimos años. ¿Frenan a los países en vías de desarrollo, cuando los países ya desarrollados no necesitaron nunca estas instituciones?
El libro me ha parecido soberbio, y muy buen documentado. Tanto, que más que como lectura ligera se podría usar como libro de consulta.
1) medidas proteccionistas que llevó a cabo cada país a lo largo de su historia para proteger su riqueza e industria.
2) qué hicieron, una vez alcanzado el poderío económico, para que otros países no les alcanzasen.
3) la creación y valor de las instituciones económicas, sociales, financieras que surgieron en los últimos años. ¿Frenan a los países en vías de desarrollo, cuando los países ya desarrollados no necesitaron nunca estas instituciones?
El libro me ha parecido soberbio, y muy buen documentado. Tanto, que más que como lectura ligera se podría usar como libro de consulta.
"Solo después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, Estados Unidos - con su supremacía industrial sin competencia- acabó por liberalizar el comercio y pasó a liderar la causa del libre comercio. Sin embargo, cabe señalar que Estados Unidos nunca lo practicó en la misma medida que lo hiciera el Reino Unido durante su período de libre comercio (de 1860 a 1932)"
August 26, 2020
Somewhat disappointed by this one. I'm sympathetic to Chang's central argument -- that protectionism and industrial policy were important tools in the growth of today's developed countries -- but the historical work to get there is just too thin. Chang has a tendency to read correlation as causation, which is OK in the messy world of history, provided that you make a strong case unpacking the mechanisms and delving into the institutional detail. But with 700 years of European economic history to cover in fifty-odd pages, there just isn't enough meat on the bones.
(As an example of the historical critiques, read the indispensable Pseudoerasmus on tariffs.)
Would make for a nice companion to Joe Studwell's How Asia Works for someone new to (mildly) heterodox development. But if you want to dig deeper, look elsewhere.
(As an example of the historical critiques, read the indispensable Pseudoerasmus on tariffs.)
Would make for a nice companion to Joe Studwell's How Asia Works for someone new to (mildly) heterodox development. But if you want to dig deeper, look elsewhere.
Want to read
May 22, 2014كتاب أحزنني .. فهو يوضح كيف أصبحنا نحن الدول الناميه مجرد دميه تحركها الدول المتقدمه .. كم من الحلول المقدمه و التي تخبيء بين ثناياها السم .. فكل من يصل للقمه يركل السلم بعيدا .. فالدول المتقدمه و إدارتها لصندوق النقد الدولي و الليبراليه العالميه لا تسعي أبدا الي النهوض بالدول الناميه بل تريد أن تبقي دائما في ثالوث الفقر و الجهل و البطاله!! :(
July 6, 2023
ترجمه این کتاب با عنوان 《انداختن نردبان؛ استراتژی توسعه در چشم اندازی تاریخی》 توسط جهاد دانشگاهی مشهد چاپ شده.
نگاه نویسنده در این کتاب این است که کشورهای توسعه یافته مسیر طولانی برای توسعه طی کردند و اینکه توسعه این کشورها به واسطه تجارت آزاد تعریف بشود، تفسیر درستی نیست؛ بلکه این کشورها یک دوره طولانی و مشخص، سیاستهای حمایت از صنایع نوپا داخلی خود را دنبال میکردن.
و نتیجه میگیرد که اینکه به کشورهای درحال توسعه فعلی هم دنبال کردن سیاستهای تجارت آزاد توصیه بشود، روش غلطی هست و مثل این میماند که کشورهای توسعه یافته بخوان نردبانی که از آن بالا رفتن را بندازن تا کشور دیگهای به مرتبه آنها نرسد.
نگاه نویسنده در این کتاب این است که کشورهای توسعه یافته مسیر طولانی برای توسعه طی کردند و اینکه توسعه این کشورها به واسطه تجارت آزاد تعریف بشود، تفسیر درستی نیست؛ بلکه این کشورها یک دوره طولانی و مشخص، سیاستهای حمایت از صنایع نوپا داخلی خود را دنبال میکردن.
و نتیجه میگیرد که اینکه به کشورهای درحال توسعه فعلی هم دنبال کردن سیاستهای تجارت آزاد توصیه بشود، روش غلطی هست و مثل این میماند که کشورهای توسعه یافته بخوان نردبانی که از آن بالا رفتن را بندازن تا کشور دیگهای به مرتبه آنها نرسد.
October 23, 2018
هذا الكتاب من الكتب التي توضح لك " كيف يُدار العالم !" ، فهو يوضح التخريب الاقتصادي الممنهج الذي تتبعه الدول الغنية - الرأسمالية- حيال الدول النامية ، فالسؤال الذي يحاول " ها-جون تشانج" الإجابة عليه هو هل حقيقة الدول المتقدمة حاليًا عندما كانت في مرحلة النمو الأولى تنتهج تلك السياسات التي توصي بها حاليًا الدول النامية ؟!.
إن المؤلف يؤكد أن ما حدث مخالف لذلك تمامًا ، ومن ثم فإن السلم الذي صعدت عليه الدول الغنية حاليًا نحو التنمية تم ركله بعيدًا حتى لا يصعد غيرها عليه ، بمعنى آخر أن هذه الدول عملت على إخفاء أسرار نجاحها ، ومن هنا يبحث الكتاب عن الكيفية التي أصبحت بها هذه الدول غنية بالفعل .
إن الكتاب رغم أنه اقتصادي بحت إلا أنه كُتب بأسلوب سهل وجميل ، إنه يوضح لك بلسان الحال كيف يتحول البشر إلى وحوش تمص دماء الأبرياء ، كيف أن هذه النهضة وهذا التقدم الذي يفتخر به الغرب قامت على أجساد الضعفاء باستعمارهم ومص ما تبقى فيهم من ماء الحياة ، ثم يحاول تفكيك بعض الرؤى الشائعة التي ليس لها نصيب من الصحة ، مثلًا بريطانيا - وفق النظرة السائدة- هي المدافع الصلب عن التجارة الحرة واقتصاد السوق الحر ، ولكن كيف كانت بدايات بريطانيا ؟ إنها أول دولة تجيد فن الترويج للصناعات الوليدة وحمايت��ا ، فبدايتها غير ما تنادي به حاليًا .
يقرر الاقتصادي الألماني " فردريك ليست " أن التجارة الحرة يمكن أن تكون مفيدة بين دول على مستوى متشابه من التنمية الصناعية ، وغير ذلك يؤدي إلى تدمير الصناعات الوطنية ، ونفس الأمر ينطبق على الولايات المتحدة ، فعندما حققت تفوقها الصناعي راحت تروج للتجارة الحرة ، على الرغم أنها أنجزت هذا التفوق من خلال الصناعة الوطنية ، وكذا بريطانيا عندما وصلت إلى حافة التقدم التكنولوجي تخلصت من منافسيها ، واستخدمت كل وسائل الحد من نقل التكنولوجيا إلى المنافسين .
لماذا الكلام عن بريطانيا تحديدًا ؟ وذلك لأنها الواحة الفكرية للمفاهيم الحديثة لسياسة " دعه يعمل دعه يمر " ، كما أن الرؤية الشائعة أنها حققت نموها وتقدمها دون تدخل جوهري من جانب الدولة ، ولكن المؤلف يؤكد أن الحقيقة ليست كذلك ، حتى في الولايات المتحدة يؤكد المؤلف أن دور الحكومة الفيدرالية في التقدم الصناعي كان معتبرًا حتى بعد الحرب .
فسياسة تحفيز الصناعات الوليدة - وفق مفاهيم القرن السادس عشر- التي صنعها الملك هنري السابع في بريطانيا ، وطورها الملوك الذين خلفوه لكان من الصعب أن تحقق بريطانيا النجاح المبدئي في عملية التصنيع ، ثم مع دخول مرحلة الثورة الصناعية واصلت بريطانيا سياسة تحفيز الإنتاج الصناعي عن طريق " الحماية التعريفية " و " حظر الواردات من المنتجات الأكثر تفوقًا على منتجاتها " .
وكذا الولايات المتحدة تعتبر حصن الحمائية الحديثة ، وهذه النظرة - وفق الكتاب- تخالف ما هو شائع ، ويلاحظ المؤلف أن الولايات المتحدة لم تبدأ في تزعم الحملة العالمية من اجل تحرير التجارة إلا بعد انتهاء الحرب العالمية الثانية ، وبعد أن ثبتت تفوقها الصناعي .
لمعرفة الإستغلال البشع الذي مارسته هذه الدول الراسمالية ، يذكر المؤلف أن اليابان في بداية تطورها لم تستطع فرض نظام حمائي في تجارتها ، حيث اضطرت لتوقيع سلسلة من المعاهدات غير المتكافئة عام ١٨٥٨ منعتها من فرض تعريفات تزيد عن ٥٪ في الوقت الذي كانت فيه الولايات المتحدة تفرض تعريفة تصل إلى ٥٠٪ .
وكذا بريطانيا انتهجت سياسات هدفت إلى منع تقدم التصنيع في المستعمرات ، وذلك عن طريق تجريم بعض المجالات التصنيعية ، وكذا حظر صادرات المستعمرات المنافسة ، وانظر قانون الصوف الذي قضى على صناعة الصوف الأيرلندية .
الكتاب يقرر بشكل واضح ومباشر أن سياسة " ركل السلم " لم تكن قادرة على إحداث ديناميكية النمو الموعود في الدول النامية خلال العقدين الأخيرين .
إن المؤلف يؤكد أن ما حدث مخالف لذلك تمامًا ، ومن ثم فإن السلم الذي صعدت عليه الدول الغنية حاليًا نحو التنمية تم ركله بعيدًا حتى لا يصعد غيرها عليه ، بمعنى آخر أن هذه الدول عملت على إخفاء أسرار نجاحها ، ومن هنا يبحث الكتاب عن الكيفية التي أصبحت بها هذه الدول غنية بالفعل .
إن الكتاب رغم أنه اقتصادي بحت إلا أنه كُتب بأسلوب سهل وجميل ، إنه يوضح لك بلسان الحال كيف يتحول البشر إلى وحوش تمص دماء الأبرياء ، كيف أن هذه النهضة وهذا التقدم الذي يفتخر به الغرب قامت على أجساد الضعفاء باستعمارهم ومص ما تبقى فيهم من ماء الحياة ، ثم يحاول تفكيك بعض الرؤى الشائعة التي ليس لها نصيب من الصحة ، مثلًا بريطانيا - وفق النظرة السائدة- هي المدافع الصلب عن التجارة الحرة واقتصاد السوق الحر ، ولكن كيف كانت بدايات بريطانيا ؟ إنها أول دولة تجيد فن الترويج للصناعات الوليدة وحمايت��ا ، فبدايتها غير ما تنادي به حاليًا .
يقرر الاقتصادي الألماني " فردريك ليست " أن التجارة الحرة يمكن أن تكون مفيدة بين دول على مستوى متشابه من التنمية الصناعية ، وغير ذلك يؤدي إلى تدمير الصناعات الوطنية ، ونفس الأمر ينطبق على الولايات المتحدة ، فعندما حققت تفوقها الصناعي راحت تروج للتجارة الحرة ، على الرغم أنها أنجزت هذا التفوق من خلال الصناعة الوطنية ، وكذا بريطانيا عندما وصلت إلى حافة التقدم التكنولوجي تخلصت من منافسيها ، واستخدمت كل وسائل الحد من نقل التكنولوجيا إلى المنافسين .
لماذا الكلام عن بريطانيا تحديدًا ؟ وذلك لأنها الواحة الفكرية للمفاهيم الحديثة لسياسة " دعه يعمل دعه يمر " ، كما أن الرؤية الشائعة أنها حققت نموها وتقدمها دون تدخل جوهري من جانب الدولة ، ولكن المؤلف يؤكد أن الحقيقة ليست كذلك ، حتى في الولايات المتحدة يؤكد المؤلف أن دور الحكومة الفيدرالية في التقدم الصناعي كان معتبرًا حتى بعد الحرب .
فسياسة تحفيز الصناعات الوليدة - وفق مفاهيم القرن السادس عشر- التي صنعها الملك هنري السابع في بريطانيا ، وطورها الملوك الذين خلفوه لكان من الصعب أن تحقق بريطانيا النجاح المبدئي في عملية التصنيع ، ثم مع دخول مرحلة الثورة الصناعية واصلت بريطانيا سياسة تحفيز الإنتاج الصناعي عن طريق " الحماية التعريفية " و " حظر الواردات من المنتجات الأكثر تفوقًا على منتجاتها " .
وكذا الولايات المتحدة تعتبر حصن الحمائية الحديثة ، وهذه النظرة - وفق الكتاب- تخالف ما هو شائع ، ويلاحظ المؤلف أن الولايات المتحدة لم تبدأ في تزعم الحملة العالمية من اجل تحرير التجارة إلا بعد انتهاء الحرب العالمية الثانية ، وبعد أن ثبتت تفوقها الصناعي .
لمعرفة الإستغلال البشع الذي مارسته هذه الدول الراسمالية ، يذكر المؤلف أن اليابان في بداية تطورها لم تستطع فرض نظام حمائي في تجارتها ، حيث اضطرت لتوقيع سلسلة من المعاهدات غير المتكافئة عام ١٨٥٨ منعتها من فرض تعريفات تزيد عن ٥٪ في الوقت الذي كانت فيه الولايات المتحدة تفرض تعريفة تصل إلى ٥٠٪ .
وكذا بريطانيا انتهجت سياسات هدفت إلى منع تقدم التصنيع في المستعمرات ، وذلك عن طريق تجريم بعض المجالات التصنيعية ، وكذا حظر صادرات المستعمرات المنافسة ، وانظر قانون الصوف الذي قضى على صناعة الصوف الأيرلندية .
الكتاب يقرر بشكل واضح ومباشر أن سياسة " ركل السلم " لم تكن قادرة على إحداث ديناميكية النمو الموعود في الدول النامية خلال العقدين الأخيرين .
September 24, 2012
Key Quotes -
It is a very common clever device that when anyone has attained the summit of greatness, he kicks away the ladder by which he has climbed up, in order to deprive others of the means of climbing up after him. – Friedrich List; The National System of Political Economy
As has been repeatedly observed over the last few centuries, the common problem faced by all catch-up economies is that the shift to higher-value-added activities, which constitutes the key to the process of economic development, does not happen ‘naturally’. – Ha-Joon Chang; Kicking Away The Ladder; Development Strategy in Historical Perspective
It is a very common clever device that when anyone has attained the summit of greatness, he kicks away the ladder by which he has climbed up, in order to deprive others of the means of climbing up after him. – Friedrich List; The National System of Political Economy
As has been repeatedly observed over the last few centuries, the common problem faced by all catch-up economies is that the shift to higher-value-added activities, which constitutes the key to the process of economic development, does not happen ‘naturally’. – Ha-Joon Chang; Kicking Away The Ladder; Development Strategy in Historical Perspective
September 1, 2023
mm kinda crazy
October 6, 2024
Mainstream international development largely revolves around a core set of beliefs: developing countries should embrace free trade, open their markets and develop strong institutions (such as independent central banks, strong property rights and patent systems, etc). The story goes that these were the key drivers of economic development in today’s large economic powers. Therefore, once they are implemented in developing countries, economic growth and prosperity will follow naturally.
In this work, Ha-Joon Chang challenges this conventional wisdom, arguing that the historical record contradicts it. Developed countries were actually quite interventionist and protectionist during the early industrial age. Policies like infant industry protection, strong tariffs, industrial espionage and patent stealing were deployed extensively. Chang argues that these measures were crucial for the economic development of these countries, and that the shift to laissez faire policies only occurred after industrial development was well on its way.
Turning to modern times, Chang shows that the highest growth rates in developing countries were achieved precisely when protectionist strategies were used. Thus, when institutions like the IMF and World Bank prevent developing countries from using these policies, Chang argues that we are effectively “kicking away the ladder” thay we used to achieve economic development.
While the book’s thesis is very interesting and thought provoking, the historical overview is a bit too fastidious and technical for a layman. Some sections were tough to get through. The book is quite short however, so I’d still recommend it.
April 18, 2023
Super insightful. This an excellent attempt at historicising economics, and is a great way for students and academics to 'rethink' economics.
Chang's central thesis is that the Now-Developed Countries (NDCs) in fact used 'bad' policies (such as infant industry protection and interventionist domestic policies) in their march to development, and are now attempting to 'kick away the ladder' from above so that the developing countries of today don't get there. Moreover, he argues that the NDCs were institutionally much less advanced than the currently developing countries are, at similar stages of development.
Today, through their influence on international development, trade and financial institutions, the NDCs are forcing the latter to adopt 'good' policies (free trade, open markets, privatisation) and pushing them to establish 'best'-practices and better institutions within a short span of time, when they themselves took centuries to establish and perfect them. Chang invites us to rethink what constitutes 'good' and 'bad' policies in this historical context, as well as what constitutes 'good' institutions in the context of contemporary developing economies.
A must-read for students of economics, policy and politics.
Chang's central thesis is that the Now-Developed Countries (NDCs) in fact used 'bad' policies (such as infant industry protection and interventionist domestic policies) in their march to development, and are now attempting to 'kick away the ladder' from above so that the developing countries of today don't get there. Moreover, he argues that the NDCs were institutionally much less advanced than the currently developing countries are, at similar stages of development.
Today, through their influence on international development, trade and financial institutions, the NDCs are forcing the latter to adopt 'good' policies (free trade, open markets, privatisation) and pushing them to establish 'best'-practices and better institutions within a short span of time, when they themselves took centuries to establish and perfect them. Chang invites us to rethink what constitutes 'good' and 'bad' policies in this historical context, as well as what constitutes 'good' institutions in the context of contemporary developing economies.
A must-read for students of economics, policy and politics.
April 17, 2023
Good thesis, and I especially like the methodological commitment to history over neoclassical methods. It was a little bit short and thus somewhat lacked defence of some points, but as a slow reader I did not mind too much!
July 13, 2019
En lo personal no me cautivo como otros; pero mi falta de concentracion no va a tirar abajo un libro muy bien investigado y muy bien escrito
September 23, 2018
Not too convincing though, but through the lens of historical approach, the book triggers some critical questions worth being answered, e.g. whether the development policy your country is pursuing is right or wrong, whether so-called free trade wave is beneficial or harmful to yours.
Do now-developed-countries really have good will to help developing countries?
Do now-developed-countries really have good will to help developing countries?
May 9, 2024
Un análisis histórico de casos que termina demostrando como las fórmulas neoliberales que los países desarrollados proponen (o imponen) a los países en vías de desarrollo son definitivamente una trampa que contradice por completo las vías y estrategias usadas por los primeros para llegar a donde están ahora.
El libro es mucho más que esta (para algunos) obviedad de perogrullo. Hace un recorrido por los distintos elementos que vinculan el desarrollo institucional, la ampliación de derechos laborales, la transición hacia los regímenes democráticos, la eliminación gradual del trabajo infantil y los distintos matices, contradicciones y datos incómodos que pueden surgir en el camino.
El libro es mucho más que esta (para algunos) obviedad de perogrullo. Hace un recorrido por los distintos elementos que vinculan el desarrollo institucional, la ampliación de derechos laborales, la transición hacia los regímenes democráticos, la eliminación gradual del trabajo infantil y los distintos matices, contradicciones y datos incómodos que pueden surgir en el camino.
July 28, 2008
Written more for an academic/professional/specialist audience than the general reader, Chang's short book is still accessible and full of information that is vital to our understanding of how the ideology of free trade has been created in order to reward developed nations at the expense of those trying to develop. The United States, Great Britain, Germany—essentially every country that has successfully industrialized—used tariffs, protections of infant industries, control of capital markets and other policies that poor countries are warned away from, often at the expense of losing IMF or World Bank funding.
The ladder image is simple and brilliant. It was coined by Frederich List, a nineteenth century Germany economist, to describe how the British tried to impose free trade policies on nations that hadn’t yet become industrial powers and is no less true today than it was in 1834.
Chang historical approach is devastating to free trade apologists and propagandists who serve the dominant development ideology which keeps poor countries poor. His more popular book “Bad Samaritans” is based some of the research evident here.
The ladder image is simple and brilliant. It was coined by Frederich List, a nineteenth century Germany economist, to describe how the British tried to impose free trade policies on nations that hadn’t yet become industrial powers and is no less true today than it was in 1834.
Chang historical approach is devastating to free trade apologists and propagandists who serve the dominant development ideology which keeps poor countries poor. His more popular book “Bad Samaritans” is based some of the research evident here.
August 30, 2019
O livro traz dados históricos relevantes sobre os países desenvolvidos (PAD) com a intenção de mostrar que em vários momentos as práticas de livre-comércio recomendadas por eles não foram aplicadas ao longo do tempo. Entretanto, a conclusão de que o objetivo é impedir o crescimento dos países em desenvolvimento contém muitas falhas. O autor percebe a falha desse argumento quando diz que nem todas as práticas dos PADS quanto em estágio de desenvolvimento devem ser adotadas, a exemplo, sufrágio limitado e escravidão. Além disso, não discute de que os países em desenvolvimento adotam o protecionismo é algumas décadas. Na conclusão, indica que os países em desenvolvimento tiveram crescimento nos anos de 60 a 80, quando não adotaram as práticas recomendadas pelos PAD, entretanto omite que a maioria estava sob a ditadura militar e que a dívida pública aumentou nesse período. A nota é pela revisão histórica e não pela conclusão.
August 31, 2014
Contrary to popular belief many of the now developed countries (NDCs) used activist industrial policies, including tariff protection, to spur their processes of economic development, so argues Ha Joon Chang in this much needed intervention into the debate on free trade as a panacea for the developing world.
By providing a sense of historical perspective and amassing a variety of empirical evidence he shows that the kind of policies currently championed today by dominant interests and institutions run contrary to those the NDCs used themselves in the past. The intention of the book is to broaden the current policy debate and provide scope for alternatives to current economic orthodoxy. Chang surely accomplishes this aim with aplomb. Essential reading for those interested in development economics.
By providing a sense of historical perspective and amassing a variety of empirical evidence he shows that the kind of policies currently championed today by dominant interests and institutions run contrary to those the NDCs used themselves in the past. The intention of the book is to broaden the current policy debate and provide scope for alternatives to current economic orthodoxy. Chang surely accomplishes this aim with aplomb. Essential reading for those interested in development economics.
October 11, 2025
Ich bin in Kamerun aufgewachsen, in einem Land, das mehr Entwicklungsprogramme als Jahreszeiten kennt. Entwicklung war kein Wort aus Lehrbüchern, sondern ein Geräusch, das aus Radios kam, eine Überschrift in Zeitungen, ein Versprechen in der Luft. Ich sah, wie neue Straßen geplant wurden, bevor alte überhaupt fertig waren, wie Berater kamen, um uns zu erklären, warum Armut effizienter verwaltet werden müsse. Die Weltbank sprach von Reformen, doch die Lehrer meiner Jugend bekamen monatelang kein Gehalt. Jahrzehnte später baut China Straßen, und die Menschen fahren darauf – aber niemand weiß, wohin.
Vielleicht habe ich deshalb Ha-Joon Chang sofort verstanden. Sein Blick auf die Geschichte der Nationen ist mir vertraut, weil er so nah an der Erfahrung vieler Länder meines Kontinents liegt: Entwicklung als ständige Verschiebung zwischen Hoffnung und Ernüchterung. In Kamerun habe ich gelernt, dass Fortschritt selten ein Triumph ist, sondern eine Form der Geduld, eine zähe Bewegung zwischen Mangel und Erwartung. Chang schreibt, als würde er diese Erfahrung in die Sprache der Ökonomie übersetzen – als wüsste er, dass jedes Dogma, das von außen kommt, sich früher oder später gegen die richtet, die es befolgen sollen.
Wenn ich heute über Entwicklung spreche, tue ich das nicht als Beobachter, sondern als jemand, der ihre Widersprüche gelebt hat: die langen Schatten des Kolonialismus, die stillen Enttäuschungen der Unabhängigkeit, die neue Versuchung des chinesischen Pragmatismus. Vielleicht sehe ich die Dinge deshalb weniger als Gegensatz, sondern als Wiederkehr – als zyklische Bewegung zwischen Belehrung und Erinnerung.
Ha-Joon „Changs Kicking Away the Ladder“ ist ein Buch, das den Mythos der ökonomischen Unschuld zerstört. Es erzählt die Geschichte des Westens, aber nicht die, die der Westen selbst erzählt. Chang erinnert daran, dass kein Land durch Freihandel reich geworden ist. Die großen Industrienationen, die heute die Dogmen des Marktes predigen, haben sich selbst unter den Schutz von Zöllen, Subventionen und gezielter Industriepolitik gestellt. Großbritannien, die Vereinigten Staaten, Deutschland, Japan – sie alle bauten ihre Wirtschaft hinter Mauern, nicht auf offenen Märkten. Erst nachdem sie ihre eigene Leiter erklommen hatten, verkündeten sie der Welt, dass Leitern gefährlich seien.
Das Vergessen dieser Geschichte ist kein Zufall, sondern politische Methode. Es erlaubt den Reichen, ihre eigene Vergangenheit in Moral zu verwandeln. Der Washington Consensus, jene kalte Blaupause neoliberaler Tugend, war in Wahrheit eine Ethik des Gedächtnisverlusts: Die Rezepte, die einst Wachstum ermöglichten, wurden zu Tabus erklärt. Entwicklungsländer sollten liberalisieren, bevor sie industrielle Grundlagen hatten, ihre Märkte öffnen, bevor sie Wettbewerb verkraften konnten, sparen, bevor sie Wohlstand kannten. Die Weltbank und der IWF verwandelten so ein ganzes Kontinent in ein Experiment geschichtsloser Vernunft. Afrika, das nach wirtschaftlicher Souveränität suchte, erhielt stattdessen Lektionen in Anpassung.
Dann trat China auf – ohne Dogma, ohne Moral, aber mit einer Erinnerung, die der Westen verloren hatte. Auch China hatte sich durch protektionistische Maßnahmen, staatliche Planung und industrielle Lenkung entwickelt. Es nahm ernst, was Chang theoretisch formulierte: dass Märkte Werkzeuge sind, keine Prinzipien, und dass wirtschaftlicher Fortschritt politische Steuerung braucht. In Afrika wurde China so zum unbeabsichtigten Erben der historischen Vernunft. Während die Weltbank Institutionen reformieren wollte, baute China Straßen, Kraftwerke, Häfen. Die eine Hand predigte, die andere handelte.
Doch auch hier lauert Ambivalenz. Chinas Pragmatismus ist nicht selbstlos, sein Engagement nicht ohne Eigennutz. Es bietet keine Befreiung, sondern eine neue Abhängigkeit – aber eine produktive, eine, die etwas entstehen lässt. Wo der Westen Disziplin forderte, erzeugt China Dynamik. Vielleicht ist das die bittere Ironie der Gegenwart: dass moralische Hybris lähmt, während strategischer Egoismus belebt.
Changs Buch ist in diesem Sinn weniger eine ökonomische Analyse als eine philosophische Erinnerung. Es fragt, ob Entwicklung überhaupt etwas ist, das man geben kann. Wer Entwicklung „hilft“, behauptet, sie zu besitzen – und wiederholt damit den kolonialen Reflex der Vormundschaft. Chang kehrt diese Logik um: Entwicklung ist Selbstermächtigung, nicht Belehrung. Sie beginnt nicht mit der Einführung westlicher Institutionen, sondern mit der Rückgewinnung historischer Erfahrung.
Vielleicht liegt darin die eigentliche Provokation seines Denkens: dass die Ökonomie nicht von Theorien, sondern von Gedächtnis abhängt. Jede Nation, die sich entwickeln will, muss sich an ihre eigenen Widersprüche erinnern – an die Zeit, als Armut noch Antrieb war, nicht Schande.
Die Leiter, die Chang als Metapher wählt, ist mehr als ein ökonomisches Bild. Sie ist das Symbol einer Moderne, die an den Aufstieg glaubt, aber das Oben nicht mehr kennt. Der Westen hat sie als Instrument der Belehrung gebraucht, China benutzt sie als Werkzeug des Ehrgeizes. Beide blicken nach oben, beide vergessen, woher sie kamen.
In diesem Vergessen liegt der eigentliche Bruch der Gegenwart: Die Weltbank sieht in Geschichte ein Hindernis, China eine Gelegenheit. Chang aber erinnert daran, dass beides nur Haltungen desselben Irrtums sind. Entwicklung ist kein Exportprodukt, kein Geschäftsmodell, keine universelle Formel. Sie ist eine Form des Erinnerns – der Versuch, aus der eigenen Geschichte eine Zukunft zu bauen, statt aus fremder Zukunft eine Geschichte zu machen.
Am Ende bleibt seine Botschaft so schlicht wie unbequem: Wer die Leiter anderer zerstört, verliert irgendwann auch den Boden unter den eigenen Füßen.
Vielleicht habe ich deshalb Ha-Joon Chang sofort verstanden. Sein Blick auf die Geschichte der Nationen ist mir vertraut, weil er so nah an der Erfahrung vieler Länder meines Kontinents liegt: Entwicklung als ständige Verschiebung zwischen Hoffnung und Ernüchterung. In Kamerun habe ich gelernt, dass Fortschritt selten ein Triumph ist, sondern eine Form der Geduld, eine zähe Bewegung zwischen Mangel und Erwartung. Chang schreibt, als würde er diese Erfahrung in die Sprache der Ökonomie übersetzen – als wüsste er, dass jedes Dogma, das von außen kommt, sich früher oder später gegen die richtet, die es befolgen sollen.
Wenn ich heute über Entwicklung spreche, tue ich das nicht als Beobachter, sondern als jemand, der ihre Widersprüche gelebt hat: die langen Schatten des Kolonialismus, die stillen Enttäuschungen der Unabhängigkeit, die neue Versuchung des chinesischen Pragmatismus. Vielleicht sehe ich die Dinge deshalb weniger als Gegensatz, sondern als Wiederkehr – als zyklische Bewegung zwischen Belehrung und Erinnerung.
Ha-Joon „Changs Kicking Away the Ladder“ ist ein Buch, das den Mythos der ökonomischen Unschuld zerstört. Es erzählt die Geschichte des Westens, aber nicht die, die der Westen selbst erzählt. Chang erinnert daran, dass kein Land durch Freihandel reich geworden ist. Die großen Industrienationen, die heute die Dogmen des Marktes predigen, haben sich selbst unter den Schutz von Zöllen, Subventionen und gezielter Industriepolitik gestellt. Großbritannien, die Vereinigten Staaten, Deutschland, Japan – sie alle bauten ihre Wirtschaft hinter Mauern, nicht auf offenen Märkten. Erst nachdem sie ihre eigene Leiter erklommen hatten, verkündeten sie der Welt, dass Leitern gefährlich seien.
Das Vergessen dieser Geschichte ist kein Zufall, sondern politische Methode. Es erlaubt den Reichen, ihre eigene Vergangenheit in Moral zu verwandeln. Der Washington Consensus, jene kalte Blaupause neoliberaler Tugend, war in Wahrheit eine Ethik des Gedächtnisverlusts: Die Rezepte, die einst Wachstum ermöglichten, wurden zu Tabus erklärt. Entwicklungsländer sollten liberalisieren, bevor sie industrielle Grundlagen hatten, ihre Märkte öffnen, bevor sie Wettbewerb verkraften konnten, sparen, bevor sie Wohlstand kannten. Die Weltbank und der IWF verwandelten so ein ganzes Kontinent in ein Experiment geschichtsloser Vernunft. Afrika, das nach wirtschaftlicher Souveränität suchte, erhielt stattdessen Lektionen in Anpassung.
Dann trat China auf – ohne Dogma, ohne Moral, aber mit einer Erinnerung, die der Westen verloren hatte. Auch China hatte sich durch protektionistische Maßnahmen, staatliche Planung und industrielle Lenkung entwickelt. Es nahm ernst, was Chang theoretisch formulierte: dass Märkte Werkzeuge sind, keine Prinzipien, und dass wirtschaftlicher Fortschritt politische Steuerung braucht. In Afrika wurde China so zum unbeabsichtigten Erben der historischen Vernunft. Während die Weltbank Institutionen reformieren wollte, baute China Straßen, Kraftwerke, Häfen. Die eine Hand predigte, die andere handelte.
Doch auch hier lauert Ambivalenz. Chinas Pragmatismus ist nicht selbstlos, sein Engagement nicht ohne Eigennutz. Es bietet keine Befreiung, sondern eine neue Abhängigkeit – aber eine produktive, eine, die etwas entstehen lässt. Wo der Westen Disziplin forderte, erzeugt China Dynamik. Vielleicht ist das die bittere Ironie der Gegenwart: dass moralische Hybris lähmt, während strategischer Egoismus belebt.
Changs Buch ist in diesem Sinn weniger eine ökonomische Analyse als eine philosophische Erinnerung. Es fragt, ob Entwicklung überhaupt etwas ist, das man geben kann. Wer Entwicklung „hilft“, behauptet, sie zu besitzen – und wiederholt damit den kolonialen Reflex der Vormundschaft. Chang kehrt diese Logik um: Entwicklung ist Selbstermächtigung, nicht Belehrung. Sie beginnt nicht mit der Einführung westlicher Institutionen, sondern mit der Rückgewinnung historischer Erfahrung.
Vielleicht liegt darin die eigentliche Provokation seines Denkens: dass die Ökonomie nicht von Theorien, sondern von Gedächtnis abhängt. Jede Nation, die sich entwickeln will, muss sich an ihre eigenen Widersprüche erinnern – an die Zeit, als Armut noch Antrieb war, nicht Schande.
Die Leiter, die Chang als Metapher wählt, ist mehr als ein ökonomisches Bild. Sie ist das Symbol einer Moderne, die an den Aufstieg glaubt, aber das Oben nicht mehr kennt. Der Westen hat sie als Instrument der Belehrung gebraucht, China benutzt sie als Werkzeug des Ehrgeizes. Beide blicken nach oben, beide vergessen, woher sie kamen.
In diesem Vergessen liegt der eigentliche Bruch der Gegenwart: Die Weltbank sieht in Geschichte ein Hindernis, China eine Gelegenheit. Chang aber erinnert daran, dass beides nur Haltungen desselben Irrtums sind. Entwicklung ist kein Exportprodukt, kein Geschäftsmodell, keine universelle Formel. Sie ist eine Form des Erinnerns – der Versuch, aus der eigenen Geschichte eine Zukunft zu bauen, statt aus fremder Zukunft eine Geschichte zu machen.
Am Ende bleibt seine Botschaft so schlicht wie unbequem: Wer die Leiter anderer zerstört, verliert irgendwann auch den Boden unter den eigenen Füßen.
August 27, 2025
Neo-mercantilism with romantique undertonnes. Very 19th century. A confused reaction to neoliberalim. Is humanity in a loop between free trade and protectionism. I hope not.
Rethinking about this book, I still think trade is the way countries, especially smaller ones, can develop. Yet it holds a logic into itself, but the ideas of unequal exchange summarize the situation way better. This books conception of development is still very 19th century while the 20th and 21st century development is much different. I suggest him to study Latin America to understand why the ideas of 19th may not translate to 20th as technology and production changes.
Rethinking about this book, I still think trade is the way countries, especially smaller ones, can develop. Yet it holds a logic into itself, but the ideas of unequal exchange summarize the situation way better. This books conception of development is still very 19th century while the 20th and 21st century development is much different. I suggest him to study Latin America to understand why the ideas of 19th may not translate to 20th as technology and production changes.
October 29, 2021
Un ensayo que desnuda las vergüenzas de las "buenas políticas" y el "buen gobierno" que las instituciones financieras y los países más desarrollados exigen a los países en desarrollo. Desde una perspectiva histórica demuestra que lo que piden no es por el interés de los países empobrecidos, sino por los suyos propios. No es noticia y cualquiera lo podría intuir, pero demostrarlo es otra cosa, y este libro lo consigue.
April 19, 2020
في هذين الرابطين محاضرة مسموعة استعرض فيها تلخيص سريع لهذا الكتاب
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August 17, 2022
Un clasico. Cualquier persona deberia leerlo si esta mínimamente interesada en como funciona el mundo. Basico economia.
April 3, 2023
A very good challenge to many of the conventional beliefs that pervade the discourse around economic history and economic development. While Chang does not fully succeed in establishing that his recommended mix of policies (broadly infant industry protection, specifically: tariff protections, export subsidies, indicative planning, public-private partnerships, certain nationalisations, state led technological development etc) are the ‘key’ to economic development and to a lesser extent growth he does demonstrate convincingly that historically NDC’s (now developed countries) used activist ITT (industrial, trade and technology) policies during their development.
The USA, for instance, maintained some of the highest average tariffs in the world (at a time when transportation costs already afforded significant natural protection) between 1816 and ~1945. The British woollen industry - which provided roughly half of Britain’s export earnings up to the Industrial Revolution - was arguably aided greatly in its development by trade protections (often outright bans on exports of raw wool) and active state encouragement. While it is true that Britain adopted a policy of unilateral free trade in the mid/late nineteenth century, it only did this at a point when its industrial supremacy was unrivalled, that is to say, when the benefits of infant industry protection are unnecessary and harmful (Chang does not deny the obvious benefits of free trade among nations at similar levels of economic development). The French state in the nineteenth century was actually relatively non-interventionist and by some measures maintained a less restrictive trade regime than Britain, at least in the former half of that century. Many other such myths in the laissez faire constellation are shown to be out of step with the historical record. This does not necessarily doom the arguments for a more laissez faire political economy, but it does show that the historical arguments lack critical nuance in the best cases and are outright wrong in the worst.
However, even if various state’s maintained a more activist ITT policy than is commonly believed, it is still true that the size of those states was minuscule by modern standards. What level of influence they were truly able to exert over their nations development is thus still hard to gauge. Chang very briefly discusses this but I think greater elaboration would have been helpful.
Along with his discussion of ‘policies’ (basically ITT policies) he also discusses the role of ‘institutions’ in economic development. I think this distinction is helpful but also left somewhat hazy such that what exactly constitutes a ‘policy’ as opposed to an ‘institution’ isn’t always clear. Anyhow, this is a minor complaint. He discusses a very wide range of institutions such as: democracy, bureaucracy, the judiciary, corporate governance (limited liability, bankruptcy law, financial disclosure requirements), banking (regulations and central banking) and social welfare institutions. I have probably missed a few too. The main takeaway of this is to emphasise that development is complicated and that we have little idea of exactly what works, to what degree and in what circumstances (I wonder how the academic literature has developed since the publishing of this book, which I believe was around 2001). These aren’t groundbreaking insights but we far too often forget them. We might know them in the abstract, but it’s quite another thing to ‘feel’ them to be true. I think that’s the main benefit of this chapter because ultimately it is very dry. I attribute this more to the subject matter itself rather than Chang, since he has shown himself able to write engagingly elsewhere. Each topic covered is primarily just a listing of historical factors - useful no doubt, but not engaging.
Overall therefore, kicking away the ladder is a necessary refutation to many of the historical myths that have accreted over the decades. It changed my view on the role and viability of state intervention in economic development, and even if I remain less convinced than Chang I am glad I read it. It also, as I alluded to, made me less certain of my views regarding the necessity of various institutions to development. What I do think is missing - which is probably beyond this book’s scope - is a discussion of the role that other ‘institutions’ that aren’t so closely affiliated to the state play and the role of culture. Bankruptcy law may be important but how the people conceptualise themselves and their relation to other people seems just as important.
A short note on methodology:
One of the chief virtues of this book I think is it’s emphasis on empiricism for making its arguments. Examining the historical record and postulating theories based that experience - as opposed to an abstract and deductive method - seems the correct one and also, though I don’t think Chang would appreciate it, a markedly conservative one.
The USA, for instance, maintained some of the highest average tariffs in the world (at a time when transportation costs already afforded significant natural protection) between 1816 and ~1945. The British woollen industry - which provided roughly half of Britain’s export earnings up to the Industrial Revolution - was arguably aided greatly in its development by trade protections (often outright bans on exports of raw wool) and active state encouragement. While it is true that Britain adopted a policy of unilateral free trade in the mid/late nineteenth century, it only did this at a point when its industrial supremacy was unrivalled, that is to say, when the benefits of infant industry protection are unnecessary and harmful (Chang does not deny the obvious benefits of free trade among nations at similar levels of economic development). The French state in the nineteenth century was actually relatively non-interventionist and by some measures maintained a less restrictive trade regime than Britain, at least in the former half of that century. Many other such myths in the laissez faire constellation are shown to be out of step with the historical record. This does not necessarily doom the arguments for a more laissez faire political economy, but it does show that the historical arguments lack critical nuance in the best cases and are outright wrong in the worst.
However, even if various state’s maintained a more activist ITT policy than is commonly believed, it is still true that the size of those states was minuscule by modern standards. What level of influence they were truly able to exert over their nations development is thus still hard to gauge. Chang very briefly discusses this but I think greater elaboration would have been helpful.
Along with his discussion of ‘policies’ (basically ITT policies) he also discusses the role of ‘institutions’ in economic development. I think this distinction is helpful but also left somewhat hazy such that what exactly constitutes a ‘policy’ as opposed to an ‘institution’ isn’t always clear. Anyhow, this is a minor complaint. He discusses a very wide range of institutions such as: democracy, bureaucracy, the judiciary, corporate governance (limited liability, bankruptcy law, financial disclosure requirements), banking (regulations and central banking) and social welfare institutions. I have probably missed a few too. The main takeaway of this is to emphasise that development is complicated and that we have little idea of exactly what works, to what degree and in what circumstances (I wonder how the academic literature has developed since the publishing of this book, which I believe was around 2001). These aren’t groundbreaking insights but we far too often forget them. We might know them in the abstract, but it’s quite another thing to ‘feel’ them to be true. I think that’s the main benefit of this chapter because ultimately it is very dry. I attribute this more to the subject matter itself rather than Chang, since he has shown himself able to write engagingly elsewhere. Each topic covered is primarily just a listing of historical factors - useful no doubt, but not engaging.
Overall therefore, kicking away the ladder is a necessary refutation to many of the historical myths that have accreted over the decades. It changed my view on the role and viability of state intervention in economic development, and even if I remain less convinced than Chang I am glad I read it. It also, as I alluded to, made me less certain of my views regarding the necessity of various institutions to development. What I do think is missing - which is probably beyond this book’s scope - is a discussion of the role that other ‘institutions’ that aren’t so closely affiliated to the state play and the role of culture. Bankruptcy law may be important but how the people conceptualise themselves and their relation to other people seems just as important.
A short note on methodology:
One of the chief virtues of this book I think is it’s emphasis on empiricism for making its arguments. Examining the historical record and postulating theories based that experience - as opposed to an abstract and deductive method - seems the correct one and also, though I don’t think Chang would appreciate it, a markedly conservative one.
October 8, 2024
The book is quite technical and with lots of information that is mostly well placed but also not always necessary in the given form, i.e. very detailed. It cannot be verifyied either way by a casual reader.
Now, as it comes to the content, it astonished me how high were the tariffs in developed countries in XIX and first decades of the XX century. E.g. in the US customs were between 50-70% most of the until long after the WWI.
Another interesting fact that had evaded my full attention before the read was how often in European development government had played an active role in developing and protecting strategic infant industries - not merely by tariffs, but through subsidies, tax exemptions, proactive policies etc., while the technical espionage, poaching skilled workers etc. were widely accepted, in Switzerland, Netherlands and many more until the late XIX century or first decades of the XX cent.
Below remarks are a mixture of facts from the book juxtaposed with my own prior knowledge. All emerged during the read. So what propels and slows the economic development in my opinion goes like this (morality and ethical judgments, also my own, besides):
1. Democracy is often not a good form of rule for developing countries - business, especially international, needs stability, democracy takes time to develop and is very prone to outside influences (mafia, business cliques, industrial lobbies, external pressure etc.)
2. Process of developing institutions takes time and always involves not negligible cost. Is it always worth it? Often times probably not.
3. Big push theory and focus on strategic infant industries make the difference - here utilising tools like tariffs, subsidies, tax exemptions etc. is beneficial, ofc tailored for the particular country's specific case (like US industry with about 50-70% tariff rate! For most final end products. Basically the South subsidised the North by buying more expensive, lower quality industrial products from the North in comparison to its European counterparts, e.g. textiles, while exporting resources and competing with low tariff imports or raw materials).
4. Stealing technology, no regard for patents etc. is the most obvious and a free way to quickly develop high-end technologies (China's example with semi-conductors). Like above, skilled labor poaching, technological espionages etc. can significantly shorten the development time of a new technology.
5. Try to utilise natural advantages and focus on sectors that are just developed or will be, like Taiwan with microchips, Sweden with steel industry etc. Or like Singapore/Korea with shipyards - advantageous location played a role there.
6. Importance of education leading to a skilled labor with the comparative advantage due to low wages/salaries - Chinese factories, Indian IT services, Romanian tech hubs. English proficiency, communication skills cannot be downplayed when it comes to the international business.
7. FDIs flow when there is a stable political environment and good technical skills plus English, like mentioned above and they constitute a big stimulus for a rapid growth.
8. Role of regulations, ease of making business - "Shoedog" experiences with Japan, China and Mexico plus India's example in the Economist report (rigid regulations, long waiting time, in general very long and sinuous road to launching a subsidiary/factory there, so FDIs remain low in that country).
9. Existing wealth transfer to the public, more productive managers - Singaporean public housing (mandatory sell to housing agency, land after fires and so on), Russian revolution plus how high taxes should be and what to exempt from them is a very important decision to be made and probably will change depending on the lvl of development.
10. Welfare state cost, like pensions, holidays, labor unions and wage-bargaining (starking examples of English 16h workday probably 6 day a week or China or the rest of XIX century Europe...) is very costly at the start. Most needed are long working hours, when industrial/factory stage of development is prevalent, combined with relatively low wages (but also keep in mind that we look from the international perspective, prices also are low, so not as bad as it sounds) like in Singapore - so also social norms and values, obviously Asia "good" vs Africa.
11. Remember about the climate. Geography greatly impacts the cost of infrastructure, rivers affect the cost of transportation, flatlands, diseases, fertile soils, sea access, big neighbour markets, tourist attractions and natural resources.
12. Important - stable currency or some form of a central bank (hyperinflation risk)
13. Average societal tendency to being risk averse vs risk seeking. It's another social factor and changing culture takes lots of times, if it can even be done in the first place.
Now, as it comes to the content, it astonished me how high were the tariffs in developed countries in XIX and first decades of the XX century. E.g. in the US customs were between 50-70% most of the until long after the WWI.
Another interesting fact that had evaded my full attention before the read was how often in European development government had played an active role in developing and protecting strategic infant industries - not merely by tariffs, but through subsidies, tax exemptions, proactive policies etc., while the technical espionage, poaching skilled workers etc. were widely accepted, in Switzerland, Netherlands and many more until the late XIX century or first decades of the XX cent.
Below remarks are a mixture of facts from the book juxtaposed with my own prior knowledge. All emerged during the read. So what propels and slows the economic development in my opinion goes like this (morality and ethical judgments, also my own, besides):
1. Democracy is often not a good form of rule for developing countries - business, especially international, needs stability, democracy takes time to develop and is very prone to outside influences (mafia, business cliques, industrial lobbies, external pressure etc.)
2. Process of developing institutions takes time and always involves not negligible cost. Is it always worth it? Often times probably not.
3. Big push theory and focus on strategic infant industries make the difference - here utilising tools like tariffs, subsidies, tax exemptions etc. is beneficial, ofc tailored for the particular country's specific case (like US industry with about 50-70% tariff rate! For most final end products. Basically the South subsidised the North by buying more expensive, lower quality industrial products from the North in comparison to its European counterparts, e.g. textiles, while exporting resources and competing with low tariff imports or raw materials).
4. Stealing technology, no regard for patents etc. is the most obvious and a free way to quickly develop high-end technologies (China's example with semi-conductors). Like above, skilled labor poaching, technological espionages etc. can significantly shorten the development time of a new technology.
5. Try to utilise natural advantages and focus on sectors that are just developed or will be, like Taiwan with microchips, Sweden with steel industry etc. Or like Singapore/Korea with shipyards - advantageous location played a role there.
6. Importance of education leading to a skilled labor with the comparative advantage due to low wages/salaries - Chinese factories, Indian IT services, Romanian tech hubs. English proficiency, communication skills cannot be downplayed when it comes to the international business.
7. FDIs flow when there is a stable political environment and good technical skills plus English, like mentioned above and they constitute a big stimulus for a rapid growth.
8. Role of regulations, ease of making business - "Shoedog" experiences with Japan, China and Mexico plus India's example in the Economist report (rigid regulations, long waiting time, in general very long and sinuous road to launching a subsidiary/factory there, so FDIs remain low in that country).
9. Existing wealth transfer to the public, more productive managers - Singaporean public housing (mandatory sell to housing agency, land after fires and so on), Russian revolution plus how high taxes should be and what to exempt from them is a very important decision to be made and probably will change depending on the lvl of development.
10. Welfare state cost, like pensions, holidays, labor unions and wage-bargaining (starking examples of English 16h workday probably 6 day a week or China or the rest of XIX century Europe...) is very costly at the start. Most needed are long working hours, when industrial/factory stage of development is prevalent, combined with relatively low wages (but also keep in mind that we look from the international perspective, prices also are low, so not as bad as it sounds) like in Singapore - so also social norms and values, obviously Asia "good" vs Africa.
11. Remember about the climate. Geography greatly impacts the cost of infrastructure, rivers affect the cost of transportation, flatlands, diseases, fertile soils, sea access, big neighbour markets, tourist attractions and natural resources.
12. Important - stable currency or some form of a central bank (hyperinflation risk)
13. Average societal tendency to being risk averse vs risk seeking. It's another social factor and changing culture takes lots of times, if it can even be done in the first place.
March 12, 2022
"Đầu tiên, những sự thật lịch sử về kinh nghiệm phát triển của các nước phát triển nên được công bố một cách rộng rãi. Điều này không chỉ là vấn đề của việc "hiểu rõ lịch sử", mà còn tạo điều kiện cho các nước đang phát triển thực hiện những lựa chọn có đầy đủ thông tin về chính sách và thiết chế thích hợp cho họ. Phải có nỗ lực trí tuệ lớn hơn để hiểu kĩ lưỡng hơn vai trò của chính sách và thiết chế - đặc biệt là thiết chế - đối với phát triển kinh tế, bằng cách loại bỏ những chuyện hoang đường và những lí thuyết quá giản lược đã làm mờ mắt nhiều lí thuyết gia và các nhà hoạch định chính sách.
Cụ thể hơn, về phương diện chính sách, "những chính sách tồi", mà phần lớn các nước NDC đã sử dụng rất hiệu quả khi còn là những nhà phát triển, ít nhất cần phải được phép sử dụng, nếu không nói là tích cực ủng hộ, bởi các nước phát triển và IDPE do họ kiểm soát. Trong khi đúng là những chính sách can thiệp ITT đôi khi có thể thoái hoá thành mạng lưới những thủ tục rườm rà và tham nhũng, thì điều đó cũng không có ý nghĩa rằng không nên sử dụng các chính sách đó. Nói cho cùng, chúng ra không bắt tất cả máy bay dừng bay vì có khả năng là chúng sẽ lao xuống đất hoặc bỏ tất cả các chương trình tiêm chủng vì một số trẻ có thể chết vì dị ứng.
Kết quả là, chúng ta cần một cách tiếp cận với quá trình hoạch định chính sách phát triển quốc tế khác hẳn cách tiếp cận mà các nước phát triển và IDPE theo đuổi.
Về phương diện chính sách, trước hết tôi ủng hộ sự thay đổi triệt để những điều kiện liên quan đến chính sách gắn liền với sự giúp đỡ tài chính từ Quỹ Tiền Tệ Quốc Tế (IMF) và Ngân hàng Thế giới (WB) hay từ chính phủ các nước phát triển. Những điều kiện này dựa trên việc thừa nhận rằng nhiều chính sách được cho là "tồi" trên thực tế lại không phải như vậy, và cũng không có chính sách "thực tiễn tốt nhất" mà tất cả phải bám vào. Thứ hai, các quy định của WTO và các hiệp định thương mại đa phương khác nên được viết lại để tạo điều kiện cho việc sử dụng một cách linh hoạt những công cụ thúc đẩy các ngành non trẻ (ví dụ như thuế xuất nhập khẩu và trợ cấp).
Việc cải tiến thiết chế nên được khuyến khích, vì chính tiềm năng phát triển to lớn mà sự kết hợp giữa các chính sách và thiết chế tốt (thực sự) có thể tạo ra. Nhưng, không nên đánh đồng việc đó với việc áp đặt một gói thiết chế cố định đương thời của các nước Mĩ-Anglo lên tất cả các quốc gia. Cần phải cố gắng nghiêm túc hơn nữa, cả trong lĩnh vực học thuật lẫn thực tiễn, nhằm tìm cho ra thiết chế nào là thực sự cần thiết hay có lợi cho những nhóm nước nào - căn cứ mức độ phát triển và những điều kiện về kinh tế, chính trị và thậm chí là văn hoá cụ thể của các nước đó. Cần đặc biệt thận trọng để không đòi hỏi các nước đang phát triển cải tạo quá nhanh các thiết chế của họ, đặc biệt là khi ta biết rằng họ đã có những thiết chế khá phát triển so với các nước NDC khi ở cùng một mức độ phát triển, và biết rằng việc thiết lập và vận hành những thiết chế mới là vô cùng tốn kém.
Cho phép các nước đang phát triển áp dụng những chính sách và thiết chế phù hợp hơn với giai đoạn phát triển của họ và với những điều kiện khác mà họ trải qua sẽ tạo điều kiện tăng trưởng nhanh hơn, như trong những năm 1960 và 1970. Điều này, về dài hạn, không chỉ có lợi cho các nước đang phát triển mà còn cho cả các nước phát triển, vì cơ hội giao thương và đầu tư sẽ gia tăng. Việc các nước phát triển không có khả năng nhìn thấy điều này là bi kịch của thời đại chúng ta. Nói theo ngạn ngữ của người Trung Quốc, thì họ có thể "bỏ những cái lợi lớn, và lâu dài để đuổi theo những cái lợi nhỏ, và ngắn hạn". Đây là thời gian để suy nghĩ lại xem chính sách và thiết chế nào sẽ giúp các nước đang phát triển hiện nay phát triển nhanh hơn; điều đó, đến lượt nó, cũng sẽ mang lại nhiều lợi ích hơn cho những nước phát triển."
*ITT = industry, trade & technology: công nghiệp, thương mại, công nghệ
**NDC = now-developed countries: các quốc gia đã phát triển hiện nay
Cụ thể hơn, về phương diện chính sách, "những chính sách tồi", mà phần lớn các nước NDC đã sử dụng rất hiệu quả khi còn là những nhà phát triển, ít nhất cần phải được phép sử dụng, nếu không nói là tích cực ủng hộ, bởi các nước phát triển và IDPE do họ kiểm soát. Trong khi đúng là những chính sách can thiệp ITT đôi khi có thể thoái hoá thành mạng lưới những thủ tục rườm rà và tham nhũng, thì điều đó cũng không có ý nghĩa rằng không nên sử dụng các chính sách đó. Nói cho cùng, chúng ra không bắt tất cả máy bay dừng bay vì có khả năng là chúng sẽ lao xuống đất hoặc bỏ tất cả các chương trình tiêm chủng vì một số trẻ có thể chết vì dị ứng.
Kết quả là, chúng ta cần một cách tiếp cận với quá trình hoạch định chính sách phát triển quốc tế khác hẳn cách tiếp cận mà các nước phát triển và IDPE theo đuổi.
Về phương diện chính sách, trước hết tôi ủng hộ sự thay đổi triệt để những điều kiện liên quan đến chính sách gắn liền với sự giúp đỡ tài chính từ Quỹ Tiền Tệ Quốc Tế (IMF) và Ngân hàng Thế giới (WB) hay từ chính phủ các nước phát triển. Những điều kiện này dựa trên việc thừa nhận rằng nhiều chính sách được cho là "tồi" trên thực tế lại không phải như vậy, và cũng không có chính sách "thực tiễn tốt nhất" mà tất cả phải bám vào. Thứ hai, các quy định của WTO và các hiệp định thương mại đa phương khác nên được viết lại để tạo điều kiện cho việc sử dụng một cách linh hoạt những công cụ thúc đẩy các ngành non trẻ (ví dụ như thuế xuất nhập khẩu và trợ cấp).
Việc cải tiến thiết chế nên được khuyến khích, vì chính tiềm năng phát triển to lớn mà sự kết hợp giữa các chính sách và thiết chế tốt (thực sự) có thể tạo ra. Nhưng, không nên đánh đồng việc đó với việc áp đặt một gói thiết chế cố định đương thời của các nước Mĩ-Anglo lên tất cả các quốc gia. Cần phải cố gắng nghiêm túc hơn nữa, cả trong lĩnh vực học thuật lẫn thực tiễn, nhằm tìm cho ra thiết chế nào là thực sự cần thiết hay có lợi cho những nhóm nước nào - căn cứ mức độ phát triển và những điều kiện về kinh tế, chính trị và thậm chí là văn hoá cụ thể của các nước đó. Cần đặc biệt thận trọng để không đòi hỏi các nước đang phát triển cải tạo quá nhanh các thiết chế của họ, đặc biệt là khi ta biết rằng họ đã có những thiết chế khá phát triển so với các nước NDC khi ở cùng một mức độ phát triển, và biết rằng việc thiết lập và vận hành những thiết chế mới là vô cùng tốn kém.
Cho phép các nước đang phát triển áp dụng những chính sách và thiết chế phù hợp hơn với giai đoạn phát triển của họ và với những điều kiện khác mà họ trải qua sẽ tạo điều kiện tăng trưởng nhanh hơn, như trong những năm 1960 và 1970. Điều này, về dài hạn, không chỉ có lợi cho các nước đang phát triển mà còn cho cả các nước phát triển, vì cơ hội giao thương và đầu tư sẽ gia tăng. Việc các nước phát triển không có khả năng nhìn thấy điều này là bi kịch của thời đại chúng ta. Nói theo ngạn ngữ của người Trung Quốc, thì họ có thể "bỏ những cái lợi lớn, và lâu dài để đuổi theo những cái lợi nhỏ, và ngắn hạn". Đây là thời gian để suy nghĩ lại xem chính sách và thiết chế nào sẽ giúp các nước đang phát triển hiện nay phát triển nhanh hơn; điều đó, đến lượt nó, cũng sẽ mang lại nhiều lợi ích hơn cho những nước phát triển."
*ITT = industry, trade & technology: công nghiệp, thương mại, công nghệ
**NDC = now-developed countries: các quốc gia đã phát triển hiện nay
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
January 12, 2019
Notwithstanding its release in 2002, I believe the main message of this book to be as relevant today as it was 16 years ago. Basically, Chang argues that the "now developed countries" (or: NDCs) are prescribing developmental strategies and rules for developing countries based on 'good policies' (such as a liberal trade schemes) and 'good institutions' (democracy, a good working bureaucracy, independent central banks etc.). But both these sets of 'good' stem from the idea that we - the NDCs - have used these to grow and develop. That they are therefore essential to any growth strategy.
Incorrect, Chang argues. By tracing the development path of the US, the UK, Germany, France, Sweden, the Netherlands and Belgium, Switzerland and Japan, he lays bare two fundamental and insightful things. Firstly, that all these countries have used 'bad policies' to successfully grow themselves: tariffs, import quotas, export subsidies, direct government subsidies, etc. In other words: protecting your infant industries from outside (and often at that point: better and fiercer) competition, can be healthy, and can be logical.
Secondly, the institutions which we now suggest to be taken over in a limited amount of time (think: imposing democracy as quickly as possible) is also not in line with the NDC experience, since it has often taken decades, if not centuries, for the NDCs to have some working 'good governance' institutions in this sense.
In sum, Chang argues that the NDCs are denying developing countries the same policies and institutional development strategy that they themselves used. They are therefore 'kicking away the ladder' of development that they themselves have climbed. He therefore suggests restoring the intellectual debate, by showing that we too used these policies to grow, and should therefore at least allow them the freedom (or policy space) to use these as well - if not actively promote it.
Chang's analysis is a provoking one when it comes to showcasing the developmental path of NDCs. The main take-away should be that there is no one-size-fits-all approach to development strategy, and that both different types of government intervention can play a role in development strategies.
Two elements are missing though. Firstly, there is no analysis of how the international economic governance institutions (such as the IMF, World Bank or the WTO) are actually limiting the policy options of developing countries. I agree they do, to an extent (especially the shift from the GATT to the WTO). And I agree with the main message. But there is a larger (academic) debate raging until this day, revolving around the question to what extent the 'policy space' of developing countries is being curtailed by these institutions. Chang starts from the point that this is heavily constrained, and that this is detrimental. There is certainly a case to be made here, but a thorough analysis of the limiting options would have made this an even better, and more convincing, read.
Secondly, Douglas Irwin raises the important point that correlation is no causation - and that Chang may have been misguided. From his historical analysis, he draws the conclusion that NDCs are now rich because of protectionist policies, but this is not necessarily so. Irwin argues that Chang fails to take into account very context-specific variables that could have accounted for the growth, despite the protectionist flavors. Hence, drawing the conclusion that protectionist policies are more favorable, may be a stretch. Chang should have (in Irwin's opinion) made a stronger case of how much protectionism actually played a role in the development of Western countries.
Incorrect, Chang argues. By tracing the development path of the US, the UK, Germany, France, Sweden, the Netherlands and Belgium, Switzerland and Japan, he lays bare two fundamental and insightful things. Firstly, that all these countries have used 'bad policies' to successfully grow themselves: tariffs, import quotas, export subsidies, direct government subsidies, etc. In other words: protecting your infant industries from outside (and often at that point: better and fiercer) competition, can be healthy, and can be logical.
Secondly, the institutions which we now suggest to be taken over in a limited amount of time (think: imposing democracy as quickly as possible) is also not in line with the NDC experience, since it has often taken decades, if not centuries, for the NDCs to have some working 'good governance' institutions in this sense.
In sum, Chang argues that the NDCs are denying developing countries the same policies and institutional development strategy that they themselves used. They are therefore 'kicking away the ladder' of development that they themselves have climbed. He therefore suggests restoring the intellectual debate, by showing that we too used these policies to grow, and should therefore at least allow them the freedom (or policy space) to use these as well - if not actively promote it.
Chang's analysis is a provoking one when it comes to showcasing the developmental path of NDCs. The main take-away should be that there is no one-size-fits-all approach to development strategy, and that both different types of government intervention can play a role in development strategies.
Two elements are missing though. Firstly, there is no analysis of how the international economic governance institutions (such as the IMF, World Bank or the WTO) are actually limiting the policy options of developing countries. I agree they do, to an extent (especially the shift from the GATT to the WTO). And I agree with the main message. But there is a larger (academic) debate raging until this day, revolving around the question to what extent the 'policy space' of developing countries is being curtailed by these institutions. Chang starts from the point that this is heavily constrained, and that this is detrimental. There is certainly a case to be made here, but a thorough analysis of the limiting options would have made this an even better, and more convincing, read.
Secondly, Douglas Irwin raises the important point that correlation is no causation - and that Chang may have been misguided. From his historical analysis, he draws the conclusion that NDCs are now rich because of protectionist policies, but this is not necessarily so. Irwin argues that Chang fails to take into account very context-specific variables that could have accounted for the growth, despite the protectionist flavors. Hence, drawing the conclusion that protectionist policies are more favorable, may be a stretch. Chang should have (in Irwin's opinion) made a stronger case of how much protectionism actually played a role in the development of Western countries.
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