BOOK REVIEW
FREEFALL: America, Free Markets, and the Sinking of the World Economy
by Joseph E. Stiglitz, W. W. Norton & Company, 2010
Reviewed by Bill Breakstone, February 8, 2010
Here is yet another enlightening book about the current global financial crisis, written by the 2001 winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics, and a former member of President Clinton’s Council of Economic Advisors. There have been many worthy and highly interesting accounts of the current crisis, and they generally fall into one of two categories—either detailed “inside” accounts of the failures or rescues of various financial firms, such as Andrew Ross Sorkin’s current “Too Big To Fail,” or books such as Stiglitz’s “Freefall” or John Cassidy’s “How Markets Fail,” that deal with the underlying economic theories, causes, and possible future remedies to prevent a repeat of the mistakes made leading up to our current situation. There will no doubt be many more, and those to come, as this one, have the benefit of a wider time line or perspective looking both back to past actions, and judging present policies that have been put forward.
Though Stiglitz is a Keynesian economist, his participation in Clinton era policymaking took place at a time when financial deregulation reached its peak, in 1999, with the passage of the Financial Services Modernization Act, and the repeal of the Depression era Glass-Steagel Act, which separated the functions of commercial and investment banks. It would be very interesting indeed to read the minutes of the “Council”, and discover what position Steiglitz took against the likes of Robert Rubin and Larry Summers.
“Freefall” is reviewed in Sunday’s New York Times Book Review Section by Kevin Phillips, a writer with a Republican background, but also, since 1993, an author of several economic texts highly critical of the effects of securitization on the American economy. His review is highly favorable, but not without several qualifications.
“Freefall” traces the origins of the “Great Recession,” offers critiques on policies that were initiated to deal with it, and offers alternative remedies for future policies that might better address a still developing crisis. What the book has in common with so many others on this subject is that the system is broken, and we can only fix it by examining the underlying theories that have led us into what the author describes as “bubble capitalism.”
There are certain underlying threads that Stiglitz shares with other authors on this subject. One is the effect that the 30-year reliance on free market economic theories (market fundamentalism) expressed by the “Chicago School” that became popular originally under the Reagan Administration had upon the American economy, in contradiction of the lessons learned and safeguards that were put in place following the “Great Depression.” Others are the re-ordering of incentives in the financial services sector of the economy to put emphasis on short-term performance over long-term societal goals. Yet another is the political power that the financial services industry wields over economic policymaking and the inherent conflicts of interest that such power has over issues that legislative and executive initiatives have historically been delegated to deal with such challenges.
An examination of historical policies followed by our governmental leaders since the “Great Depression” provides lessons that, with the benefit of hindsight, make clear the nature and causes of what can only be referred to as an extreme market failure. Central to that are the past and future role that government plays in the oversight and control of our economy. Following is an extended quote from the close of Chapter Seven, in which Steiglitz examines this in great detail, and concludes that:
“The United States will have regulation, just as government will spend money on research and technology and infrastructure and some forms of social protection. Governments will conduct monetary policy and will provide for national defense, police and fire protection, and other essential public services. When markets fail, government will come in to pick up the pieces. Knowing this, the government has what it can to prevent calamities.
The questions then are, what should the government do? How much should it do? And how should it do it?
Every game has rules and referees, and so does the economic game. One of the key roles of the government is to write the rules and provide the referees. The rules are the laws that govern the market economy. The referees include the regulators and the judges who help enforce and interpret the laws. The old rules, whether they worked well in the past, are not the right rules for the twenty-first century.
Society has to have confidence that the rules are set fairly and that the referees are fair. In America, too many of the rules were set by and for those from finance, and the referees were one-sided. That the outcomes have been one-sided should not come as a surprise. There were alternative responses that held open at least an equal chance of success, but which put taxpayers less at risk: if only the government had just played by the rules, rather than switching midcourse to a strategy that involved unprecedented gifts to the financial sector.
In the end, the only check on these abuses is through democratic processes. But the chances that democratic processes will prevail will depend upon reforms in campaign contributions and electoral processes. Some clichés are still true: he who pays the piper calls the tune. The financial sector has paid the pipers in both parties and has called the tune. Can we citizens expect to have regulations passed breaking up the too-big-to-fail, too-big to resolve, or too-big-to-manage banks if the banks continue to be the too-big-to-ignore campaign contributors? Can we expect even to restrict the banks from engaging in excessively risky behavior?”
[Now weigh in the recent decision by the U. S. Supreme Court removing prohibitions on political contributions by corporations, and start shaking your heads.]
“Dealing with this crisis—and preventing future crises—is as much a matter of politics as it is economics. If we as a country don’t make these reforms, we risk political paralysis, given the inconsistent demands of special interest and the country at large. And if we do avoid political paralysis, it may well be at the expense of our future: borrowing from the future to finance today’s bailouts, and/or creating minimal reforms today, passing on the larger problems to a later date.”
As Steiglitz implies in the above paragraph, it will be up to the Administration to call for the needed reforms, but it will then fall to the Congress to pass enabling legislation. And a quick look to Capitol Hill will be enough to put the fear of God into anyone who considers reforms to be so necessary. As Paul Krugman writes on The Times Op-Ed page today, “The truth is that given the state of American politics, the way the Senate works is no longer consistent with a functioning government. Senators themselves should recognize this fact and push through those rules [procedural rules], including eliminating or at least limiting the filibuster. This is something they could and should do, by majority vote, on the first day of the next Senate session. Don’t hold your breath. As it is, Democrats don’t even seem able to score political points by highlighting their opponent’s obstructionism”
“Today, the challenge is to create a New Capitalism. We have seen the failures of the old. But to create this New Capitalism will require trust—including trust between Wall Street and the rest of society. Our financial markets have failed us, but we can not function without them. Our government failed us, but we can not do without it. The Reagan-Bush agenda of deregulation was based on mistrust of government; the Bush-Obama attempt to rescue us from the failure of deregulation was based on fear. The inequities that have become manifest as wages fall, unemployment rises, but bank bonuses soar, or as corporate welfare is strengthened and the corporate safety net is expanded as that for ordinary citizens is cut back, generates bitterness and anger. An environment of bitterness and anger, of fear and mistrust, is hardly the best one in which to begin the long and hard task of reconstruction. But we have no choice: if we are to restore sustained prosperity, we need a new set of social contracts based on trust between all the elements of our society, between citizens and government, between this generation and the future.”
The concluding chapters of “Freefall” offer some specific remedies and reforms that need to be discussed as the world moves from the current crisis into a future that will, hopefully, be brighter and more prosperous for all its citizens. As Phillips points out in his review, many of his suggestions are controversial and will be criticized by fellow economists. But they will be at least worthy of consideration and discussion.
Steiglitz’s concluding words from “Freefall” are worth noting:
“I write this book in midstream. The sense of freefall has ended. Perhaps by the time the book is out, the sense of crisis will be over. Perhaps the economy will have returned to full employment—though that is unlikely.
I have argued that the problems our Nation and the world face entail more than a small adjustment to the financial system. Some have argued that we have had a minor problem in our plumbing. Our pipes got clogged. We called in the same plumbers who installed the plumbing—having created the mess, presumably only they knew how to straighten it out. Never mind if the overcharged us for the installation; never mind that they overcharged us for the repair. We should be grateful that the plumbing is working again, quietly pay the bills, and pray that they do a better this time than the last.
But it is more than just a matter of “plumbing”: the failures in our financial system are emblematic of broader failures in our economic system, and the failures in our economic system reflect deeper problems in our society. We began the bailouts without a clear sense of what kind of financial system we wanted at the end, and the result has been shaped by the same political sources that got us into the mess. We have not changed our political system, so we should perhaps not be surprised by any of this. And yet, there was hope that change was possible. Not only possible, but necessary.
That there will be changes as a result of the crisis is certain. There is no going back to the world before the crisis. But the questions are, How deep and fundamental will the changes be? Will they even be in the right direction? We have lost the sense of urgency, and what has happened so far does not portend well for the future.
In some areas, regulations will be improved—almost surely, the excesses of leverage will be curbed. But in other areas, as this book goes to press, there is remarkably little progress—the too-big-to-fail banks will be allowed to continue much as before, the over-the-counter derivatives that cost taxpayers so much will continued almost abated, and finance executives will continue to receive outsized bonuses. In each of these areas, something cosmetic will be done, but it will fall far short of what is needed. In still other areas, deregulation will continue apace, shocking as it may seem: unless a popular outcry prevents it, it appears that basic protections of ordinary investors will be undermined with a critical weakening of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, passed in the aftermath of the Enron and other dot-com scandals, by a Republican Congress and signed into law by a Republican president.”
He continues:
It has become a cliché to observe that the Chinese characters for crisis reflect “danger” and “opportunity.” We have seen the danger. The question is Will we seize the opportunity to restore our sense of balance between the market and the state, between individualism and the community, between man and nature, between means and ends? We now have the opportunity to create a new financial system that will do what human beings need a financial system to do: to create a new economic system that will create meaningful jobs, decent work for all those who want it, one in which the divide between haves and have-nots is narrowing, rather than widening; and, most importantly of all, to create a new society in which each individual is able to fulfill his aspirations and live up to his potential, in which we have created citizens who live up to shared ideals and values, in which we have created a community that treats our planet with the respect that in the long run it will surely demand. These are the opportunities. The real danger now is that we will not seize them.”
Those thoughts were composed in November of 2009. Since that time, there has been little progress indeed in making the reforms that the author calls for. Instead, we have seen political gamesmanship and legislative paralysis. The economy has improved, but joblessness remains too high. The sense of urgency that Steiglitz notes has continued to diminish. What do we need to get things back on track? Another deep recession or worse?