Nietzsche's Philosophy of Art

by Julian Young

This is the first comprehensive treatment of Nietzsche's philosophy of art to appear in English. Julian Young argues that Nietzsche's thought about art can only be understood in the context of his wider philosophy. In particular, he discusses the dramatic changes in Nietzschean aesthetics against the background of the celebrated themes of the death of God, eternal recurrence, and the idea of the Ubermensch. Young then divides Nietzsche's career, and his philosophy of art, into four distinct phases, but suggests that these phases describe a circle. An attempt at world-affirmation is made in the central phases, but Nietzsche is predominantly influenced at the beginning and end of his career by a Schopenhauerian pessimism. At the beginning and end art is important because it "redeems" us from life.

Genres: Philosophy, Art

184 pages, Hardcover

First published February 28, 1992

Reviews

[Tomislav · Rating 3 out of 5]

A short but very dense polemic about Nietzsche’s views on art in the context of his attempts to overcome nihilism and pessimism. The generic title is quite misleading because the book is not trying to be a simple overview but a critique with a specific focus. Young, emphasizing Schopenhauer’s lasting impact on Nietzsche, argues that he failed in his attempts to affirm life through art and in the end somewhat unconsciously returned to ideas very similar to his early pessimism. He interprets different parts of Nietzsche’s philosophy along that line, sometimes quite speculatively; while there are more and less convincing parts, they are overall quite interesting. Nietzsche’s ideas are presented chronologically; chapters are named after his main works which is also misleading since the topics discussed are a bit broader than that. A summary of Schopenhauer’s views is followed by a chapter on Birth of Tragedy. Young disagrees with authors who claim that even then Nietzsche had moved past his teacher’s pessimism, only using his language to express personal views which were already compatible with his later philosophy. Like in Schopenhauer’s philosophy, his early artistic, Dionysian solution to suffering and meaninglessness of life consists of transcending individuality and humanity.

In his middle period he turned toward a naturalistic, positivist worldview, rejecting metaphysics and diminishing the importance of art. Romantic idea of deified, Dionysian art, delivering us from suffering, is replaced with a more down-to-earth view in which art has a variety of simpler functions, such as pleasure, emotional experience, education, communication. However, this worldly art is not supposed to naturalistically recreate any kind of reality, or follow the popular interests, but in classical manner be selectively oriented towards beauty and greatness. Most importantly, art is necessary because science cannot create values, itself being an expression of externally created values. Nietzsche calls for future artists to take this task on themselves. But artists also should not be mystified, rather than being oracles they are just people with an excess of creative energy. In the end, direct application of such energy to the art of living is more important to Nietzsche than the creation of artworks. Art certainly should not be seen as a means of romantic intoxication and escapism, but help us in the practical task of living the life.

While rejecting metaphysical pessimism Nietzsche still could not discard obvious facts of suffering and depression, although he now saw them physiologically, like an illness to be cured. However, he toned down his optimism about the power of science, and further developed the aesthetic approach as the solution to the misery of life. Young does not take his proclamations from Gay Science at face value, seeing still some pessimistic residues. Some of the conflicting tendencies in Nietzsche’s approach are solved and clarified in 1888, when he returns to some of his early preoccupations. He criticizes Kant’s and Schopenhauer’s theory of aesthetic experience as the state of disinterestedness, noting that artist does not lack interest and desire – and the perspective of the creator should be the starting point for correct interpretation. The artist again gained the high status ascribed in the Birth of Tragedy, art being ecstatic affirmation and perfection of life. Young is quite critical of this late developments, seeing his middle-period theory as more coherent and powerful. In the end he claims that Nietzsche failed in his search for artistic affirmation of life. He presented two solutions – Apollonian life made bearable by beautiful illusions, profound superficiality – or Dionysian ecstasy which in its final form again rejects individual life and pretends to identify with trans-individual will. That way, in his last works he returned to the basic idea of Birth of Tragedy.

The book is not really what I expected – a quick overview of Nietzsche’s philosophy of art – although it contains useful information about nature of art, role of the artist, opinions about different styles, what makes art good or bad, etc. Also, it often feels somewhat nitpicky in its search for inconsistencies among Nietzsche’s aphorisms. Most of Young’s criticisms are from some vaguely Schopenhauerian perspective, which is funny because Schopenhauer often complained that his critics take his metaphorical claims too literally and exaggerate unimportant details instead of focusing on the main point he is trying to make. Young sometimes tries to present Nietzsche’s ideas as expression of his personal frustrations, and takes some of his (bad) jokes and intentional exaggerations too seriously, or as basis for intense psychological analysis. His harsh concluding remarks on Nietzsche’s dishonesty are also quite funny, considering that Young himself later got into serious trouble, being accused of plagiarizing Curtis Cate’s biography of Nietzsche. To make things even better, in a note at the end of this book Young claims that distinction between master and slave morality in On the Genealogy of Morality is so similar to the one provided by Callicles in Gorgias that it puts Nietzsche "in some danger of sustaining a charge of plagiarism". Really nice! But most of his important criticisms in this book are legitimate, he does not seriously distort Nietzsche’s main views and he clearly states when he is speculating about what Nietzsche tried to say or conceal. Since pessimism is a major theme of the book, some of Young’s comments about suffering and affirmation could have been put in context in a better way, considering that they were widely discussed during the Pessimismusstreit. Also for that purpose, more attention could have been given to Nietzsche’s epistemological, naturalistic and sociopolitical ideas, instead of focusing only on art. It is a strange book in many ways, starting with the title, although it is not badly written. If you are interested purely in aesthetic theory this is probably not what you are looking for. However, it is an interesting and thought-provoking work on Nietzsche’s philosophy, worth reading.

[Cameron · Rating 5 out of 5]

Very illuminating exposition of Nietzsche's views on art, and how it's central to his philosophy in general. Young's ideas were helpful when I was writing my thesis, in particular the idea that religion, science, and art cannot change the meaningless nature of the world, but art may ease the ‘nausea and suicide’ (as explained in the Gay Science) of the realization of such truth.

[Dan DalMonte · Rating 3 out of 5]

This is a workmanlike rundown of the changes in Nietzsche’s philosophy of art over the course of his career. Beginning with the Birth of Tragedy, Young contrasts the Appolonian and Dionysian approaches to art. Nietzsche shifts to endorsing the liberating power of science in Human, All-Too-Human. Late in his career, in Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche views art as prescribing pleasant illusions that can inspire us in a world in which God has died. The doctrine of the eternal recurrence involves an affirmation of all moments of our lives, and an amor fati that would seek a repetition of our lives all over again. I learned a lot from this book but it is too summative for a higher rating.

[Hamoun Dorfaninezhad · Rating 5 out of 5]

نیچه، شوپنهاور را در سال 1865 کشف کرد و بی درنگ مرید او شد. سال بعد از آن ، در نامه های خود از "شوپنهاور من" سخن می راند و خودش و شوپنهاور را "در بیشتر جاها یک چیز" توصیف می کرد. این عشق او به شوپنهاور به وضوح نخستین عامل کشش او به سمت واگنر بود: او در سال 1869 درباره واگنر به کارل ون دورف نوشت: "مردی را یافته ام که برای من تجسم آن چیزی است که شوپنهاور نبوغ می نامد و هم او نیز مسخر فلسفه ی ژرف و شورانگیز اوست." پیشتر در همان دوره رابطه اش را با واگنر برای اروین روده "مانند گذراندن یک دوره ی عملی فلسفه شوپنهاور" توصیف کرده بود. بیش و کم در همان تاریخ به خود واگنر می نویسد: "والاترین و الهام بخش ترین لحظات زندگیم آمیخته با نام شماست، و تنها یک فرد دیگر هست_آرتور شوپنهاور، همزاد شما در فرزانگی_که من با قداستی یکسان او را احترام می گذارم، آری حتی فراتر از آن به عنوان
religione quadam."

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