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The Byzantine Christ: Person, Nature, and Will in the Christology of Saint Maximus the Confessor
St Maximus the Confessor is one of the giants of Christian theology. His doctrine of two wills gave the final shape to ancient Christology and was ratified by the Sixth Ecumenical Council in AD 681. This study throws new light upon one of the most interesting periods of historical and systematic theology. Its focus is the seventh century, the century that saw the rapid expansion of Islam, and the Empire's failed attempt to retain many of its south-eastern provinces by inventing and promoting the heresy of Monothelitism (only one will in Christ) as a bridge between the Byzantine Church and the anti-Chalcedonian Churches which prevailed in some of these areas.
- GenresChristianityTheology
240 pages, Hardcover
First published January 13, 2004
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August 4, 2011Bathellos gives us a thorough, systematic, and surprisingly clear treatment of the issues, people, and terminology in the monothelite debate. Any book on St Maximus--whether it be from Roman Catholic or Orthodox--is most certainly welcome. Theologians are realizing that St Maximus may actually have peered deeper into the mysteries of reality than anyone outside the apostles.
Bathellos begins with the standard treatments of the Byzantine court and the monothelite debate. There isn't too much here that differs from von Balthasar, Thurnberg, and others (although Bathellos' treatment is much superior, since von Balthasar's disdain for Byzantium is hardly disguised). Bathellos next moves to the anti-Chalcedonians and neo-Chalcedonians (Cyrillians). I suppose this section could have been expanded, since it is not always clear to what degree St Maximus was a neo-Chalcedonian.
The most important part comes in the terminology. He begins his treatment with "person and nature." He takes the Cappadocian definition and expands it to avoid future problems: ousia has the same relation to hypostasis as common has to particular. A nature/essence becomes a person/hypostasis by possessing particular idioms. This will later change to: Hypostasis: it is an essence with idioms, or the essence of an individual man that includes all his idioms (102)
Bathellos takes us through the often dizzying discussions of what St Maximus could have meant by will. Maximus makes the important distinction between willing and "mode of willing." We can take the distinction even further to see the capacity of willing and the object of willing (119).
The "mode of willing" is the particular way in which a will is actualized.
More on Proaerisis--closely linked to the English words "choice" and "decision." Gnome is a disposition of the appetite: Maximus uses these words to refer to the sinful state. Maximus excludes these modes of willing from Christ firstly, because it would introduce a human person in Christ. Why? While will is a faculty of nature, natures qua natures do not will. Persons do. If Christ had a deliberative will per gnome, and this was part of his human nature, he would now have a human person as well as a divine person (152). Further, as Joseph Farrell notes, gnome is a sub-category of "the mode of willing," it is not identical with the mode of willing. Excluding the former does not negate the latter.
The Willing of the Saints in Heaven
Can saints have free-will in heaven? Sort of. Obviously, they will not sin, but neither will they be robots. How? The wills of the saints in heaven will be one according to the logos of nature, but varied insofar as the mode of movement of the wills is concerned, for each saint will participate in God in a manner proportionate to his desire (157; Farrell also scores huge points on this, Free Choice in St. Maximus the Confessor, 124).
Conclusion
It is important that we see will as a faculty of nature, not person: thus two wills in Christ. Otherwise, we will have a chaotic three wills in the divine Trinity. This is a fantastic book and with a few exceptions, it is surprisingly easy to read. Is it worth the $150? Obviously not, but if you can find it via Interlibrary Loan, go for it.
Bathellos begins with the standard treatments of the Byzantine court and the monothelite debate. There isn't too much here that differs from von Balthasar, Thurnberg, and others (although Bathellos' treatment is much superior, since von Balthasar's disdain for Byzantium is hardly disguised). Bathellos next moves to the anti-Chalcedonians and neo-Chalcedonians (Cyrillians). I suppose this section could have been expanded, since it is not always clear to what degree St Maximus was a neo-Chalcedonian.
The most important part comes in the terminology. He begins his treatment with "person and nature." He takes the Cappadocian definition and expands it to avoid future problems: ousia has the same relation to hypostasis as common has to particular. A nature/essence becomes a person/hypostasis by possessing particular idioms. This will later change to: Hypostasis: it is an essence with idioms, or the essence of an individual man that includes all his idioms (102)
Bathellos takes us through the often dizzying discussions of what St Maximus could have meant by will. Maximus makes the important distinction between willing and "mode of willing." We can take the distinction even further to see the capacity of willing and the object of willing (119).
The "mode of willing" is the particular way in which a will is actualized.
More on Proaerisis--closely linked to the English words "choice" and "decision." Gnome is a disposition of the appetite: Maximus uses these words to refer to the sinful state. Maximus excludes these modes of willing from Christ firstly, because it would introduce a human person in Christ. Why? While will is a faculty of nature, natures qua natures do not will. Persons do. If Christ had a deliberative will per gnome, and this was part of his human nature, he would now have a human person as well as a divine person (152). Further, as Joseph Farrell notes, gnome is a sub-category of "the mode of willing," it is not identical with the mode of willing. Excluding the former does not negate the latter.
The Willing of the Saints in Heaven
Can saints have free-will in heaven? Sort of. Obviously, they will not sin, but neither will they be robots. How? The wills of the saints in heaven will be one according to the logos of nature, but varied insofar as the mode of movement of the wills is concerned, for each saint will participate in God in a manner proportionate to his desire (157; Farrell also scores huge points on this, Free Choice in St. Maximus the Confessor, 124).
Conclusion
It is important that we see will as a faculty of nature, not person: thus two wills in Christ. Otherwise, we will have a chaotic three wills in the divine Trinity. This is a fantastic book and with a few exceptions, it is surprisingly easy to read. Is it worth the $150? Obviously not, but if you can find it via Interlibrary Loan, go for it.
February 19, 2026
Really helpful exposition of the thought of Saint Maximus the confessor surrounding the Dyothelite controversy. Clear definitions and distinction between categories respective to person and nature are crucial for understanding his thought, and that is certainly given here.
While he does discuss the soteriological implications and significance of dyothelitism, laying this out in greater detail would've really completed this book. At points, further engagement with other perspectives, particularly on the relationship between person and nature would've been helpful as well.
Definitely an important read for understanding why the dyothelitism expressed by maximus confessor and codified in the sixth ecumenical council is crucial for christology.
While he does discuss the soteriological implications and significance of dyothelitism, laying this out in greater detail would've really completed this book. At points, further engagement with other perspectives, particularly on the relationship between person and nature would've been helpful as well.
Definitely an important read for understanding why the dyothelitism expressed by maximus confessor and codified in the sixth ecumenical council is crucial for christology.
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