What do you think?
Rate this book


420 pages, Paperback
First published August 1, 1984
While for most modern social philosophers the chief aim of politics consists in setting up an ideal social order through utopian reforms, Hayek sees its main task as that of finding rules to enable men with different values and convictions to live together. These rules should be so constructed as to permit each individual to fulfill his aims.
Whereas the word economy suggests that people in a community possess a common and congruent set of values and goals, catallaxy suggests that the emergent properties of a market (prices, division of labor, growth, etc.) are the outgrowths of the diverse and disparate goals of the individuals in a community.It's impossible to not be swayed by Hayek's absolute reverence of this catallaxy—of the self-organizing and self-regulating nature of the free market. His style of argument is clear, slow and methodical, especially with respect to terminology: you'll find he devotes entire essays to distinguishing the different senses of a word or deliberating over the best word to apply to a given situation. I can't say this book made me a classical liberal, but it has given me a nuanced understanding of the beauty of capitalism (in theory), and of the complex interactions between market and government in a democracy.
It would scarcely be too much to claim that the main merit of the individualism which he [Adam Smith] and his contemporaries advocated is that it is a system under which bad men can do least harm. It is a social system which does not depend for its functioning on our finding good men for running it, or on all men becoming better than they now are, but which makes use of all men in their given variety and complexity, sometimes good and sometimes bad, sometimes intelligent and more often stupid. (138)
Human Reason, with a capital R, does not exist in the singular, as given or available to any particular person, as the [Cartesian] rationalist approach seems to assume, but must be conceived as an interpersonal process in which anyone's contribution is tested and corrected by others. (140)
The most general principle on which an individualist system is based is that it uses the universal acceptance of general principles as the means to create order in social affairs. It is the opposite of such government by principles when, for example, a recent blueprint for a controlled economy suggests as "the fundamental principle of organisation … that in any particular instance the means that serves society best should be the one that prevails." It is a serious confusion thus to speak of principle when all that is meant is that no principle but only expediency should rule; when everything depends on what authority decrees to be "the interests of society." [I see Ayn Rand..]
This brings me to my second point: the necessity, in any complex society in which the effects of anyone's action reach far beyond his possible range of vision, of the individual submitting to the anonymous and seemingly irrational forces of society — a submission which must include not only the acceptance of rules of behavior … but also a readiness to adjust himself to changes which may profoundly affect his fortunes and opportunities and the causes of which may be altogether unintelligible to him. It is against these that modern man tends to revolt unless their necessity can be shown to rest upon "reason made clear and demonstrable to every individual." Yet it is just here that the understandable craving for intelligibility produces illusory demands which no system can satisfy. Man in a complex society can have no choice but between adjusting himself to what to him must seem the blind forces of the social process and obeying the orders of a superior.
The recognition of the insuperable limits to his knowledge ought indeed to teach the student of society a lesson in humility which should guard him against becoming an accomplice in men's fatal striving to control society — a striving which makes him not only a tyrant over his fellows, but which may well make him the destroyer of a civilization which no brain has designed but which has grown from the free efforts of millions of individuals. (276)
What we call 'legislatures' are in fact bodies continually deciding on particular measures, and are authorising coercion for their execution, on which no genuine agreement among a majority exists, but for which the support of a majority has been obtained by deals. In an omnipotent assembly, which is concerned mainly with particulars and not with principles, majorities are therefore not based on agreement of opinions, but are formed by aggregations of special interests mutually assisting each other. (356–357)