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832 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2006
Pioneer of quantum mechanics Max Planck (1950) was perhaps only slightly exaggerating when he said: "A new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar with it" [...].
Mental causation, volition, and the "self" do not really exist; they are mere illusions, by-products of the grinding of our neural machinery. And of course because one's mind and personality are entirely products of the bodily machinery, they will necessarily be extinguished, totally and finally, by the demise and dissolution of that body.
Views of this sort unquestionably hold sway over the vast majority of contemporary scientists, and by now they have also percolated widely through the public at large.
Furthermore, our intimate familiarity with the basic facts of mental life - including, for example, our ability to direct our thoughts to states of affairs in the external world, and indeed the fundamental fact of consciousness itself - should not be confused with understanding, or blind us to the deeply puzzling and mysterious character of these phenomena.
James Clerk Maxwell commented in 1871 that "the opinion seems to have got abroad, that in a few years all the great physical constants will have been approximately estimated, and that the only occupation which will then be left to men of science will be to carry on these measurements to another place of decimals" (p. 50). In 1894 his American counterpart A. A. Michelson declared that "it seems probable that most of the grand underlying principles have been firmly established and that further advances are to be sought chiefly in the rigorous application of these principles to all the phenomena which come under our notice" (p. 52).
Ironically, AI seemed to have adopted the conceptual framework of Wittgenstein's Tractatus shortly after the realities of language use had driven Wittgenstein himself to abandon it.
The most significant by far of these rumblings from within, however, occurred a decade later when a consummate insider, Terry Winograd himself, publicly defected from the program of classical AI. Winograd and Flores (1986) explicitly embraced most of the points already raised above, emphasizing in particular that large parts of human mental life cannot be reduced to explicit rules and therefore cannot be formalized for production by a computer program.
Physiologists routinely presume that the role of the brain is productive, the brain generating the mind in something like the way the tea kettle generates steam, or the electric current flowing in a lamp generates light. But other forms of functional dependence exist which merit closer consideration. The true function of the brain might for example be permissive, like the trigger of a crossbow, or more importantly, transmissive, like an optical lens or a prism, or like the keys of a pipe organ (or perhaps, in more contemporary terms, like the receivers in our radios and televisions).
The cognitive losses that often accompany savant skills could perhaps be a reflection of such substitution, but we must remember that savant-type skills sometimes also occur in geniuses such as the mathematicians Gauss and Ampère [...].
A similar evolution is underway in regard to perceptual theory. Most of the work to date has taken a strongly "bottom-up" approach, along lines formulated in the seminal book of Marr (1982). This school views perceptual synthesis as a kind of exhaustive calculation from the totality of input currently present at our sensory surfaces. Machine vision and robotics, for example, necessarily took this approach, and even in neuroscience it seemed to make sense to start with the most accessible parts of the perceptual systems - the end organs and their peripheral connections - and work our way inward. The great sensory systems themselves - vision, audition, somato-sensation, and so on - were also presumed to operate more or less independently, and were in fact typically studied in isolation.
A separate tradition dating back at least to Kant and the early Gestalt theorists, and carried forward into the modern era by psychologists such as Neisser [...], has been sensitive to the presence of "top-down" influences, both within and between sensory modalities. [...] On this view perceptual synthesis is achieved not from the input, but with its aid. This is necessarily the case for example in regard to ambiguous figures, where the stimulus information itself is not sufficient to determine a uniquely "correct" interpretation.
Sometimes, however, the homunculus is more brazenly evident. One example is Marr's account of vision, which applies computations to the two-dimensional array of retinal input in order to generate a "description" of the three-dimensional world that provided that visual input, but then needs someone to interpret that description [...].
Meister Eckhart's short treatise On Detachment [...] is also exemplary: "I find no other virtue better than a pure detachment from all things; because all other virtues have some regard for created things, but detachment is free from all created things." Perfect detachment leads to the "annihilation of self." This language of "annihilation" and "nothingness" is of course parallel to the Sufi fana or fading and the early Buddhist sunyata or void, emptiness.
Specifically, mystical experience may sometimes transform an individual's perceptual, cognitive, and expressive capacities themselves. Bucke [...], for example, regards such sudden increases in mental powers as one aspect of an objective "transfiguration" produced by genuine experiences of cosmic consciousness. His primary example is Walt Whitman, whose published works he studied diligently and whom he knew personally as well. Bucke asserts that "in the case of Whitman (as in that of Balzac) writings of absolutely no value were immediately followed (and, at least in Whitman's case without practice or study) by pages...covered not only by a masterpiece but by such vital sentences as have not been written ten times in the history of the race" [...].
Yet even a casual acquaintance with the broader literature of mysticism would have made him aware that such events, as for example the various visions of St. Teresa, can crop up anywhere around the subject in spherical space. Even when relevant and potentially helpful, in short, his neurologizing is too dependent both on idiosyncrasies of the Zen tradition and on his own quite limited personal experience of unusual states.
The sacred Soma plant glorified in the ancient Hindu Rig Veda was tentatively identified by Wasson (1968) as the red bulbous mushroom amanita muscaria or fly-agaric, rich in the psychedelic agent psilocybin, and thus some of the foundational mystical scriptures of India may at least in part reflect experiences engendered by this psychedelic mushroom [...].
Unlike Masters and Houston (1966), who suggest that many aspects of LSD experience "may constitute subliminal triumphs of Time, Life, Newsweek" (p. 306), Grof also shows little or no awareness of the potential for cryptomnesia to explain much of his data [...].
We already have some questionnaire-type instruments with respectable psychometric properties (reliability and validity) that sample these overlapping domains. These include Hood's mysticism scale [...], which is based directly on Stace's analysis [...] and Pekala's PCI and DAQ (Phenomenology of Consciousness Inventory, Dimensions of Attention Questionnaire [...]), which are more general-purpose tools for quantitative characterization of altered states of consciousness.
Leading educational and membership organizations involved in the promotion and study of meditation and other transformative practices, such as Esalen, the Institute for Noetic Sciences, the Institute for Transpersonal Psychology, and the California Institute for Integral Studies, might also participate.