On Academic Scepticism

by Marcus Tullius Cicero, Charles Brittain (Translator)

Charles Brittain's elegant new translation of Cicero's Academica makes available for the first time a readable and accurate translation into modern English of this complex yet crucial source of our knowledge of the epistemological debates between the sceptical Academics and the Stoics.

Brittain's masterly Introduction, generous notes, English-Latin-Greek Glossary, and Index further commend this edition to the attention of students of Hellenistic philosophy at all levels.

Genres: Philosophy, Classics, History, Skepticism, Nonfiction, Politics, Ancient History

224 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 46

About the author

Born 3 January 106 BC, Arpinum, Italy
Died 7 December 43 BC (aged 63), Formia, Italy

Marcus Tullius Cicero was a Roman philosopher, statesman, lawyer, political theorist, and Roman constitutionalist. Cicero is widely considered one of Rome's greatest orators and prose stylists.

Alternate profiles:
Cicéron
Marco Tullio Cicerone
Cicerone

Note: All editions should have Marcus Tullius Cicero as primary author. Editions with another name on the cover should have that name added as secondary author.

Reviews

[Steve · Rating 4 out of 5]

Most of Marcus Tullius Cicero's (106-43 BCE) Academica has been lost to the winds of time. He produced two editions of this work, the first in two books, of which we have only the second, and the second edition in four books, of which we have only portions of the first book. And the bits of the latter we do have don't fit together very well with the former, due to changes in the dramatis personae and dates. This promises a field day for a philologist, but, for one interested in philosophy, to find most of the beginning of an argument missing is somewhat disheartening.

During Cicero's time the intellectuals of the Roman empire were themselves Greek or bilingual Romans. So philosophy was simply done in Greek, by everybody. Forced out of public life by Julius Caesar's dictatorship, Cicero wanted to reach out to the non-Greek-reading Romans, and in order to do so he had to invent a philosophical vocabulary in Latin. Fortunately for the Romans, Cicero was particularly well suited for this task. The Romans accepted his neologisms and increasingly philosophized in Latin; for reasons well known to all, they subsequently influenced philosophizing in most of the European languages, as well. I mention this because, though he may not have been the most original philosopher of ancient times, he was a particularly well informed one, and because the book under review was part of his project to bring philosophy into the Latin language.

The book takes the form of a debate between a character (who changed between the first and second editions for reasons I won't go into) representing the position of the Stoics and one (coincidentally named Cicero in both editions) representing that of the so-called Academic sceptics, though there are subsidiary characters participating in the discussion. Unlike many of Plato's "dialogues", Cicero's is an authentic exchange of views. The Academica was written late in Cicero's life, and by then (and possibly much earlier, but that is being argued by the experts(*)) he adhered to the positions and techniques then being taught at the Academy in Athens. Briefly summarized, they held that under close scrutiny, (almost) all philosophical positions crumbled; that there are positions more persuasive (i.e. which crumble less swiftly) than others, but there are (almost) none that a rational person could accept as the Truth. One of the techniques students of that school had to practice was to argue both sides of every question. So, when Cicero set out to present two distinct philosophical positions, he earnestly made the argument on both sides (in contrast to Plato). As he had studied all of the major philosophical schools, he correctly represented the position of the Stoics in this dialogue (according to the experts).

The argument in the Academica is focused on epistemology, i.e. on truth and knowledge. What are they and can we attain them? Epistemology is still a central field of study in modern academic philosophy, but the arguments have become very technical. The basic positions argued in this dialogue are still in play today. But be warned, though the arguments in this book are less technical than those to be found in the modern literature, they are still not easy reading for many.

Since much of the Stoic literature Cicero could pull out of his legendary library and unroll at his convenience has not survived, a good portion of what we know about Hellenistic Stoicism has been gleaned second hand from Latin texts like this one. Reading this book offers one of the few opportunities to catch a reliable glimpse into the thoughts of Chrysippus, the third head of the Stoic school in Athens, who, had his works survived as Plato's and most of Aristotle's did, could well be regarded as their equal now. Philosophical Stoicism was essentially formed in the estimated 705 books Chrysippus wrote, of which not a single manuscript has survived in more than fragmentary fashion. (Ach, wie man träumt!)

By the time Cicero wrote this book, the Stoic/Academic debate about epistemology had already been underway for 250 years. One of the great services of this edition translated and commented by Charles Brittain is that he provides an overview of what we know about the historical development of this 250 year old argument from this and other sources. This eases the entry into the dialogue's topics, but Brittain also analyzes how the different historical layers of the debate are reflected in Cicero's text and, thus, significantly aids understanding an incomplete text like this.

Even with these aids, the usefulness and pleasure of reading this book are mitigated by its incompleteness. Nonetheless, the entire second book of the first edition is here, and after making the necessary transition, aided by Brittain's introduction and notes, one is soon engaged in the very clear and interesting exchange of ideas that Cicero so deftly presents. It then becomes a real pleasure. How many philosophical books are written now with illustrative examples taken from mythology and literature? As for the remaining fragments of the first book of the second edition, the first 20 pages are complete, and then the text breaks off in mid-sentence... After that, only pieces. What a shame.

For those who understand French, I strongly recommend that you also read the fine review by Yann of a French edition of this book:

http://www.goodreads.com/review/show/...

Our reviews supplement each other nicely.

Let me close with Cicero's graceful words:

However, I should come to a close, Lucullus, since it's time for me to sail, as the west wind's whispers as well as the boatman's signals are telling me, and since I have said quite enough.

(*) I suspect that he did have such views much earlier, because such a philosophical position would enable him to avoid the danger that his political and oratorical manipulations, which were made with little regard for what was actually true, would be inconsistent with his philosophy - if we cannot unimpeachably know truth, then one need not and cannot take it into account in one's actions. But perhaps I have the cart before the horse.

[Katie · Rating 5 out of 5]

I really loved this dialogue. Cicero is growing on me, and I enjoyed this one even more than The Nature of the Gods. It's a lovely translation as well, very stirring and accompanied by very helpful (yet unobtrusive) notes.

Cicero's concern here is the question of knowledge, particularly the parameters of its attainability. Lucullus is the more Stoic-leaning member of the dialogue (though if I remember correctly, he's more precisely attached to Antiochus of Ascalon's school) and his speech comes first: he puts forth the claim that the Stoic conception of knowledge - based on kataleptic impressions, sensory impressions that are received in manner than the recipient know that they must be true - is true and the most beneficial to living a virtuous life. His opponents the Academics, he argues, only serve to undermine the foundations of reason, wisdom, society, and the virtuously lived life by their incessant questioning of sensory perceptions and their ability to lead to definite knowledge. If one follows the course of their logic, society, language, and logic itself falls apart, and the individual is left helpless and immobile.

“If these Academic views are true, reason – the light and illumination of life, as we might call it – is entirely done away with. If all impressions were the way the Academics say they are, so that they could just as well be false and no examination could discriminate them, how could we say that anyone had proved anything or discovered anything?... And since philosophy ought to be progress by arguments, how will it get results? Indeed, what will become of wisdom?” [2.26-27]

When Lucullus has made his case, Cicero takes up the impassioned defense of his cause. Here, more than De natura deorum, you can see what a rhetorical powerhouse he must have been. There are parts of this speech that are really beautiful, and genuinely stirring. Cicero's central argument here serves not only to question the Stoic ability to distinguish true and false impressions, but also attacks what he perceives to be their intellectual arrogance. He seems to find it genuinely stunning that the Stoics claim to possess an understanding of the universe, one that they can declare with certainty.

"This is what I can’t bear: you forbid me to assent to anything unknown, claiming that this is shameful and excessively rash, and yet you take it upon yourself to expound a philosophical system expressing wisdom. So you’re going to unveil the nature of the universe, shape my character, determine the ethical ends, set out appropriate actions for me, define the kind of life I should adopt – and you claim, simultaneously teach me the criteria and methods of argument and understanding. How are you going to manage it so that I never slip up, never form an opinion, while I’m taking on these countless doctrines? And then which philosophical system is it that you’re going to take me off to, if you prise me from my own? I’m afraid you’ll be rather presumptuous if you say your own – and yet you must say that...Imagine someone who is in the process of becoming wise, but isn’t yet: exactly which view or system will he choose? Whichever he chooses, he will choose without wisdom.” [2.114-115]

Cicero is vehemently against the idea of dogmatism, not the idea of knowledge. He forms opinions, he possesses beliefs, but refuses to assert them with certainty. It's not epistemological pessimism, though: he seems rather to think that the dogmatic thinkers around simply aren't setting the bar high enough. He seems genuinely startled when Lucullus asks him if he is not satisfied with the majesty of the senses, and if he would demand that the gods provide him with more:

" 'I just wish he would ask, so he could hear how badly he has done by us...my reply to that gods of yours would be impudent: I am not at all happy with the eyes I have...Don’t you think that moles want the light? Though I wouldn’t complain to god that I can’t see far enough as much as I would that I can see what isn’t true.

Cicero's skepticism is one that strives, that refuses to stop asking questions because questions and criticisms are what push knowledge closer to the truth, bit by bit. It's a lovely dialogue, and I highly recommend it even if you don't have a background in philosophy.

[Yann · Rating 5 out of 5]

Cet ouvrage est de Cicéron. Le sujet en est l'épistémologie, et plus particulièrement la question de la vérité et de la connaissance, et qui est sans doute celle qui me passionne le plus. Cicéron présente ici, encore sous la forme d'un dialogue, les théories de deux écoles importantes : celle des Stoïciens, et celle de la Nouvelle Académie (de Platon, pour la distinguer de l'ancienne, qui interprétait dogmatiquement l'œuvre du fondateur ) : d'où le titre de l'œuvre, Académiques. Cicéron fait un remarquable travail d'histoire de la philosophie en expliquant la genèse de ces différents mouvements de la pensée grecque.

Philosophie, un bien étrange mot quand on y pense, car lier l'amour, le plus inconstant et capricieux des sentiments, la plus violente et la plus douce des passions, celle dont ont dit qu'elle rend aveugle, l'amour donc, avec la grave et prudente sagesse, celle qui s'accorde bien avec la vieillesse, et qu'on représente plus avec une barbe et des sourcils froncés, plutôt que comme un Cupidon, un Satyre ou une Vénus, n'est-ce pas marier des contraires ? Car amoureux, c'est bien un qualificatif que l'on pourrait donner à ces romains qui se piquent de philosophie, et embrassent avec ardeur les querelles des écoles, et se chamaillent avec tout le cœur que peut leur inspirer leur passion pour la vérité, comme des prétendants rivaliseraient de jactance pour séduire une belle. Mais, il n'en va pas ainsi, car le grec est moins avare que le français pour rendre les degrés de l'amour, en distinguant ἠ φίλια, ὁ ἐρως, ἡ ἀγάπη. Que cet amour reste donc raisonnable, puisque l'étymologie le permet !

Pour les Stoïciens, défendus par Varron, les Académiciens déraisonnent : voilà qu'ils refusent d'accorder qu'aucune représentation ne puisse être déclarée vraie ou fausse. Nos sens nous mentiraient! C'est détruire le fondement même de la vérité ! S'il n'y a plus aucune certitude, nous sommes réduits à l'impuissance, n'étant plus capable de régler notre conduite sur rien de solide. Non, il faut se défier de leurs raisonnements captieux, leur sorite qui consiste à travailler par degré à gagner l'acquiescement à une série de raisons, et qui nous jette bientôt dans la perplexité. Les sens ne nous mentent pas, et le vrai sage n'embrasse jamais que des opinions vraies : nous ne nous tromperons jamais !

Belles paroles, mais fausses, rétorquent les Académiciens, représentés par Cicéron. Il s'en faut de beaucoup que les sens ne nous trompent pas, comme le montre l'image d'une rame brisée lorsqu'elle est à moitié dans l'eau, ou les rêves ou hallucinations qui peuvent nous abuser. Et enfin, pourquoi essayer vainement de nous effrayer en prétendant que sans certitude, rien ne puisse être décidé : il nous suffit d'une probabilité que rien de vient arrêter. Enfin, nous ne détruisons pas la vérité, nous prétendons juste que n'avons pas les moyens de la connaître. Pourquoi vouloir nous faire embrasser de toutes forces vos vues ? Où est donc ce sage soi-disant infaillible, parmi tous ces grands hommes qui se sont contredits? En ne donnant prudemment notre assentiment à aucune proposition, c'est nous qui ne nous tromperons jamais !

S'il y a par contre un point sur lesquelles nos deux amis se rejoignent, c'est pour dénigrer Épicure. Le seul fait de paraître embrasser une des opinions semble si embarrassant que cela devient un puissant argument pour déstabiliser l'adversaire. Les arguments que Cicéron place dans ce dialogue sont pleins d'humour et d'ironie, mais ils ne manquent pas non plus d'éloquence, de raison et d'érudition. L'intérêt et le plaisir sont au rendez-vous.

Mais enfin, pour donner mon opinion, quoique on aime la vérité, c'est beaucoup de ne vouloir jamais se tromper, beaucoup trop ambitieux, et franchement déraisonnable. D'un coté, les Stoïciens ont raison : la vérité a besoin d'un critère, il faut donner un sens aux mots, mais ils se fourvoient avec cette crainte excessive de l'erreur qui semblerait les réduire à l'impuissance, tant ils croient à cet fable de l'infaillibilité du sage. A l'inverse, les Académiciens raisonnent bien en acceptant la probabilité, mais ils renversent effectivement tout critère de vérité en détruisant la pertinence des sensations.

Mais aussi, bien que je reconnaisse que cela soit utile et nécessaire, je me demande aussi si ce n'est pas un peu facile de se contenter de prendre une attitude critique, de ne jamais prendre parti, sans ne jamais rien construire : c'est vivre au crochet d'autrui, à peu de frais et sans grand risque, se couvrir de gloire en se hissant sur le labeur des autres. Que l'on essaie donc aussi un peu, de voir en quoi tel système douteux pourrait être amélioré! Que l'on essaie de mettre sa cervelle à l'alambic, et de décrire le monde de manière cohérente ! Que l'on essaie de voir où nous mènent les probabilités, qui par l'habitude nous mènent bientôt à des certitudes qui énervent notre prudence!

Qu'en est-il ? Le vrai ou le faux découlent d'un jugement de comparaison entre un modèle interprétatif subjectif que nous conservons dans notre esprit, et des sensations, qui soit nous reviennent par la mémoire, soient s'offrent à nous par la perception. Les sens ne nous trompent pas plus qu'ils n'auraient toujours raison. Par contre, notre mémoire peut nous trahir, si on l'exerce trop peu. En vérité, c'est nous-mêmes qui nous trompons en construisant un modèle interprétatif qui ne s'accorde pas avec la réalité, ou en ne nous en souvenant que mal ou partiellement. Mais nous avons une telle répugnance de la culpabilité ou de l'erreur, que nous accusons nos malheureux organes dépourvus de toute capacité de jugement, plutôt que notre entendement, qui seul comprend nos facultés de mémoire, d'intelligence et de jugement. A notre entendement la faute, c'est-à-dire nous-mêmes, et pas un autre, ou un autre dans nous-mêmes qui voudrait, sentirait, penserait ou jugerait à notre place, parfois pour nous tromper. Soit nous ne nous apercevons pas de l'écart entre notre modèle interprétatif et nos sensations, par manque d'analyse, d'attention, de méthode, de mémoire, soit cet écart devient manifeste: et c'est alors la chose la plus heureuse qui puisse nous arriver.

Bien loin de la fuir, nous devons au contraire rechercher nos erreurs avec bien plus d'ardeur que la vérité, non pas qu'il soit glorieux de s'être trompé, mais il est très heureux de se corriger. Il faut donc bien adopter des opinions, tout en gardant à l'esprit que nous restons sujet à l'erreur, et c'est l'opinion que Cicéron donne enfin à Catulus, disciple de Carnéade, alors que nos philosophes romains se séparent à l'épilogue de ce beau, de ce très beau dialogue.

[Jacob Aitken · Rating 4 out of 5]

Cicero, On Academic Skepticism. Ed. Charles Brittain. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 2006.

Skepticism is a word with an unfortunate history. It appears that it takes on a new nuance in each age of philosophy. Rarely are these nuances seen as positive. Today’s skeptic is taken as one who doubts anything is true. Descartes’ skepticism began with radical doubt. Cicero’s, by contrast, is not one of radical doubt, but suspension of judgment. That is important to keep in mind, since Cicero is not always clear on what he is suspending judgment.

This collection of texts, taken primarily from Cicero’s Luculla, is edited by Charles Brittain. He has a thorough introduction (at times too thorough), but his footnotes provide a crash course in post-Platonic Roman philosophy. Cicero’s interlocutor, Lucullus, is a Stoic. The broader nuances of Stoicism are not relevant to this text. Key to the discussion is the Stoic epistemology. In short, and this can only be so brief, the Stoic says the mind receives external impressions. These impressions are then molded onto the mind. In response, the mind “grasps” these impressions.

The mind has a natural power that is directed at things. It seizes on a primary impression, subordinating and organizing other impressions in the memory. This conception of things is an ennoai kai prolepsis (Luc. 2.29). It seems that Cicero does not actually disagree with the Stoic view so far. The problem arises in another Stoic claim: each thing has a distinguishing marker that allows us to identify a thing as this and not that.

In response, and in anticipation of modern philosophical challenges, Cicero says the view breaks down when faced with numerous analytical challenges. His argument is thus:
There are some false impressions;
Those impressions are not apprehensible;
When two impressions do not differ at all, it is not possible that one is apprehensible and one is not.
There are no true impressions derived from the senses that may not be paired with another impression that does not differ from it at all but is not apprehensible.

(4) is the problematic premise. Cicero says that for any true impression, it will have a mirror impression identical with it and for that reason indistinguishable from it. And if that is the case, then the two things are identical. In order for (4) to work, he needs one more premise:

There is no such distinguishing criterion.

The dialogue then descends into the standard philosophical dialogue: both sides attack extreme versions of the position which the other does not hold. Lucullus says Cicero holds to radical skepticism: if sense impressions are not reliable, then on what grounds does Cicero trust his senses to even have this discussion? In response, Cicero maintains that Lucullus cannot answer the famous “bent oar in the water” situation.

Who won the debate? It is hard to say. The Stoic epistemology seems right, and there might be some evidence that Cicero agrees with a large part of it. On the other hand, the Stoics are not clear on what the distinguishing criterion is. Not surprisingly, that might explain the ambiguity of Cicero’s (4). It does not seem true that there are no true impressions that do not have a mirror impression. At best, all that Cicero can say is that there are some impressions that have a mirror impression, which leads him to a much more modest conclusion:

There are some impressions that cannot be separated from other impressions (cf. Roderick Chisholm’s On Metaphysics for several examples).

Cicero seems to agree with the Stoics that there are “persuasive impressions.” He just denies that the act of apprehension is infallible.

Conclusion

The dialogue is often frustrating and is probably not the best place to start with Cicero. The Stoics should not claim that all sense impressions are accurate (and to be fair, they might not actually claim that). Moreover, Alvin Plantinga’s work on “proper function” (i.e., my cognitive faculties are functioning and are in a normal environment; cf. Warrant and Proper Function) answer many of Cicero’s objections.

[Illiterate · Rating 5 out of 5]

On perception and epistemology. Stoicism vs probabilism/skepticism, favoring the latter.

[Markus · Rating 4 out of 5]

CICERO (106-43AD)
ACADEMICA – ‘Les Academiques’ is a bi-lingual translation Latin/French.
A good translation, but a subject not easy to read. Mostly a matter for scholars in Ancient Philosophy. For me, of historical and intellectual interest.
The work presented by Cicero in his usual style by conversations with friend Philosophers and Roman Intellectuals. It is about the Schools of Philosophy in Ancient Greece, the Academies.
Sextus Empiricus, in his writings, tells us that there have been basically three Academies: the oldest by Plato and his followers, the second by Arcesilas, student of Polémon, the third, the ‘new’ one by Carneades and Clitomaques, some add a fourth by Philon and Charmidas, and others a fifth by Antiochus and his followers.
There is ample material for a book and even two books.
Cicero in his first book describes his conversation with his friends Atticus, the Epicurean and Marcus Varron, a well-known Roman intellectual and follower of the Ancient Greek Philosophy by Plato.
They first come to discuss their ambitions of translating Ancient Greek writings into Latin, but have to admit that vocabulary available in Latin would not suffice to translate all the deeper meanings of the Greek, but then Cicero points out, that the Greek language for Philosophy is different in many ways of the common language, and that a translator into Latin would have to create, similar special vocabulary to overcome the problem.
Then Varron comes to explain why he is a follower of Plato’s first Academy, speaking of Ethics, of Physics, of Dialectics and Rhetorics, and more.
Cicero then explains why he is a follower of the ‘New Academy’ which, he says, is wrongly named because it relates directly to all of Plato’s teachings.
The second book is a conversation that takes place at the villa of Hortensius where Cicero, Catullus, and Lucullus meet.
Lucullus, a great statesman, and Philosopher is now the spokesman to defend the so-called ‘New Academy’. He will go over all the chapters, like wisdom, moral, doubt, memory, dreams, madness, probability, truth, sensations, virtues, etc.
While reading, you come to realize the problems they would have had due to insufficient clarity in vocabulary and language for one.
And that they could not distinctly separate mythology with gods and heroes of all kind, as well as beliefs based on poetry and Greek Tragedies, from reality and real history.
The last word in the book says: “We have to adjourn! “
So we may conclude that they are still discussing.
I enjoyed reading this book more than I had expected, for it takes a while to get into the subject.

[Whitlaw Tanyanyiwa Mugwiji · Rating 3 out of 5]

Cicero on Academic Scepticism provides us with an insight into the Hellenistic philosophy in general and in particular, Stoicism and Academic Scepticism. The book is written in the form of a dialogue between Cicero (Academic Scepticism) and two Stoic interlocutors Lucullus and Varro.

This book was directly translated from Cicero's original Latin text. I personally found it a bit hard to understand because the discussions assumes the reader has prior knowledge of the on going discussions. I forgive Cicero for this oversight because the discussions were probably topical at the time when the text was written. I probably need to read the book again, perhaps a third time, to fully grasp the whole debate.

That said, I think it is a must read for those interested in Hellenistic philosophy.

[Conrado · Rating 5 out of 5]

Cicero's presentation and defense of radical skepticism is very interesting as well as thought-provoking, specially when so many of its points seem very close to Pyrrhonian skepticism in particular (one particular point being their focus on the disagreement trope as the main motivation behind their suspension of assent/judgement). A very interesting aspect of the whole debate is how most of it stems from a disagreement on what the criteria for knowledge should be in the first place - should it include infallibility or not? Philo's introduction of fallibilism is a nice background for Cicero's presentation of stoic responses to that view.

Still, the most intriguing points are the historical ones. The stoic Antiochus claims there's no crucial difference between him and the followers of Plato and Aristotle, which suggests a strange unitary view of what we now take to be three different philosophical schools of thought. Even stranger is Antiochus' claim that certain academic skeptics took Plato as one of the predecessors to their view, along with Socrates and pre-socratics such as Parmenides. It's certainly very interesting to see how both skeptics and dogmatic philosophers like the stoics were already attempting to understand themselves as part of an older tradition, in a way that would legitimate their enterprise.

Another point that stood out to me is how ahead of the curve the stoics seemed. Unless I'm mistaken... don't their theses on perception amount to a form of epistemological disjunctivism? They do claim that they (or rather, the "wise men") are able to distinguish between veridical and non-veridical impressions in their response to the problem of illusion because they have cataleptic impressions, which - not going into details - reminds me a lot of the disjunctivist response that veridical perceptions are accessible and factive unlike non-veridical perceptions. If that is the case, then disjunctivism is not at all a contemporary phenomenon in philosophy - it's much, much older than most of us think. Which is exciting, even though I tend to side with the skeptics.

[Zachary Rudolph · Rating 3 out of 5]

“Nor is there any difference between us and those people who fancy that they know something, except that they do not doubt at all that those doctrines which they uphold are the truth, while we account many things as probable which we can adopt as our belief, but can hardly positively affirm.”

[Katherine Gibson · Rating 4 out of 5]

This translation is really well written - evident that Cicero was an excellent writer and thoughtful speaker. Would read this again to dive deeply into his philosophical criticisms and not as another homework assignment.

[Santiago González · Rating 4 out of 5]

Cicerón expone su escepticismo académico frente al estoicismo, buen diálogo la verdad, suele parecerme generalmente razonable Cicerón pero aquí no me llama mucho su filosofía. Buen testimonio histórico y una pena que la obra no esté completa.

[Christopher · Rating 4 out of 5]

Can we know things with certainty or just get to "close enough"? Hume threw some logs on the fire of this debate but it has been raging for a long time.

[Andrew Roxby · Rating 5 out of 5]

The only extant source text on this philosophical school.

[Jalil]

DNF- idk if I’ll ever be as interested in epistemology as I was in high school. Maybe I’ll come back to some day but as of now it’s just boring

[Ethan · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is essential reading for anyone interested in the history of Academic Skepticism, one of two forms of skepticism in Hellenistic philosophy (the other being Pyrrhonism). It should also appeal to people with interests in epistemology more generally. Those familiar with other forms of skepticism may find it interesting as a compare and contrast exercise. The extent to which the Academics' arguments about the senses are a forerunner to the likes of Montaigne and Descartes is particularly interesting.

Brittain's translation is quite readable despite the incompleteness of the texts, and Brittain's introduction, footnotes, and other supplementary material (such as an analytical table of contents, glossary of names, and glossary of English-Latin-Greek terms) are extremely helpful. Cicero isn't always easy (for a guy who doesn't know anything he sure seems to want to show off how much he's read!), but the dialogue format works well for injecting some life into subjects that can sometimes seem dry and lifeless, at least for those without a previously-awakened passion for epistemology and/or the history of ancient Greek and Roman philosophy.

[Alina · Rating 3 out of 5]

Very good exposition of Epircurean, Stoic, and the Academic Skeptic thought. As can be expected, Cicero's style is clear and appealing.