Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future War

by S.L.A. Marshall

Book discusses the days of General Marshall and his experiences where he served in Europe and the Pacific as a combat officer in the Second World War.

Genres: Military Fiction, History, Nonfiction, War, Military History, Psychology, Leadership

224 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 1947

About the author

S.L.A. Marshall (full name, Samuel Lyman Atwood Marshall) served in World War I and then embarked in a career in journalism. In World War II, he was chief combat historian in the Central Pacific (1943) and chief historian for the European Theater of Operations (1945). He authored some 30 books about warfare, including Pork Chop Hill: The American Fighting Man in Action, The River and the Gauntlet and Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future War.

Reviews

[Tom Wilson · Rating 4 out of 5]

Based on POW interviews. this book caused the US Army to change its doctrine from the private soldier as the basic unit of the military organization to the squad.

One of the purposes of the US Army Ranger School was to proliferate the leadership model for the squad structure, along with other military virtues associated with the Ranger traditions dating back to the 7 Years War, throughout the Army. This strategy transformed the Army's performance model from the 19th Century 3rd Wave High Performance to the current "Be All You Can Be" 5th Wave High Performance reflected in Gordon Sullivan's Hope Is Not A Miracle, which is 70 years ahead of the Harvard Business model.

[James · Rating 3 out of 5]

A very mixed bag.
On the one hand, Marshall was truly onto something with his reporting on the extreme reluctance of many soldiers to actively try to kill enemy soldiers. He wasn't the first to note this, and some of his data collection and analysis methods were unsound. Still, it's true that most people find it harder than they expect to kill other people, and to a lot of military leaders in his day the extent of this phenomenon came as as surprise.
That reluctance is a good thing in general, but bad for military effectiveness, and we do need to have effective military forces. Marshall's solution, to change training methods to reduce those inhibitions, has been effective both by getting soldiers more used to the idea in real terms rather than the more abstract sense gained by firing a gun at a blank round bullseye and by training the act into muscle memory so that soldiers will be more likely to aim and fire automatically, before the thinking mind has time to interrupt the process with moral qualms.
This was where Marshall made his greatest mistake. It didn't seem to cross his mind, or those of the military training establishment in general, to wonder how having reflexively killed people would affect those soldiers once they had time to think about it, with their moral systems still unchanged; basically, having been tricked into doing something that their instincts and upbringing told them was evil.
As we now know, of course, the impact of having killed has been shattering on a large share of those who fought throughout history, often haunting them for the rest of their lives. By increasing the number who killed and ensuring that more killed without being psychologically ready for the reality of it, Marshall and the military establishment greatly increased the damage caused by what we now call PTSD or PTS.
So that's one gigantic aspect of the fundamental subject of the book on which Marshall is silent.
His second mistake was in his forecast for the future of warfare. He looked at the increase in the firepower of military arms up to and including nuclear weapons and at the fact that throughout history, each advance in weapons technology had led to the new and improved weapons being used without inhibition; from that he extrapolated that the trend would continue with nuclear weapons, and painted his picture of the future of warfare accordingly. Of course, that has not happened, because we finally managed to create weapons so destructive we were afraid to start using them on each other. The balance of terror based on the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction led to an avoidance of not only nuclear war but of all-out high-intensity conventional war between the strongest powers, for fear it would lead to that nuclear war when someone felt they had nothing to lose. So instead it led to the era of lower-intensity, or shorter, or smaller-scope proxy wars by weaker allies of the opposing superpowers.
Marshall might argue that nuclear weapons were something new and no one could have anticipated the too-terrible-to-use argument actually working. However, he'd seen that happen during his lifetime with the poison gas weapons used in World War I but not before or during World War II, except against noncombatants and troops of countries like Ethiopia that could not retaliate in kind.
So this book is interesting as a look at where the U.S. military mindset was at after the Korean War and before Vietnam, but not as a realistic or complete picture of the issues addressed.

[RYD · Rating 2 out of 5]

For full disclosure, I'm not sure why I read a book of military theory in the first place.

This work had two flaws that ended up being fatal for me. The first was that the most intriguing detail S.L.A. offered -- that one of four soldiers fail to fire their weapons during combat because of fear, confusion and a reluctance to kill their fellow man -- ended up being a statistic that he made up without factual support. The second was that his the view of battle that he offered comes across as very dated in our time of terrorism and scattered urban combat.

For instance: "But it is not the fact of death and of killing which is the prime characteristic of the battlefield. Its essential is that it is the meeting place of opposing military forces where they engage in decisive struggle for the possession of ground. ... There is no battlefield until two forces close, each with the object of overriding the body of the enemy while avoiding being overridden.

"It is my belief that the field, as I have defined it here, has not lost its decisive character, and that in the nature of things, it cannot do so."

[Ryan · Rating 4 out of 5]

A good psychological book about battle command, weak statistics

This book is a classic in military history — one of the most popular analyses of morale in the US WW2 soldier. Unfortunately some of the main statistics in the book (primarily that only 10-25% of soldiers fire their weapons in combat) were probably never true, and are definitely not true with current training systems, but the rest of the book’s insights about the psychology of both commanders and the commanded remain true.

It was interesting to me just how different WW2-style war is from the “low intensity conflict” I’ve seen up close — primarily in an urban environment, sustained for years, and without decisive force or the same kind of clear territorial objectives. While both kinds of war are terrible, I hope we never see total war of the WW2 style again.

Some of the insights from this book seem applicable to civilian leadership, but it probably isn’t a particularly good resource for that, being both very dated and kind of specific to a certain kind of challenge (even if it weren’t military).

[Victor Wu · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a great example of when someone is wrong in the details but right in the big picture. As documented in the helpful Introduction by Russell W. Glenn, Marshall's purported data (or lack thereof) do not stand up to professional standards of scrutiny. But the conclusions Marshall mines from his experiences and reflections in the World Wars are some of the most enduring insights of military theory and psychology. The influence of Marshall's ideas on Marine Corps maneuver warfare doctrine (see e.g. MCDP 1 Warfighting ), as well as on the methodology of innovative historians such as John Keegan, is undeniably deep. His basic approach can be summarized as this: Understand the real experience on the ground and how people actually are and act, not what you might assume or idealize them to be.

[Noah Dommaschk · Rating 4 out of 5]

I thought this book would be good, as I saw it was recommended on a Quora digest page on military and battle command. Turned out it was a directly factual book with no story behind it, that I did not enjoy. It was too black and white for me. However, the book is filled with information that is useful for changes in battle command and how it was before. For example how important the mind is for soldiers rather than raw fitness.

[Brian Thorson · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book examines the relationship between combat effectiveness, lethality, the human psyche, and training with clear language, compelling arguments, and sound recommendations. While originally published just after WWII, this book is just as applicable today and I suspect will remain relevant into perpetuity. My only regret is that I read this on kindle and now will also be purchasing a paper version for easier referencing.

[Mike · Rating 2 out of 5]

The first half is a tough read and based on flawed data (the introduction discusses the issue of the flawed data that the author used to base some of his arguments on). However, the second half of the book raises many excellent points and makes the book worth the read for any small unit tactical leader.

[Jens · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book really resonated with me as I am right now learning to act as a PL for my first military period. It's easy to understand what he means with isolation, the invisible enemy and the crucial act of information sharing to activate everyone. Loved it.

[Dharma Agastia · Rating 3 out of 5]

Putting aside the faulty statistics and research methods, this is a good book for understanding a form of battle "friction": the issue of morale and communications.

[Corbin Routier · Rating 5 out of 5]

The first thirty pages is not very impressive, and the last 30 pages also tapers off into unimpressive theory. That being said, the remaining 150 pages is well written and imperative for all soldiers as well as policy makers.

I would categorize the book into four main points: first, that human nature determines fighting attitudes; second, that professional soldiers have largely ignored the first point and instead rely on unreliable mythologies; third, that social pressure and communication are often more important than technological superiority; and fourth, that policies should be implemented to emphasize the human factor and its limitations on the battlefield.

Quotes, in no particular order:

Page 50 - "Now I do not think I have seen it stated in the military manuals of this age, or in any of the writings meant for the instruction of those who lead troops, that a commander of infantry will BE WELL ADVISED TO BELIEVE [my emphasis] that when he engages the enemy not more than one quarter of his men will ever strike a real blow unless they are compelled by almost overpowering circumstances or unless all junior leaders constantly 'ride herd' on troops with the specific mission of increasing their fire. The 25% estimate stands even for well-trained and campaign-seasoned troops... it is an aspect of infantry combat which goes unheeded... This is a very curious oversight, inasmuch as the problem of how much fire can be brought to bear is the basic problem in all tactics. In fact... tactics are simply shaped around it."

Page 52 - "... it is a point of honor with professional soldiers to hold dogmatically to the belief that training conquers all, and that when perfectly drilled and disciplined, all men will fight. But what of human nature? In the workshop or office, or elsewhere in the the society, a minority of men and women carry the load of work and accept the risks and responsibilities which attach to progress [the Pareto distribution]; the majority in any group seeks lives of minimum risk and expenditure of effort, plagued by doubts of themselves and by fears for their personal security. When the deeper currents of life run counter to the proposition that a majority of men will engage willingly, it would not appear reasonable to believe that military training will succeed where other disciplines fail."

Page 66 - "We should take it that the initiative to fire is ONLY ONE positive quality in the good soldier. Notwithstanding that it is the mainspring of successful minor tactics and hence of final victory in war, those who are incapable of developing it are not to be too greatly discounted FOR THIS ONE FAULT."

Page 148 - "In the normal man it is an absolutely normal impulse to move away from danger. Yet within an army it is recognized by all that personal flight from danger, where it involves dereliction of duty, is the final act of cowardice and of dishonor... The majority are unwilling to take extraordinary risks and do not aspire to a hero's role, but they are equally unwilling that they should be considered the least worthy among those present... From that point, one could go on to say that social pressure, more than military training, is the base of battle discipline, and that when social pressure is lifted, battle disintegrates."

Page 148 - "An army is still a crowd, though a highly organized one. In times of great stress it is subject to the same laws which govern crowds and it is only the presence of strong control which keeps it from acting like a mob."

The author's last page can be paraphrased as such: The guardians of national security are civilians. It begins in the cradle and the nurturing of the child. It continues with the education and indoctrination of certain values. The emphasis placed on their society, their country, and all of mankind. These beliefs are imposed through politics and law. The need for soldiers ONLY comes when they are needed and their substance can ONLY originate from what they were before. In essence, an honorable and peace loving society with standards is the best way to ensure premium fighting forces when the need arrives.

[Rafael Sales · Rating 4 out of 5]

Obra clássica da Literatura Militar que aborda, do ponto de vista tático, a conduta dos soldados frente aos desafios do combate. Trata-se de um relato direto e objetivo dos pontos essenciais em relação aos métodos de instrução, a necessidade da comunicação no campo de batalha e de aspectos relacionados com a liderança das pequenas unidades. O autor, de forma destemida, aponta os principais erros cometidos durante a preparação dos efetivos para a guerra, no caso a II GM. Meu primeiro contato com o livro foi em 1999, quando cursava o 1º ano da AMAN. Leitura obrigatória para todo militar, principalmente oficiais e sargentos.

[Hofstetter Patrick · Rating 5 out of 5]

S.L.A. Marshall's classic impresses with its wealth of human and military lessons, which he draws noticeably from his personal experiences and observations. In 1947 it was a novelty to analyze wars on the level of the small unit; so it is not surprising what a massive impact the book had on the leadership and training of the US Army after World War II. But even 70 years later and in other armed forces, SLAM‘s findings have lost none of their relevance. Some of them were already raised to the standard during the Cold War. But many deserve to be read again and again.

[Kenneth Tubman · Rating 3 out of 5]

Startling facts regarding how men in battle react once they are on the firing line. Bravado leaves the instant the enemy comes into view. It's more how to save your own skin and settling your moral conscience deciding weather to kill or be killed.

This book explains why PTSD is so prevalent amongst veterans and further explains the huge cost of war especially when the last shot is fired and these "shell shocked" souls have to gather with the rest of society to attempt a normal life. Learning how to kill in warfare kills the soul.

[Michael Bistrica · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a must read for all who lead men into combat. Some will say that it is dated and some of his ideas have been debunked. It does give the leader a look at the issues of why get men do not always use their personal weapons in combat. It also provides recommendations to improve training some which the US Army has done going from known distance ranges to pop-up targets and now even computer simulations.

[Scott · Rating 5 out of 5]

Whether he made up the numbers of rates of riflemen using their weapons or not, this is a work of incredible brilliance and common sense. Blurring the lines between philosophy, observation, and psychology, it is a deep gaze into the minds and hearts of men in combat, who's conclusions are as relevant today as they were on the day they were written.

[Callum · Rating 3 out of 5]

The second half of the book makes it worthwhile.

[Richard Hanson · Rating 4 out of 5]

Some of his statements seem to be made out of thin air, but he frames his arguement well. Weight is the infrantryman's enemy for sure.

[Nic Cooper · Rating 4 out of 5]

A good overview of the challenge of leading men in war.

[Richard A Lambing]

This book, not for me.

[Chris Bull · Rating 2 out of 5]

Needs a rewrite and an editor. Must be,assigned reading as it seems to be popular.

[Tammam Aloudat · Rating 4 out of 5]

A book about soldiers written by a soldier... SLA Marshall believed in war deeply and unwavreingly and in that he represents what soldiers are expected to be. However, this is not the value in his famous book, it is in his discovery that only a minority of soldiers in WWII in both the European and Pacific battle fields fired their weapons despite the risk to their lives. His finding lead to the adjustment in training methodologies of American soldiers that lead to a significant increase almost immediately in the Korean war and then to a very high percentage of weapons use in the high eighties in Vietnam war as described in the other famous book, Grossman's On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society.

My take away from the book, as a non-soldier who do not believe in war, is that humans are opposed to killing and violence by their nature and that we only get them to kill by stuffing their heads with empty chauvinism and patriotic bullshit and drilling them repeatedly into killing machines. In his attempt to make war more efficient, I believe that Marshall has proven, unwittingly, how unnatural it is.

[Martin Samuels · Rating 3 out of 5]

First published in 1947, Men Against Fire is one of the most famous books in the military canon. Based on hundreds of interviews undertaken almost immediately after combat actions during the Second World War, the book sets out the key lessons derived by S L A Marshall (often known as SLAM). Central to these were two arguments: that the essence of successful infantry combat is the application of maximum fire on the enemy, and yet that only between 15 and 25% of troops actually fire their weapons at the enemy, though the rate for the crews of heavy weapons was much higher.

Based on these observations, Marshall argued that troops failed to fire, even when to do so might save their lives, due to a combination of fear and moral reluctance to kill. His conclusion was that everything needed to be done to overcome these barriers. The key, he believed, was to remove the isolation experienced by soldiers on the modern battlefield and instead make them feel part of a larger team. This human contact would encourage them to be more active and positive about their potential impact on the course of events, and hence use their weapons. Visible leadership by commanders, explanation of how their tasks fitted into the bigger picture, constant verbal communication between the men, and explicit protection of rear and flanks, were all key means by which this would be achieved.

Although Men Against Fire gave Marshall an enormous reputation, subsequent research has revealed that his study methods were seriously flawed and that his claims regarding the low rate of active participation in combat were in fact drawn from opinion rather than evidence, as he had stated. In addition, his view that combat was essentially a matter of weight of fire has also been shown to be simplistic.

Yet these very real flaws in the work should not obscure the fact that Marshall was surely right to demand a focus on the human aspects of combat at the lowest organisational level, and to require that commanders take account of the actions and approaches that affect the willingness and ability of the lowliest people in the whole army - the infantry - to take an effective part in the battle.

If these failings are taken fully into account, Men Against Fire remains a challenging and important work.

[Okechukwu Ihenacho · Rating 5 out of 5]

SLAM Dunk!!

5 star rating because it provides a balanced view on war, both from the human dimension of leadership and command to the mechanical aspects of war.

[Phillip Manson]

This may seem to be out of date in comparison with what our troops are encountering in the Middle East but leadership in combat needs the same old skills of preparing soldiers for any kind of battlefield by allowing for deceptions, new tactics and flexible positions instead of fixed installations. Ambushes in the jungle or on the sandy hills of the desert still call for analysis of the situation in order to organize the troops for the best use of firepower instead of shooting at phantoms. The biggest problem, which is hardly mentioned for a solution, is communication with squad and platoon with better radios for short distance contact as well as distant for artillery and airpower.

[Christine · Rating 3 out of 5]

This was a little dry, but the subject matter was interesting. Ended on a note which is still very applicable today as our country transitions from two wars - that we need to cultivate a civilian population that would be willing to defend our country or in a few years we will face the consequences. Definitely a worthwhile read.

[Kai · Rating 4 out of 5]

Men Against Fire takes awhile to hit its stride, but once it does, it becomes clear why this is one of the foundation works on combat psychology, which has been referenced in almost every book on the subject since.

[Bruinrefugee · Rating 4 out of 5]

A seminal, if controversial, book in military theory concerning the role and use of infantry. As a layman, seems that one can draw a line from the ideas in the book to the general approach of American doctrine/training.

[David M. Callahan · Rating 4 out of 5]

A very surprising look at what happens in the,field during combat.

Fascinating st u dying of why men fight and why men cower in battle. An intimate look at the roots of courage and fear.

[Leonard J. Kusek · Rating 4 out of 5]

As a former combat infantryman I found many interesting insights. BUT, Marshall must have had a word count he had to meet when he wrote the book. In too many cases he took a whole chapter to cover a point that could have been made in a few paragraphs.