Chinese Military Strategy in the Third Indochina War: The Last Maoist War

by Edward C. O'Dowd

This well-researched volume examines the Sino-Vietnamese hostilities of the late 1970s and 1980s, attempting to understand them as strategic, operational and tactical events. The Sino-Vietnamese War was the third Indochina war, and contemporary Southeast Asia cannot be properly understood unless we acknowledge that the Vietnamese fought three, not two, wars to establish their current role in the region. The war was not about the Sino-Vietnamese border, as frequently claimed, but about China’s support for its Cambodian ally, the Khmer Rouge, and the book addresses US and ASEAN involvement in the effort to support the regime. Although the Chinese completed their troop withdrawal in March 1979, they retained their strategic goal of driving Vietnam out of Cambodia at least until 1988, but it was evident by 1984-85 that the PLA, held back by the drag of its ‘Maoist’ organization, doctrine, equipment, and personnel, was not an effective instrument of coercion. Chinese Military Strategy in the Third Indochina War will be of great interest to all students of the Third Indochina War, Asian political history, Chinese security and strategic studies in general.

Genres: History

248 pages, Paperback

First published April 4, 2007

Reviews

[Ted Tyler · Rating 3 out of 5]

O'Dowd's account of the Sino-Vietnam War has two major strengths. One, he uses a ton of primary documents from both China and Vietnam. It's obvious that he did a significant amount of archival research and obtained access to some important documents. Two, he provides ample and often excessive detail about the various movements of various People's Liberation Army (PLA) units. While it can be challenging to find publicly-available, comprehensive accounts of the war from either Hanoi or Beijing, O'Dowd certainly put in a ton of effort to piece together something from all the published memoirs and various unit histories that have been privately published.

That being said, there are some major issues.

One, O'Dowd overvalues tactical defeats and undervalues strategic victories. Did China's military perform at the highest possible level during this conflict? No. Absolutely not. The Cultural Revolution had forced the PLA into commerce, guard duty, and police work. Not exactly what is necessary for fighting effectively. Vietnam had a smaller, but well-trained military that accorded itself relatively well against the PLA. Hanoi's People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) had fought the Japanese, the French, and the Americans. The PAVN was an experienced and better-trained force, but there simply were not enough soldiers to hold the northern provinces. Vietnam had roughly 50,000 regulars to China's 450,000 (this doesn't account for Vietnam's militia forces, which might have doubled that number). China could have fought more efficiently, but I would argue that it didn't matter because they managed to march fairly close to Hanoi and they accomplished all their pre-invasion objectives of taking Lao Cai, Cao Bang, and Lang Song. Did Vietnam leave Cambodia? No, and not for another decade, but O'Dowd loses sight that Vietnam now had to spend significant resources fighting in Vietnam and defending the homefront against a possible repeat PLA invasion. Hanoi's economy faced significant strain that China's did not. O'Dowd seems to miss this in his analysis.

Two, O'Dowd's account can get so in the weeds to become a tad dry. And sometimes his deep dives are distracting and do not seem to add to his overall thesis. You can definitely tell that this work is from a dissertation because it does not flow together as smoothly as a more conventional book manuscript. And for a book about strategy, the author includes probably way too many tactical details. I also think that he should have spent time mentioning Mao's life before the Civil War, and he should have explored the Northern Expedition. O'Dowd's thesis is that China's version of political warfare and political-military officers come from Mao. This is actually misleading because it comes from the joint Communist and Nationalist experience of learning military science at the Whampoa Military Academy and the Peasant Movement Training Institute in the last 1920s. Political work and officers were first introduced during the Eastern Expedition of 1925 and subsequently the Northern Expedition of 1926-1928.

[Jim Pomeroy · Rating 4 out of 5]

Sort of dry at times but very informative and well structured. The narrative is purposefully bland so as to fit as much information as possible into a short amount of text. Well researched. A necessary book.