A bone-dry dystopian satire written in the form of a charmingly pompous sociological treatise. Rise of the Meritocracy is perhaps less palatable than Huxley or Orwell, but it’s far more bitingly accurate in its predictions.
Written in 1958, this book by sociologist Michael Young features a totally fictional sociologist named Michael Young who, writing on the eve of revolution in 2034, reflects on the past century of human social, political, and economic development in order to explain how things have come to this point. He is comprehensive in his analysis.
The book starts a bit slowly, but I highly recommend reading the author's introduction, which is delightful. Here Young makes it clear that this book is indeed a satire – a point that may have been lost on those who have wholeheartedly embraced the concept of “meritocracy” without any consideration of the potential downsides.
Indeed, "merit" has underpinned many, if not most, economic and social policies of the 20th and 21st centuries, and Young’s depiction of a futuristic meritocratic society is eerily familiar. A non-exhaustive list of things that Young correctly predicted of the late 20th and early 21st centuries includes:
The shift from a manufacturing-based economy to a knowledge-based economy. This may not seem like much of a prediction in 2018, but in 1958 it was hardly clear how profound this shift would be. While Young does not attempt to predict the exact nature of the technology of the 21st century, he accurately predicts that changes in technology will devalue manual labor and shift labor demands to work involving innovation, problem solving, and highly technical knowledge.
The declining role of labor unions and Socialism. Here in the United States, labor unions, which used to represent about 33% of the workforce now represent less than 10% of the workforce. While our libertarian tendencies have always made labor union membership lower here than in Europe, recent declines in unionized labor are due in part because of the difficulty unionizing jobs in the emerging service- and knowledge-based economy, and in part because of our wholesale embrace of competition (as a producer of efficiency and as a system of determining merit), rather than solidarity. Young predicts this as the necessary consequence of the adoption meritocratic policies.
The uncoupling of wages from productivity. Young explicitly discusses this dynamic in which he envisions laborers demanding a share of GDP based on their increased productivity. However, since increases in productivity are no longer gained primarily from people working harder or longer, but rather by improvements in technology and organization, under a meritocratic society the profits from rising productivity should go to those who invented the technology and created more efficient organization – the scientists, inventors, and managers – not to the laborers.
Universal basic income. Because of the dynamic outlined above, Young envisions a shift towards a bare minimum standard income, determined not by a worker’s productivity, but by the bare minimum needed to survive. This is adjusted by CPI each year, and workers who produce higher value for their companies receive compensation above and beyond this bare minimum. While this is not yet a widespread reality, it is gaining traction because of the exact dynamics Young describes.
The increasing importance of education. Because labor demands shift away from brute strength and manual dexterity and towards mental capacity, Young identifies education as the single most important factor in a meritocratic society. In today’s world, despite a renewed call for shop classes and apprenticeships, higher education has steadily become increasingly correlated with both employment and higher earnings, while low educational attainment has become increasingly correlated with unemployment and low earnings. Education is today the single most predictive factor of financial wellbeing, just as Young predicted.
Parenthood as the primary barrier to implementation of meritocratic public policy Young picks up on a dynamic that is one of the oldest themes of political philosophy: the family as a unit of social structure introduces incentives and loyalties that often run counter to public goods or communal needs. In The Republic, Plato addresses this issue by having Socrates suggest a society in which all children are taken from their parents at birth and raised communally, so that parents have an incentive to educate and care for all children, not only their own. We might be aghast at such a suggestion, and yet the damage done by parents working towards their own children's interests, rather than society's interests, is real and profound. In a competitive meritocratic society where education is so highly correlated with financial wellbeing and professional success, any individual parent is incentivized not only to give their child the best education, but to give them a better education than other children receive, even if their own children aren't particularly... smart. This is precisely what we see in America today, where quality educational opportunities are hoarded by the upper class and upper middle class, regardless of their children's actual intelligence or academic aptitude. (Although, of course, any given upper middle class parent would argue that their child is truly exceptional, regardless of evidence to the contrary.) Poor and lower middle class parents can't afford the best education, both in terms of fronting tuition and in terms of the opportunity cost of having a dependent, non-income generating child for an extended period of time. The necessary consequence of this dynamic is that those who receive higher education today are not necessarily the best and brightest; they are simply those most able to afford the costs of educational advancement. This is repugnant to meritocratic ideals: from the standpoint of both individual justice and producing the greatest good for society as a whole, brilliant poor students should be the ones in Harvard, not average rich kids. While Young correctly identified this as a profound issue for the 21st century meritocratic society, he incorrectly predicted that the government would address this issue by standing up to the upper and upper middle classes, limiting the degree to which wealth can determine academic outcomes and increasing public funds to promote the advancement of poor and working class children.
The rise of the technocrats. Young sees a greater role for “experts” in governing in the democracies of the 21st century. In his world, with increasing economic and technological complexity, many representatives elected from among the masses are unable to fully understand or appreciate the issues they’re asked to deal with. Therefore, a class of policy experts and technical administrators rises to help govern and advise. While our current system is not as extreme as the one Young predicts, there has indeed been an explosion of think tanks and policy researchers whose roles are increasingly important in shaping the highly technical legislation required by our modern society.
Rising inequality. Young identifies two factors in increasing inequality: First, as companies become larger and more complex, they necessarily have more “rungs” in the ladder of their organizational structure. If you assume even a minor difference in income between these rungs, having more rungs necessarily increases the spread between the top rung and the bottom rung. Young discusses how there must be differences in income between rungs, because what other incentive is there to have able individuals step up into roles with increased demands, increased responsibilities, and more difficult tasks? Under a meritocratic system, it’s important to get the “best and brightest” into “upper-level” roles, so incentives should not run counter to this. Second, income follows merit in a meritocratic society. With the demands of the knowledge-based economy, Young envisions a scarcity of intellect and an over-abundance of physical skill relative to the demands of the economy. Because of this, it makes sense for organizations to compete more for “top talent,” driving up wages for the most intelligent and educated, while wages for unskilled laborers plunge. It’s basic supply and demand put into the context of a meritocratic, knowledge-based economy, and it is the dynamic we see today: Over the past several decades, "technical" workers, such as doctors, programmers, engineers, and executives have seen the vast majority of wage gains in the economy while wages for unskilled workers have stagnated, and, in some cases, fallen. Inequality has exploded.
Perks as pay. While inequality has been on the rise, it’s probably also under-reported since high-level jobs now include increasing amounts of “benefits” in addition to salaries. These benefits are not always included in measures of economic wellbeing, even though they often significantly increase the value of a worker’s “total compensation package.” Health insurance, child care, tuition reimbursement, 401(k)s with company matching, company contributions to employee 529 plans, free food and drinks, gym memberships, free on-site dry cleaning, free parking, company-sponsored travel, paid sabbaticals, company cars, happy hours: All of these benefits are far more likely to be provided to upper-level employees than to low-level employees or service-sector employees. Young correctly identified this trend as well as the shift towards classifying employee perks as “business costs,” rather than as direct compensation.
The self-segregation of “elites” into an exclusive upper class and declining social mobility. In Young’s meritocratic society, the upper class is no longer composed of those whose wealth or titles were inherited, but rather by those with the highest educational attainment: doctors, lawyers, highly skilled technocrats, and innovators. Because the new upper class attains their status through their own skill and hard work (merit), these people no longer feel any sense of uncertainty about their position. Correspondingly, there is no sense of noblesse oblige, nor any reason whatsoever to associate with people of different classes. Young writes:
“Now that people have become classified by ability, the gap between classes has inevitably become wider. The upper classes are, on the one hand, no longer weakened by self-doubt and self-criticism. Today the eminent know that success is just reward for their own capacity, for their own efforts, and for their own undeniable achievement. They deserve to belong to a superior class… What can they have in common with people whose education stopped at sixteen or seventeen?”
In today’s world, our society has never been more geographically segregated by wealth: the rich live in gated enclaves of mansions, the poor live in ghettos or destitute rural counties. In fact, the rich actively employ zoning restrictions and fees to keep their areas economically inaccessible to the lower classes. Geographic mobility is down, with the poor rarely able to move to more affluent areas. Economic mobility has likewise fallen off since the 1980s, with the vast majority of Americans never rising far from the class in which they were brought up. This is a trend that has only increased in the past several decades. Meanwhile, the upper-middle class and rich seem to feel positively indignant at the idea there is anything wrong with this: they’ve earned it. The problem is less one of attitude, however repugnant; the problem is one of division, and we have increasingly seen the political repercussions of having “two Americas.”
The rise of the service-sector economy, and the corresponding increase in male unemployment relative to female unemployment. This is an interesting prediction made by Young, and one of the most surprising to be more or less correct. Young envisions former factory workers needing to be “retrained” in skills more fitting for the modern economy if they are to remain employed. So, what does society need if not people making things? Young’s answer: Society needs service workers and caregivers. Young describes how a larger percentage of unskilled labor ends up in restaurants, bars, and in “personal service,” like housekeeping, transportation, and childcare, once factory work is no longer needed. Women, he says, make this transition well. Men, however, do not, and their unemployment rises drastically in the new economy, even as women fare relatively well. Young shows his true nature as a sociologist here: Factory work, and other manual labor, has long been dominated by men given our cultural understanding of strength and manual skill being associated with “maleness.” Meanwhile, “women’s work” has long been associated with caregiving and domestic tasks, so the new economy allows them to preserve a traditional cultural sense of identity. Indeed, we have seen male unemployment rise relative to female unemployment over the past decade, and at least part of this has been explained by similar cultural reasoning.
Women becoming doubly burdened under the new economic system. Young underestimates the degree to which society’s norms would change to allow more women into the workplace, but he does accurately predict that women will increasingly take up high-level roles in accordance with their intellectual capacity, becoming surgeons and high-level executives. However, Young notes that these 21st-century women are often forced to choose between a career and a family. Those who chose their careers either opt to not have children or have fewer children, leading to a decline in birthrate. Those who choose to have a family are forced to give up their careers, much to their discontent. Because “merit” is the highest value, being unable to fully realize their merit causes a very real crisis among women. Unfortunately, Young isn’t wrong on this front, although a rapid embrace of feminist ideals is leading to policy shifts to mitigate this dynamic (paid family leave, job protection laws), and changing cultural norms (men being equal partners in childcare and domestic tasks) are allowing for a more truly equitable society than Young dreamed possible.
Women lead the revolution of the future. Young discusses how educated, upper-class women become the ones to partner with the lower-class once they realize the “meritocratic” economy doesn’t work for them given their double burden. This is an uneasy partnership however, because the interests of the two groups aren’t necessarily well aligned. The political manifesto they create together ends up being a hodge-podge of minor demands, since going too far in any given direction will cause the coalition to fall apart. Although the coalition has neither a coherent political platform nor central driving ideology, their resistance to the current order is strongly felt, and the subsequent revolution comes as a complete surprise to those in power. Here I also see echoes of the present day, particularly in the wake of the Me Too movement, in which left-wing reformers are a coalition of uneasy alliances with more rage at the existing power structure than coherent narrative for the future. In a sense, what Young predicts in the end of this book is a rise of identity-based politics in response to a history of politics dominated by questions of economic efficiency.
Young makes some bad predictions too. As noted above, he fails to account for the sweeping changes brought about by feminism. He also overpredicts the degree to which governments act rationally in pursuit of meritocratic ideals. For example, since intelligence and education are in high demand in the new economy, Young believes that policy-makers will choose to spend more public funds on education: raising wages for teachers to attract the best into those ranks and giving not only scholarships, but stipends to low-income gifted students so they are able to continue their education rather than drop out to work. Neither of these things is true in America today, and in some ways, we’ve gone in the opposite direction in recent decades, letting schools crumble and making higher education more burdensome and unobtainable for brilliant low-income students, not less.
The genius of Young’s vision is not solely in its ability to predict the trajectory of social and economic development, but in its exposition of how a focused commitment to a single ideal, merit, can have serious unintended consequences. Social progress involves tradeoffs, and while perhaps everyone is made better off materially by a maximization of efficient use of labor resources, and while the value of merit is unquestionably supported by a sense of justice, there is also an existential desperation that sets in when any given individual’s future is fully determined by factors outside their control. This is the case in Young’s dystopia. Under a perfected meritocracy, the “stupid” will always be “stupid,” and the only thing they can do is accept their lot in life and make do with their meager wages. When “merit” is society’s only guiding ideal, anyone who cannot fully achieve his or her merit becomes hopelessly devalued, as with women forced to give up careers in favor of motherhood.
The solution to Young's dystopia is pretty straight forward: introduce additional values into the metric for forming economic and public policy. Most people hold multiple, if sometimes conflicting values already. Society is largely a balancing act between these values, played out a million times through a million interactions of a billion people. Given that people already hold multiple values, a single-minded commitment to just one is implausible. Life isn’t quite as simple as Young presents here, and that’s a good thing.
In spite of Young’s warnings about the ossified society meritocracy brings about, he also is not wholly opposed to it. Merit has the clear and ringing endorsement of people’s natural intuitions of what is just and fair. Again, the introduction gives insight into this nuanced position: “This book was, in other words, intended to present two sides of the case – the case against as well as the case for a meritocracy. It is not a simple matter and was not intended to be… The decision, one way or another, was, and is left to the reader, the hope being that, on the way to making up his or her mind on one of the great issues of modern society, he or she will also have a little fun.”
This is the definitive dystopia for our time.