Laches and Charmides

by Plato, Rosamond Kent Sprague (Translator)

Rosamond Kent Sprague’s translations of the Laches and Charmides are highly regarded, and relied on, for their lucidity and philosophical acuity. This edition includes notes by Sprague and an updated bibliography.

Genres: Philosophy, Classics, Ancient, Nonfiction

102 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1973

About the author

Plato (Greek: Πλάτων), born Aristocles (c. 427 – 348 BC), was an ancient Greek philosopher of the Classical period who is considered a foundational thinker in Western philosophy and an innovator of the written dialogue and dialectic forms. He raised problems for what became all the major areas of both theoretical philosophy and practical philosophy, and was the founder of the Platonic Academy, a philosophical school in Athens where Plato taught the doctrines that would later become known as Platonism.
Plato's most famous contribution is the theory of forms (or ideas), which has been interpreted as advancing a solution to what is now known as the problem of universals. He was decisively influenced by the pre-Socratic thinkers Pythagoras, Heraclitus, and Parmenides, although much of what is known about them is derived from Plato himself.
Along with his teacher Socrates, and Aristotle, his student, Plato is a central figure in the history of philosophy. Plato's entire body of work is believed to have survived intact for over 2,400 years—unlike that of nearly all of his contemporaries. Although their popularity has fluctuated, they have consistently been read and studied through the ages. Through Neoplatonism, he also greatly influenced both Christian and Islamic philosophy. In modern times, Alfred North Whitehead famously said: "the safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato."

Reviews

[Jacob Aitken · Rating 4 out of 5]

Laches:

When I seek knowledge of something, do I value knowledge for the ends or for the means? For example, if I want to heal the eyes, do I need knowledge about eyes or medicine? This actually is a bad question and one where the modern world has advanced over the Greek.

More importantly, he echoes the discussion in Meno on whether virtue can be taught. Before then, we must know the nature of virtue.

Can courage be isolated from other virtues? (or can any virtue be completely isolated?)

Charmides:

Key idea: Temperance has a holistic effect on body and soul.

This is a hard dialogue to crack. The best approach is to see temperance in the soul as a microcosm of justice in society and leave it at that.

Similar reading: Read Spenser’s Faerie Queen.

[Dominic Muresan · Rating 4 out of 5]

Doua dialoguri socratice, aceeasi jmecherie - Socrate ii baga pe toti interlocutorii in aceeasi groapa - daca vrei sa definesti o singura virtute, cum de ajungi de fiecare data sa le definesti pe toate odata? Tematica virtutii care este cunoasterea binelui si a raului apare si aici.

Dintre cele doua Laches e cel mai manageable, Charmides devine foarte tehnic si foarte ametitor odata ce treci de jumatate. Concluzia lipseste oricum. Desigur, asta nu e aleator, toti interlocutorii sunt personalitati istorice, iar in cazul lui Nicias, Charmides si Critias, toti se vor dovedi incapabili sa actioneze conform virtutilor de care, dupa cum reiese din aceste dialoguri, n-aveau habar.

Cred ca pot vorbi de tot ce e Platon de la Hackett, dar editia asta e super useful in modul in care sunt redactate notele de subsol, detaliind fiecare idee, facand legatura cu cea de dinainte. E greu sa te pierzi.

[Nathan Miller · Rating 3 out of 5]

Laches is helpful both as an introduction to courage as a virtue in particular and Socratic dialogues in general. Charmides is more scattered—read Laws if you want a better dive into the virtue of temperance, particularly the first three books.

Spragues introduction in this edition is helpful to situate these dialogues in their broader Platonic context.

[pearl · Rating 4 out of 5]

Socrates in the Charmides is, in a word, amazing, not to mention an unabashed lecher. The Charmides deals with one of my favorite topics, like, ever--sophrosyne--the discussion of which devolves into an unholy and very amusing mess. So fun. Critias is also a fascinating character whose arguments are perhaps some of the least foolish of all the interlocutors who engage with Soc' in the Dialogues. My professor is holding a graduate seminar on the Charmides in the winter, which I will forcibly brown-nose my way into. Woo!

[Nektarios kouloumpos · Rating 3 out of 5]

Διάβασα και τους δυο πρώιμους διαλόγους ξεχωριστά από μετάφραση Χ.Καμπάνη και Ν.Τετενέ αντίστοιχα.
Φιλοσοφικά, απαντήσεις για τις ιδέες δεν παίρνεις ξεκάθαρα αλλά λειτουργούν ως προθάλαμος για το ύστερο έργο του.
Ο διάλογος Λάχης πραγματεύεται το ζήτημα της ανδρείας και ο Χαρμίδης το ζήτημα της σωφροσύνης.
Λογοτεχνικά δεν είναι κοντά στα ύστερα διαμάντια του Πλάτωνα αλλά έχουν ενδιαφέρον οι απορρίψεις του Σωκράτη στους διάφορους ορισμούς αλλά και στις μεταφορές του!

[Borum · Rating 5 out of 5]

Difficult but totally worth the effort

As in the other Platonic dialogues, Socrates continues to ask the definition of a single virtue: courage in Laches and temperance (sophrosyne) in Charmides. I won't go over all the details of their elenchus, as it's probably summarized in many cliffnotes already. I would like to make some comments regarding the two dialogues.



Although Charmides is more subtle and much more complicated than Laches in its logic and approach, the two dialogues both try to elucidate what we actually mean by a single virtue. First of all, I would like to address a major issue in Plato's theory of virtue, that is if virtue is truly in a 'single' form. Could virtue be in more than one form, or OUGHT it have just a single form? Are they really just shadows of the true single idea of virtue if they are variegated with different aspects?



In the end of their discussion, the respondents who first claimed to 'know' what the repective virtues are failed to answer it and reveal their ignorance and thus their lack of these virtues. This raises another question: Do these virtues truly have to be a 'knowledge' of something? Does the ignorance or inability to define these virtues automatically disqualify them as possessors of these virtues?



Socrates introduces us to the concept of the tinos-word that appears to be complete by itself but actually is not. The word needs another word to explain itself. So, 'knowledge' should be backed up by another word that explains 'of what' the knowledge is: eg. 'knowledge' of 'good and evil'. He also distinguishes the first-order art (science) from the second-order art. The first-order art has a recognizable scope and object, whereas the second-order art deals with the first-order art as its scope of art. Critias regards temperance as the knowledge of the first-order art such as medicine and the second-order art of good and evil, but comes to the moment of aporia. Like many Platonian dialogues, the solution to the problem is inconclusive and instead brings the epiphany of ignorance in order to stimulate his newfound urge to discover the truth.

Whether the virtue questioned is courage or temperance, and whether the participants in the dialogue are frustrated with the conclusion, the answer seems to lie in the aporia itself and hints that all these virtues are different 'aspects' of the single 'form' or 'knowledge' of the good and evil.



This reminded me of all the various branches of knowledge such as history, economics, physics, philosophy, biology, chemistry, psychology, etc. Although they each seem to dealing with different objects in such distinct ways, they seem to be diverging pathways to the common goal of truth. Our world of scientific research gives grants to research that seem to be done for the sake of research only under the misconception of science as the virtue and not as the neutral means to attain that object. Even our most acclaimed political and military policies are jumbled up results of our confusion of the second-order art of distinguishing the good and evil with the first-order art. They make us question the two important virtues, courage and temperance, and we should all ask ourselves the actual aim and the extent of our knowledge.



I also noticed how both Laches and Charmides are less articulate or acquainted with Socrates' dialectic method than their respective partners, Nicias and Critias. However, they both are more honest in admiting their ignorance and are more eager to discover the truth. This attitude of acknowledging one's ignorance is the gate opening up the real possibilities of discovering the truth and is emphasized in many of the dialogues. The false 'belief' in our knowledge is the toughest barrier to attaining a true education and a virtuous life. Nothing is worse than a confident know-nothing know-it-all. :-) So keep those questions alive and coming!

1 Corinthians 3:18
Do not deceive yourselves. If any of you think you are wise by the standards of this age, you should become "fools" so that you may become wise.

p.s. I wish the IRB or any ethical committee reads this when they are contemplating whether any new scientific research is actually good or not.

[Marthese Formosa · Rating 3 out of 5]

So proud of myself for having read another philosophy book! I knew it would be a challenge, but one I was ready for.

Laches and Charmides are two platonic texts on virtue. Laches took me longer to finish, but it includes an introduction to what is virtue, which serves other texts as well. Laches deals with courage and how parents can help their children acquire this virtue. In the end, results were inconclusive but the process and Socratic method used help you also draw your own conclusions and the method on its own helps you think clearly.

Charmides was more fun and the reason why I read Laches too. I have to say, it's quite gay with Socrates' initial crush on Charmides (who is from Plato's family, so he must have been handsome too?) was cute. In Charmides, Socrates, Charmides and Critio discuss what is temperance. The arguments were clear although sometimes confusing. The hypothetical method was used a lot. The ending was also good - although no certain conclusion as to what temperance is and if it is the good, were reached. Some of the arguments certainly make you think/

[Chris Linehan · Rating 3 out of 5]

Plato’s dialogues are incredibly well written and tend to circle round and round the stated objective of the dialogue without ever quite hitting the bullseye. His linkage of knowledge and virtue seems to always play a central theme. At time he critiques his characters for having definitions that are too narrow to serve as the definition. At others he gets on to them for having definitions that are so vague they barely distinguish one thing from the other.

Plato is harsher with those who seem too cocksure. He blasts rigid dogmatics whenever he encounters it. With those who seem more flexible he still corrects, but generally not as harshly as with others.

I still think a lot of his game is to play with language. He often lampoons Prodicus for his sophistry in definitions while using language in a way that would make Prodicus proud.

Of the two, Charmides is more complex in its philosophy. But, I find the characters of Laches more compelling. The two Generals,Nicias and Laches are much more of an interesting pair than Critias and Charmides.

[Marcus Greene · Rating 3 out of 5]

I didn't read this exact translation, but I did listen to these two dialogues.
I didn't really get much out of them. I even watched some summaries/analyses online.
I felt like they were too inconclusive to be satisfying. I know that one of Socrates's main methods is to question everything until we conclude that we do not truly understand the nature of something. This was certainly the case in Alcibiades I. But I found Alcibiades I very entertaining and satisfying, whereas Laches and Charmides were less interesting to me. I enjoyed Charmides a little more I would say, because it felt more visual than Laches. Anyway, I'm glad I listened to these.

[Simon]

Charmides was excellent. Temperance is actually self-knowledge. It thus concerns (if one looks at it fractally) with the knowledge of the knowledge.

Then the discussion goes further whether one only knows the meta-knowledge or all of knowledge (I believe the first).

Laches talks about courage. Most of the discussion is not about courage, but more on who is most apt to answer the question about virtue. This is answered by the fact that people whose words and actions are in agreement, should be listened to. Socrates even admits he has not had any teacher of virtue, but the enquirers still seek his wisdom.

[Niloufar Mazinani · Rating 3 out of 5]

رساله خارمیدس درباره خویشتن‌داری/ تقواست، درنهایت مانند بقیه رساله‌ها، سقراط جواب قطعی مبنی بر اینکه خویشتن داری چیست نمیدهد و از تعاریف ساده و سطحی پرهیز میکند و طبق شیوه خود با پرسش‌هایش دیگران را به چالش میکشد تا تفکر کنند.
تقوا در عربی هم به معنای ترس از خدا و هم پرهیزکاری میباشد. درواقع تقوا به لوازمش که ترس و پرهیزکاریست ترجمه شده اما در یونانی به اعتدال و پرهیز از افراط و تقریط معنی میشود.

[Harry]

I never went through so much to find out nothing was known. But at least they set it up for the sequel. It would be so frustrating to talk with Socrates. Are his arguments logical fallacies or evasive? Guess I need to go talk to the philosopher - who recommended it to me.

[Caitlin ~WordsAreMyForte~]

Only read the Laches so far😛

[Jess · Rating 5 out of 5]

Read both dialogues.

[David · Rating 3 out of 5]

+Lysis
Hehe dialogerne er sjovere i fuld længde. Gennemgående tema om ideen om det absolutte gode - hvordan skal vi forstå noget godt uden at forstå godet i sin abstrakte form? Og en slet skjult kritik af dem som mener at kende til det(!)

[E7boehm · Rating 2 out of 5]

Just as always Plato disappoints most of the time.
E

[J.D. Steens · Rating 1 out of 5]

The point of the Laches’ dialogue is not evident. It’s similar to Protagoras that way. There’s much discussion about virtue (specifically, courage) and, in the end, we don’t know what it means.

As with other Plato dialogues, we get hints of the cosmological background from which Plato writes. When Socrates takes the bait and objects to decision making by majority, he says that decisions should be based on “knowledge” by experts. In other dialogues, such knowledge is that of the divine world and expertise in that area lies with those philosophers aligned with Plato’s thought. There are also references to souls of young men. Again, from other dialogues we might reasonably suspect that Plato’s “virtue” has something to do with the soul’s health and the divine world of philosophical wisdom. None of this – virtue, knowledge, soul – is explicit in this dialogue, and it suffers as a result.

As with Laches, Charmides is disappointing. It starts out with some promise. There’s an issue about the health of Charmides’ soul and Socrates engages the other characters in the dialogue with his series of questions about this and that, and the reader, if not the characters themselves, get lost or hopelessly confused. Toward the end, we understand that temperance, a sort of self control, is a virtue because it allows one to distinguish real from false knowledge (and to be aware of ignorance which may refer to the things of this world that are not real). While Socrates is not explicit, it appears that real knowledge involves the sense of good and bad and the science of the soul. What good and bad and science and soul are is not discussed, although we might guess from other dialogues that all of these have something to do with the presumed reality of an immortal world.

[I · Rating 4 out of 5]

A must read to those who seldom question anything in life. This book becomes frustrating to any reader due to its inability to find a conclusive argument and thus employ a circular question. It is a short read, but quite a difficult one to grapple with easily.

[meg (the.hidden.colophon) · Rating 3 out of 5]

I read this for Classical Greek Philosophy in Fall ‘22.