In the spring of 1951, the Cold War entered its chilliest and most dangerous phase yet. The prospects of war were immediate and frightening. The Soviet Union's apparent willingness to support China's intervention in Korea convinced Canadian observers that Moscow was willing to risk a third world war to achieve its territorial and strategic objectives. The North Atlantic alliance, despite its efforts to rearm, remained dangerously weak. The Red Army, Canadian officials estimated, could occupy Western Europe to the Pyrennes in three months. A Communist advance against the whole of Southeast Asia - sweeping through IndoChina, Burma, Malaya and Indonesia all the way to India and Pakistan - was considered an early possibility. Persia (Iran) and the Middle East were also threatened. In short, warned a December 1950 memorandum to Cabinet, recent Communist successes disclose the stark possibility that, either in the course of a general war or as a result of piece-meal attrition, the whole of Asia and Europe, apart from the United Kingdom, Spain and Portugal, might fall rapidly under Soviet domination. Inevitably, these circumstances had a profound impact on Canadian foreign policy.