The Kennedy Withdrawal: Camelot and the American Commitment to Vietnam

by Marc J. Selverstone

A major revision of our understanding of JFK’s commitment to Vietnam, revealing that his administration’s plan to withdraw was a political device, the effect of which was to manage public opinion while preserving US military assistance.

In October 1963, the White House publicly proposed the removal of US troops from Vietnam, earning President Kennedy an enduring reputation as a skeptic on the war. In fact, Kennedy was ambivalent about withdrawal and was largely detached from its planning. Drawing on secret presidential tapes, Marc J. Selverstone reveals that the withdrawal statement gave Kennedy political cover, allowing him to sustain support for US military assistance. Its details were the handiwork of Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, whose ownership of the plan distanced it from the president.

Selverstone’s use of the presidential tapes, alongside declassified documents, memoirs, and oral histories, lifts the veil on this legend of Camelot. Withdrawal planning was never just about Vietnam as it evolved over the course of fifteen months. For McNamara, it injected greater discipline into the US assistance program. For others, it was a form of leverage over South Vietnam. For the military, it was largely an unwelcome exercise. And for JFK, it allowed him to preserve the US commitment while ostensibly limiting it.

The Kennedy Withdrawal offers an inside look at presidential decisionmaking in this liminal period of the Vietnam War and makes clear that portrayals of Kennedy as a dove are overdrawn. His proposed withdrawal was in fact a cagey strategy for keeping the United States involved in the fight—a strategy the country adopted decades later in Afghanistan.

Genres: History, Presidents

327 pages, Kindle Edition

First published November 15, 2022

About the author

Marc J. Selverstone is a professor at the Miller Center of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia.

Reviews

[Caleb Pykkonen · Rating 3 out of 5]

The Kennedy Withdrawal by Marc J. Selverstone is a history of the ideological struggle between Kennedy and his various aides and cabinet members (i.e., “Camelot”) regarding the path forward in Vietnam, from the start of Kennedy’s presidency to his assassination in 1963. Selverstone seeks to reveal Kennedy’s personal views regarding the Vietnam War immediately prior to his death, and if the President was in favor of removing US troops at the time. Selverstone concludes that Kennedy was not in favor of a complete withdrawal of US troops at the time of his death. Of course, any study of Kennedy’s policy in Vietnam will, at least indirectly, result in a consideration of the evidence for the various conspiracy theories surrounding his murder. By arguing that Kennedy did not want to remove troops, Selverstone pushes back against the idea that he was killed by forces from within the US National Security State.

The conspiracy theory that the Kennedy assassination was orchestrated by individuals within the United States National Security apparatus hinges on Kennedy moving towards troop removal from Vietnam, thus blocking an increase in size of the US military industrial complex. Selverstone uses documentary evidence from the Kennedy administration as well as JFK’s secret recordings to attempt to reveal the thought process and ideological position of Kennedy and other members of his administration, including Vice President Johnson, Robert McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, and others. Selverstone concludes that any claim that JFK did want to remove troops is based on incomplete evidence and an implicit comparison to LBJ’s policies which led to a massive expansion of the War. Selverstone compares Kennedy’s handling of Vietnam to President Obama’s supervision of the war in Afghanistan, and thinks that Kennedy would have been moved by the technocrats in the US government to expand the war in Vietnam just like Obama was in the Middle East.

Unfortunately, Withdrawal ignores the forces of capital behind each of the individuals in the Kennedy administration, and how those forces drove Camelot’s ideology and perspectives on Vietnam. The result is an argument that individual members of Kennedey’s administration had their own ideology which existed in a vacuum, purely based on their own personal feelings and moral inclinations. Regardless of Selverstone’s feelings on whether there was a conspiracy orchestrated by elite global capital (i.e., the “Deep State”) to kill Kennedy (on a recent appearance on the podcast “American Prestige” Selverstone says that he does not believe in this conspiracy theory, though he admits that he is not an expert in the theory), the result of Withdrawal is an exculpation of the Deep State and US Capital without considering how those forces shaped the decision-making in Vietnam. Lukacs’ points out that a purely ideological history is a bourgeois history: “Bourgeois thought judges social phenomena consciously or unconsciously, naively or subtly, consistently from the standpoint of the individual. No path leads from the individual to the totality; there is at best a road leading to aspects of particular areas, mere fragments for the most part, facts bare of any context, or to abstract, special laws.” (History and Class Consciousness, p. 39). Whether he meant to or not, Selverstone has created an ideological history that serves the needs of the bourgeois and is not historically accurate.

A historically accurate analysis of the reasons for Kennedy’s decisions regarding troop levels in Vietnam would consider the forces of capital behind Kennedy and the relevant decision-makers in his cabinet, and the existing state of global capital at the time. What contradictions existed in November 1963 in the realm of global capital, and how much control did elite global capital wield over the global capitalist system as a whole? Where did JFK and the rest of Camelot come from before finding themselves in the driver’s seat of the Vietnam War? How did the forces of capital which propelled each of those individuals into power continue to act on them while they were in office between 1961 and 1963? Not only would answers to these questions clarify Kennedy’s feelings about troop withdrawal from Vietnam, such analysis would provide a much more compelling case for whether President Kennedy was murdered in a conspiracy.

In Withdrawal, Selverstone points out the ways that President Kennedy frequently waivered in his decision making and preferred to keep as many options open as possible as the situation evolved in Vietnam. Specifically, Selverstone argues that Kennedy did not have strong feelings one way or the other about keeping troops in Vietnam. This could be seen as evidence of a rift in capital and the elite class. In other words, it is possible that elements of capital were torn about the extent to which the US should have a military footprint in Vietnam. Perhaps one camp (possibly including elements of the military industrial complex) was driven to force an increasing presence in Vietnam, and Kennedy, as the final decision-maker in US military policy, became the primary obstacle in the way of that objective. By presenting the history of the Kennedy administration as a history of battling ideologies and individuals with personal objectives, Selverstone does not consider this material perspective in his analysis. Therefore, the forces of capital driving decision-making in Vietnam remain a mystery to the reader.

Another hint at the indecision of elite global capital regarding how to proceed in Vietnam is the way they handled US involvement in 1962. Selverstone describes the rise of counter insurgency programs orchestrated by the US National Security institutions beginning in 1962. In the context of the Vietnam War, counter insurgency programs can be seen as the way that capital chose to address the contradictions that the War presented. From an over simplified standpoint, capital’s justification for fighting the war was to stop the spread of communism, but to do this meant throwing US bodies into conflict, which could have progressed into mass civil unrest. In fact, the 1960s did become a period of great civil unrest in the US, and one wonders if capital was already aware of the discontent brewing under the surface at the beginning of the decade. Through use of counter insurgency programs abroad (and COINTELPRO operations domestically) capital tried to simultaneously address the spread of communism in Vietnam while appearing to keep the conflicts abroad at arms-length.

[Braxton Zavala · Rating 3 out of 5]

A professor’s research to define a theoretical response of President John F. Kennedy to the Vietnam War, The Kennedy Withdrawal Camelot and the American Commitment to Vietnam cites unclassified documents, recordings, memoirs and oral histories as evidence to contradict earlier writings and theories. President Kennedy had the conflicting task of hindering communism while trying to withdraw American troops from fighting in the Vietnam War. Openly Kennedy preached to help Vietnam help itself and win its own war whereas privately Kennedy and officials were plotting to overthrow President Diem of Vietnam. Kennedy’s abrupt death halted all of his plans and the unfulfilled promises heroized him and became known as Camelot. Marc. J. Selverstone never claims to answer the unknown but his research and writing leans towards Kennedy responding much like his successor. President Lyndon B. Johnson was determined to continue Kennedy’s promises and two days after Kennedy’s death, he discussed Vietnam’s prospects with senior national security officials who had returned to Washington earlier to discuss them with his predecessor (Selverstone). Tragically, President Johnson escalated America’s involvement in Vietnam and it wasn’t until President Nixon who signed the Paris Peace Accords and withdrew American troops, unifying Vietnam under communism. As a novice political science reader, I give this book a three out of five star rating. There is plenty of background information making this book easily recommended to anyone interested in Kennedy, Vietnam, political policies, or communism. The book is jam packed with references but does not read as a text book, however, it tends to drag with its details and repetition

[Socraticgadfly · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is an excellent overview of the decision-making within various subsets of the Kennedy administration over Vietnam policy, and Jack's ultimate personal intervention via what became NSAM-263, as well as, while avoiding direct alt-history, strong insinuation that through 1964 and into 1965, at a minimum, JFK's policy would have been pretty much the same as LBJ's.

In his intro, Marc J. Selverstone says he rejects alt-history and his focus is just on Kennedy’s actual time in office.

He does talk about a twofold division in historians between a “Cold Warrior” camp and a “Kennedy exceptionalism” camp on the possibility of withdrawal. Then notes that Mac, not Jack, took the lead on withdrawal planning. Later notes that LBJ offered a “three-year plan” for involvement after getting back from his 1961 visit to Nam.

Key point? Page 71:

“(T)he president … never fully embraced the GVN’s defense as a vital interest of the United States.” [Government of Vietnam.] Yet, Jack never expended any public political capital on articulating this belief. And, Selverstone doesn’t factor in how that would have 8-balled him more and more post-assassination, especially after Tonkin.

Skirmish/small battle at Ap Bac early 1963 a big turning point for non-rosy scenario administration and military insiders. ARVN shows it can’t fight and NLF shows it will, even with definite casualties.

Next big turning point? An October 1963 meeting between Jack, Mac and Max Taylor. Kennedy’s on record there as saying the big three-year total withdrawal will be dependent on circumstances — and will likely get pushed back. Page 172:

“Kennedy’s Vietnam War, then, by his own admission, was likely to continue through the election of 1964, into the first year of a presumed second term, and perhaps beyond.”

Followed by the start of the next graf, which illustrates the bottom-line problem in assessing Kennedy:

“Yet neither Kennedy nor his team came to grips with either losing in Southeast Asia or extending their involvement.”

Meanwhile, in all of this, long after Mac kept pushing the original 1,000-man withdrawal, British general Brian Thompson, the guy who ran their counterinsurgency effort in Malaysia, thought the withdrawal parameters just weren’t there.

The “Implementation” chaper, right after this, covers converting a policy statement into a psition paper for the public. Here, Jack first inserts “the major part” into the following statement by Mac, that “(the major part of) the U.S part of the task” would be done by 1965. Then, Jack says, whatever statement is workshopped should be made to look like it was by Mac and Max, not him. Next, Mac Bundy the next day inserts language about “if military progress persists.” And, Bobby was in on all of this.

This eventually evolved into the famous NSAM-263.

Shortly after LBJ became president came NSAM-273, which authorized US actions north of the 17th parallel. Selverstone says the likes of Oliver Stone are wrong to treat it as a smoking gun of conspiracy theory, as Kennedy staff when he was still alive discussed this possibility.

In his epilogue, Selverstone notes that Bobby first tried to draw a bright line, a Camelot bright line, between Jack’s policy and LBJ’s in October 1967, something that Joe Alsop called “fraud.” He then notes how Jack’s plans, or possible plans, became fodder for Iraq debates 40 years later. Selverstone then notes Obama’s Afghanistan “surge” and its parallels to Jack on Vietnam.

Not answered, beyond the biggies of Jack and alt history, is, did Mac later on turd-polish his effort for the eye of history?

And, I will delve into alt-history. Jack’s response to Tonkin Gulf probably would have been about as robust as LBJ’s, if not more so. HIS campaign against Goldwater was loseable; in this alt-history, Jack is not a dead martyr to civil rights and has passed no bill that Goldwater votes against on constitutional grounds. Jack’s overall approval is down in the 50s. He probably is re-elected, but with less than 400 EVs and no more than 55 percent of the vote. I think he would have inserted fewer ground combat troops than LBJ in summer 1965, but would have inserted some, and had the US presence near 100K by the end of 1966. He certainly wouldn’t have been withdrawing by 1965, or even 1966.

[Earl Ecklund III · Rating 5 out of 5]

One of the great "What If" questions in American history is what would have JFK done about Vietnam had he not be assassinated and been re-elected? In this incredibly well researched book Marc Selverstine examines the Kennedy administration's plan to withdraw some troops from Vietnam in 1963, how it came about, how it was implemented and what could tell us about JFK's plans for the future.

For the first 2 years of his presidency JFK rarely focused on Vietnam except for during the Laos neutralization talks of 1961. It was only in 1963 that JFK himself began to become more involved in a policy that was still largely the purview of Defense Secretary Robert McNamara. The potential withdrawal of troops was a proposal drawn up largely by McNamara and General Maxwell Taylor to facilitate the training of the South Vietnamese army and was originally conditional on the progress of the war.

Ultimately the 1000 troops withdrawn from Vietnam in 1963 was merely part of a troop rotation and were replaced by other troops. A potential further withdrawal was canceled shortly after the assassinations of JFK and South Vietnam President Diem, both in November 1963, when it came apparent that the war was not progressing in the direction the Pentagon had originally hoped it would.

What is clear from this book is that JFK struggled with what to do about Vietnam and the American commitment there.

This book is a great one and a must for all interested in JFK and the history of America's involvement in Vietnam.

[Jim Gulley · Rating 4 out of 5]

A detailed study of the JFK administration’s plans to withdraw some US personnel from Vietnam by the end of 1963. Those plans were derailed by the assassination of the President in November of that year. Selverstone’s history sets the stage for LBJ’s escalation of the war and provides more texture for the counterfactual debate over what JFK would have done about Vietnam had he lived and won reelection in 1964.

The book is focused on the planning to remove 1,000 US personnel by the end of 1963. This plan was largely a PR stunt as the number of US military advisors jumped from 2-3,000 at the beginning of the planning process to 16,000+ at the time of the assassination. The withdrawal plan was plagued with the contingency that it be coordinated with GVN military successes. But as the GVN floundered, the need for US personnel increased rather than diminished. The “1,000-man” withdrawal became a chimera.

Selverstone depicts JFK as a chief executive who was risk averse (especially after the Bay of Pigs fiasco), and reluctant to make decisions so that he could keep his options open. His prudence acted as a brake on escalation in SE Asia. LBJ, on the other hand, was rash, mired in complex domestic politics, and desperate to escape the JFK shadow. All of which goaded him into the disastrous escalation in Vietnam.

[Martin · Rating 3 out of 5]

As comprehensive and exhaustive a treatment as you'll find on the Kennedy admin's Vietnam policy. Would JFK have pulled the U.S. out of Vietnam by 1965? Probably not. McNamara's plans to reduce the U.S. footprint in South Vietnam were predicated on predictions of a successful mission in two years time (1965). By Kennedy's death in Nov. 1963, the mission was not succeeding -- and Kennedy never stopped subscribing to domino theories and he remained caught up with issues of credibility and firmness, both domestically and internationally.