The Kennedy Withdrawal: Camelot and the American Commitment to Vietnam

by Marc J. Selverstone

A major revision of our understanding of JFK’s commitment to Vietnam, revealing that his administration’s plan to withdraw was a political device, the effect of which was to manage public opinion while preserving US military assistance.

In October 1963, the White House publicly proposed the removal of US troops from Vietnam, earning President Kennedy an enduring reputation as a skeptic on the war. In fact, Kennedy was ambivalent about withdrawal and was largely detached from its planning. Drawing on secret presidential tapes, Marc J. Selverstone reveals that the withdrawal statement gave Kennedy political cover, allowing him to sustain support for US military assistance. Its details were the handiwork of Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, whose ownership of the plan distanced it from the president.

Selverstone’s use of the presidential tapes, alongside declassified documents, memoirs, and oral histories, lifts the veil on this legend of Camelot. Withdrawal planning was never just about Vietnam as it evolved over the course of fifteen months. For McNamara, it injected greater discipline into the US assistance program. For others, it was a form of leverage over South Vietnam. For the military, it was largely an unwelcome exercise. And for JFK, it allowed him to preserve the US commitment while ostensibly limiting it.

The Kennedy Withdrawal offers an inside look at presidential decisionmaking in this liminal period of the Vietnam War and makes clear that portrayals of Kennedy as a dove are overdrawn. His proposed withdrawal was in fact a cagey strategy for keeping the United States involved in the fight—a strategy the country adopted decades later in Afghanistan.

Genres: History, American History, Presidents

327 pages, Kindle Edition

First published November 15, 2022

About the author

Marc J. Selverstone is a professor at the Miller Center of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia.

Reviews

[Caleb Pykkonen · Rating 3 out of 5]

The Kennedy Withdrawal by Marc J. Selverstone is a history of the ideological struggle between Kennedy and his various aides and cabinet members (i.e., “Camelot”) regarding the path forward in Vietnam, from the start of Kennedy’s presidency to his assassination in 1963. Selverstone seeks to reveal Kennedy’s personal views regarding the Vietnam War immediately prior to his death, and if the President was in favor of removing US troops at the time. Selverstone concludes that Kennedy was not in favor of a complete withdrawal of US troops at the time of his death. Of course, any study of Kennedy’s policy in Vietnam will, at least indirectly, result in a consideration of the evidence for the various conspiracy theories surrounding his murder. By arguing that Kennedy did not want to remove troops, Selverstone pushes back against the idea that he was killed by forces from within the US National Security State.

The conspiracy theory that the Kennedy assassination was orchestrated by individuals within the United States National Security apparatus hinges on Kennedy moving towards troop removal from Vietnam, thus blocking an increase in size of the US military industrial complex. Selverstone uses documentary evidence from the Kennedy administration as well as JFK’s secret recordings to attempt to reveal the thought process and ideological position of Kennedy and other members of his administration, including Vice President Johnson, Robert McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, and others. Selverstone concludes that any claim that JFK did want to remove troops is based on incomplete evidence and an implicit comparison to LBJ’s policies which led to a massive expansion of the War. Selverstone compares Kennedy’s handling of Vietnam to President Obama’s supervision of the war in Afghanistan, and thinks that Kennedy would have been moved by the technocrats in the US government to expand the war in Vietnam just like Obama was in the Middle East.

Unfortunately, Withdrawal ignores the forces of capital behind each of the individuals in the Kennedy administration, and how those forces drove Camelot’s ideology and perspectives on Vietnam. The result is an argument that individual members of Kennedey’s administration had their own ideology which existed in a vacuum, purely based on their own personal feelings and moral inclinations. Regardless of Selverstone’s feelings on whether there was a conspiracy orchestrated by elite global capital (i.e., the “Deep State”) to kill Kennedy (on a recent appearance on the podcast “American Prestige” Selverstone says that he does not believe in this conspiracy theory, though he admits that he is not an expert in the theory), the result of Withdrawal is an exculpation of the Deep State and US Capital without considering how those forces shaped the decision-making in Vietnam. Lukacs’ points out that a purely ideological history is a bourgeois history: “Bourgeois thought judges social phenomena consciously or unconsciously, naively or subtly, consistently from the standpoint of the individual. No path leads from the individual to the totality; there is at best a road leading to aspects of particular areas, mere fragments for the most part, facts bare of any context, or to abstract, special laws.” (History and Class Consciousness, p. 39). Whether he meant to or not, Selverstone has created an ideological history that serves the needs of the bourgeois and is not historically accurate.

A historically accurate analysis of the reasons for Kennedy’s decisions regarding troop levels in Vietnam would consider the forces of capital behind Kennedy and the relevant decision-makers in his cabinet, and the existing state of global capital at the time. What contradictions existed in November 1963 in the realm of global capital, and how much control did elite global capital wield over the global capitalist system as a whole? Where did JFK and the rest of Camelot come from before finding themselves in the driver’s seat of the Vietnam War? How did the forces of capital which propelled each of those individuals into power continue to act on them while they were in office between 1961 and 1963? Not only would answers to these questions clarify Kennedy’s feelings about troop withdrawal from Vietnam, such analysis would provide a much more compelling case for whether President Kennedy was murdered in a conspiracy.

In Withdrawal, Selverstone points out the ways that President Kennedy frequently waivered in his decision making and preferred to keep as many options open as possible as the situation evolved in Vietnam. Specifically, Selverstone argues that Kennedy did not have strong feelings one way or the other about keeping troops in Vietnam. This could be seen as evidence of a rift in capital and the elite class. In other words, it is possible that elements of capital were torn about the extent to which the US should have a military footprint in Vietnam. Perhaps one camp (possibly including elements of the military industrial complex) was driven to force an increasing presence in Vietnam, and Kennedy, as the final decision-maker in US military policy, became the primary obstacle in the way of that objective. By presenting the history of the Kennedy administration as a history of battling ideologies and individuals with personal objectives, Selverstone does not consider this material perspective in his analysis. Therefore, the forces of capital driving decision-making in Vietnam remain a mystery to the reader.

Another hint at the indecision of elite global capital regarding how to proceed in Vietnam is the way they handled US involvement in 1962. Selverstone describes the rise of counter insurgency programs orchestrated by the US National Security institutions beginning in 1962. In the context of the Vietnam War, counter insurgency programs can be seen as the way that capital chose to address the contradictions that the War presented. From an over simplified standpoint, capital’s justification for fighting the war was to stop the spread of communism, but to do this meant throwing US bodies into conflict, which could have progressed into mass civil unrest. In fact, the 1960s did become a period of great civil unrest in the US, and one wonders if capital was already aware of the discontent brewing under the surface at the beginning of the decade. Through use of counter insurgency programs abroad (and COINTELPRO operations domestically) capital tried to simultaneously address the spread of communism in Vietnam while appearing to keep the conflicts abroad at arms-length.

[Jerome Otte · Rating 4 out of 5]

An engaging and nuanced work.

Selverstone lays out Kennedy’s commitment to South Vietnam and the plans McNamara drew up for an American withdrawal. The book doesn’t try to speculate too much about what Kennedy might have done had he lived, but instead looks at whether Kennedy had a real plan for a real withdrawal. The book certainly succeeds at explaining the forces and ideas that shaped Kennedy’s thinking.

It’s easy to understand why the “Kennedy withdrawal” has captured the imagination. The Kennedy assassination traumatized the nation, and Vietnam would traumatize it, too. Kennedy's death helped give him and his presidency a certain aura as some kind of Golden Age of hope, and events like the Cuban Missile Crisis reinforced the impression that Kennedy was a more independent or intelligent thinker than other American Cold Warriors. When the nation turned against the Vietnam War, and then that war came to an end, these ideas would acquire new force. Johnson was escalating the war, and Johnson didn’t seem as intelligent or pragmatic as Kennedy; therefore, Kennedy’s approach to Vietnam would have been to pull out, the argument goes. Kennedy, apparently, was a Vietnam skeptic all along. Unsurprisingly, Robert Kennedy would be a big proponent of this idea as he sought to differentiate himself from LBJ.

Selverstone finds, instead, that, at the time of his death, Kennedy had not made up his mind on what to do in Vietnam. And, of course, after his death, Kennedy would have a whole army of former Kennedy officials and loyalists who were eager to bolster his reputation. And, of course, one of the reasons these sorts of questions appeal to people is because they are unanswerable. Some commentators also seem to find it likely that Kennedy would have withdrawn from Vietnam simply because he had a different temperament and personality than LBJ (“pragmatic” is a term they like using)

Selverstone notes that most of the dynamics that shaped the withdrawal planning actually had nothing to do with the war in Vietnam. Maxwell Taylor and McGeorge Bundy viewed the withdrawal as a way to put pressure on Diem. McNamara seemed to view it as a way to accommodate Diem and placate his fears about a bigger US presence. McNamara also felt that the US had to put some sort of “time limit” on American advisory efforts to prod the South Vietnamese to shoulder more of the burden. But, according to the Pentagon Papers, McNamara also wanted to counter the pressure for more reinforcements; wanted to subordinate Vietnam issues to more pressing crises in Berlin, Cuba, and Laos; and counter political opposition to US involvement in the region. The book notes that McNamara's own planning for a drawdown in Vietnam stemmed from optimistic reporting about progress in Vietnam. At the time these plans were being formulated, US officials were optimistic about the war. To ensure support, policymakers had to demonstrate progress. And one way to do so was to withdraw some of the troops. Selverstone notes the irony that US officials framed its assistance program to South Vietnam as conditional in progress in the war and on South Vietnamese government reforms, while at the same casting the failure of the program as an unacceptable disaster that had to be prevented at all costs. Nor did Congress bother challenging this framing.

Planners also assumed that the military situation would continue to be challenging in the short term but would, after mid-1965, begin to improve. But, apparently, these planners never bothered to explain how they came up with these numbers. Selverstone also notes that McNamara pushed for a US withdrawal in three years’ time, but he did not say such a thing publicly. Selverstone also notes that Diem himself told the US ambassador about his desire for a reduced American footprint in South Vietnam, since the US presence reinforced the impression that he was a US puppet.

Some of the impetus for a partial withdrawal was also related to McNamara's budget reforms and to Kennedy’s concerns over the balance-of-payments issue, which led to decisions to cut some military spending. This did lead to “formal planning” for a phased withdrawal from Vietnam, but this was not set in stone, and was conditional on progress in the war. There was no fixed timetable. In July 1962, McNamara did propose a three-year period for American training efforts and then withdrawal, but it is unclear how much Kennedy knew about this. McNamara's planning for a limited withdrawal from Vietnam happened as he was also planning similar limited withdrawals from Europe. The South Vietnamese were also uncomfortable with the increasing US presence, and nobody in the US really wanted a war, so the withdrawal could appease those audiences. At the same time, it could serve as leverage against the South Vietnamese. The composition of the withdrawn troops also reveals some of the thinking behind the withdrawal, because the actual US troops being withdrawn actually had little operational effect on ARVN field operations.

As president, Kennedy didn’t actually say all that much about Vietnam, either publicly or privately. According to some commentators, Kennedy knew by 1963 that the war in Vietnam was a lost cause, but Selverstone finds no hard evidence about his private thoughts about the war by that stage. At the time of his assassination, Kennedy had not actually decided on what to do in Vietnam. Selverstone contends that Kennedy had some misgivings about the US aid program to South Vietnam, but was still planning to sustain it at the time of his death. The partial withdrawal of some US advisers, Kennedy decided, would give him the latitude to do so, Selverstone argues.

The Kennedy tapes, however, do explain some of Kennedy’s thinking about the withdrawal.Selverstone notes that, in the few taped conversation we have of Kennedy talking about Vietnam, he expresses an openness to modify McNamara’s 1965 withdrawal timeline (“And then ‘65, if it doesn’t work out, we’ll get a new date.”) In these taped conversations, Kennedy also emphasizes the need to keep the withdrawals low-key. “The more public the talk about sanctions, the more likely Diem would resist US pressures,” Selverstone writes. “And the more public the withdrawal announcement—particularly in the face of dubious military progress, the more likely it would seem nonsensical.” In taped conversations, Kennedy also said that, in his mind, the withdrawal of American troops in Vietnam was conditional on battlefield progress.

Kennedy's role in the withdrawal is elusive, and the paper trail doesn't link him to its planning. The Kennedy tapes indicate that he didn't follow its progress and was skeptical if it was a worthwhile exercise. But it remains unclear how he viewed the withdrawal’s meaning
The planning began at a time when US officials were optimistic about the war.

Selverstone depicts Kennedy as a fairly conventional Cold Warrior, and that public opinions would, in any case, not have tolerated anything less. Kennedy was genuinely opposed to communism. As a Senator, he supported American aid to Diem's government. As a presidential candidate, he promised to wage the Cold War more effectively. As President, Kennedy would oversee an expansion of American conventional and unconventional forces and new doctrines for using them, for instance.

As President, Kennedy would increase the status and power of America’s advisory mission in South Vietnam. Under Kennedy, American advisors would engage directly in hostilities, and would also take more casualties. There would be an increase in the number of US advisers, even when they flouted the 1954 Geneva Accords. Kennedy openly admitted to the press that his administration (for reasons of prudence, of course) would not reveal to the press the full extent of US activities in South Vietnam. Publicly, Kennedy warned again and again that withdrawal from Vietnam would be a mistake, and would mean the collapse of southeast Asia. Publicly, he declared that the US would stay in Vietnam and commit to South Vietnam’s defense. All of it in the face of skepticism from some elements of the press about whether Vietnam was worth it. And the Kennedy administration, knowing that talk of a neutralist solution made Diem nervous, worked to reassure him that they weren't interested in such a course. Selverstone notes Kennedy's interest in covert action against North Vietnam during his presidency, and how these operations were expanded under his watch. These operations would, under Johnson, lead to the Gulf of Tonkin incident, even though Johnson expressed somewhat more caution than Kennedy did.

Kennedy’s leadership style also played a role. Kennedy was reluctant to act, wanting to avoid any decisions that narrowed his options further, and taking such classic steps like sending fact-finding missions, a typical political maneuver wherein such missions reach conclusions that they could have reached without leaving Washington.

Kennedy did rebuff the deployment of US combat troops (although US advisers were authorized to participate in combat, despite Kennedy's denials) Senior Kennedy officials never actually made a decision about whether Vietnam was important enough to require the deployment of US combat troops. Instead, they put off that question, hoping that the situation would resolve before then. Of course, under Kennedy, there was no Gulf of Tonkin incident. Would Kennedy have stuck to that position had he had been president at that time? Would politics have allowed him to do so? Who knows? Selverstone notes a dilemma at the heart of US policy: the US needed to make public affirmations of the US commitment to South Vietnam in order to bolster South Vietnamese morale. But these affirmations would tie America more closely to the sorts of open-ended commitments and big promises that Kennedy wished to sidestep. Selverstone notes that the Kennedy administration wanted to limit its commitment to South Vietnam and keep it away from public scrutiny. However, this proved difficult to square with the political rhetoric that declared that South Vietnam’s collapse would be a disaster for America and the free world. Another problem was that the Kennedy administration was receiving conflict reports about progress in South Vietnam, which made it harder to formulate policy.

Some commentators cite the neutralization of Laos as an indication of Kennedy's skepticism towards Cold War orthodoxies, but Selverstone notes that this neutralization plan didn't actually end up working. Laos continued to be unstable, the North Vietnamese freely violated its neutrality, and the Kennedy administration was wary of the optics of shrinking from its commitment to South Vietnam in the wake of apparent defeats like the Berlin, the Bay of Pigs, and Laos. It seems like the neutralization of Laos only increased Kennedy’s resolve to draw the line in South Vietnam.

Kennedy doesn’t actually feature in the book all that much, since the withdrawal plan was mostly McNamara’s. Selverstone writes that the planning for the withdrawal “bore few of Kennedy's fingerprints, and was mostly the work of McNamara who made these plans with little to no engagement from Kennedy.” These plans were also, importantly, conditional on progress on the war. For Kennedy, the withdrawal was mainly a PR exercise. From Selverstone’s research, it seems that Kennedy didn’t personally know much of the plans’ details, and approached the question with caution and pragmatism. Selverstone notes McNamara’s authorship of the plan and the fact that these plans were conditional on progress in the war, would have taken two years to complete, and would not have spelled the end of US aid for Diem. Withdrawal was a symbolic act (an “accounting exercise,” as Selverstone puts it) and everyone involved knew that. The two withdrawal plans that McNamara devised were also contingency plans

Selverstone also notes that Kennedy dealt with the question of Vietnam while dealing with civil rights issues at home and crises in Cuba, Berlin, and Laos abroad. He details the overly optimistic assessments of the war that underpinned these plans, and the idea that a withdrawal would pressure Diem to reform and win over Congress. He also notes that Kennedy was planning to give a speech arguing for continued engagement in South Vietnam shortly before he was killed. When Kennedy was shot, more American troops were in Vietnam than when he assumed the presidency. Selverstone also connects the withdrawal announcement to the fate of Ngo Dinh Diem; ARVN generals feared the US would abandon South Vietnam unless they got rid of Diem, so this contributed to their decision to mount a coup. The book focuses more on what the administration’s withdrawal planning meant at the time than on whether Kennedy would have actually carried these plans out. Selverstone concludes that the question is “ultimately unknowable,” a conclusion shared by Kennedy's advisers after his death.

The narrative is pretty clear and the writing elegant, despite it dealing with so much bureaucratic minutiae. The book’s focus is rather narrow, and some readers may wish for more background on North Vietnam, American policy in South Vietnam, and America’s relationship with Diem. The coverage of the November 1961 debates over US combat troops in Vietnam is surprisingly brief. Also, Selverstone suggests that a US withdrawal was floated in order to win over the media, but he doesn’t really convince the reader that the media was opposed to escalation (he himself writes of the media’s support for engagement)

A rich and well-researched work.

[Braxton Zavala · Rating 3 out of 5]

A professor’s research to define a theoretical response of President John F. Kennedy to the Vietnam War, The Kennedy Withdrawal Camelot and the American Commitment to Vietnam cites unclassified documents, recordings, memoirs and oral histories as evidence to contradict earlier writings and theories. President Kennedy had the conflicting task of hindering communism while trying to withdraw American troops from fighting in the Vietnam War. Openly Kennedy preached to help Vietnam help itself and win its own war whereas privately Kennedy and officials were plotting to overthrow President Diem of Vietnam. Kennedy’s abrupt death halted all of his plans and the unfulfilled promises heroized him and became known as Camelot. Marc. J. Selverstone never claims to answer the unknown but his research and writing leans towards Kennedy responding much like his successor. President Lyndon B. Johnson was determined to continue Kennedy’s promises and two days after Kennedy’s death, he discussed Vietnam’s prospects with senior national security officials who had returned to Washington earlier to discuss them with his predecessor (Selverstone). Tragically, President Johnson escalated America’s involvement in Vietnam and it wasn’t until President Nixon who signed the Paris Peace Accords and withdrew American troops, unifying Vietnam under communism. As a novice political science reader, I give this book a three out of five star rating. There is plenty of background information making this book easily recommended to anyone interested in Kennedy, Vietnam, political policies, or communism. The book is jam packed with references but does not read as a text book, however, it tends to drag with its details and repetition

[Socraticgadfly · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is an excellent overview of the decision-making within various subsets of the Kennedy administration over Vietnam policy, and Jack's ultimate personal intervention via what became NSAM-263, as well as, while avoiding direct alt-history, strong insinuation that through 1964 and into 1965, at a minimum, JFK's policy would have been pretty much the same as LBJ's.

In his intro, Marc J. Selverstone says he rejects alt-history and his focus is just on Kennedy’s actual time in office.

He does talk about a twofold division in historians between a “Cold Warrior” camp and a “Kennedy exceptionalism” camp on the possibility of withdrawal. Then notes that Mac, not Jack, took the lead on withdrawal planning. Later notes that LBJ offered a “three-year plan” for involvement after getting back from his 1961 visit to Nam.

Key point? Page 71:

“(T)he president … never fully embraced the GVN’s defense as a vital interest of the United States.” [Government of Vietnam.] Yet, Jack never expended any public political capital on articulating this belief. And, Selverstone doesn’t factor in how that would have 8-balled him more and more post-assassination, especially after Tonkin.

Skirmish/small battle at Ap Bac early 1963 a big turning point for non-rosy scenario administration and military insiders. ARVN shows it can’t fight and NLF shows it will, even with definite casualties.

Next big turning point? An October 1963 meeting between Jack, Mac and Max Taylor. Kennedy’s on record there as saying the big three-year total withdrawal will be dependent on circumstances — and will likely get pushed back. Page 172:

“Kennedy’s Vietnam War, then, by his own admission, was likely to continue through the election of 1964, into the first year of a presumed second term, and perhaps beyond.”

Followed by the start of the next graf, which illustrates the bottom-line problem in assessing Kennedy:

“Yet neither Kennedy nor his team came to grips with either losing in Southeast Asia or extending their involvement.”

Meanwhile, in all of this, long after Mac kept pushing the original 1,000-man withdrawal, British general Brian Thompson, the guy who ran their counterinsurgency effort in Malaysia, thought the withdrawal parameters just weren’t there.

The “Implementation” chaper, right after this, covers converting a policy statement into a psition paper for the public. Here, Jack first inserts “the major part” into the following statement by Mac, that “(the major part of) the U.S part of the task” would be done by 1965. Then, Jack says, whatever statement is workshopped should be made to look like it was by Mac and Max, not him. Next, Mac Bundy the next day inserts language about “if military progress persists.” And, Bobby was in on all of this.

This eventually evolved into the famous NSAM-263.

Shortly after LBJ became president came NSAM-273, which authorized US actions north of the 17th parallel. Selverstone says the likes of Oliver Stone are wrong to treat it as a smoking gun of conspiracy theory, as Kennedy staff when he was still alive discussed this possibility.

In his epilogue, Selverstone notes that Bobby first tried to draw a bright line, a Camelot bright line, between Jack’s policy and LBJ’s in October 1967, something that Joe Alsop called “fraud.” He then notes how Jack’s plans, or possible plans, became fodder for Iraq debates 40 years later. Selverstone then notes Obama’s Afghanistan “surge” and its parallels to Jack on Vietnam.

Not answered, beyond the biggies of Jack and alt history, is, did Mac later on turd-polish his effort for the eye of history?

And, I will delve into alt-history. Jack’s response to Tonkin Gulf probably would have been about as robust as LBJ’s, if not more so. HIS campaign against Goldwater was loseable; in this alt-history, Jack is not a dead martyr to civil rights and has passed no bill that Goldwater votes against on constitutional grounds. Jack’s overall approval is down in the 50s. He probably is re-elected, but with less than 400 EVs and no more than 55 percent of the vote. I think he would have inserted fewer ground combat troops than LBJ in summer 1965, but would have inserted some, and had the US presence near 100K by the end of 1966. He certainly wouldn’t have been withdrawing by 1965, or even 1966.

[Earl Ecklund III · Rating 5 out of 5]

One of the great "What If" questions in American history is what would have JFK done about Vietnam had he not be assassinated and been re-elected? In this incredibly well researched book Marc Selverstine examines the Kennedy administration's plan to withdraw some troops from Vietnam in 1963, how it came about, how it was implemented and what could tell us about JFK's plans for the future.

For the first 2 years of his presidency JFK rarely focused on Vietnam except for during the Laos neutralization talks of 1961. It was only in 1963 that JFK himself began to become more involved in a policy that was still largely the purview of Defense Secretary Robert McNamara. The potential withdrawal of troops was a proposal drawn up largely by McNamara and General Maxwell Taylor to facilitate the training of the South Vietnamese army and was originally conditional on the progress of the war.

Ultimately the 1000 troops withdrawn from Vietnam in 1963 was merely part of a troop rotation and were replaced by other troops. A potential further withdrawal was canceled shortly after the assassinations of JFK and South Vietnam President Diem, both in November 1963, when it came apparent that the war was not progressing in the direction the Pentagon had originally hoped it would.

What is clear from this book is that JFK struggled with what to do about Vietnam and the American commitment there.

This book is a great one and a must for all interested in JFK and the history of America's involvement in Vietnam.

[Jim Gulley · Rating 4 out of 5]

A detailed study of the JFK administration’s plans to withdraw some US personnel from Vietnam by the end of 1963. Those plans were derailed by the assassination of the President in November of that year. Selverstone’s history sets the stage for LBJ’s escalation of the war and provides more texture for the counterfactual debate over what JFK would have done about Vietnam had he lived and won reelection in 1964.

The book is focused on the planning to remove 1,000 US personnel by the end of 1963. This plan was largely a PR stunt as the number of US military advisors jumped from 2-3,000 at the beginning of the planning process to 16,000+ at the time of the assassination. The withdrawal plan was plagued with the contingency that it be coordinated with GVN military successes. But as the GVN floundered, the need for US personnel increased rather than diminished. The “1,000-man” withdrawal became a chimera.

Selverstone depicts JFK as a chief executive who was risk averse (especially after the Bay of Pigs fiasco), and reluctant to make decisions so that he could keep his options open. His prudence acted as a brake on escalation in SE Asia. LBJ, on the other hand, was rash, mired in complex domestic politics, and desperate to escape the JFK shadow. All of which goaded him into the disastrous escalation in Vietnam.

[Chet Slonina · Rating 4 out of 5]

The President who planned for two term and the work to be done within that same time period. Marc J. Silverstone presents a compelling argument through his Crystal Ball conclusions with the indications that lead to the many presumptive results in this read. Herein lies the adage that “History repeats itself “ falling on the heels of numerous factors: the U.S. had seen the failure of France in the Vietnamese part of the world, the Berlin Wall, Korea was afflicted by becoming two separate nations, the Domino effect weighed heavy on all of the world as the United States was the cavalry to ride to the rescues and rescue the world from Communism. JFK really never forgave the event that singed his reputation with the Bay of Pigs and mandated his own course of actions to never to be embarrassed again. A sound read that makes for the argument for what Kennedy would have done with a second term in office more believable than before.

[Trevan Klug · Rating 3 out of 5]

If you’re looking for a very deep, analytical, archival resource by archival resource analysis of JFK’s administration strategizing and discussing Vietnam and the details of a planned troop withdrawal, this book is great. However, it was way too in depth for me, but that’s just a mismatch. I did learn quite a bit about how all over the place the early US effort in Vietnam was, and also learned more about the neutralization of Laos, as well as the various SVN regimes from Diem to Khanh. Overall far too in depth for what I was looking for, but a great argument crafted by rigorous archival work.

[Martin · Rating 3 out of 5]

As comprehensive and exhaustive a treatment as you'll find on the Kennedy admin's Vietnam policy. Would JFK have pulled the U.S. out of Vietnam by 1965? Probably not. McNamara's plans to reduce the U.S. footprint in South Vietnam were predicated on predictions of a successful mission in two years time (1965). By Kennedy's death in Nov. 1963, the mission was not succeeding -- and Kennedy never stopped subscribing to domino theories and he remained caught up with issues of credibility and firmness, both domestically and internationally.

[Joseph Case · Rating 5 out of 5]

Exceptional archival and relatively up to date sourcing on declassified files. Complicates the binary framework of the "withdrawal" debate, and adds how the press covered McNamara's withdrawal press release that other historians ignore.

Nuanced. Document driven. Up to date as of 2022.