How do people decide which country came out ahead in a war or a crisis? Why, for instance, was the Mayaguez Incident in May 1975--where 41 U.S. soldiers were killed and dozens more wounded in a botched hostage rescue mission--perceived as a triumph and the 1992-94 U.S. humanitarian intervention in Somalia, which saved thousands of lives, viewed as a disaster? In Failing to Win , Dominic Johnson and Dominic Tierney dissect the psychological factors that predispose leaders, media, and the public to perceive outcomes as victories or defeats--often creating wide gaps between perceptions and reality.
To make their case, Johnson and Tierney employ two "Scorekeeping," which focuses on actual material gains and losses; and "Match-fixing," where evaluations become skewed by mindsets, symbolic events, and media and elite spin. In case studies ranging from the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and the current War on Terror, the authors show that much of what we accept about international politics and world history is not what it seems--and why, in a time when citizens offer or withdraw support based on an imagined view of the outcome rather than the result on the ground, perceptions of success or failure can shape the results of wars, the fate of leaders, and the "lessons" we draw from history.
A very interesting book which explores the psychological factors getting in the way of judging victory in a war.
It has happened countless times that one side had won the war/battle on paper but was still judged to be the ultimate loser. This book will explain why that happens with the help of real life case studies. Cuban Missile crisis, Tet offensive, Yom kippur war, Somalia’s civil war, & Iraq war are explained in detail to give the reader a better understanding. However this book may seem to be archaic while reading the chapter about Iraqi conflict. Its early publication is to be blamed for that.
This is a very interesting book that was difficult to read. The information was valuable, the presentation very dry and scholarly. No reason it shouldn't be. Anyway, the talked about the different ways of perceiving victory in wars or military action. They used as examples, the Cuban Missile Crises of 1962, the Tet Offensive of 1968, the Yom Kippur war in early 70's, action in Somalia in the early 90's and Iraq in the 2000's. They showed how our perception of the results didn't necessarily follow what happened on the ground and why. Basically, there are two ways of judging results in conflict, score keeping and match fixing. This will give me a new perspective on how to view our wars. It's worth slogging through if you are interested in politics.
A pretty enjoyable modern history of military victories that feel like defeats to the victors and military defeats that are political victories. It's immensely readable and doesn't dwell. The focus is on the public/political nature of warfare, especially in a modern world more capable of telling multiple narratives on distant wars. It seems like this was written in part to give context to the political narrative surrounding America's most recent wars. In that, and in many other things, it's successful.