Groundless Belief: An Essay on the Possibility of Epistemology

by Michael J. Williams

Inspired by the work of Wilfrid Sellars, Michael Williams launches an all-out attack on what he calls "phenomenalism," the idea that our knowledge of the world rests on a perceptual or experiential foundation. The point of this wider-than-normal usage of the term "phenomenalism," according to which even some forms of direct realism deserve to be called phenomenalistic, is to call attention to important continuities of thought between theories often thought to be competitors. Williams's target is not phenomenalism in its classical sense-datum and reductionist form but empiricism generally. Williams examines and rejects the idea that, unless our beliefs are answerable to a "given" element in experience, objective knowledge will be impossible.




Groundless Belief was first published in 1977. This second edition contains a new afterword in which Williams places his arguments in the context of some current discussions of coherentism versus the Myth of the Given and explains their relation to subsequent developments in his own epistemological views.

Genres: Philosophy

386 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1977

About the author

From Wikipedia: Michael Williams (born 6 July 1947) is currently the Kreiger-Eisenhower Professor of Philosophy at Johns Hopkins University and chair of the department. Williams is a noted epistemologist, and has significant interest in the philosophy of language, Wittgenstein, and the history of modern philosophy. He is particularly well-known for his work on philosophical skepticism. He received his BA from the University of Oxford and his PhD. from Princeton University under the direction of Richard Rorty. He has taught at Yale University, the University of Maryland, and Northwestern University.
He is married to the philosopher and noted Wittgenstein scholar Meredith Williams, also a member of the Johns Hopkins philosophy faculty.

Reviews

[Jtsimpson · Rating 4 out of 5]

Great defense of anti-foundationalist epistemology. In the afterword, Williams suggests that he is ultimately advocating a contextualist position. Quite different from other forms of contextualism, but it does fall within the general contours of contextualist epistemology. Great book. Clear and well argued.

[Robert Heckner · Rating 4 out of 5]

Good argumentation against foundationalist epistemologies; wished there was a bit more constructive argument for an anti-/non-foundationalist theory (perhaps he added this in a later edition, which I did not read).