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An Essay on Free Will
This book is a defence of the thesis that free will and determinism are incompatible, and an exploration of some of the consequences of this thesis. Free will is understood at the power to act otherwise than one in fact does, and determinism is understood as the thesis that the past and the laws of nature together determine a unique future. The author argues that determinism is incompatible with free will because determinism entails that one’s present acts are determined by factors outside one’s control.
Several arguments in favour of the compatibility of free will and determinism are examined and rejected, the most important being the argument that free will in fact entails determinism, since if one’s acts were undetermined by one’s past, they would be mere random occurrences. The author goes on to argue that moral responsibility requires free will; and that, since the reality of moral responsibility is not in doubt, and since there is no good reason to accept determinism, one should accept the existence of free will and reject determinism.
The book also contains discussions of the problem of future contingencies, the paradigm-case argument, the thesis that ‘can’ statements are disguised conditionals, the relation between general laws and singular causal statements, the individuation of events, deliberation, and the nature of moral responsibility.
Several arguments in favour of the compatibility of free will and determinism are examined and rejected, the most important being the argument that free will in fact entails determinism, since if one’s acts were undetermined by one’s past, they would be mere random occurrences. The author goes on to argue that moral responsibility requires free will; and that, since the reality of moral responsibility is not in doubt, and since there is no good reason to accept determinism, one should accept the existence of free will and reject determinism.
The book also contains discussions of the problem of future contingencies, the paradigm-case argument, the thesis that ‘can’ statements are disguised conditionals, the relation between general laws and singular causal statements, the individuation of events, deliberation, and the nature of moral responsibility.
248 pages, Hardcover
First published August 25, 1983
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About the author
Peter van Inwagen
36 books64 followersPeter van Inwagen is an American analytic philosopher and the John Cardinal O'Hara Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame. earned his PhD from the University of Rochester under the direction of Richard Taylor and Keith Lehrer.
Today, Van Inwagen is one of the leading figures in contemporary metaphysics, philosophy of religion, and philosophy of action. He has taught previously at Syracuse University and was the president of the Society of Christian Philosophers from 2010 to 2013. He was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2005 and was President of the Central Division of the American Philosophical Association in 2008-2009. Van Inwagen has also received an honorary doctorate from the University of Saint Andrews in Scotland.
Today, Van Inwagen is one of the leading figures in contemporary metaphysics, philosophy of religion, and philosophy of action. He has taught previously at Syracuse University and was the president of the Society of Christian Philosophers from 2010 to 2013. He was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2005 and was President of the Central Division of the American Philosophical Association in 2008-2009. Van Inwagen has also received an honorary doctorate from the University of Saint Andrews in Scotland.
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Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews
September 14, 2007
The Consequence Argument. Enough said.
August 3, 2017
An excellent overview of the problem of free will, reviewed by a philosopher who spent most of his life thinking about it. The book is actually a collection of papers written by Peter van Inwagen at various time of his career.
Peter van Inwagen spends a lot of time defining precisely what is free will. The clearest definition borrows from the style Turing used to define Turing machines : describing a situation where free will must exist for that situation to happen. This is most often a situation where a human being, supposedly endowed with free will, is taking a decision where he could perfectly have taken another, inverse decision.
The author then describes the current and past philosophical battlefield about the topic, which can vary whether the world is proven to be deterministic or non-deterministic. In the deterministic world (Aristotle is a determinist in that sense), there are hard determinists, who contend that free will is not possible in a world whether each event derives from another event just before it, and compatibilists, who say that somehow free will can exist in a deterministic world. There are also incompatibilists, who says that free will is not compatibible with determinism, but is compatible with a undeterministic universe, where we are assumed to live - hopefully.
The contribution brought by the author to this edifice is precisely that free will is incompatible with undeterministic world.
As Peter van Inwagen says himself : "Perhaps the explanation of the fact that both compatibilism and incompatibilism seem to lead to mysteries is simply that the concept of free will is self-contradictory. Perhaps free will is, as the incompatibilists say, incompatible with determinism. But perhaps it is also incompatible with indeterminism, owing to the impossibility of its being up to an agent what the outcome of an indeterministic process will be. If free will is incompatible with both determinism and indeterminism, then, since either determinism or indeterminism has to be true, free will is impossible. And, of course, what is impossible does not exist."
However, we do have a clear impression of free will. Maybe it's real or perhaps neuroscience will explain where this impression comes from, and close the debate.
We might then have to deal with the despair of mourning the free will that never was.
Peter van Inwagen spends a lot of time defining precisely what is free will. The clearest definition borrows from the style Turing used to define Turing machines : describing a situation where free will must exist for that situation to happen. This is most often a situation where a human being, supposedly endowed with free will, is taking a decision where he could perfectly have taken another, inverse decision.
The author then describes the current and past philosophical battlefield about the topic, which can vary whether the world is proven to be deterministic or non-deterministic. In the deterministic world (Aristotle is a determinist in that sense), there are hard determinists, who contend that free will is not possible in a world whether each event derives from another event just before it, and compatibilists, who say that somehow free will can exist in a deterministic world. There are also incompatibilists, who says that free will is not compatibible with determinism, but is compatible with a undeterministic universe, where we are assumed to live - hopefully.
The contribution brought by the author to this edifice is precisely that free will is incompatible with undeterministic world.
As Peter van Inwagen says himself : "Perhaps the explanation of the fact that both compatibilism and incompatibilism seem to lead to mysteries is simply that the concept of free will is self-contradictory. Perhaps free will is, as the incompatibilists say, incompatible with determinism. But perhaps it is also incompatible with indeterminism, owing to the impossibility of its being up to an agent what the outcome of an indeterministic process will be. If free will is incompatible with both determinism and indeterminism, then, since either determinism or indeterminism has to be true, free will is impossible. And, of course, what is impossible does not exist."
However, we do have a clear impression of free will. Maybe it's real or perhaps neuroscience will explain where this impression comes from, and close the debate.
We might then have to deal with the despair of mourning the free will that never was.
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November 10, 2023Read Chap. 6: "The Traditional Problem". This, paired with a few other texts I've read by PVI, makes me pretty confident that he must be one of the worst philosophers alive. His "argument" for the existence of avoidability freedom is nothing short of ridiculous and disrespectful to any serious philosopher who considers evidence and is led by arguments where they lead.
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October 13, 2020Peter van Inwagen (PVI) is a very precise and careful thinker. He argues that determinism and free will are incompatible and then he argues for why free will exists. Therefore, there are some indeterminate factors in the world, by this argument.
February 18, 2009
A clear defense of incompatibilism from a leading metaphysician.
Displaying 1 - 5 of 5 reviews