Subversion As Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia

by Audrey R. Kahin, George McTurnan Kahin

In 1957, President Eisenhower, his secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, and the CIA--unbeknownst to Congress or to the American public--launched a massive covert military operation in Indonesia. Its aims were to topple or weaken Indonesia's populist President Sukarno, viewed as too friendly toward Indonesia's Communist Party, and to cripple the Indonesian army. The CIA, run by Allen Dulles, the brother of the secretary of state, funneled financial support and weapons to rebel colonels on the islands outside Java, seat of the government. In the ensuing civil war, thousands of civilians were killed; the Indonesian army put down the rebellion and crushed noncommunist political parties; Sukarno's centralized regime became more authoritarian and jettisoned parliamentary government. Historian Audrey Kahin, editor of the journal Indonesia, and Cornell professor of international studies George Kahin have written a disturbing, scholarly expose of a major covert operation that paved the way for the Indonesian army's massacre of half a million people in 1965-66 with Washington's support. The authors maintain that Indonesia's communist party was essentially a homegrown nationalist movement and that the Eisenhower administration's fears were misguided. Copyright 1995 Cahners Business Information, Inc.

Genres: History, Politics, Asia, Indonesian Literature, International Relations

318 pages, Paperback

First published May 1, 1995

Reviews

[Awais · Rating 5 out of 5]

A detailed and authoritative account of U.S. involvement in the Indonesian rebellions during the 1950s. The Kahins provide a nuanced exploration of both American and Indonesian perspectives, highlighting the internal debates among U.S. policymakers over the threat of communism and domestic developments within Indonesia. It's an important case study in how foreign policy can be shaped, and potentially distorted, by faulty intelligence and ideological assumptions, particularly concerning the CIA and Dulles’ interpretation and subsequent response to developments in Indonesia. The sourcing is also incredible; the authors draw on access to numerous government and military officials in Indonesia.

Published in 1995.

[Jonah Lo · Rating 5 out of 5]

Essential reading for anyone who desires a clear-eyed view of the legacy of the Dulles Brothers, the Eisenhower Administration, and the House of Djojohadikusumo. This is the tale of the Bay of Pigs disaster on steroids. The United States, driven by hysteria over an imagined imminent Communist takeover of Indonesia and embittered by the China Civil War experience, sought to build up and radicalise a regional autonomy movement in Sumatra into an armed countergovernment, equipped with American (and Taiwanese) guns, pilots, planes, and submarines. This effort was only narrowly averted by careful and rapid manoeuvring by General Abdul Haris Nasution - who pre-empted the American pretext for direct naval intervention, dismantled the Sumatran resistance before it could sufficiently draw upon its benefactors, and shook Washington's faith in Padang enough for the Americans to withdraw its blank cheque and reconsider its strategy.

This is the Kahins at their best as senior scholars - bringing to bear not just an enormity of archival work, but also their own interviews and notes with Indonesian elites going as far back as the Bandung Conference itself.

[Syafira Kurnia]

Gbu