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Thanks to recently declassified government documents from the early Cold War era, Craig is able to investigate what America's strategists really thought about the viability of nuclear warfare. He demonstrates that even as they were publicly attempting to make nuclear war technically feasible, many Pentagon officials were privately pessimistic regarding any nuclear strategy. Craig probes the heated arguments Eisenhower had with his national security advisors, and shows how the president conspired to make the option of war with the Soviet Union impossible.

240 pages, Hardcover

First published June 1, 1998

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About the author

Campbell Craig

18 books9 followers
Campbell Craig is Professor of International Politics at Aberystwyth University, where he teaches and writes about cold war and nuclear history, US foreign relations, and contemporary international politics.

He is currently working on Marxism and modern war in the twentieth century, classical realism, and a larger project on the nuclear revolution as theory.

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Displaying 1 - 2 of 2 reviews
Profile Image for Trav.
61 reviews
November 29, 2012
An interesting book that makes sense of Eisenhower's approach to nuclear strategy. Craig argues in this book that nuclear war was avoided by the by Eisenhower's "all-or-nothing" strategy towards war with the Soviet Union.

Dividing the book into distinct time-periods, Craig focuses on the internal wrangling within the Eisenhower administration over what the most appropriate strategy was for the employment of US nukes. This internal dynamics are cast against the events that were unfolding at the time that tested the validity of that strategy.

In all, a good book. Well written, and interesting.
Profile Image for Lillian.
229 reviews12 followers
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August 2, 2011
As president Eisenhower declared that the U.S. would either wage no war, or wage total war--nukes and all. While this seemed utterly rash and foolhardy, Craig thinks that attempting to wage "limited" wars was the one thing most likely to start a nuclear war. In this way Craig argues that Eisenhower's foreign policy actually prevented nuclear holocaust and shows that subsequent politicians fell back on his strategy repeatedly.
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