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Campaign Chronicles
Salerno 1943: The Allied Invasion of Italy
In September 1943, in the first weeks of the Allied campaign to liberate Italy, an Anglo-American invasion force of over 80,000 men was nearly beaten back into the sea by the German defenders in a ferocious ten-day battle at Salerno, south of Naples.
This is the story of the tense, bitter struggle around the Salerno beachhead which decided the issue and changed the course of the campaign - for those ten critical days the fate of Italy hung in the balance. Using documentary records, memoirs and eyewitness accounts from all sides, Angus Konstam recreates every stage of the battle at every level as it happened, day by day, hour by hour.
His painstakingly researched account offers a fresh perspective on a decisive battle that has been neglected by British and American historians in recent years, and it gives a fascinating insight into the realities of warfare in Europe 60 years ago.
This is the story of the tense, bitter struggle around the Salerno beachhead which decided the issue and changed the course of the campaign - for those ten critical days the fate of Italy hung in the balance. Using documentary records, memoirs and eyewitness accounts from all sides, Angus Konstam recreates every stage of the battle at every level as it happened, day by day, hour by hour.
His painstakingly researched account offers a fresh perspective on a decisive battle that has been neglected by British and American historians in recent years, and it gives a fascinating insight into the realities of warfare in Europe 60 years ago.
- GenresHistory
192 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 2007
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About the author
Angus Konstam
219 books61 followersAngus Konstam is a Scottish writer of popular history. Born in Aberdeen, Scotland and raised on the Orkney Islands, he has written more than a hundred books on maritime history, naval history, historical atlases, with a special focus on the history of piracy.
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Displaying 1 - 3 of 3 reviews
May 23, 2018
A very businesslike, day-by-day action report on the Salerno landings.
Angus Konstam provides the occasional wrap-up alinea, but the gaps between them are wider than the gap between the British & American sectors.
Salerno studies are thin on the ground- his bibliography has less than half a dozen monographs since the '60s, the rest are memoirs or larger theatre studie.
Yet there is not much to take away from this, other than a cautionary tale against misplaced optimism:
"The bay was a model amphibious site except for the mountains around it & a river through the middle, within air cover range from Sicily. Commandos & Rangers would secure the passes against German reinforcement while a British & American corps (from Oran) would land on either river bank, hoping to link up in time...but the Germans weren't slow enough to lit all these "maybe's" materialize after the Italian surrender." (p.20)
Lessons for Overlord: air support, naval artillery support. link up the beaches. expect instant armoured counter attack. Create a zone deep enough to permit follow-up traffic that doesn't run the gauntlet of enemy coastal defenses. Salerno relied too much on German passivity, even tough the first day went almost to objective.
I'm disappointed in you, Konstam.
The Osprey edition catalogued erroneously under the same ISBN, however, benefits from this encyclopedic text: readable in its brevity and augmented with excellent 3D maps.
Angus Konstam provides the occasional wrap-up alinea, but the gaps between them are wider than the gap between the British & American sectors.
Salerno studies are thin on the ground- his bibliography has less than half a dozen monographs since the '60s, the rest are memoirs or larger theatre studie.
Yet there is not much to take away from this, other than a cautionary tale against misplaced optimism:
"The bay was a model amphibious site except for the mountains around it & a river through the middle, within air cover range from Sicily. Commandos & Rangers would secure the passes against German reinforcement while a British & American corps (from Oran) would land on either river bank, hoping to link up in time...but the Germans weren't slow enough to lit all these "maybe's" materialize after the Italian surrender." (p.20)
Lessons for Overlord: air support, naval artillery support. link up the beaches. expect instant armoured counter attack. Create a zone deep enough to permit follow-up traffic that doesn't run the gauntlet of enemy coastal defenses. Salerno relied too much on German passivity, even tough the first day went almost to objective.
I'm disappointed in you, Konstam.
The Osprey edition catalogued erroneously under the same ISBN, however, benefits from this encyclopedic text: readable in its brevity and augmented with excellent 3D maps.
November 20, 2023
The back panel of the dust jacket says, "He realised that as no clear and balanced account of the campaign had been published, then research into this pivotal campaign would fill a historical void." Unfortunately, he failed and in 2023 we're still waiting for an accurate history of the Salerno invasion to be written.
The most confused part is the battle for Altavilla on September 12-13. Konstam thinks that September 12 was the German II/15 battalion against the American 1/142 battalion. If you look at the German 10th Army's records and situation maps, you see that the Germans actually attacked with III/15 and III/71. Then Konstam gets confused and starts calling that American battalion 2/142. In fact, 2/142 was far to the south. See Map I in Blumenson's Salerno to Cassino. II/15 actually fought to the south of Albanella, I suspect against 2/142. On September 13 Konstam does not identify the German units, which were III/15, II/71, and I/15. (III/71 had been pulled back into reserve.)
Konstam apparently relied on the British official history for his German order of battle in the back because they make similar mistakes. You need to look at the German records to get the true story. There was no II/115/15 PG: it had been broken up to strengthen I and III battalions. (I/115 is correctly omitted because it was guarding the coast west of Naples.) 15 PG Division had more StuGs than tanks (correctly noted on pages 42 and 61). 129/15 PG had all three battalions. 9/26 Pz had both of its battalions. The omission of I/67/26 Pz is justified because it was the rearguard holding off Eighth Army. 3 PG Division sent II/29 to this battle instead of I/29, and the recon battalion did not participate: it was diverted to Naples. 29 PG Division did not have half-tracks, and the order of battle omits II/15 (which elsewhere in the book is misplaced at Altavilla). 71/29 PG had all three battalions. I/3FJ is missing: it fought in Battipaglia and is probably the unidentified FJ battalion on page 45.
The Americans had the 3rd Ranger Battalion, not the 2nd. The OOB omits corps-level assets like 191st Tank Battalion and 601st, 636th, and 645th Tank Destroyer Battalions, although most do end up being mentioned in the text.
Page 42 says that 26th Panzer Division’s Panzer battalion reached the battlefield, but the German records show only one company was sent: the rest were kept around Rome to guard the coast.
On page 64 the 115th PG regiment is misidentified as the 15th.
Page 74 has a sidebar pointing out that many accounts inaccurately claim Tiger tanks were present, but then bizarrely claims that the 201st Panzer Battalion was present and its StuGs were mistaken for Tigers. I can’t find any evidence that that unit even existed.
Page 108 claims that the 325th Glider Regiment arrived the morning of 9/15, but page 122 of Blumenson's Salerno to Cassino says it did not arrive until late that night.
The most confused part is the battle for Altavilla on September 12-13. Konstam thinks that September 12 was the German II/15 battalion against the American 1/142 battalion. If you look at the German 10th Army's records and situation maps, you see that the Germans actually attacked with III/15 and III/71. Then Konstam gets confused and starts calling that American battalion 2/142. In fact, 2/142 was far to the south. See Map I in Blumenson's Salerno to Cassino. II/15 actually fought to the south of Albanella, I suspect against 2/142. On September 13 Konstam does not identify the German units, which were III/15, II/71, and I/15. (III/71 had been pulled back into reserve.)
Konstam apparently relied on the British official history for his German order of battle in the back because they make similar mistakes. You need to look at the German records to get the true story. There was no II/115/15 PG: it had been broken up to strengthen I and III battalions. (I/115 is correctly omitted because it was guarding the coast west of Naples.) 15 PG Division had more StuGs than tanks (correctly noted on pages 42 and 61). 129/15 PG had all three battalions. 9/26 Pz had both of its battalions. The omission of I/67/26 Pz is justified because it was the rearguard holding off Eighth Army. 3 PG Division sent II/29 to this battle instead of I/29, and the recon battalion did not participate: it was diverted to Naples. 29 PG Division did not have half-tracks, and the order of battle omits II/15 (which elsewhere in the book is misplaced at Altavilla). 71/29 PG had all three battalions. I/3FJ is missing: it fought in Battipaglia and is probably the unidentified FJ battalion on page 45.
The Americans had the 3rd Ranger Battalion, not the 2nd. The OOB omits corps-level assets like 191st Tank Battalion and 601st, 636th, and 645th Tank Destroyer Battalions, although most do end up being mentioned in the text.
Page 42 says that 26th Panzer Division’s Panzer battalion reached the battlefield, but the German records show only one company was sent: the rest were kept around Rome to guard the coast.
On page 64 the 115th PG regiment is misidentified as the 15th.
Page 74 has a sidebar pointing out that many accounts inaccurately claim Tiger tanks were present, but then bizarrely claims that the 201st Panzer Battalion was present and its StuGs were mistaken for Tigers. I can’t find any evidence that that unit even existed.
Page 108 claims that the 325th Glider Regiment arrived the morning of 9/15, but page 122 of Blumenson's Salerno to Cassino says it did not arrive until late that night.
February 14, 2023
I like Angus Kostam, usually, and I really enjoyed his books on pirates. But here he lets the reader down, with his Anglo-centric focus, and antipathy towards 5th Army commander, US general Mark Clark. Kostam excuses the needless diversion of landing craft at the direction of and in support of UK general Montgomery's feckless advance up the toe of Italy, and Kostam further takes glee in the poorly framed photo of Montgomery "rescuing" Clark in Salerno after the Germans ended their drive to the Salerno beachheads. In discussing the relief of US Army VI Corps commander general Dawley, Kostam relates that Dawley showed clear physical signs of having lost his nerve, and voiced insubordinate views of his superiors, but still maintains that it was Clark who should have been dismissed. Throughout the text, Kostam demonstrates that he read a lot of After Action Reports by battalions and companies, but rarely places those isolated actions in an overall analysis and framework.
With UK and US companies repeatedly advancing too far, getting cut off, and surrendering, one gets the impression of very high POW counts. But Clark stated in his memoirs that most of the "missing" straggled back into Allied lines after the breakout from the beachhead. No attempt to reconcile the numbers is made.
Kostam also notes complaints by Montgomery that Clark failed to pin the Germans in place, who instead withdrew to a line across Italy, north of Naples. Huh. I could have sworn that pinning the German LXXVI Panzer Corps in place was Montgomery's job.
Overall, I was not enlightened on the course of the key battle of WWII.
p.s. It was interesting to learn that Wellington's great-great-grandson, also known as the Duke of Wellington, died at Salerno while leading Commandoes.
With UK and US companies repeatedly advancing too far, getting cut off, and surrendering, one gets the impression of very high POW counts. But Clark stated in his memoirs that most of the "missing" straggled back into Allied lines after the breakout from the beachhead. No attempt to reconcile the numbers is made.
Kostam also notes complaints by Montgomery that Clark failed to pin the Germans in place, who instead withdrew to a line across Italy, north of Naples. Huh. I could have sworn that pinning the German LXXVI Panzer Corps in place was Montgomery's job.
Overall, I was not enlightened on the course of the key battle of WWII.
p.s. It was interesting to learn that Wellington's great-great-grandson, also known as the Duke of Wellington, died at Salerno while leading Commandoes.
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