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GCHQ
The gripping inside story of the last unknown realm of the British secret GCHQ (Government Communication Headquarters). GCHQ is the successor to the famous Bletchley Park wartime code-breaking organisation and is the largest and most secretive intelligence organisation in the country. During the war, it commanded more staff than MI5 and MI6 combined and has produced a number of intelligence triumphs, as well as some notable failures. Since the end of the Cold War, it has played a pivotal role in shaping Britain's secret state. Still, we know almost nothing about it. In this ground-breaking new book, Richard Aldrich traces GCHQ's evolvement from a wartime code-breaking operation based in the Bedfordshire countryside, staffed by eccentric crossword puzzlers, to one of the world leading espionage organisations. It is packed full of dramatic spy stories that shed fresh light on Britain's role in the Cold War - from the secret tunnels dug beneath Vienna and Berlin to tap Soviet phone lines, and daring submarine missions to gather intelligence from the Soviet fleet, to the notorious case of Geoffrey Pine, one of the most damaging moles ever recruited by the Soviets inside British intelligence. The book reveals for the first time how GCHQ operators based in Cheltenham affected the outcome of military confrontations in far-flung locations such as Indonesia and Malaya, and exposes the shocking case of three GGHQ workers who were killed in an infamous shootout with terrorists while working undercover in Turkey. Today's GCHQ struggles with some of the most difficult issues of our time. A leading force of the state's security efforts against militant terrorist organisations like Al-Qaeda, they are also involved in fundamental issues that will mould the future of British society. Compelling and revelatory, Aldrich's book is the crucial missing link in Britain's intelligence history.
666 pages, Hardcover
First published June 10, 2010
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 52 reviews
November 28, 2024
I am so glad I stayed away from social media. I cannot believe how much they spy on us, their innocent, law-abiding, citizens.
They've been doing it for years and do it more and more as every years goes by.
They've been doing it for years and do it more and more as every years goes by.
August 5, 2010
A really good look in the history of the GCHQ, and actually in the presence of it and some of the similar to it organizations like the NSA in the world history. The book can give the opposite view on a lot of issues, and shows a lot of the reasons why NSA and the similar organizations oppose the public use of cryptography.
Also, it's pretty eye-opening how much stuff is actually recorded and analysed by such organisations. Although some stuff is missing, especially on the latest developments and the eavesdropping on gsm phones, it still makes you think really hard who can be listening to you and why.
Also, it's pretty eye-opening how much stuff is actually recorded and analysed by such organisations. Although some stuff is missing, especially on the latest developments and the eavesdropping on gsm phones, it still makes you think really hard who can be listening to you and why.
July 21, 2010
Even the asides in this book are packed full of interesting facts that have become public but just not well known enough. One that particularly sticks in the mind is the mention of the banker Roberto Calvi who was found hanging beneath Blackfriars Bridge in 1982. Do read what the book says about this and Argentine attempts to acquire more Exocet missiles during the Falklands war... in fact just read the whole book it’s fascinating stuff....
April 10, 2019
Very detailed, at times dense - but worth it to all who want clear information about GCHQ. I'd recommend it to those used to reading analytical history, but beware of the habit of skipping over lines or reading fast. This book doesn't allow it.
April 30, 2026
I think my rating of three stars differs to what Goodreads considers three stars. What I consider to be three stars is, that is was generally ok or quite good but there was some things I wasn't so keen on and that is definitely the case here.
First of all, it is superbly researched and there is without doubt some interesting stuff here, particularly the last few chapters covering more modern aspects.
And here is the thing, I was expecting, actually, that the post war stuff is what I would be most interested in as that is my bag but too be honest I found it almost too detailed or at least the detail there was I didn't find interesting. Moreover i found often the detail didn't warrant the findings. There seemed to be a lot of times a chapter would build up with a lot of detail without there being any great revelation.
A goodread friend suggested that I read this alongside something else and I didn't because that is not something I tend to do but I think that was good advice.
In summary, it was a good read but very dense in places.
First of all, it is superbly researched and there is without doubt some interesting stuff here, particularly the last few chapters covering more modern aspects.
And here is the thing, I was expecting, actually, that the post war stuff is what I would be most interested in as that is my bag but too be honest I found it almost too detailed or at least the detail there was I didn't find interesting. Moreover i found often the detail didn't warrant the findings. There seemed to be a lot of times a chapter would build up with a lot of detail without there being any great revelation.
A goodread friend suggested that I read this alongside something else and I didn't because that is not something I tend to do but I think that was good advice.
In summary, it was a good read but very dense in places.
June 17, 2018
There will be a review on the blog shortly.
There's so much to talk about...
There's so much to talk about...
October 5, 2019
Meaty, comprehensive, eye-opening.
February 21, 2026
This hardback has been sitting on my shelf for over a decade -- finally tackled it. A worthy read. One topic I found of interest is the history of why GCHQ doesn't have their employees take polygraphs. Here's some excerpts (page numbers from the 2010 hardback):
- - -
p101: since 1948 the CIA had been using the polygraph or lie detector test, initially only to screen people who had access to sigint, although its use was soon extended to all CIA employees. By May 1951 it had been adopted for all American code-breakers, and polygraph examiners were testing 'from seven in the morning till eleven at night' to clear the backlog. Polygraphs soon became an embedded part of American sigint culture, but were not introduced at Britain's GCHQ.
- - -
p381: In February 1983 Beach took his commission on a visit to Washington, which they found to be 'most valuable'. All the Americans and 'particularly the NSA and CIA made no secret of their belief that their personnel security procedures are more effective than our own'. What impressed them most was the routine use of the polygraph. They noted that in 1962 a secret and unpublished section of the Radcliffe Inquiry into security procedures in the Civil Service had recommended its use. The Security Commission thought it significant that during his interrogation Prime had conceded that if he had faced a polygraph test prior to joining GCHQ in 1968, he would not have applied to the organisation. Their strongest recommendation was a pilot scheme for the introduction of the polygraph at Cheltenham. They accepted that it would take time to build up expertise in its use, and that the political obstacles to its introduction would be 'formidable'. Benson Buffham, a former Deputy Director of NSA who had recently served as the American Liaison Officer to GCHQ, or 'SUSLO', visited London to confer on security, and made it very clear that the Americans were keen to see the polygraph arrive at GCHQ.
- - -
P424: As we have seen, in July 1983, having reviewed the Prime case and Visited NSA, the Security Commission had recommended the introduction of the polygraph at GCHQ. The unions feared that the polygraph was inaccurate, and that many innocent individuals would fail the test. Staunch union resistance was guaranteed, so the removal of the unions seemed to be a prerequisite for the introduction of this unpopular security measure.
The dark shadow of the polygraph also explains why government did not pursue obvious options such as a 'continuity of service' agreement — effectively a non-strike agreement — with the unions. Brian Tovey told the Employment Select Committee of the House of Commons that this would have left him perfectly satisfied. However, it would not have solved the underlying problem of union resistance to the polygraph. This left managers with no choice but to go down the more radical road of replacing the unions with a staff federation. The polygraph also shut off the other sensible option of closing union membership to new joiners. Given that union membership at Cheltenham was only about half the staff, this would have reduced it significantly over a decade, with the unions gradually withering on the vine. However, the polygraph issue required them to be removed abruptly.
NSA did not give GCHQ any sort of directive on the issue. Brian Tovey has stated that the Americans never explicitly requested the removal of trade unions at GCHQ, and that it was his own initiative. However, they had directly and repeatedly requested the introduction of the polygraph, and former Deputy Director of NSA Benson Buffham had come to London to reinforce this. The team NSA sent to Britain to assess the damage caused by Geoffrey Prime concluded that while the systems for handling sigint product securely were standardised throughout the UKUSA alliance system, the protocols for personnel security were lamentably weak. The sense of urgency was increased by the fact that some believed that Prime had assisted the KGB with the recruitment of further moles. The pressure for the polygraph influenced the way in which the trade union ban was implemented.
The unions were clearly petrified by the polygraph. In May 1983 the Cabinet Secretary, Sir Robert Armstrong, assured them that 'no loyal servant has anything to fear' from the polygraph, and promised further talks before it was introduced. However, the unions believed it would be introduced quickly, and perhaps operated by Americans. In July 1983 Armstrong explained that there was 'a risk that the USA would question UKUSA exchange if the UK did not at least, run a pilot scheme to see if the polygraph was feasible'. He assured the unions that the machines would not be operated by Americans, but by M15 personnel who were even now undertaking a fourteen-week training course in the USA. The unions now saw the introduction of the polygraph as a foregone conclusion. At Cheltenham, both security (R Division) and personnel (E Division) were thought to be keen, since it was known that Russian agents were briefed to avoid exposure to the polygraph if at all possible. By November 1983 the unions suspected that E3, part of the personnel division, already had machines hidden on the premises at GCHQ, although there were fervent denials. The following month, senior staff at GCHQ volunteered to act as guinea pigs, and a pilot machine was allocated to Personnel Security Branch (R12). Margaret Thatcher was personally committed to the polygraph, arguing that 'people employed in work which makes them privy to that nation's highest secrets would accept the logic' and realise that it was aimed at strengthening their organisation against 'hostile penetration'.
The trade unions had good reason to resist the polygraph. The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice Procedure had recently examined the device, and concluded that while the claimed 86 percent success rate sounded good, what it meant in practice was that there existed a high chance of honest people being branded a security risk. Moreover, any agents who slipped past the polygraph — which required only a modicum of training — would have their reliability falsely confirmed. No fewer than four NSA staff who defected to the Russians had taken and passed the polygraph test. .... The worry was not so much the testing of new entrants to GCHQ, but that many loyal staff" with years of service might fail the test and have their clearances removed.
- - -
P433: Ironically, the government's drive to bring in the polygraph arguably the main reason for the abrupt nature of the ban in January 1984, failed. In 1985 the House of Commons Select Committee on Employment took a close look at the polygraph with experts from the British Psychological Society. They were scathing, and dismissed the machine as useless. Whitehall now chose to run a field test on members of M15, hoping to prove its effectiveness. Although the tests were secret, the results were leaked to the Sunday Times by mutinous officials. Two hundred members of M15 were tested. No less than 37 per cent failed, and in theory would now have to be removed from their posts as security risks. The government did not want to admit to the Americans that things were not going well. On 3 March 1986, Bill Odom, Director of NSA, made a note to himself to 'Ask Peter Marychurch about poly of his people,' but he does not seem to have had a clear answer from his British counterpart. By the end of the year, NSA realised that GCHQ was dragging its feet, and was reported to be 'angered and dismayed'.
It was not until 8 December 1988 that Margaret Thatcher quietly announced that, after considering a new report by the Medical Research Council, and a further report by the Security Commission, the so-called 'second phase of trials would not now go ahead'. This was a quiet admission of defeat. Everyone knew that the polygraph was unscientific and inaccurate. Its main value was that it deterred those with a guilty conscience. NSA had observed that the greatest benefits it provided were the things people confessed to before or immediately after taking a polygraph test because of the state of anxiety it created. Infamously, President Nixon once discussed the polygraph with his inner circle and offered remarks in much the same vain: 'don't know anything about polygraphs, and I don't know how accurate they are, but I know they scare the hell out of people.'
- - -
p101: since 1948 the CIA had been using the polygraph or lie detector test, initially only to screen people who had access to sigint, although its use was soon extended to all CIA employees. By May 1951 it had been adopted for all American code-breakers, and polygraph examiners were testing 'from seven in the morning till eleven at night' to clear the backlog. Polygraphs soon became an embedded part of American sigint culture, but were not introduced at Britain's GCHQ.
- - -
p381: In February 1983 Beach took his commission on a visit to Washington, which they found to be 'most valuable'. All the Americans and 'particularly the NSA and CIA made no secret of their belief that their personnel security procedures are more effective than our own'. What impressed them most was the routine use of the polygraph. They noted that in 1962 a secret and unpublished section of the Radcliffe Inquiry into security procedures in the Civil Service had recommended its use. The Security Commission thought it significant that during his interrogation Prime had conceded that if he had faced a polygraph test prior to joining GCHQ in 1968, he would not have applied to the organisation. Their strongest recommendation was a pilot scheme for the introduction of the polygraph at Cheltenham. They accepted that it would take time to build up expertise in its use, and that the political obstacles to its introduction would be 'formidable'. Benson Buffham, a former Deputy Director of NSA who had recently served as the American Liaison Officer to GCHQ, or 'SUSLO', visited London to confer on security, and made it very clear that the Americans were keen to see the polygraph arrive at GCHQ.
- - -
P424: As we have seen, in July 1983, having reviewed the Prime case and Visited NSA, the Security Commission had recommended the introduction of the polygraph at GCHQ. The unions feared that the polygraph was inaccurate, and that many innocent individuals would fail the test. Staunch union resistance was guaranteed, so the removal of the unions seemed to be a prerequisite for the introduction of this unpopular security measure.
The dark shadow of the polygraph also explains why government did not pursue obvious options such as a 'continuity of service' agreement — effectively a non-strike agreement — with the unions. Brian Tovey told the Employment Select Committee of the House of Commons that this would have left him perfectly satisfied. However, it would not have solved the underlying problem of union resistance to the polygraph. This left managers with no choice but to go down the more radical road of replacing the unions with a staff federation. The polygraph also shut off the other sensible option of closing union membership to new joiners. Given that union membership at Cheltenham was only about half the staff, this would have reduced it significantly over a decade, with the unions gradually withering on the vine. However, the polygraph issue required them to be removed abruptly.
NSA did not give GCHQ any sort of directive on the issue. Brian Tovey has stated that the Americans never explicitly requested the removal of trade unions at GCHQ, and that it was his own initiative. However, they had directly and repeatedly requested the introduction of the polygraph, and former Deputy Director of NSA Benson Buffham had come to London to reinforce this. The team NSA sent to Britain to assess the damage caused by Geoffrey Prime concluded that while the systems for handling sigint product securely were standardised throughout the UKUSA alliance system, the protocols for personnel security were lamentably weak. The sense of urgency was increased by the fact that some believed that Prime had assisted the KGB with the recruitment of further moles. The pressure for the polygraph influenced the way in which the trade union ban was implemented.
The unions were clearly petrified by the polygraph. In May 1983 the Cabinet Secretary, Sir Robert Armstrong, assured them that 'no loyal servant has anything to fear' from the polygraph, and promised further talks before it was introduced. However, the unions believed it would be introduced quickly, and perhaps operated by Americans. In July 1983 Armstrong explained that there was 'a risk that the USA would question UKUSA exchange if the UK did not at least, run a pilot scheme to see if the polygraph was feasible'. He assured the unions that the machines would not be operated by Americans, but by M15 personnel who were even now undertaking a fourteen-week training course in the USA. The unions now saw the introduction of the polygraph as a foregone conclusion. At Cheltenham, both security (R Division) and personnel (E Division) were thought to be keen, since it was known that Russian agents were briefed to avoid exposure to the polygraph if at all possible. By November 1983 the unions suspected that E3, part of the personnel division, already had machines hidden on the premises at GCHQ, although there were fervent denials. The following month, senior staff at GCHQ volunteered to act as guinea pigs, and a pilot machine was allocated to Personnel Security Branch (R12). Margaret Thatcher was personally committed to the polygraph, arguing that 'people employed in work which makes them privy to that nation's highest secrets would accept the logic' and realise that it was aimed at strengthening their organisation against 'hostile penetration'.
The trade unions had good reason to resist the polygraph. The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice Procedure had recently examined the device, and concluded that while the claimed 86 percent success rate sounded good, what it meant in practice was that there existed a high chance of honest people being branded a security risk. Moreover, any agents who slipped past the polygraph — which required only a modicum of training — would have their reliability falsely confirmed. No fewer than four NSA staff who defected to the Russians had taken and passed the polygraph test. .... The worry was not so much the testing of new entrants to GCHQ, but that many loyal staff" with years of service might fail the test and have their clearances removed.
- - -
P433: Ironically, the government's drive to bring in the polygraph arguably the main reason for the abrupt nature of the ban in January 1984, failed. In 1985 the House of Commons Select Committee on Employment took a close look at the polygraph with experts from the British Psychological Society. They were scathing, and dismissed the machine as useless. Whitehall now chose to run a field test on members of M15, hoping to prove its effectiveness. Although the tests were secret, the results were leaked to the Sunday Times by mutinous officials. Two hundred members of M15 were tested. No less than 37 per cent failed, and in theory would now have to be removed from their posts as security risks. The government did not want to admit to the Americans that things were not going well. On 3 March 1986, Bill Odom, Director of NSA, made a note to himself to 'Ask Peter Marychurch about poly of his people,' but he does not seem to have had a clear answer from his British counterpart. By the end of the year, NSA realised that GCHQ was dragging its feet, and was reported to be 'angered and dismayed'.
It was not until 8 December 1988 that Margaret Thatcher quietly announced that, after considering a new report by the Medical Research Council, and a further report by the Security Commission, the so-called 'second phase of trials would not now go ahead'. This was a quiet admission of defeat. Everyone knew that the polygraph was unscientific and inaccurate. Its main value was that it deterred those with a guilty conscience. NSA had observed that the greatest benefits it provided were the things people confessed to before or immediately after taking a polygraph test because of the state of anxiety it created. Infamously, President Nixon once discussed the polygraph with his inner circle and offered remarks in much the same vain: 'don't know anything about polygraphs, and I don't know how accurate they are, but I know they scare the hell out of people.'
March 10, 2020
Haven't finished the whole book, as it's very dense. Most suited to those with a pre-existing base line knowledge of some of the history involved. I came to this simply from having enjoyed a few spy non fiction and fiction books, i.e. about the Cambridge 5 etc. and wanted to explore in a little more detail, but I have to confess I found myself drowning in all the detail that is offered up in each section. Thoroughly well researched, but so much is compacted into each chapter, I found it a struggle to retain the information.
I suspect a reader is best served here by selecting chapters of particular interest and coming back to others as and when they wish to complement their understanding. Useful for academic study, but tough going if you're considering reading it from start to finish if you don't have a decent knowledge base already.
I suspect a reader is best served here by selecting chapters of particular interest and coming back to others as and when they wish to complement their understanding. Useful for academic study, but tough going if you're considering reading it from start to finish if you don't have a decent knowledge base already.
July 3, 2014
Not easy to get into at first as it is a slow starter.
March 2, 2021
This was an interesting read having just finished "the age of surveillance capitalism," which focuses on surveillance by private companies as opposed to intelligence agencies.
This book provides insight into the incentives of GCHQ, and global intelligence agencies more broadly, since WW2. If you'd like to learn more about surveillance, the powers of the state, intelligence (especially signals intelligence, "sigint"), and international relations, I would recommend this book.
Some things that surprised me:
- How much counter espionage, spying and hacking activities occur(ed) without explicit consent from politicians (and often, likely most of the time, with most MPs having no idea what was going on), and the shaky legal grounds of many of these surveillance techniques
- The role embassies play in housing spies, the level of bugging that occurs in embassies, and how this spying can sometimes reduce tensions by providing each side with information on the motivations and next actions of the other side (ie are they going to imminently attack us or not)
- The UK-US special relationship, or the "UKUSA" alliance which became the five eyes alliance, and how much cooperation there has historically been between GCHQ and the NSA. Especially due to the UK's cryptographical talent and overseas bases eg on Cyprus, while the US had all the tech and money.
- That the US and UK intelligence agencies basically bought out a crypto company, ensured there were no other viable alternatives for most of the world (minus Russia and China), and then had a direct line to much of the supposedly secret comms of national leaders in Africa, the middle east, etc. (see Crypto AG).
- The amount of offensive capabilities and actions committed by organisations such as GCHQ in spreading disinformation/propoganda, and spying on basically everyone.
This book provides insight into the incentives of GCHQ, and global intelligence agencies more broadly, since WW2. If you'd like to learn more about surveillance, the powers of the state, intelligence (especially signals intelligence, "sigint"), and international relations, I would recommend this book.
Some things that surprised me:
- How much counter espionage, spying and hacking activities occur(ed) without explicit consent from politicians (and often, likely most of the time, with most MPs having no idea what was going on), and the shaky legal grounds of many of these surveillance techniques
- The role embassies play in housing spies, the level of bugging that occurs in embassies, and how this spying can sometimes reduce tensions by providing each side with information on the motivations and next actions of the other side (ie are they going to imminently attack us or not)
- The UK-US special relationship, or the "UKUSA" alliance which became the five eyes alliance, and how much cooperation there has historically been between GCHQ and the NSA. Especially due to the UK's cryptographical talent and overseas bases eg on Cyprus, while the US had all the tech and money.
- That the US and UK intelligence agencies basically bought out a crypto company, ensured there were no other viable alternatives for most of the world (minus Russia and China), and then had a direct line to much of the supposedly secret comms of national leaders in Africa, the middle east, etc. (see Crypto AG).
- The amount of offensive capabilities and actions committed by organisations such as GCHQ in spreading disinformation/propoganda, and spying on basically everyone.
May 8, 2025
The book is about how the British monitor telecommunications traffic from around the world and decode it to provide “intelligence” for military and political purposes. It is a fairly weighty tome, long on facts and short on anecdotes. It is not a particularly easy read. However, on page 400, I was wading through the description of the Falklands War when I came across this sentence: “The Argentinean Air Force’s traffic was the hardest to read, since it had recently invested in new encrypted communications made by a subsidiary of the British defence company Racal, based in South Africa.”
“Just a minute,” I said aloud to myself, “that was one of mine.” Actually, this is a bit of an exaggeration. In fact, I had designed the first prototype — the proof of concept — for the microprocessor that controlled the digital tuning of a radio to operate as a frequency-hopping device.
The facts presented in the book are a little suspect, since by that time Racal had sold the organization to a South African company, Grinaker Electronics, but perhaps Racal still held some shares or was responsible for international marketing. The book makes the point that, when it comes to arms supplies, there are some very strange bedfellows, so the fact that this system had ended up in Argentina did not surprise me too much. What did surprise me was that this system should come back into my life 38 years later. It felt really surreal, almost like I was looking at the back of my own head.
“Just a minute,” I said aloud to myself, “that was one of mine.” Actually, this is a bit of an exaggeration. In fact, I had designed the first prototype — the proof of concept — for the microprocessor that controlled the digital tuning of a radio to operate as a frequency-hopping device.
The facts presented in the book are a little suspect, since by that time Racal had sold the organization to a South African company, Grinaker Electronics, but perhaps Racal still held some shares or was responsible for international marketing. The book makes the point that, when it comes to arms supplies, there are some very strange bedfellows, so the fact that this system had ended up in Argentina did not surprise me too much. What did surprise me was that this system should come back into my life 38 years later. It felt really surreal, almost like I was looking at the back of my own head.
March 19, 2021
A most detailed account of gathering and defeating ‘Signals Intelligence’ (sigint) and ‘Communications Intelligence’ (comint) from 1904 to 1989.
700 pages of detail. Many names, positions and dates to keep mind of. Once more, I reached for the highlighter and the notebook. I did not find this easy going and did at times put it down in favour of more undemanding ventures (The Road to Station X).
Before anything, I do believe this to be a well-researched and honest account of the matters-at-hand. So, ...
First, and I remain speechless over the revelation, during the war with Nazi Germany, when Bletchley Park is doing its utmost to provide for those in need, we find there are politically minded folk in the capitol more interested in petty-jealousies, personal agendas and career advancement than ensuring the right information ends up in the right hands.
It was that little-nugget that kept me with this; was there more incredulous facts to find?
It does tell of some very dedicated people, some remarkably intelligent people and on-the-front-line cases of courage and daring.
I am glad I chose to read this. It is fascinating the lengths opposing factions must reach for to keep their traffic secure and the how far they’ll go to ‘capture’, ‘listen in’ to the other side. The other side not just being the accepted foe, but also the acknowledged friend and ally.
700 pages of detail. Many names, positions and dates to keep mind of. Once more, I reached for the highlighter and the notebook. I did not find this easy going and did at times put it down in favour of more undemanding ventures (The Road to Station X).
Before anything, I do believe this to be a well-researched and honest account of the matters-at-hand. So, ...
First, and I remain speechless over the revelation, during the war with Nazi Germany, when Bletchley Park is doing its utmost to provide for those in need, we find there are politically minded folk in the capitol more interested in petty-jealousies, personal agendas and career advancement than ensuring the right information ends up in the right hands.
It was that little-nugget that kept me with this; was there more incredulous facts to find?
It does tell of some very dedicated people, some remarkably intelligent people and on-the-front-line cases of courage and daring.
I am glad I chose to read this. It is fascinating the lengths opposing factions must reach for to keep their traffic secure and the how far they’ll go to ‘capture’, ‘listen in’ to the other side. The other side not just being the accepted foe, but also the acknowledged friend and ally.
February 17, 2020
The history of signals intelligence in the UK from the late 19th century to (almost) the present is well presented and very thought provoking.
Naturally, though the focus is primarily on SIGINT in the UK, that story cannot be told without reference to the worldwide situation, in particular with the ongoing uncomfortable sort-of alliance with 🇺🇸 and other nations of more variable status.
It is an exciting history, of war-winning code-breakers at Bletchley Park, of sometimes hilarious beginnings- like 🇺🇸 rivalry between army and navy leading to decoding being shared - army and navy working on alternate days!! - of moles and scares, scandals and concern for human rights, of politicians saying more than was wise, of 🇺🇸attempts to impose the pseudoscientific polygraph “lie detector” on UK intelligence for starters.
However the explosion of digital technology has brought new ethical and security challenges beyond those I had imagined in nightmare.
Naturally, though the focus is primarily on SIGINT in the UK, that story cannot be told without reference to the worldwide situation, in particular with the ongoing uncomfortable sort-of alliance with 🇺🇸 and other nations of more variable status.
It is an exciting history, of war-winning code-breakers at Bletchley Park, of sometimes hilarious beginnings- like 🇺🇸 rivalry between army and navy leading to decoding being shared - army and navy working on alternate days!! - of moles and scares, scandals and concern for human rights, of politicians saying more than was wise, of 🇺🇸attempts to impose the pseudoscientific polygraph “lie detector” on UK intelligence for starters.
However the explosion of digital technology has brought new ethical and security challenges beyond those I had imagined in nightmare.
October 6, 2026
I'm very glad my conscience is clear because until reading this I had no idea just how much everyday communication is hoovered up by GCHQ. Nor how closely it works with NSA. This really is a comprehensive and well researched book, from the earliest days of signals intelligence - sigint - and the Government Code & Cypher School in 1919, via Bletchley, to the present hi-tech and ultra secret operation based in a big round building in Cheltenham. We follow the evolution of both the organisation and intelligence gathering in general through two world wars, the Cold War, numerous crises, internal terrorism, international terrorism, independence wars, civil unrest and political clashes, with a leavening of pestiferous journalists, the information explosion enabled by the internet and mobile devices, and the sclerosis that can affect any large, embedded organisation. Sometimes it's hard to remember that we are all meant to be on the same side - but I ended the book very glad that we are.
October 20, 2026
Informative but perhaps over long for the topics covered? I found different parts of this book more interesting than others due to my own personal preferences of specific historic time periods so there is maybe worth reading specific chapters as the book doesn’t necessarily need to be read as a whole to make sense. Some definitely interesting information covered but lots of things left out or only touched on briefly. Requires some level of knowledge about past political and world events to understand what is being talked about as background is not always well explained or explained at all. Touches on a lot of different geographies and other organisations history also such as NSA but as is expected, is a male and westernised view with some views or comments outdated even just since the book was published with the rapidity of global changes in recent years.
Read
December 2, 2021I don’t usually read this genre of book for pleasure. There is a great deal of factual information contained within its pages and as such you often have to reread passages to gain an understanding.
The history of intelligence gathering and processing is well explained using global or often British political influences.
The development of cypher machines since World War 2 is fascinating. Up until I read this book I was under the the impression that there was only the ones developed at Bletchley Park. British and American influences on later development and distribution of these cypher machines is a revelation!
I have reached 66% into the book and have held off. There is a lot to take in. In the meantime I’ll return to fiction and pick it up later.
The history of intelligence gathering and processing is well explained using global or often British political influences.
The development of cypher machines since World War 2 is fascinating. Up until I read this book I was under the the impression that there was only the ones developed at Bletchley Park. British and American influences on later development and distribution of these cypher machines is a revelation!
I have reached 66% into the book and have held off. There is a lot to take in. In the meantime I’ll return to fiction and pick it up later.
September 5, 2020
Fascinating detail, and worth a read especially alongside the Edward Snowden revelations, which came out after this book yet this book goes into much the same detail.
This book appears to make the point that services like GCHQ had their highlight in the 1950s and 1960s, and are now increasingly irrelevant: finding it hard to deal with the sheer amount of electronic communication. Unlike Snowden, the author here is sympathetic to the eavesdropping services, rather than critical: and is an interesting counterpoint.
With interesting tales of derring-do in history, this is certainly worth a read.
This book appears to make the point that services like GCHQ had their highlight in the 1950s and 1960s, and are now increasingly irrelevant: finding it hard to deal with the sheer amount of electronic communication. Unlike Snowden, the author here is sympathetic to the eavesdropping services, rather than critical: and is an interesting counterpoint.
With interesting tales of derring-do in history, this is certainly worth a read.
May 15, 2021
Easy read and nicely detailed with plenty of references.
Pretty neutral throughout except at the end where he talks about the contemporary situation.
This last section feels tacked on and rushed. Moreover, he starts making negative judgements about government surveillance but did not do so at any other point in the book (even when he talks often about the interception of commercial messages); and really doesn't have anything to say about tech companies who are doing much the same thing, which makes the judgements feel very inconsistent.
Pretty neutral throughout except at the end where he talks about the contemporary situation.
This last section feels tacked on and rushed. Moreover, he starts making negative judgements about government surveillance but did not do so at any other point in the book (even when he talks often about the interception of commercial messages); and really doesn't have anything to say about tech companies who are doing much the same thing, which makes the judgements feel very inconsistent.
January 20, 2023
A comprehensive, in depth download of the full history of GCHQ up to 2008. It would be great to see a new version to bring it up to date. I found it a fascinating as well as educational read. It is a factually dense read, but nonetheless has some gripping tales of spying and espionage. A lot of the more recent stories readers will be aware of from news articles, so this text gives some unbiased context to those incidents. A great read I would recommend to anyone interested in modern military or political history.
December 17, 2024
Absolutely fascinating and illuminating. Thought provoking and a well balanced history. The stories were very relevant and new to me, and the analysis great. I can really recommend it and will re- read it too! The choices that our government makes/ made and how informed they are (or not) at the time. Which politicians were involved at the time of the decisions, and how well ( or otherwise) the armed forces and “allies” were at critical moments of military history. There is so much to think about!
February 15, 2020
Brilliant history of this national asset. Great to get an understanding of how this organisation developed and the many challenges it has faced and the invaluable contribution it has made in so many areas over many years. Helps you to understand what is meant by the Special Relationship that exists between the UK and USA. The challenges GCHQ faces now to help protect us from terrorism and organised crime are immense.
Well worth reading
Well worth reading
November 2, 2020
Eye-opening and thought-provoking, this highly readable history of signals intelligence brings a secretive world to light almost as if it were merely part of a gripping novel - not actual facts.
Many events from news as I was growing up were put into perspective while I read this most excellent book.
A huge subject, but readers should not be put off but its length - this is a fascinating and completely absorbing read.
Many events from news as I was growing up were put into perspective while I read this most excellent book.
A huge subject, but readers should not be put off but its length - this is a fascinating and completely absorbing read.
April 29, 2024
Its a puzzle book. Why buy it if youre not going to solve the puzzles...why rate it any less. Why act suprised when you realise that your just helping yourself develop (weakly) some pattern recognition skills. Great way to practice for IQ test if youve deluded yourself into thinking IQ is a test for intelligence
July 4, 2018
Balanced and thought provoking
Immensely detained but readable account of surveillance from the world wars to the internet era, from a British perspective, with analysis of the special relationship, and tensions, between British GCHQ and US NSA.
Immensely detained but readable account of surveillance from the world wars to the internet era, from a British perspective, with analysis of the special relationship, and tensions, between British GCHQ and US NSA.
May 31, 2020
Well researched and contains a lot of interesting info, however, the editing could have been improved. There is quite a lot repetition and it doesn't feel like it is well integrated into a "story" in places.
July 8, 2024
Scary stuff
An excellent and incredibly in depth look at one of the planet's most prestigious spy agencies. A look at the good, bad and down right ugly side of Commsec and Sigint collection techniques past and present. An incredibly important read.
An excellent and incredibly in depth look at one of the planet's most prestigious spy agencies. A look at the good, bad and down right ugly side of Commsec and Sigint collection techniques past and present. An incredibly important read.
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December 12, 2022DFN. Not because it’s a poorly written but because I’ve read a book on the history of MI5 about a year ago and this book covers a lot of the same ground albeit from a different perspective.
February 13, 2023
A very interesting history of GCHQ, from its inception and development to the present day. Would have liked more technical details, but I guess that is secret! Recommended.
May 18, 2026
Informationally this is fascinating, however the structure and pacing feels more like a textbook than a gripping read.
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