On War: Tr. by J.J. Graham. 3 Vols. Complete in 1

by Carl von Clausewitz

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Genres: History, Philosophy, Nonfiction, War, Military Fiction, Politics, Classics

598 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1832

About the author

Carl Philipp Gottlieb von Clausewitz was a Prussian soldier, military historian and military theorist. He is most famous for his military treatise Vom Kriege, translated into English as On War.

Clausewitz has served in the Rhine campaign (1793–1794), when the Prussian army invaded France during the French revolution and in the Napoleonic Wars from 1806 to 1815.

Clausewitz helped negotiate the Convention of Tauroggen where Russia, Prussia and the United Kingdom formed an coalition that later defeated Napoleon Bonaparte.

Reviews

[Stephanie · Rating 3 out of 5]

No one can actually enjoy reading Clausewitz - it simply must be done.

[Julio The Fox · Rating 5 out of 5]

The great thundering paradox of Clausewitz is that no matter what the modern world throws at him- atomic war, revolutionary war, and especially these days, high-tech wars with no soldiers- he stands tall and continues to inform. The cycle of America's endless and losing wars since 1945- Korea, Vietnam, two wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Iran- would not have surprised him, and he can tell us why they failed. Those who do not learn from Clausewitz are condemned to repeat their mistakes. He warns us that history is the best, and only, guide to examining and learning the lessons of war, and that ON WAR is not an instruction manual. The commander, even in the armchair, makes his decisions based on evidence. Clausewitz has had multiple and controversial admirers and students for the past two centuries, from Lenin and Hitler to Henry Kissinger and John Mearsheimer, and who, for the most part, have mistaken, misapplied, distorted, and ignored his teachings. But what did he really say? The three themes Clausewitz develops in ON WAR are defining war strictly in political terms, treating war as a philosophical question, and a close-up look at the inevitable brutality of combat. ON WAR, published posthumously in 1832 with authorization by the widow Clausewitz, has outlasted and outsmarted all critics.

Clausewitz is best remembered for the maxim "war is the continuation of politics by other means". His observation is nothing less than revolutionary. War is an instrument of state policy, and the pursuit of non-political goals leads to disaster. The days of war for the sake of the sovereign's whims, Louis XIV over Europe, and the wars of Habsburg cousins are over. War is not a matter of ideologies, be they Catholic against Protestant wars or the United States fighting Communism. Clausewitz would have laughed at the American "Hearts and Minds" campaign in Vietnam, along with Hitler's drive for Aryan superiority over the Slavs. He is all cold-blooded and realpolitik. Disputes are not settled through diplomacy, treaties, or international organizations. The world is composed of rival states, and those states must conquer and subdue their enemies through war. War has but one aim, and that is to destroy the enemy's armies-not take his territory, not even his capital city- and make him bow to our will. Such destruction can take various forms besides physical annihilation. The enemy may be convinced by enough battles that further resistance is suicidal, or seizing a prize objective of his, a capital, port, or province, can render him incapable of a counterattack. A less common approach, although not unthinkable, is depriving the enemy of a crucial ally by defeating him first. In war, military means must be aligned to political objectives. A nation that declares, the way Rome did, carthago delenda est, cannot use half-way measures to obtain such an outcome. Limited war to diminish an enemy or contain him simply ensures he remains a menace to be fought again; Clausewitz likens this to a businessman telling his competitors what he won't do in the market. Korea provided this lesson for the U.S., and later the Persian Gulf War. Clausewitz was already on guard for what later would be called "mission creep", or moving in the course of a war from one political goal to another while retaining the same military force. The American pursuit of Pancho Villa during the Mexican Revolution, the British Army in Northern Ireland, and the U.S. occupation of Iraq all testify to this bloody foolishness. War is a purely destructive affair, and a nation that pursues constructive goals- label it pacification, nation-building, or anything else-, encounters blowback and probable defeat; think Vietnam, Somalia, and Afghanistan.

War is combat and combat, the clash of steel, cannot be avoided. Blockades and capturing enemy seaports seldom result in victory; The North in the U.S. Civil War, which Clausewitz's disciple Moltke the Elder called "a contest between armed mobs", had to fight another three years after taking New Orleans and controlling the Atlantic. Sanctions are a terrible idea. An enemy economy will collapse only by the destruction of its goods on the ground. Many commanders put their trust in new and deadlier technology to win the war. Clausewitz cites the use of the cannon to disprove this theory. Cannons balls and other heavy explosives can demolish fortifications and frighten soldiers and civilians, but still the enemy will fight. Napoleon found that out in Russia, and the same might be said of "Bomber" Harris and the aerial bombardment of Germany in World War II. Once we eliminate war on the cheap, the only conclusion left is that combat is mostly a matter in the hands of Fortuna. War is one part chance, another danger, and a third probability. Combat assumes battle with an equilibrium of forces whose outcome cannot be forecast and only a great commander can exploit. Victory goes to those geniuses who weigh probabilities, take risks, and face danger firsthand: L'audace, l'audace, toujours l'audace!"

For exemplary heroes in the art of war, Clausewitz chose a fellow Prussian, Frederick the Great, and the enemy of Prussia, Napoleon. In combining in their person head of state and commander-in-chief, Frederick and Bonaparte guaranteed that their military campaigns followed from political goals. Their careers grant us insight into how politics and war can combine to produce victory. Frederick fought two wars against better-armed opponents, the War of the Austrian Succession and the Seven Years' War, and emerged the winner. In the first contest, he carefully chose his political objective, seizing Silesia from Maria Theresa, concentrated his forces therein, and never wavered from his target. In the second, he faced a grand alliance of Russia, France, and Austria, and craftily surmised that if he picked off the weakest member, the Czarina Elizabeth, by outlasting her army in the field, what Clausewitz calls "the war of duration", the alliance would collapse. Napoleon captured Europe from Lisbon to Rome by finding the enemy's center of gravity, what the Germans label scherpunkt, and concentrating his strength there to exploit its weaknesses; this might be the economy, transport and communication hubs, or political capital. Locating the scherpunkt is not simple; Napoleon occupied half of Russia west of the Urals, smashed the enemy's finest divisions, captured Moscow, and still did not prevail. War is, above all, a mental contest, and the commander must make his enemy feel defeated, whether at the bargaining table or in the smoldering ruins of battle.

How is a theory of war possible if chance is the only constant in battle? Montaigne raised this objection in his ESSAYS, concluding that learning from military history was impossible. Clausewitz responds by invoking Kant. Once we approach war dialectically and get past rigid categories like "War" and "Peace," a picture will emerge for us to lean on. Diplomacy and warfare, war and peace, legitimate and illegitimate means, are not antagonists but twins. They form part of a continuum. The North Vietnamese proved masters at this game, waging war in South Vietnam, at the Paris Peace Talks, and for U.S. public opinion. Montaigne was right in thinking that what may be true for a commander in one situation turns out to be false in another, and if that is a contradiction, life itself is a contradiction, and ON WAR is full of "on the other hand" sentences. War is the study of contingency lending itself to pattern. What happened in battle once may happen again, though not inexorably, and the warrior must prepare for the event. The closer the event the more it yields pedagogical points. Ancient military history, yes, including the wars of Alexander, is too full of legend and lacking in reliable details to inform. The War of the Spanish Succession, where the Duke of Marlborough made his reputation, featured weapons hardly used any more. Only modern war, with vast armies raised from the populace and arms of mass destruction, should concern the serious student.

In the memoirs of old soldiers and Hollywood movies, a battle is decided at one crucial moment. Balderdash, says Clausewitz. Combat takes the form of slow, grinding, and brutal mutual pounding, and there is no single turning point in battle. Clausewitz prefigured the Mike Tyson Rule of Boxing: "Everyone has a plan until they get punched in the mouth". Having staked your plans on the enemy's probable course of action, you must throw away your calculations when necessary and start afresh. Superior numbers usually triumph; "The Battle of Marathon is not present in current European history", but that is not an excuse for laxity on the part of the aggressor or fatalism for the defender. Battles of envelopment where one army traps another to destroy it are rare, and Cannae is the exception. Surprise attacks seldom work, but the first combat is typically the best either side can mount, and Clausewitz advises to go on the offensive always, regardless of whether one is attacking or defending. Taking the offensive is a strategic imperative, and not necessarily true on every battlefield at all times. Hitler made a grave error in mistaking Clausewitz's advice in this regard to apply to tactics, and the Wehrmacht paid dearly for his "no retreat" order from Stalingrad to Normandy.

The anti-hero of ON WAR, Bonaparte, declared, "In war, the moral is to the physical as three is to one". Clausewitz uses moral in the Napoleonic sense. Great warriors embody and demand discipline, courage, perseverance, optimism, and esprit de corps. The winner in war can process thousands of new facts while they pop up on the battlefield and issue orders in split seconds: Napoleon's"two o'clock in the morning courage". That quality is ineffable. Clausewitz calls it the coup d'œil; a superior intelligence that guides "a harmonious association of powers" by an inner light and conviction. The commander never forgets that war is a political act, and evaluates his own goals by whether or not they serve the purpose of the war. A bridge, hill, or province must be seen as something higher than a military objective. However, he does not make political decisions nor dispute them with his civilian superiors-the Douglas MacArthur mistake in Korea. The reverse is also true: Never appoint military commanders to positions in the government, cautions Clausewitz; they miss the big picture and advocate only for immediate gains.

The Coda to ON WAR is a trip through history. The Greeks devoted themselves to massacres and spoiling the countryside. The Romans conquered Italy by making political alliances with neighboring states, though Clausewitz gives them credit for destroying the armies of Carthage and demanding Hannibal surrender. Medieval wars pitted barons against each other, with armies composed of serfs bound by fealty to their masters for a short time. The wars of Renaissance Italy, the subject of Machiavelli's DISCOURSES, saw Condottieri leading mercenary armies in "sham battles" to settle political disputes. Louis XIV fought wars for the sake of diplomatic advantage, and his generals carried "a sword in one hand and pen in the other". Modern war is the product of the French Revolution, when the Holy Trinity of Nation-State-Army was born. The young male population was conscripted to fight perennially on the basis of patriotism and war was not finished until the Revolution had conquered its enemies. Bonaparte built on that tradition and merged it to the latest weapons and tactics, making all of Europe his battlefield.

A classic Clausewitzian would say war has not changed since his day. The twentieth century, the bloodiest in human history, challenged that assumption. World War One produced something Clausewitz had not foreseen in presenting a mortal stalemate between two armies lasting four years. In World War Two both sides deliberately targeted civilians to cripple the other. Non-Combatants do not figure in ON WAR, even though Napoleon had razed an entire continent. The two world wars were one essentially by one side outproducing the other in arms. Clausewitz considers the problem of supplies, ordnance, food, and clothing, but not how the whole national economy is to be integrated for war. The nuclear bombings at Hiroshima and Nagasaki raised the dilemma of a war in which the means, atomic weapons, would obliterate the warring nations. Enter the neo-Clausewitzians, prominently Hermann Kahn, who pronounced that a nuclear war could still be fought through limited means. The contestants might agree to only use nukes below a certain scale or strike only select targets, say trading New York for Moscow, to attain their political goals. Revolutionary war against the nuclear superpowers, in which no two armies meet and combat consists largely of skirmishes, vexed the Clausewitzians until Henry Kissinger provided an answer. Since "guerrillas win by not losing", the occupying power must raise the cost of war to them to insurmountable heights; that explains Cambodia and the Christmas Bombing of Hanoi in 1972. In the twenty-first century, war is feasible without soldiers or commanders on the ground, thanks to drones and AI. Is this the end of Clausewitz? He would no doubt reply that so long as states utilize war as the means by which they impose their will on other states, the tenets of ON WAR are still valid. A tougher objection is the near absence of commanders from the battlefield ever since World War Two. War cannot be fought one, two, or multiple steps removed from the coup d'oeil, and no amount of technology can substitute for human judgment. War is not a computer calculation, and probability, which is the only thing a commander relies on to asses the chances for victory, is not a mathematical matter. A machine is incapable of reading the battlefield like Napoleon, or finding the weakest link among those powers allied against him the way Fredrick did in 1756.

Clausewitz is a military and not moral philosopher. The morality of war never comes up in ON WAR. He simply takes it for granted that states cannot settle their differences otherwise than by combat. Whether war is legitimate is a legal question that is beyond his purview. How many times have humans outlawed war only to have it return, and usually in crueler form? What Clausewitz opposes are unnecessary wars that serve no raison d'etat and in which the military campaign contributes nothing to the political goals defined by the nation's rulers. When that campaign takes on a life of its own, and military objectives replace the political, it is time to end the war. Bismark was Clausewitz's ideal statesman at war: A short war with Denmark to settle the festering wound of Schelswig-Holstein and consolidate Germany's borders; an equally short war with Austria to keep her out of the future German Reich; and the Franco-Prussian war to eliminate, not exterminate, Germany's traditional enemy. But, no war with Russia, colonization in Africa, or getting dragged into those futile endless wars in the Balkans; "They are not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian Grenadier". War may be immortal, "only the dead have seen the last of war" Santayana said, and still that is no reason why they should proliferate to fulfill the dreams of tyrants and other megalomaniacs.

ON WAR is still being read and misread. Robert Greene in THE 33 RULES OF WAR thinks Clausewitz regarded war only as a last resort in disputes among states when in fact he thinks armed conflict is inevitable. The Penguin Classics edition of ON WAR was published in 1967 and reflects the concerns of its time. The Vietnam War seemed endless, the Arab-Israeli war of 1967 lasted six days, the United States and Soviet Union stood locked in a nuclear arms race that endangered the whole planet, Africa was ablaze with national independence movements, Latin America was fit for Castro and Guevara's "foco theory" of guerrilla war, and Mao had proclaimed "Long live the victory of people's war!" to the Third World. The introduction by Anatol Rapaport takes these conflicts into account in weighing the relevance of Clausewitz to the modern reader, but meanders off into useless digressions on game theory, particularly his own contribution, and Soviet military policy since Lenin, among others of dozens of topics. I trust the translation from the German is accurate, and also wish another word could be substituted for Clausewitz's use of "moral" to describe what is really the psychological component of war. Moral may be a true rendering in the literal sense but misleading, convincing many readers that only morale is at play. ON WAR is far too important to allow for misunderstandings.

[Michael Burnam-Fink · Rating 5 out of 5]

"War is simply the continuation of politics by other means."

Far too many people quote Clausewitz without reading him, but after reading this edition of On War, there is no excuse not to read Clausewitz, and perhaps understand him.

I will speak first to the translation: This is how it should be done. Howard, Paret, and Brodie produce an accurate and highly readable text, with invaluable supplementary essays on the historical impact of Clausewitz and his key points. Accept no other translations.

Second, the text itself. I'm a war nerd, and this is one of the best books on strategy that I've read. Compared to The Art of War or Liddell Hart's Strategy, Clausewitz is clear and direct. War is violence used to disarm and enemy and compel him to your will. The best way to achieve this end is to concentrate your forces and destroy the enemy in a decisive battle. But this reading is also simplistic and unfair. Clausewitz has the utmost respect for friction, uncertainty and confusion in war, and the impact of psychological and political factors. He does not advocate for war, merely for clarity in the process of conducting a war. If there is one aphorism that is not in the text but should be, it is "The object of war is to secure a better peace." If more political leaders had a conception of the better peace they aimed at, and the cost and limitations of military means in securing that end, we would have a safer and more secure world.

The philosophy is timeless, but much of the specific detail is tied up in the tactics of Napoleonic arms and armies, and may be of limited interest to anyone aside from the most dedicated history buffs. After reading this book, I just wish that we had a thinker of similar ability and breadth today to clarify the use of modern combined arms, the problems of counter-insurgency warfare, and the features of Cold War style economic, political, and cultural competition. Clausewitz has moved to the top of my post-Singularity Resurrection list.

[Matt · Rating 2 out of 5]

Reviewing classics can be humbling. Some books have passed through so many generations and have been analyzed so thoroughly that they've reached mythic proportions. Only the arrogant or ignorant would criticize them. On War is just such a book.

First the disclaimer. I have an amateur interest in military history but do not have the depth to fully appreciate mid-19th century military theory. Regardless, I know enough to appreciate Clausewitz's rejection of formulated tactics and movement.

Now for the arrogant and ignorant part.

Clausewitz was a Prussian officer who saw action when he was younger and in the Napoleonic campaigns. As an older staff officer he never seemed to hold significant command. His later career was devoted almost entirely to theory. Despite this (or due to this), he is very self-aware as to the distinction between theorist and practitioner:

Activity in war is movement in a resistant medium. Just as a man immersed in water is unable to perform with ease and regularity the most natural and simplest movement, that of walking, so in war, with ordinary powers, one cannot keep even the line of mediocrity. This is the reason that the correct theorist is like a swimming master, who teaches on dry land movements which are required in the water, which must appear grotesque and ludicrous to those who forget about the water. This is also why theorists, who have never plunged in themselves, or who cannot deduce any generalities from their experience, are unpractical and even absurd, because they only teach what everyone knows- how to walk. pg. 67-68.

Even though Clausewitz's speaks to the uselessness of theorists expounding well-understood concepts, slightly reworded to sound insightful, he does the same. For example: "The only means of destroying the enemy's armed force is by combat, but this may be done in two ways: 1) directly, 2) indirectly, through a combination of combats." Pg. 325 or "The best strategy is always to be very strong, first generally then at the decisive point." pg. 175.

Granted, any book can be dissected and sentences taken out of context to give absurd impressions. However, these types of assertions are presented at frustratingly tiring length and repetitiously. Again, to be fair, Clausewitz was a soldier, not a writer. But precisely because of that, I expected Clausewitz to present his ideas with greater clarity and precision.

Clausewitz's devotion to articulating simple points may be a rejection of the esoteric theorists of his time. He places great importance on plain meaning.

Thus it has come to pass that our theoretical and critical books instead of being straightforward, intelligible dissertations, in which the author always knows knows at least what he says and the reader what he reads, are brimful of these technical terms, which form dark points of interference where author and reader part company. But frequently they are something worse, being nothing but hollow shells without any kernel. The author himself has no clear perception of what he means, contents himself with vague ideas, which if expressed in plain language would be unsatisfactory even to himself. pg. 129.

The "hollow kernels" he rejects in the language of others unfortunately feels similar in his own writing. Simple ideas excessively elaborated upon to chapter long expositions don't make them any more insightful.

But On War is a classic for a reason. His core ideas, which have given the work its timeless nature, display his modern savviness. Clausewitz, a career soldier, surprisingly supports the subordination of pure military campaign planning to the judgments of political (though martially competent) statesmen. He portrays the military machine as a political tool. The objectives of any combat are either total annihilation of the opponent's fighting force, or more realistically, fighting will. His chapters on defensive combat and protracted campaigns resonate well in the post-Vietnam era as well the current era of fighting ideological groups which may not be defined in geo-political terms.

Clausewitz is most compelling in his stress on the intangibles. As he mentions at the end:

Now, if anyone wonders at finding nothing here about turning rivers, about commanding mountains from their highest points, about avoiding strong positions, and finding the keys of a country, he has not understood us, neither does he as yet understand war in general in its general relations according to our views.pg. 373.

Stochastic efforts such as war require fluidity and brilliance that Clausewitz places front and center. The "moral force" of an army is given considerable discussion as is its leader's character. The combination of cleverness and courage is given considerable importance "(a)s we admire presence of mind in a pithy answer to anything said unexpectedly, so we admire it in a ready expedient on sudden danger." pg. 45. Clausewitz recognizes that maintenance of intellectual acuity distinguishes the leader from the "...subordinate general grown grey in the service, and in whom constant discharge of routine duties has produced a decided poverty of mind, as a man of failing intellect, and, with all respect for his bravery, to laugh at his simplicity." pg. 57.

On War has been a military studies staple for generations. Its impact cannot be ignored. But, frankly, the book suffers stylistically and most of the pages are filled with repetitions of straightforward concepts. For the modern reader, who may not be reading it for its pure historical significance, On War (much like this review) is more tedious than enlightening.

[Mike Edwards · Rating 5 out of 5]

Almost 200 years later, this masterpiece is still misunderstood and ignored.

Clausewitz argues that the purpose of war is to disarm your opponent and thereby force him to give you want you want. Based on this premise, he concludes that wars are essentially unwinnable on the battlefield: it is virtually impossible to completely disarm your opponent through might alone. Instead, your opponent at some point has to decide to give you want you want--and getting your opponent to come to that decision means that a war must be fought as part of a larger political strategy. Moreover, the goals of battle must always be subservient to the political context in which the war is being fought; if winning the war becomes the end and not the means to a greater goal, the aggressor will find himself bogged down in an ceaseless conflict.

[E. G. · Rating 4 out of 5]

Preface to the Pelican Edition
Introduction, by Anatol Rapoport

Introduction, by Col. F. N. Maude
Introduction of the Author
Brief Memoir of General Clausewitz by the Translator

--On War

Concluding Remarks by Anatol Rapoport
Notes
References
Glossary
Index

[Silvana · Rating 4 out of 5]

One of the most difficult books I've ever read (so far). Took me a month just to read it, and sadly not 100% able to understand the whole thing. This one needs a re-read someday. Some parts are just so indigestible and make me want to pull my hair due to frustration.

Having said that, why I gave this book four stars? Well, first it is a challenging read and I like challenges. Secondly, the contents are unbelievable. Yes, some explanations may be outdated, but the gist is still relevant. If one could get pass through the Book I-II of this book, then he/she is able to continue, that's my guarantee. Book III is where the fun starts, down right to the end. The examples taken from the Napoleonic and Prussian wars were quite helpful.

Strategies, combats, relation of power, defense vs offense and plan of war, a military enthusiast should make this book his/her bible. Or even politicians, yes, they are obliged to read this book. Besides, as Clausewitz pointed out, the only source of war is politics.

I will not make a thorough review due to my need to re-read this enigmatic book to have a full grasp on its notions and philosophies (which are many).

Come to think of it... reading this book is like waging a war with the aim to compel our opponents (in this case our laziness, ignorance, lack of understanding) to fulfill our will.

[Phillip Fuller · Rating 3 out of 5]

From a scholarly view it is a great resource for the study of the lessons learned from the Napoleonic wars but I found it boring. It was a challenge to keep reading this book to the end as he describes the details of strategy and dry descriptions of warfare. The saving grace of this book was how important it was to speak truth to power about a new age of warfare based on a nationalist ideology that mobilizes whole nations. The French Revolution produced a general that made it a people's war where the common masses fought in overwhelming force against small well trained armies and used revolutionary tactics to overrun Europe. Claus Von Clausewitz's thesis that war is an extension of political policy is very true and we see it even today in the Ukraine. The other point I agree with is that real commanders are forged on the battlefield not in military academies far from the action. I don't believe that someone who is not a serious student of military history would like this book since it is supposed to be a serious study in war not entertaining.

[Clay Davis · Rating 5 out of 5]

A very wordy tome. Felt like I was reading War and Peace. Clausewitz seemed obsessed with Fredrick the Great. Odd that Clausewitz didn't mention Wellington. The edition I read needs to have the typos fixed. Not much mentioned about sea power or guerilla warfare. The book is a good snap shot of the thinking of the time.

[Aaron Crofut · Rating 3 out of 5]

It's hard to write a review of such a disjointed work. The important points he hits on are indeed extremely important, but wading through 750 pages of repetitive and wordy abstract run on sentences gets old pretty quickly. Two most important points:

1) Why don't nations fight wars of annihilation (remember, this is the early 19th Century, he doesn't know about the World Wars)? Well, why don't school children carry on their fights to the death? Answer: doing so isn't anywhere near worth the cost. Wars are fought by different nations over disagreements on policy; while that disagreement may be worth fighting over in their mind, it may not be worth risking national obliteration. The idea is to drive up the cost of war (deaths, wounded, money, political support) for the enemy higher than the worth of the thing being fought over is to them. What that thing is worth will be different for the different parties. While Clausewitz doesn't focus much on this, or at least not clearly, this asymmetric valuation is of extreme importance. The United States inflicted far more damage on our Vietnamese enemies than they did on us, but the value of victory for them approached infinity whereas most in the United States had only so much patience for supporting a corrupt regime in some country most couldn't find on a map. If both sides see victory as worth any cost, we get closer to the "pure theory of war", which is a bad thing.

2) The concept of friction. Pushing flags on a board: easy. Getting the 10,000 men that flag represents to the actual location indicated on the board in the face of enemy opposition, incomplete knowledge of roads and terrain, and feeding them all: not so easy. The more complex the plan, the more opportunities there are for something to go wrong.

I found these ideas, along with most of Clausewitz's theory, were better illustrated in Shelby Foote's The Civil War. Clausewitz himself is at his best when using historical examples to show his ideas in action, rather than pondering about "theory" and it's relation to practice and whether war is a science or art.

[P.E. · Rating 4 out of 5]

The imposing and tangled manuscript meant to become a comprehensive theory on war and its praxis.

-----------------

Le manuscrit intimidant et broussailleux qui devait servir à une théorie générale de la guerre.

[Olethros · Rating 4 out of 5]

-Probablemente, sin superar tras ciento ochenta y dos años.-

Género. Ensayo.

Lo que nos cuenta. Análisis teórico sobre la guerra basado en el pensamiento del autor, su experiencia y su tiempo, desde su propio concepto hasta la generalidad de sus planes operativos, pasando por las fuerzas armadas, el combate y la teoría estratégica. Publicado de manera póstuma, menos de un año después del fallecimiento del autor, con sólo el primer libro, de los ocho que lo componen, revisado por Clausewitz y los siguientes en mayor o menor grado de finalización editorial.

¿Quiere saber más de este libro, sin spoilers? Visite:

http://librosdeolethros.blogspot.com/...

[Walter · Rating 5 out of 5]

"On War" is one of those books that was at the same time amazingly influential and almost never actually read. While Clausewitz is quoted and discussed by military men repeatedly, it fascinates me how many military officers serve long and distinguished careers without ever having read this book. In many ways this is understandable. Clausewitz is very philosophical and abstract, to the point that many of his ideas are simply not applicable to everyday military planning. One must also remember that, despite the frequency with which he is cited, Clausewitz was a radical and very much opposed to the thinking of military men in his own day, and certainly in ours. While Clausewitz wrote in the first half of the 19th Century, his thought never really came to be accepted in the armies of France, Britain or the United States until well into the 20th century. Why was that? For one thing, Clausewitz bucked tradition by refusing to write about historical examples from antiquity. While most military authors waxed eloquently about the battles of Cannae, Thermopylae and Agincourt, Clausewitz felt, correctly I believe, that it is useless to take military lessons from battles so long ago because the tactics and technology of those days were very different from our own. For another thing, Clausewitz wrote far more at length about the defense, praising the defense as an excellent way to buy time and attrit the enemy before wearing him down enough to take the initiative in the attack. In most militaries of the 19th Century such thinking was heresy. The attack was the decisive form of battle, and it took on the aspect of almost a religion among military planners. These thinkers would scoff at the tendency of Clausewitz to praise the defense and discuss it at such great length. Finally, Clausewitz discussed the goal of a military campaign, not to take the enemy's capital, some key fortification or some key terrain feature, but rather to attack the enemy's "Center of Gravity". This concept applied to whatever it was that drove the enemy's military strength. In most cases this would be his forces, but perhaps it could be his ideology or perhaps even his leaders. Again, such thinking was scoffed by military thinkers who were sure that their objective must be some fixed location on the map. It was only in the wars of the 20th Century that we have learned how even an insignificant place like Stalingrad or Omaha Beach could be so decisive in war.

This particular edition of "On War" is undoubtedly the best one out there. The introduction gives the reader a great background on Clausewitz and the world in which he lived. Since most of us are relatively unfamiliar with the wars of Fredrick the Great, or the wars of the French Revolution and Napolean, this insight is invaluable. Reading this really made me want to understand better the Napoleanic era about which Clausewitz writes. Another thing that fascinated me about this book is how similar Clausewitz's view of war was to the view of Adam Smith concerning the economy. Whereas Smith spelled out the key components of the economy as land, labor, capital, transportation and entrepreneurial ability, Clausewitz discusses the five great elements of military success as the terrain, the troops, the weapons, maneuver and generalship. It would be fascinating to compare and contrast these similarities, especially since military theory has in recent years become so much in vogue among Corporate executives.

Overall I would highly recommend this book to everyone who is interested in military theory. It is an indispensable read for military leaders. And this edition is particularly valuable for both.

[Ivana · Rating 5 out of 5]

Without doubt the best book about war ever written!
Even after all this time (how long has it been since it was written? centuries!) it is not dated. Really, it is not dated.

Carl Von Clausewitz is the first theorist of war (and he remains the best). Moreover, he is the first to write and understand war fully. There are other great books on this subject such as those written by Machiavelli and Sun Tzu but this is a theory, a great theory of war. Just like Sun Tzu and Machiavelli, the author created something that can be applicable not just to a specific situation, but to life in general.

Now, what are the down sides to this book? It is not easy to read, that fact probably couldn't be avoided due to its broadness. For most readers, it's going to be a tough read. Don't get discouraged, I for one didn’t find it as difficult as people say it is. To be honest, it wasn't that difficult at all, now when I think of it, I just needed a lot of time to read it.

If you're not interested in the subject or you're not willing to put in some time (and maybe effort) into reading this one, skip it ...but alas you'll have to live with the fact that you've missed a great book.

[Tom Stewart · Rating 4 out of 5]

A two hundred year old book innovative for its time and still highly relevant today. Clausewitz introduces complexity dynamics, uncertainty in war where the larger force does not inevitably win, and reconceptualizes war as politics. He says that war is a moral catastrophe, and yet, “The maximum use of force is in no way incompatible with the simultaneous use of the intellect.” He has an anti-doctrinal position: you can analyze war but not systematize it. There are several dynamics interacting unpredictably with one another. War is chaos.

***

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[Al · Rating 5 out of 5]

Five stars for the translation which is simply the best on the market, and includes a superb commentary by Bernard Brodie. This is my fourth time reading this in the context of a class (Naval War College) and it is not any easier to navigate or understand, however, it is never a waste of time.

Clausewitz himself gives the best summary of this work on p. 89: "First, therefore, it is clear that war should never be thought of as something autonomous, but always as an instrument of policy; otherwise the entire history of war would contradict us. Only this approach will enable us to penetrate the problem intelligently. Second, this way of looking at it will show us how wars must vary with the nature of their motives and of the situations which give rise to them."

The best tool that I have found to help navigate this work is "Who is Afraid of Carl Von Clausewitz: A Guide to the Perplexed" by Michael Handel, who used to teach here. His advice on reading Book 2, Chapter 2, "On the theory of war", provides a solid foundation before proceeding to the most important part of the book, which is Book 1, Chapter 1, "On the nature of war." This chapter should be read multiple times, because each reading gives new layers of understanding Clausewitz's underlying theory.

Still, I'm glad I'm done, this time :).

[Synthia Salomon · Rating 3 out of 5]

War is simple, and yet it’s complex. The object is straightforward enough: to disarm your opponent with force, thereby forcing them to bend to your will. But there’s no straightforward way to reach this goal. There are tactics and training you can fall back on, but finding a successful strategy is an art form. It takes a commander with presence of mind, and an army made up of strong characters who can persevere through the hardships and dangers involved. Dealing with chance and the unexpected are routine challenges. And when it comes to victory, wearing down the morale of the opposing army can be just as important as doing physical damage.

[X]

I made it a full 13 pages into this, which honestly congrats to me. I liked that the important stuff is in all caps, which makes it easy to skim. (I’m not joking, this is where I left off: “The idea of wearing out in a struggle amounts in practice to A GRADUAL EXHAUSTION OF THE PHYSICAL POWERS AND OF THE WILL BY THE LONG CONTINUANCE OF EXERTION.” See??)

Idk, maybe I’ll come back to this one day……. Anything, literally anything, is POSSIBLE. But lbr - it’s not LIKELY.


I have a version of this that was published in 2010 by Pacific Publishing Studio. The text formatting is wild - huge paragraphs, the all caps thing, footnotes that they just stick in the middle of the page, and the body text is Times New Roman but the page numbers and footer info are in Calibri. Incredible.

[Michael · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is the classic work of military strategy, written by a Prussian general in the nineteenth century, which has been often discussed but little understood. It is often held up as the ultimate example of “Prussianism,” of stifling military correctness, or as the champion of “absolute war” and the use of brutality and abandonment of rules in order to annihilate the enemy. It is blamed for the outbreak of both World Wars and for the horrors which those and subsequent conflicts loosed on the world.

None of this is true.

What we really have here is an unfinished text, since Clausewitz died before he could complete it, and I suspect that the complete version would have actually been shorter, as he cut out repetition and some of the less relevant digressions. Still, there is plenty here to chew on, and more than enough to disprove most of the above assertions.

Clausewitz is, of course, both Prussian and a military man, and his subject is war, but he is not uncompassionate. In fact, he takes into consideration the difficulties suffered by men in the field, not least because he has been one himself. He is aware that, at the time he was writing, disease was responsible for the loss of more soldiers than combat, and he does not advocate prolonged forced marches or other cruel methods. He is very much aware that the spirit of the men has an impact on the outcome of battle, and the terrible responsibility a commander has in making choices that will minimize the destruction and suffering of those under his command. He is also aware that vacillating and over-cautiousness can lead to worse catastrophes than boldness, in some circumstances.

So far as “absolute war” goes, yes, he does use the term. But he doesn’t necessarily advocate it as a “better” way to fight. There are two reasons for his use of it. The first is theoretical, in line with the idealist philosophy predominant in his time, he tries to use an idealized picture of war as a theoretical basis, from which particulars can be derived and adapted to real world conditions. This may or may not be the best approach, but it is not a matter of preferring war in its absolute state. The other reason he speaks of it is that as a veteran of the Napoleonic Wars, he had witnessed the escalation of war much closer to its “absolute” state than had previously been considered possible. And he learned from Napoleon’s successes that where one side is willing to go to such an extreme while the other holds back, the more ruthless side will be at a distinct advantage. The other side is forced to adapt itself in order to survive.

So far as his influence is concerned, there is no doubt that Alfred von Schlieffen, who planned the German attack that started World War One, had read Clausewitz. But, Schlieffen didn’t start the war by himself, and had he used some other source in his planning, it wouldn’t have made the war any pleasanter. Hitler never read anything as long as this book (he boasted that he could learn all he needed to know by reading just the beginning and end of any book), and wouldn’t have cared for a lot of what Clausewitz had to say anyway.

The phrase that is best known from this book is translated here as “War is the continuation of policy by other means.” I have seen arguments that this translation misses the true meaning of this statement, and I can’t comment on that. It is true that Clausewitz also defines war as “an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.” I have seen it argued that the earlier statement is meant as a dialectical antithesis to this one. If that is true either a) Clausewitz was a very poor dialectician or b) there is something wrong in the translation of both statements. They do not negate one another. One could easily synthesize them by stating that “war is a continuation of policy by means of force, in order to compel a foreign nation to do the will expressed by our nation’s policy.” No new concept arises from this.

In all, the book is worthwhile, certainly from a historical standpoint, and maybe from a military science standpoint as well, but it is too long and too flawed to hold the interest of most readers. The best chapters are at the beginning and end of the book, while Books six and seven are the worst – book six because of too much repetition and book seven because of lack of analysis. The final chapters are where Clausewitz finally puts his theory to work by giving detailed historical analysis, and to me they would have been better if they had been placed earlier.

This edition includes a large amount of contextual prefatory matter, and a bloated summarizing essay at the end. Most of this could be dispensed with, though it is interesting to see the commenter apply Clausewitz’s concepts to the wars of the Twentieth Century. I would recommend this book primarily to specialists.

[Marcos Augusto · Rating 5 out of 5]

Clausewitz was intrigued by how the leaders of the French Revolution, especially Napoleon, changed the conduct of war through their ability to motivate the population and gain access to all state resources, triggering war on a larger scale than ever before. Clausewitz believed that the moral forces in battle had a great influence on its outcome. He was a professional soldier who spent a considerable part of his life fighting Napoleon. The insights he gained from his political and military experiences, combined with a solid understanding of European history, provided the basis for this work.

A wealth of historical examples are used to illustrate his various ideas. Napoleon and Frederick the Great stand out for having made very efficient use of the terrain, movement and forces at their disposal.

Clausewitz argues that the theory of war cannot be a strict operating council for generals. Instead, he wanted to highlight the general principles that would result from the study of history and logical thinking. Military campaigns could only be planned to a very small degree, because incalculable influences or events, so-called attrition, would quickly make any detailed planning obsolete in advance. Military leaders must be able to make decisions under time pressure with incomplete information, since, in his opinion, "three-quarters of the things on which action is based in war" are hidden and distorted by the fog of war.

He gradually went from a more existential idea of ​​war to imagining it as the highest form of self-assertion of a people, and years later concluded that war was a mere instrument: "Therefore, war is an act of violence for impose our will on the enemy."

Clausewitz analyzed the conflicts of his time along categories such as Purpose, Goal, and Mean. He reasoned that violence is the means to impose our will on the enemy and, to achieve this end, the enemy must be disarmed, which is the objective of war operations. The Goal is pursued with the help of a strategy, which can be carried out in various ways, such as the defeat or elimination of the opposing armed forces or by non-military means (such as propaganda, economic sanctions and political isolation). Thus, any resource of the human body and mind and all the moral and physical powers of a state can serve as a means to achieve the defined goal.

One of Clausewitz's best-known quotes sums up this idea: "War is a mere continuation of politics by other means."

[James · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book stands as an important and modern classic about the nature of war. Clausewitz applies rigorous analysis to almost all the factors that influence war, not least of which are social and political aspects. Indeed, for him, war is part of man's social existence, and politics the womb in which war develops. This is encapsulated in his famous comment: "War is merely the continuation of policy by other means."

There are a number of intriguing and developed insights within this book: how defense is the stronger form of waging war, how military talent does not necessarily scale, how the object of attack is not fighting but possession, how strategy belongs to art and tactics to science, and so on.

Unfortunately, this book was never completed, so some chapters are frustratingly brief and some parts are missing. Nevertheless, these fragmentary musings on war have the power of deeply felt and considered thought: they are in every sense splendid and timeless.

[Jon · Rating 4 out of 5]

Ranked one of the great contributions in the literature of war, Clausewitz's book, "On War", presents a wide-ranging and very intellectual discussion of the subject of war. There is room for debate about precisely what the book is about.  But Clausewitz is emphatic about what it is not: it is not a book on doctrine; it does not presume to give definitive tactical lessons; it does not pretend to give a formula on strategy-making. These are not Clausewitz's purpose. Rather it is theory that he says he is after. To use a formulation of Clausewitz: war is his subject, but theory is his object. This in a breath is the spirit of his book.

There is a lot to say about "On War". Some in praise, some in criticism, but all interesting. Because the space of this entry need not wander on needlessly in length or purpose, the discussion here must be abridged. Therefore I will confine myself to mention of three main themes. First is Clausewitz's discussion of politics and warfare. Second is his use of historical figures, particularly Napoleon and Frederick II. And third, the self conscious aspect of Clausewitz's theory.

The role of politics looms large in Clausewitz's theory of war. It is no coincidence Clausewitz and his book are known by the slogan "that war is nothing but the continuation of policy by other means." Though Clausewitz does not limit his theory of war to politics, his theory has become synonymous with the phrase. But Clausewitz is deliberate about identifying other influences on war. He proposes military genius, friction, and other intangible, psychic factors. Still for Clausewitz it is clear that politics has an influence on war that is predominant. Clausewitz goes out of his way in the preface to give the influence of politics specific highlight. That mention is followed right after by his dramatic first chapter, which exclusively discusses the importance of politics in war, and supplies its proof with an elaborate dialectical argument contrasting real and absolute war. This order of presentation should not be dismissed. The positioning of politics at a location foremost in the arrangement in his book has a special significance. By his own theory of war, Clausewitz advocates identifying the point of decision, and directing the main energy of the force against it. The same is apparent in his attention to argument. For Clausewitz, the influence of politics is the decisive point in his theory. Therefore he supplies it with his own main effort. The influence of moral qualities, military genius, danger, are important, but for Clausewitz they are really secondary actions. It is for this reason book 1 chapter 1 reads entirely different from every other chapter of the book. It has been combed and carefully organized in a way unmatched by any other chapter—this Clausewitz admits himself. It is also for this reason that he devotes all of book 8 to exploring the consequences of politics in his theory of war. Such disproportionate labor on the influence of politics, it is clear that Clausewitz’s intent is to impress the significance of this theme.

If politics represents the major insight of the book, his use of historical personages, particularly Napoleon and Frederick, is an important second. Clausewitz does not make it an explicit point of his theory. Nevertheless the same opinions appear too often and too consistently to be dismissed as trivia meant for illustration. For Clausewitz, Napoleon and Frederick represent something more than relevant examples. Far more. The two famous generals typify exactly the qualities of failure and success in warfare that his theory means to explain. Put more dramatically: they are the very inspiration for the theory itself. Napoleon is given as example of the archetypal general who is seemingly the great military genius, but in fact is not. Though he may possess characteristics that bring great success in battle, despite his brilliance, his politics and his war strategy are not in harmony. Therefore, for all Napoleon's apparent success, as a true strategist and statesmen he must be judged a failure. On the other hand, conventional opinion has it that Frederick should not enjoy equal rank with Napoleon, Alexander, Caesar, or other military royalty, though he be regarded as great general nonetheless. But by Clausewitz's reckoning, Frederick is truly the superior of Napoleon; for though he did not conquer near all of Europe in the manner of Napoleon, he achieved a harmony between his politics and his war strategy that Napoleon never did. Judged in this way, though he fought for bare existence in the Seven Years War, Frederick can claim a legacy greater than that of Napoleon. This anyway is one of the important sub narratives in Clausewitz's book. On most occasions Clausewitz prefers to question Napoleon's command, asking whether he truly deserved credit for his victories. While in the case of Frederick there is absolutely no instance where Clausewitz does not cover him with flatteries. The difference in treatment is extreme. So different in fact, one could speculate darkly whether Napoleon and Frederick are meant to serve theory, or whether the theory is meant to serve the men. Though it would be unfair to dismiss Clausewitz with such cynical speculation; there is an important strain of historical revisionism in "On War", which if true, degrades the theory as a disguise for rationalizing Prussian superiority.

There is one other feature of "On War" that stands out among others. Nevertheless, in many ways it is so pervasive in Clausewitz's writing, it is hard to perceive. This is the unusual manner Clausewitz uses to develop his study of war. His method and style are quite unorthodox. As a goal for his book, Clausewitz intends to make theory. But this is an end quite different then most other treatises on the subject. The tradition in military writing is to offer prescriptions, provide formulas, outline doctrine, and in general prepare lessons that have application for war. But for Clausewitz the project is far more intellectual. He says that he wants to give a theory of war. One that is holistic, that identifies key concepts, refines them with precision, illuminates war's principles, and give an order and coherence to the theory of war in the abstract. This is a project completely different in kind. And one gets the sense Clausewitz fancies himself a sort of heretic, and has his ambition set to provide a rethink of the way war is conceived. If so, it would explain his extended treatment of the weaknesses of earlier theories of war. He ridicules those that relied on numeric equations or depended solely on the geometry of the battlefield to provide a guide to war. These theories may have fulfilled a heuristic purpose he says, but so far as theory is judged they were inadequate. This interpretation of Clausewitz would also explain his censure of other academic styles for the study of war. Those writers that descend into petty technicalities, put their knowledge on parade, prefer to catalogue examples rather than give a single thorough description, or otherwise recall ancient history to beguile the reader with romantic accounts—all these Clausewitz says corrupt the analysis rather than advance it. In its place, Clausewitz proposes a style of deliberation all his own. Because war is not quite science, nor is it quite art, special accommodation is required. War may be a phenomenon unlike any other, nevertheless it is not beyond the power of theory. By this point Clausewitz has wandered far into the philosophical. Digressions of this kind, enormous repetition of substance, heavy reliance on abstract argument, intense use of the deliberative style of narrative, and a tendency to give conclusions in sweeping terms—all these distinguish Clausewitz's style for composing “On War”. It gives the entire book an intellectual, sage-like quality; though it also tends to obscure his meaning. It is in this context that Clausewitz proceeds to develop his theory of war.

[Matt · Rating 4 out of 5]

It is the most influential yet incomplete and unrevised book of military history and political theory as its readers developed the opening strategies that would lead to stalemate in 1914. On War by Carl von Clausewitz distilled his experiences in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars as well as his career long study of military history into book of on the nature and meaning of war in all it’s aspects.

Since his widow published his uncompleted work, in which only the first chapter of Book One was revised to his satisfaction, Clausewitz’s features discussions on strategic and tactical doctrines, engagements, a military force, and the basics of defense and attack. While many other 19th century military writers covered the same things, Clausewitz however took note of the differences of absolute and limited war, the violence of war, and most importantly that war is “just the continuation of politics by different means”. Clausewitz style is markedly different between the first chapter of Book One and almost the rest of the volume, except Book Eight, due to the unrevised nature of the text that doesn’t reflect the dual focus Clausewitz introduced at the beginning of the book. While numerous chapters deal with what lay readers would take to be military minutia, for those in the military who realize Clausewitz’s overall objective they understand why. Potentially for those like me who are civilians and want to read this book, it’s because of Clausewitz’s tying military theory with political theory with an eye to understanding how it influenced the Western way of war since its publication. Yet this aspect which was covered in essays and commentary by Michael Howard, Peter Paret, and Bernard Brodie informs the reader that the Imperial German generals and their French counterparts in the lead up to the First World War misinterpreted Clausewitz and emphasized the offensive and not the defensive as the author intended nor did they understand the author’s typing in of the political aspect of war. While reading the book with this knowledge it was a great help in understanding what Clausewitz was talking back.

On War is one of the most influential books of the 20th Century due to its use by those in the military who misinterpreted the intentions of author Carl von Clausewitz, even though the book is incomplete and not revised to the author’s satisfaction. The Everyman edition with essays and commentary really helps laymen like me understand what the Prussian intended to leave to future military professionals.

[Emily Kim · Rating 4 out of 5]

still probably couldn't fight one

[Henry Manampiring · Rating 2 out of 5]

Dubbed "Sun Tzu from the West", I rushed to buy this book after it was mentioned in my fave movie Crimson Tide. Turned out to be as indigestible as unthawed frozen food. So much with my youth's dream of becoming a general and invade Malaysia....

One point from the book still rings in my head though: "you only achieve complete victory if you have broken the enemy's WILL to fight". As long as there is will to resist and fight, the enemy will be a pain in the ass, no matter how poorly equipped they are.

[Dan · Rating 5 out of 5]

Best book on war I have ever read. There are no moral judgments in this book against war, on the contrary. Following the political purposes and the goal of defeating the enemy, an exposition of “total war” is given here by Clausewitz. By defining war mainly as an art and a practice (as opposed to a systematic theory), the content of the book is quite interesting in opposing theoretical miss-conceptions or even attempts to systematize or theorize particular aspects of war. Gives an insight into what was meant by the “Prussian war spirit”.

[Gary · Rating 3 out of 5]

This was a rather heavy read that I had to put it away and revisit throughout a period of months. It was war specific in a lot of places as the name implies (I am a coddled North American and don’t have much use for war tactics except in chess or video games lol) but I really enjoyed the chapters on Criticism and and the subject of objectivity.

There are parts that’s I will revisit but I would not read the whole thing beginning to end again.

[Graham · Rating 5 out of 5]

Who am I to critique Clausewitz? Honestly, everything he says could be written in about 40% of the space he takes, but his kernels of truth remain so and ever shall. Worth everyone's time (especially in this abridged version, which cuts out much of the period-specific tactica on terrain and investing fortresses and the like).

[Fredrick Danysh · Rating 5 out of 5]

Long considered one of the experts on waging war and studies at military academies around the world, Clausewitz sets forth his military theories on strategy.

[KritikKröte · Rating 4 out of 5]

Bisher noch nicht komplett durchgelesen aber angefangen. Genau wie der Krieg selbst ist aber auch Clausewitz' Buch nur etwas für Leute, denen Krieg Spaß macht und für alle anderen ziemlich ermüdend.
Ich erkenne allerdings das Potenzial des objektiv, sachlichen und allumfassenden Stils Clausewitz' an weswegen ich es trotzdem als sehr gutes Buch bewerte. Das Thema ist mir schlichtweg zu praktisch und deswegen nur auf wirklich militärische Auseinandersetzungen gemünzt, weswegen man für ein allgemeinstrategisches Werk wahrscheinlich Sun Tzus Werk in die Hand nehmen sollte, dessen Titel Clausewitz ganz sicher nicht geklaut hat.

Fazit: Für Militärstrategen ein must-read, für Zivilisten ein Regalwärmer.