Kant's Theory of Freedom

by Henry E. Allison

In his new book the eminent Kant scholar Henry Allison provides an innovative and comprehensive interpretation of Kant's concept of freedom. The author analyzes the concept and discusses the role it plays in Kant's moral philosophy and psychology. He also considers in full detail the critical literature on the subject from Kant's own time to the present day. In the first part Professor Allison argues that at the center of the Critique of Pure Reason there is the foundation for a coherent general theory of rational agency. The second part employs this account of rational agency as a key to understanding Kant's concept of moral agency and associated moral psychology. The third part focuses on Kant's attempt to ground both moral law and freedom in the Groundwork and the Critique of Practical Reason. This is a major contribution to the interpretation of Kant which will be of special interest to scholars and graduate students of Kant's moral theory.

Genres: Philosophy

320 pages, Paperback

First published September 28, 1990

Reviews

[Dan DalMonte · Rating 4 out of 5]

This is a great book by a great Kant scholar. I do not think the interpretation of transcendental idealism as consisting in two perspectives ultimately works, since it ignores Kant's metaphysical commitments involving a unified system of both practical and theoretical reason. However, transcendental idealism is a controversial doctrine, and Allison certainly made it, through the idea of acting under two perspectives, more palatable to contemporary Anglophone philosophy. Allison's defense of TI comes in Kant's Transcendental Idealism, his seminal work, but he adds in this book some key insights, including an incompatibilist interpretation of Kant's theory of freedom. Empirical motives are insufficient to motivate us, because we incorporate them into maxims. The Incorporation Thesis is the view that empirical motives do not compel us to act but for incorporation into normative principles called maxims. These maxims act as an umbrella structure underlying individual actions. In virtue of an individual's Gessinung, or character, he is able to shape the individual manifestations of his actions in a way that is not a mere passive series of events. It is through transcendental idealism that ultimately that we deduce the moral law: the human person occupies two domains of being, and the moral law becomes an imperative for us because we are tempted by sensible inclinations to violate it.

[Faith · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is probably one of the most difficult books I have ever read. Obviously it concerns Kant's account of freedom, which is important to me, but it is awesome in its scope, dealing with basically every conceivable aspect of Kant's moral psychology down to the previously unknown to me idea of moral interest, which ultimately is the hinge upon Kant's justification of freedom (like it or not) rests. What I find funny about Kant's theory of freedom (not the book, the theory itself) is that it is so complex and yes, incoherent, that this incredibly long and detailed book ends with what is pretty much a whimper.

[Andres]

Henry Allison is more than a commentator. Or he is a commentator on Kant in the way Averroes is a commentator on Aristotle. Allison pushes Kantian philosophy forward. He describes freedom in a way that goes far beyond the source text, and creates a system that puts to shame two centuries of criticism. He is the last authentic Transcendental Idealist

[Zakarie · Rating 3 out of 5]

Lewis White Beck is not very right.