Holstein and McLaughlin’s "Battlefield Cyber" offers a panoramic look at the cyber-driven strategies used by China and Russia to subvert Western democracies. From election interference to industrial espionage, the book paints a picture of two nation-states executing long-term asymmetric warfare campaigns in the digital domain. The authors argue that these operations aren’t just one-offs—they are part of sustained efforts to weaken U.S. institutions, sow discord among citizens, and shift the global balance of power.
The authors open with a provocative thesis: that the U.S. is at war and doesn’t know it. While this framing may strike cybersecurity professionals as exaggerated, it sets the tone for a book more interested in broad strategic patterns than in technical accuracy. The early chapters track China’s campaign of intellectual property theft, highlighting how companies like Huawei and ZTE benefited from stolen research, and detail Russia’s effective use of disinformation—especially during the 2016 U.S. presidential election.
Each chapter blends reporting, historical context, and expert commentary. Chapter 3 explores how Russian state-backed actors use cyber to manipulate culture and narrative, targeting not infrastructure, but trust. The SolarWinds breach and NotPetya attacks are presented not just as technical incidents but as examples of cyber power projection. The authors succeed in helping the lay reader see these acts not as isolated events but as coordinated strategies.
Chapters 5 and 6 stand out for their real-world examples, interviews with frontline analysts, references to DHS briefings, and behind-the-scenes accounts from corporate and military cyber responders. These stories ground the book and give it a human dimension. However, the narrative tends to generalize and occasionally dramatize, favoring impact over precision.
Notably, the authors avoid hyper-technical jargon, which is a strength for general readers but a limitation for cyber professionals seeking deep insight. The book does not offer a taxonomy of threat actors, an analysis of adversary playbooks, or a blueprint for resilience. Instead, it focuses on showing how little prepared the U.S. public and private sectors have been to respond.
The final chapters turn toward prescription—calling for greater public-private collaboration, improved cyber literacy, and an ethical framework for offensive cyber operations. While these calls are directionally right, they remain broad. The authors stop short of proposing specific policy reforms or institutional models that could improve U.S. cyber posture.
The writing style is accessible and journalistic, often anecdotal. That makes it ideal for policymakers, students, and concerned citizens looking to understand the stakes. For cyber professionals, however, the book may feel underpowered. It lacks the evergreen insights or technical depth that would make it a Hall of Fame candidate in the CyberCanon tradition.
Yet the book does serve as a useful narrative companion to more technical or policy-heavy works. If you pair "Battlefield Cyber" with books like Richard Clarke’s "Cyber War," Nicole Perlroth’s "This Is How They Tell Me the World Ends," or even Thomas Rid’s "Active Measures," it rounds out the picture by emphasizing the psychological and societal dimensions of cyber conflict.
"Battlefield Cyber" is a well-written and timely exploration of how China and Russia use cyber operations to undermine democracies. It is especially valuable for non-experts who want to grasp the geopolitical stakes of cybersecurity. If you're interested in the narrative of cyber conflict, disinformation campaigns, or the fusion of digital tools and psychological warfare, this book is worth your time.