Du Diaphane: Image, Milieu, Lumiere Dans La Pensee Antique Et Medievale (Etudes De Philosophie Medievale)

by Anca Vasiliu

Emprunte au domaine de la lumiere et assimile au domaine de la pensee, le diaphane designe pour Aristote, son inventeur, une nature commune a tout milieu dans lequel la vue et la visibilite des choses s'achevent en regard recepteur et en image recue du monde diurne. Car, il ne suffit pas qu'il y ait de la lumiere et du solide pour que le monde puisse etre vu dans ses couleurs et connu sous ses formes et ses especes; il faut aussi qu'il y ait du diaphane, c'est-a-dire un tertium quid qui relie les choses entre elles et ouvre a travers lui la porte de la reception sensible et de l'entendement. Des lors, la notion de diaphane en vient a impregner tacitement toute la representation du monde sous son double aspect sensible et intelligible; il s'opere la une veritable mutation du physique au metaphysique.

320 pages, Paperback

First published January 1, 1997

Reviews

[Larry · Rating 4 out of 5]

So this is Vasiliu’s dissertation (supervisor: Marion, and yes, we can tell), and as one would expect in such case, there’s about 100 pages to scrape from it for actual publication, not because V indulges in overly erudite digressions, but because of unnecessary repetitions (of Aristotle in the Plato section especially). And that would have been an easy thing to do too, starting with getting rid of most of the extra lengthy footnotes, because sometimes I mean Jesus fucking Christ

“Having said that”, V’s writing is enjoyable enough, and her subject matter is fascinating. It is this intermediary space of visibilization, this medium that allows, gives beings the opportunity to be, which therefore is not but the copula between being and beings, the very phenomenal site of ontological difference, not only between objects but within them, both as a noetic principle and an ontological underground: the diaphanous. It is not the same as light, but it is actualized by light, hence allowing one to draw an analogy between the diaphanous and light on the one hand, and light and color on the other, light being the limit of the diaphanous like color is for beings. V shows how this relates to problems Aristotle saw in Plato pertaining to the problem of participation (as it appears in the Parmenides).

I’m just afraid her conclusion (and maybe that’s the diabolical Marionite pull) “ontifies” the diaphanous a bit too quickly, when I was rather wondering if it couldn’t pose a challenge to the Heideggerian reading of metaphysics as solely busy with the on h on (being as being) and not in the “as” as such (which would be being itself), so the way of givenness (das Wie) purged from all given (das Was). I’ll think about it