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The Child's Conception of the World
This classic examines the child's notions of reality and causality.
300 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1926
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1153 people want to read
About the author
Jean Piaget
266 books686 followersJean Piaget (1896 - 1980) was a Swiss philosopher, natural scientist and developmental theorist, well known for his work studying children, his theory of cognitive development, and his epistemological view called "genetic epistemology." In 1955, he created the International Centre for Genetic Epistemology in Geneva and directed it until his death in 1980. According to Ernst von Glasersfeld, Jean Piaget was "the great pioneer of the constructivist theory of knowing."
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Displaying 1 - 13 of 13 reviews
September 7, 2017
potrò farmi sfuggire l'occasione di dire su questo libro la cosa più sciocca di tutte? suvvia.
il musetto in dodecafonica riproduzione sulla copertina è quello di michele mari, fotografato dal padre che nel 1966 firmò il progetto grafico di questa edizione italiana.
stavo fermandomi qui. ma aggiungo che siccome un bravo designer non fa le cose a cavolo, ed enzo mari non è uno dei bravi ma dei bravissimi, la moltiplicazione visiva che si è inventato dice già molto della tesi di questo saggio fondamentale di piaget. e cioè che le idee dei bambini sul mondo non sono impressioni immediate (letteralmente senza mediazione), ma sono costruzione successiva ed esponenziale: frutto non di uno sguardo solo, ma di uno sguardo unico. e c'è una grande differenza: perché non si tratta di uno sguardo adulto a uno stadio embrionale di sviluppo, ma di uno sguardo peculiare e proprio dell'infanzia, che rielabora in progressione i dati di ogni esperienza che vive.
(cosa non farei per dare alle cose sciocche che dico uno straccio di pertinenza).
il musetto in dodecafonica riproduzione sulla copertina è quello di michele mari, fotografato dal padre che nel 1966 firmò il progetto grafico di questa edizione italiana.
stavo fermandomi qui. ma aggiungo che siccome un bravo designer non fa le cose a cavolo, ed enzo mari non è uno dei bravi ma dei bravissimi, la moltiplicazione visiva che si è inventato dice già molto della tesi di questo saggio fondamentale di piaget. e cioè che le idee dei bambini sul mondo non sono impressioni immediate (letteralmente senza mediazione), ma sono costruzione successiva ed esponenziale: frutto non di uno sguardo solo, ma di uno sguardo unico. e c'è una grande differenza: perché non si tratta di uno sguardo adulto a uno stadio embrionale di sviluppo, ma di uno sguardo peculiare e proprio dell'infanzia, che rielabora in progressione i dati di ogni esperienza che vive.
(cosa non farei per dare alle cose sciocche che dico uno straccio di pertinenza).
September 17, 2008
If you love the nuances of how children think (e.g., how they'll respond to "what color is the sky?," this is the book for you! It's heavy so take it in small doses, but it's truly adorable.
April 24, 2017
Çocuk psikolojisi ve gelişim psikolojisi konusunda verimli bir akademik kaynak.Bulutlar neden oluştu,insan neresiyle düşünür,güneşe adını kim verdi,rüya nedir... gibi sorulara çocukların getirdiği cevaplar ilgi çekici ve özellikle 6-12 yaş arası çocukları tanımak açısından önemli.
February 24, 2025
Bir psikoloji kitabı olarak değil de bir tarih kitabı olarak okunması daha makul.
August 12, 2022
Like Piaget's first two books, which I read earlier this year, The Child's Conception of the World is the first part of a two-volume work, of which the second part is The Child's Conception of Physical Causality, which I will hopefully get to next month. The first two books dealt with the development of language and logic in children, while according to the introduction these two deal with the evolution of their beliefs concerning reality and causation, but the distinction is not really all that sharp and the basic ideas are the same: egocentrism, syncretism, animism, pre-causality and so forth. The method in these two books is less based on recording spontaneous behaviors and statements by the children than in the previous books and more on questioning them, which leads to more uncertainty as to the validity of the results; there is also a certain amount of reliance on anecdotal memories of adults about their childhood beliefs, which I would almost entirely disregard. As in the previous books he divides the process into "stages" which are sequential and roughly (on average) correlated with various ages.
He admits that the method used does not justify placing particular individuals in particular stages, but argues that the existence of the stages can be discovered by statistical averages, and confirmed by the fact that what is not understood at one stage is in fact understood at later stages. I think that he is strongest in the negative aspects, that children in a lower stage are not able to make distinctions which are obvious at a later stage; I think he is weakest in his claims as to how "we", that is educated European adults, think -- there is in my opinion a strong bias toward idealist and perhaps even Christian conceptions, which is probably to be expected given the date at which he was writing.
He begins by trying to discover what children think that "thinking" is, and concludes that originally (stage one) children identify thinking with making an effort to understand something, to figure something out, rather than considering the ordinary obvious thinking which goes on all the time, and identify it as a kind of speech, saying that we think with our mouth or less frequently with our ears. Actually, I don't think that is so difficult to understand, since the word "thinking" outside philosophy classes is usually used in that sort of context (I'll think about it, that will take some thinking about, and so forth) and that sort of effort of thought does often take the form of an imaginary conversation in words even in adults. Thoughts being speech are made of air. In the second stage, children have learned from adults that thinking is "in the head" or that we think with our head or brain, but still consider it as a form of speech and that thoughts are air. In the third stage, they arrive at the "adult" conception of an immaterial mind. (Note what I said above about the idealist bias.)
Of course, what he is really interested in is not what they think thought is, but whether it is considered subjective or objective, whether it is in his words "internal" or "external". He gets at this by asking where the name of something is. In the first stage, the children say the name is where the thing is; the name of the sun is in the sky and so forth. He explains that they do not consider it as some sort of label, but rather that the name is a part of what the thing is. Children of this stage will say that the name could not be different; that the sun has to be called "sun" because it is yellow, because it shines and so on. We know it is called "sun" by looking at it and seeing what it is. His theory is that for children in the first stage, there is no separation of thought from reality; whatever we think is real, whatever we see is real. They also think that everyone knows what they think because everyone thinks the same things. In the final stage, they know that our thoughts are just "in our heads" and that they may not be correct. The intermediate stage is transitional.
He also has a chapter on beliefs about dreams and where they come from; again the first stage thinks they are real images outside the person (there may be an even earlier stage where they are considered as real happenings), the second stage is transitional and the last stage understands that they are "in the head" (subjective).
He then outlines the view that because of this "egocentrism", this failure to distinguish the world from the self, they believe there are "participations" between themselves and things, which leads first to "magical" beliefs that their activities can directly but remotely influence things, and later to "animism" or the view that things are conscious. Again there are stages: everything is conscious; only things which move; only things which move spontaneously; only animals. He also has a short chapter on what children understand as life, which is also connected to spontaneous movement. He says that this animism is abandoned as the child becomes more conscious of itself as a "self". It is not entirely clear to me whether he believes this change in the child's sense of self is sufficient in itself to cause animism to be abandoned or whether it just eliminates the resistance to accepting adult ideas derived from interaction with adults; I'm not sure he even considers the question or considers it important.
He then discusses the question of "artificialism", or the idea that everything is made by people (or God; he says there is really no difference because the child who assimilates religious instruction in his own way interprets the idea of God as a powerful man). This leads him to the ideas children have of the origin of natural phenomena such as the sun and moon; in stage one, they think they were made, in stage three they try to find natural explanations (or often simply say there is no way to know) and stage two as usual is just a transition where the two views are mixed together. This section struck me as strange (actually much of the book, but this especially); while I am sure he is reporting accurately what the children said, I find it hard to believe that children of eight or nine, or even older, still have the kind of conceptions he is reporting. Perhaps the Swiss educational system in the 1920's did not include grade school science classes, and boys that age did not read books on science, but I'm sure children that age in present-day America would know what the sun and moon are, for example.
A couple things that I wondered about as I read this:
Firstly, he explicitly denies that he intends terms like "animism" and "magic" to have the same meanings they have for ethnologists studying non-literate cultures, and says that the phenomena may be different in the two cases, and I certainly don't doubt that they are -- in the second case we are talking about a systematic worldview elaborated by adults over at least tens of thousands of years. Having recently read some (early) books about anthropology I could not help wondering, however, if the attempt to find the origins of animism or the "origin of religion" may not be misplaced; if children spontaneously adopt an animist and artificialist view of the world, and are only later able to abandon it (perhaps due to adult influence) it may be that "religion" is not based on any sort of "numinous" or other sorts of experiences but is simply the original spontaneous human conception of the world and that the real problem is how some adults at some point were able to arrive at the idea of inanimate matter; in other words, the real problem may not be the origin of religion but the origin of materialism. (I don't mean materialism as a conscious systematic worldview; that came very recently with the so-called "Pre-Socratics". But when Thales took the giant step of replacing the gods of the sea and fresh water with ordinary material water, that presupposes that there was an already long-standing concept of water as a material, inanimate substance.) Unfortunately, anthropologists (who at the beginning of anthropology were very much concerned with the question of the "origin" of religion -- e.g. Tylor, Frazer, Durkheim and so forth) looked for examples of animism, but never tell us about what the cultures considered as inanimate -- that was just taken for granted.
Secondly, some of the examples he gives of "magical" ideas of participation seem very similar to what we call OCD; I wonder if his examples were from children with OCD or conversely, whether the seeming increase in such disorders in children is caused by our confusion of an adult disorder with a normal stage of child development.
All in all, whether Piaget's theories are right or wrong -- or somewhere in between -- they are very thought provoking.
He admits that the method used does not justify placing particular individuals in particular stages, but argues that the existence of the stages can be discovered by statistical averages, and confirmed by the fact that what is not understood at one stage is in fact understood at later stages. I think that he is strongest in the negative aspects, that children in a lower stage are not able to make distinctions which are obvious at a later stage; I think he is weakest in his claims as to how "we", that is educated European adults, think -- there is in my opinion a strong bias toward idealist and perhaps even Christian conceptions, which is probably to be expected given the date at which he was writing.
He begins by trying to discover what children think that "thinking" is, and concludes that originally (stage one) children identify thinking with making an effort to understand something, to figure something out, rather than considering the ordinary obvious thinking which goes on all the time, and identify it as a kind of speech, saying that we think with our mouth or less frequently with our ears. Actually, I don't think that is so difficult to understand, since the word "thinking" outside philosophy classes is usually used in that sort of context (I'll think about it, that will take some thinking about, and so forth) and that sort of effort of thought does often take the form of an imaginary conversation in words even in adults. Thoughts being speech are made of air. In the second stage, children have learned from adults that thinking is "in the head" or that we think with our head or brain, but still consider it as a form of speech and that thoughts are air. In the third stage, they arrive at the "adult" conception of an immaterial mind. (Note what I said above about the idealist bias.)
Of course, what he is really interested in is not what they think thought is, but whether it is considered subjective or objective, whether it is in his words "internal" or "external". He gets at this by asking where the name of something is. In the first stage, the children say the name is where the thing is; the name of the sun is in the sky and so forth. He explains that they do not consider it as some sort of label, but rather that the name is a part of what the thing is. Children of this stage will say that the name could not be different; that the sun has to be called "sun" because it is yellow, because it shines and so on. We know it is called "sun" by looking at it and seeing what it is. His theory is that for children in the first stage, there is no separation of thought from reality; whatever we think is real, whatever we see is real. They also think that everyone knows what they think because everyone thinks the same things. In the final stage, they know that our thoughts are just "in our heads" and that they may not be correct. The intermediate stage is transitional.
He also has a chapter on beliefs about dreams and where they come from; again the first stage thinks they are real images outside the person (there may be an even earlier stage where they are considered as real happenings), the second stage is transitional and the last stage understands that they are "in the head" (subjective).
He then outlines the view that because of this "egocentrism", this failure to distinguish the world from the self, they believe there are "participations" between themselves and things, which leads first to "magical" beliefs that their activities can directly but remotely influence things, and later to "animism" or the view that things are conscious. Again there are stages: everything is conscious; only things which move; only things which move spontaneously; only animals. He also has a short chapter on what children understand as life, which is also connected to spontaneous movement. He says that this animism is abandoned as the child becomes more conscious of itself as a "self". It is not entirely clear to me whether he believes this change in the child's sense of self is sufficient in itself to cause animism to be abandoned or whether it just eliminates the resistance to accepting adult ideas derived from interaction with adults; I'm not sure he even considers the question or considers it important.
He then discusses the question of "artificialism", or the idea that everything is made by people (or God; he says there is really no difference because the child who assimilates religious instruction in his own way interprets the idea of God as a powerful man). This leads him to the ideas children have of the origin of natural phenomena such as the sun and moon; in stage one, they think they were made, in stage three they try to find natural explanations (or often simply say there is no way to know) and stage two as usual is just a transition where the two views are mixed together. This section struck me as strange (actually much of the book, but this especially); while I am sure he is reporting accurately what the children said, I find it hard to believe that children of eight or nine, or even older, still have the kind of conceptions he is reporting. Perhaps the Swiss educational system in the 1920's did not include grade school science classes, and boys that age did not read books on science, but I'm sure children that age in present-day America would know what the sun and moon are, for example.
A couple things that I wondered about as I read this:
Firstly, he explicitly denies that he intends terms like "animism" and "magic" to have the same meanings they have for ethnologists studying non-literate cultures, and says that the phenomena may be different in the two cases, and I certainly don't doubt that they are -- in the second case we are talking about a systematic worldview elaborated by adults over at least tens of thousands of years. Having recently read some (early) books about anthropology I could not help wondering, however, if the attempt to find the origins of animism or the "origin of religion" may not be misplaced; if children spontaneously adopt an animist and artificialist view of the world, and are only later able to abandon it (perhaps due to adult influence) it may be that "religion" is not based on any sort of "numinous" or other sorts of experiences but is simply the original spontaneous human conception of the world and that the real problem is how some adults at some point were able to arrive at the idea of inanimate matter; in other words, the real problem may not be the origin of religion but the origin of materialism. (I don't mean materialism as a conscious systematic worldview; that came very recently with the so-called "Pre-Socratics". But when Thales took the giant step of replacing the gods of the sea and fresh water with ordinary material water, that presupposes that there was an already long-standing concept of water as a material, inanimate substance.) Unfortunately, anthropologists (who at the beginning of anthropology were very much concerned with the question of the "origin" of religion -- e.g. Tylor, Frazer, Durkheim and so forth) looked for examples of animism, but never tell us about what the cultures considered as inanimate -- that was just taken for granted.
Secondly, some of the examples he gives of "magical" ideas of participation seem very similar to what we call OCD; I wonder if his examples were from children with OCD or conversely, whether the seeming increase in such disorders in children is caused by our confusion of an adult disorder with a normal stage of child development.
All in all, whether Piaget's theories are right or wrong -- or somewhere in between -- they are very thought provoking.
October 25, 2025
PIAGET LOOKS AT QUESTIONS ABOUT THINKING, OBJECTS, AND RELIGION
Jean Piaget (1896-1980) was a Swiss developmental psychologist known for his epistemological studies with children. His theory of cognitive development and epistemological view are known as "genetic epistemology.”
He wrote in the Introduction to this book (first published in English in 1929), “The subject of this investigation---one of the most important but also one of the most difficult in child psychology---is as follows: What conceptions of the world does the child naturally form at the different stages of its development? There are two essential standpoints from which the problem must be studied. Firstly, what is he modality of child thought: in other words, what is the scheme of reality which prompts this thought? Does the child, in fact, believe as we do, in a real world and does he distinguish the belief from the various fictions of play and of imagination? To what extent does he distinguish the external world from an internal or subjective world and what limits does he draw between his self and objective reality? These are the questions which make up the first problem... the child’s notion of REALITY.” (Pg. 1)
He continues, “in a previous work… the problem was an analysis of the form of functioning of child thought; here it is an analysis of its content. The two questions … are in their nature indistinguishable. The form a functioning of thought [take] are manifested every time the child comes into contact with other children or with an adult and constitute a form of social behavior observable from without. The content, on the contrary, may or not be apparent and varies with the child and the things of which it is speaking. It is a system of intimate beliefs and it requires a special technique to bring them to the light of day. Above all it is a system of mental tendencies and predilections of which the child himself has never been consciously aware and of which he never speaks.” (Pg. 2)
He continues, “Observation must be at once the starting point of all research dealing with child thought and also the final control on the experiments it has inspired. In the case of the present research it is the observations of the spontaneous questions of children which furnishes data of the highest importance.” (Pg 4)
But he adds, “It is therefore essential to go beyond the method of pure observation and without falling into the pitfalls of the test method, to take full advantage of what may be gained from experiment. With this in view we shall use a third method which claims to unite what is most expedient in the methods of test and of direct observation, whilst avoiding their respective disadvantages: this is the method of clinical examination, used by psychiatrists as a means of diagnosis.” (Pg. 7)
He notes, “It is naturally quite useless to ask children if they have ever thought about the question asked. Either from lack of memory or of introspection, they are quite unable to say.” (Pg. 13)
He acknowledges, “Unfortunately the study of the child raises a much more serious difficulty, that of distinguishing from among the results of the examination the part to be regarded as the child’s original contribution and that due to previous adult influences.” (Pg. 27-28)
He explains, “we have traced three distinct stages, the first of which… appears to contain a purely spontaneous element. During this stage children believe that thinking is ‘with the mouth.’ Thought is identified with the voice. Nothing takes place either in the head or in the body… The second stage is marked by adult influences. The child has learnt that we think with the head, sometimes it even alludes to the ‘brain.’ … The third stage, the average age of which is 11-12, shows thought no longer materialized.” (Pg. 38-39)
He asks, “What psychological factors are responsible for this progressive distinction between signs and things? Most probably the child’s growing awareness of his own thought, which takes place invariably after the age of 7 or 8…. But this awareness is itself dependent on social factors… it is through contact with others and the practice of discussion that the mind is forced to realize its subjective nature and thus to become aware of the process of thought itself.” (Pg. 87)
He observes, “The child is a realist and a realist because he has not yet grasped the distinction between subject and object and the internal nature of thought. Obviously, therefore, he will be confronted by grave difficulties when he attempts to explain the most subjective of all phenomena---dreams.” (Pg. 88)
He states, “Since the child does not distinguish the psychical from the physical world, since in the early stages of his development he does not even recognize any definite limits between his self and the external world, it is to be expected that he will regard as living and conscious a large number of objects which are for us inert. This is the phenomenon we propose to study and we shall describe it by the current word ‘animism.’” (Pg. 169)
He admits, “The technique used in the two following chapters is certainly open to serious criticism but the results undoubtedly furnish a number of indications, provided certain reservations are made. We started by asking [children]… ‘If I were to prick the table [with a pin] would the table feel it?’ … The essential [point] is… to see if the child replies arbitrarily or in accordance with a system, and in the latter case to discover what is the child’s latent conception. The great danger of this technique lies obviously in suggestion, both ordinary suggestion and suggestion by perseveration. To avoid the former the questions must be given in an unbiased form… thus the question… must be ‘does the table feel anything or nothing?’” (Pg. 171)
He notes, “Questions of children of the ages 5, 6, and 7 are also very often concerned with death, and show their attempts to find a definition of life… The animism of younger children is much more implicit and unformulated.” (Pg. 210)
He says, “The questions now to be considered are whether this dualism in the child’s thought is primitive or merely derived, whether it gives rise to contradiction or whether there is a stage which involves both animism and artificialism? But child artificialism is much too intricate a phenomenon---both in its manifestations and in the psychological components lying at its roots---for it to be possible to give our research a systematic form.” (Pg. 254)
He explains, “The child begins by attributing the distinctive qualities of the divinity---especially omniscience and almightiness---to his parents and thence to men in general. Then, as he discovers the limits of human capacity, he transfers to God, of whom he learns in his religious instruction, the qualities which he learns to deny to men. On broad lines, then, there should be two periods, one of human artificialism and the other of divine artificialism. However, we do not believe that this distinction is a useful one at this juncture and particularly in connection with this question of the origin of the planets. The fact is that too many adult influences supervene likely to upset the spontaneous conceptions of the child and a gradation corresponding clearly to a definite age is not observable.” (Pg. 268-269)
Later, he reports, “The most superficial examination of children’s questions between three and seven years shows that the child asks how the planets, the sky, clouds, wind, mountains, rivers and oceans, raw matter, earth, the universe, even how God himself, commenced. The most metaphysical questions, such as that of the primal cause, are raised at the age of 6 or 7.” (Pg. 366)
He summarizes in the last chapter, “The happy child also believes himself constantly to be known, understood and accompanied. Adult omniscience expands into omnipresence. Such then seems to be the starting point of the filial emotion---that parents are gods.” (Pg. 381)
This book will be of keen interest to those who are studying Piaget.
Jean Piaget (1896-1980) was a Swiss developmental psychologist known for his epistemological studies with children. His theory of cognitive development and epistemological view are known as "genetic epistemology.”
He wrote in the Introduction to this book (first published in English in 1929), “The subject of this investigation---one of the most important but also one of the most difficult in child psychology---is as follows: What conceptions of the world does the child naturally form at the different stages of its development? There are two essential standpoints from which the problem must be studied. Firstly, what is he modality of child thought: in other words, what is the scheme of reality which prompts this thought? Does the child, in fact, believe as we do, in a real world and does he distinguish the belief from the various fictions of play and of imagination? To what extent does he distinguish the external world from an internal or subjective world and what limits does he draw between his self and objective reality? These are the questions which make up the first problem... the child’s notion of REALITY.” (Pg. 1)
He continues, “in a previous work… the problem was an analysis of the form of functioning of child thought; here it is an analysis of its content. The two questions … are in their nature indistinguishable. The form a functioning of thought [take] are manifested every time the child comes into contact with other children or with an adult and constitute a form of social behavior observable from without. The content, on the contrary, may or not be apparent and varies with the child and the things of which it is speaking. It is a system of intimate beliefs and it requires a special technique to bring them to the light of day. Above all it is a system of mental tendencies and predilections of which the child himself has never been consciously aware and of which he never speaks.” (Pg. 2)
He continues, “Observation must be at once the starting point of all research dealing with child thought and also the final control on the experiments it has inspired. In the case of the present research it is the observations of the spontaneous questions of children which furnishes data of the highest importance.” (Pg 4)
But he adds, “It is therefore essential to go beyond the method of pure observation and without falling into the pitfalls of the test method, to take full advantage of what may be gained from experiment. With this in view we shall use a third method which claims to unite what is most expedient in the methods of test and of direct observation, whilst avoiding their respective disadvantages: this is the method of clinical examination, used by psychiatrists as a means of diagnosis.” (Pg. 7)
He notes, “It is naturally quite useless to ask children if they have ever thought about the question asked. Either from lack of memory or of introspection, they are quite unable to say.” (Pg. 13)
He acknowledges, “Unfortunately the study of the child raises a much more serious difficulty, that of distinguishing from among the results of the examination the part to be regarded as the child’s original contribution and that due to previous adult influences.” (Pg. 27-28)
He explains, “we have traced three distinct stages, the first of which… appears to contain a purely spontaneous element. During this stage children believe that thinking is ‘with the mouth.’ Thought is identified with the voice. Nothing takes place either in the head or in the body… The second stage is marked by adult influences. The child has learnt that we think with the head, sometimes it even alludes to the ‘brain.’ … The third stage, the average age of which is 11-12, shows thought no longer materialized.” (Pg. 38-39)
He asks, “What psychological factors are responsible for this progressive distinction between signs and things? Most probably the child’s growing awareness of his own thought, which takes place invariably after the age of 7 or 8…. But this awareness is itself dependent on social factors… it is through contact with others and the practice of discussion that the mind is forced to realize its subjective nature and thus to become aware of the process of thought itself.” (Pg. 87)
He observes, “The child is a realist and a realist because he has not yet grasped the distinction between subject and object and the internal nature of thought. Obviously, therefore, he will be confronted by grave difficulties when he attempts to explain the most subjective of all phenomena---dreams.” (Pg. 88)
He states, “Since the child does not distinguish the psychical from the physical world, since in the early stages of his development he does not even recognize any definite limits between his self and the external world, it is to be expected that he will regard as living and conscious a large number of objects which are for us inert. This is the phenomenon we propose to study and we shall describe it by the current word ‘animism.’” (Pg. 169)
He admits, “The technique used in the two following chapters is certainly open to serious criticism but the results undoubtedly furnish a number of indications, provided certain reservations are made. We started by asking [children]… ‘If I were to prick the table [with a pin] would the table feel it?’ … The essential [point] is… to see if the child replies arbitrarily or in accordance with a system, and in the latter case to discover what is the child’s latent conception. The great danger of this technique lies obviously in suggestion, both ordinary suggestion and suggestion by perseveration. To avoid the former the questions must be given in an unbiased form… thus the question… must be ‘does the table feel anything or nothing?’” (Pg. 171)
He notes, “Questions of children of the ages 5, 6, and 7 are also very often concerned with death, and show their attempts to find a definition of life… The animism of younger children is much more implicit and unformulated.” (Pg. 210)
He says, “The questions now to be considered are whether this dualism in the child’s thought is primitive or merely derived, whether it gives rise to contradiction or whether there is a stage which involves both animism and artificialism? But child artificialism is much too intricate a phenomenon---both in its manifestations and in the psychological components lying at its roots---for it to be possible to give our research a systematic form.” (Pg. 254)
He explains, “The child begins by attributing the distinctive qualities of the divinity---especially omniscience and almightiness---to his parents and thence to men in general. Then, as he discovers the limits of human capacity, he transfers to God, of whom he learns in his religious instruction, the qualities which he learns to deny to men. On broad lines, then, there should be two periods, one of human artificialism and the other of divine artificialism. However, we do not believe that this distinction is a useful one at this juncture and particularly in connection with this question of the origin of the planets. The fact is that too many adult influences supervene likely to upset the spontaneous conceptions of the child and a gradation corresponding clearly to a definite age is not observable.” (Pg. 268-269)
Later, he reports, “The most superficial examination of children’s questions between three and seven years shows that the child asks how the planets, the sky, clouds, wind, mountains, rivers and oceans, raw matter, earth, the universe, even how God himself, commenced. The most metaphysical questions, such as that of the primal cause, are raised at the age of 6 or 7.” (Pg. 366)
He summarizes in the last chapter, “The happy child also believes himself constantly to be known, understood and accompanied. Adult omniscience expands into omnipresence. Such then seems to be the starting point of the filial emotion---that parents are gods.” (Pg. 381)
This book will be of keen interest to those who are studying Piaget.
December 14, 2014
IN this book kids are psychologically experimented on by being asked questions like does the sun have feelings? where do rivers and lakes come from? why is the moon white. some of the series of questions and answers from essentially 3-12 year olds are HILARIOUS! q: "where did water come from at first?" ans: "from lots of people who spat a lot". Q: "what does the sun do when there are clouds and it rains?" ans: "it goes away because its bad weather" "why?" "because it doesn't want to be rained on!" Q: "do dreams come from within you or from outside?" ANS: " from outside - when you go for a walk and you see something, it makes a mark on the forehead in little drops of blood." Q: "what sends dreams to you?" ANs "the air" then "the birds" then "the pigeons" - why the pigeons? "because they are happy when its windy". apart from being hilarious in a few places and a few insights i found this a little bit monotonous.
December 18, 2014
This book was recommended by a coworker after the birth of my first child. It was a really interesting take on child psychology and behavior. Being able to check it out from my University library was icing on the cake.
Currently reading
February 4, 2025INTRODUZIONE METODOLOGICA
L'intento di questo libro è studiare le caratteristiche strutturali del pensiero umano a partire dal suo ingresso nella lingua parlata: da circa 3 fino a 11-12 anni.
La soglia è determinata dal fatto che a 11-12 anni c'è un pensiero propriamente razionale: da un lato in grado di formulare le proprie espressioni in termini di ipotesi con una controparte empirica , da un altro consapevole delle proprie emozioni in senso individuale.
IMPOSTAZIONE DEL LAVORO
Il problema principale di ogni metodo scientifico è coniugare un contesto oggettivo e un'interpretazione dei dati univoca.
Nell'indagine di Piaget quindi abbiamo:
1. l'idea centrale è che nello sviluppo umano esiste un'evoluzione delle strutture epistemologiche (attraverso le quali conosciamo il mondo).
1.1 Queste strutture sono in corrispondenza con lo sviluppo biologico: un bambino avrà un certo tipo di struttura, un adolescente una più evoluta, un adulto più evoluta. NON si parla di decadenza.
1.2 un bambino avrà strutture la cui evoluzione in altre sarà tracciata da un graduale superamento. Per esempio: "com'è cominciato il sole"? Fase 1 "lo hanno costruito gli uomini", Fase 2 "lo hanno costruito gli uomini facendo esplodere delle stelle" Fase 3: "è una stella risultato di esplosione di altre stelle". Nella fase 2 si conserva parte del meccanismo 1, ma con un'evoluzione. Non ci sono passaggi bruschi. Se c'è un passaggio brusco, Piaget ipotizza che non ci sia un atteggiamento "spontaneo" della struttura infantile, ma una suggestione di qualche tipo.
2. Il problema principale è distinguere quali siano le "risposte" del bambino che esprimono questa struttura profonda dell'infanzia e quali invece quelle "suggestionate".
2.1 Una suggestione è dettata dal modo in cui si ricavano le informazioni, per esempio con domande capzione, p.e. Come si muove la terra? (magari il bambino non pensa che si muova). La domanda più obiettiva sarebbe "come comincia la terra?" o "come comincia la notte?" in generale, bisogna bilanciare l'ascolto, per capire come si esprime il bambino, e poi l'interrogazione e l'osservazione, che da quelle espressioni devono setacciare gli elementi profondi.
2.1.1. un'altra "suggestione" è quando il bambino risponde solo per compiacere.
2.1.2 un'altra suggestione è quando il bambino risponde a caso perché annoiato, perché gioca (mistificazione, come l'adulto che risponde in modo oscuro per ingannare l'altro , e poi rischia di rimanere intrappolato e credere alla menzogna) o perché distorce la realtà al fine di regolare la sua interiorità (nell'adulto: mitomania isterica).
2.2 Piaget chiama FABULAZIONE l'invenzione del bambino di una risposta. In questa fabulazione però si possono cogliere interessanti aspetti. Per esempio, molti bambini possono fabulare, cioé inventare una risposta, e inventarla più o meno simile in certi aspetti. Per esempio, quando si chiede come comincia la notte, la maggior parte risponde: con le nuvole che oscurano il cielo.
2.2.1 Alcune volte la fabulazione sceglie tra elementi che hanno suggestionato il bambino, ma in un modo significativamente selettivo. per esempio, io posso dire che il sole è una lampada di Dio(per la forma e la luce), o posso dire che l'hanno costruito gli uomini. Nel primo caso può trattarsi di analogia con uno strumento, oppure compiacimento dei genitori tramite selezione da lezioni religiose; oppure ripiegare sulla partecipazione degli uomini alle cose tramite fabbricazione. è tipico, invece, che le cose proprie siano indicate al di fuori di sé, per esempio "le parole" non si dice che vengono "dalla bocca" ma che "sono nelle cose", come se il bambino pensasse solo di "estrarle" dagli oggetti.
3. Piaget non è interessato ad un dato puro, poiché ipotizza (a mio avviso giustamente) di potere ricavare informazioni proprio per il modo in cui è trattato.
3.1 Piaget dichiara, come regola di interpretazione, che bisogna cercare un atteggiamento nel bambino e non una verità. Per esempio, dire che le parole sono negli oggetti dice che il bambino a proposito ha un atteggiamento "realista" (le parole esistono fuori di noi e indipendentemente da noi) mentre a proposito del sole dire che "l'hanno costruito gli uomini" è un atteggiamento che Piaget chiama "artificiale" (da "artifex", costruito ad arte).
IMPRESSIONI AD ORA
Piaget esclude che le età possano essere contemporaneamente presenti nell'individuo e tende troppo a farle coincidere con lo sviluppo biologico. Inoltre, l'aspetto dell'imitazione lo trovo trascurato. Quali sono i caveat dell'imitazione? Infatti, il bambino imita il parlare secondo la grammatica da entrambi i sessi, ma di solito sceglie un sesso in particolare per imitare "lo stile", e di solito è il suo stesso.
Lettura promettente e interessante.
L'intento di questo libro è studiare le caratteristiche strutturali del pensiero umano a partire dal suo ingresso nella lingua parlata: da circa 3 fino a 11-12 anni.
La soglia è determinata dal fatto che a 11-12 anni c'è un pensiero propriamente razionale: da un lato in grado di formulare le proprie espressioni in termini di ipotesi con una controparte empirica , da un altro consapevole delle proprie emozioni in senso individuale.
IMPOSTAZIONE DEL LAVORO
Il problema principale di ogni metodo scientifico è coniugare un contesto oggettivo e un'interpretazione dei dati univoca.
Nell'indagine di Piaget quindi abbiamo:
1. l'idea centrale è che nello sviluppo umano esiste un'evoluzione delle strutture epistemologiche (attraverso le quali conosciamo il mondo).
1.1 Queste strutture sono in corrispondenza con lo sviluppo biologico: un bambino avrà un certo tipo di struttura, un adolescente una più evoluta, un adulto più evoluta. NON si parla di decadenza.
1.2 un bambino avrà strutture la cui evoluzione in altre sarà tracciata da un graduale superamento. Per esempio: "com'è cominciato il sole"? Fase 1 "lo hanno costruito gli uomini", Fase 2 "lo hanno costruito gli uomini facendo esplodere delle stelle" Fase 3: "è una stella risultato di esplosione di altre stelle". Nella fase 2 si conserva parte del meccanismo 1, ma con un'evoluzione. Non ci sono passaggi bruschi. Se c'è un passaggio brusco, Piaget ipotizza che non ci sia un atteggiamento "spontaneo" della struttura infantile, ma una suggestione di qualche tipo.
2. Il problema principale è distinguere quali siano le "risposte" del bambino che esprimono questa struttura profonda dell'infanzia e quali invece quelle "suggestionate".
2.1 Una suggestione è dettata dal modo in cui si ricavano le informazioni, per esempio con domande capzione, p.e. Come si muove la terra? (magari il bambino non pensa che si muova). La domanda più obiettiva sarebbe "come comincia la terra?" o "come comincia la notte?" in generale, bisogna bilanciare l'ascolto, per capire come si esprime il bambino, e poi l'interrogazione e l'osservazione, che da quelle espressioni devono setacciare gli elementi profondi.
2.1.1. un'altra "suggestione" è quando il bambino risponde solo per compiacere.
2.1.2 un'altra suggestione è quando il bambino risponde a caso perché annoiato, perché gioca (mistificazione, come l'adulto che risponde in modo oscuro per ingannare l'altro , e poi rischia di rimanere intrappolato e credere alla menzogna) o perché distorce la realtà al fine di regolare la sua interiorità (nell'adulto: mitomania isterica).
2.2 Piaget chiama FABULAZIONE l'invenzione del bambino di una risposta. In questa fabulazione però si possono cogliere interessanti aspetti. Per esempio, molti bambini possono fabulare, cioé inventare una risposta, e inventarla più o meno simile in certi aspetti. Per esempio, quando si chiede come comincia la notte, la maggior parte risponde: con le nuvole che oscurano il cielo.
2.2.1 Alcune volte la fabulazione sceglie tra elementi che hanno suggestionato il bambino, ma in un modo significativamente selettivo. per esempio, io posso dire che il sole è una lampada di Dio(per la forma e la luce), o posso dire che l'hanno costruito gli uomini. Nel primo caso può trattarsi di analogia con uno strumento, oppure compiacimento dei genitori tramite selezione da lezioni religiose; oppure ripiegare sulla partecipazione degli uomini alle cose tramite fabbricazione. è tipico, invece, che le cose proprie siano indicate al di fuori di sé, per esempio "le parole" non si dice che vengono "dalla bocca" ma che "sono nelle cose", come se il bambino pensasse solo di "estrarle" dagli oggetti.
3. Piaget non è interessato ad un dato puro, poiché ipotizza (a mio avviso giustamente) di potere ricavare informazioni proprio per il modo in cui è trattato.
3.1 Piaget dichiara, come regola di interpretazione, che bisogna cercare un atteggiamento nel bambino e non una verità. Per esempio, dire che le parole sono negli oggetti dice che il bambino a proposito ha un atteggiamento "realista" (le parole esistono fuori di noi e indipendentemente da noi) mentre a proposito del sole dire che "l'hanno costruito gli uomini" è un atteggiamento che Piaget chiama "artificiale" (da "artifex", costruito ad arte).
IMPRESSIONI AD ORA
Piaget esclude che le età possano essere contemporaneamente presenti nell'individuo e tende troppo a farle coincidere con lo sviluppo biologico. Inoltre, l'aspetto dell'imitazione lo trovo trascurato. Quali sono i caveat dell'imitazione? Infatti, il bambino imita il parlare secondo la grammatica da entrambi i sessi, ma di solito sceglie un sesso in particolare per imitare "lo stile", e di solito è il suo stesso.
Lettura promettente e interessante.
January 14, 2021
Puede que haya libros más actuales sobre el tema, pero es imposible que estén mejor expresados y con ejemplos más ilustrativos.
Fue un auténtico gozo y descubrimiento leerlo: animismo, artificialismo, realismo, finalismo y otros muchos rasgos de pensamiento mágico con transcripciones pacientes y profusas de las palabras de los niños...
Cuando empecé a trabajar como maestra, los hábitos docentes vigentes hicieron que ignorara todo lo que había aprendido, y ya ni respeté el discurso de un niño ni volví a registrar sus palabras... Supongo que esto va cambiando poco a poco.
Fue un auténtico gozo y descubrimiento leerlo: animismo, artificialismo, realismo, finalismo y otros muchos rasgos de pensamiento mágico con transcripciones pacientes y profusas de las palabras de los niños...
Cuando empecé a trabajar como maestra, los hábitos docentes vigentes hicieron que ignorara todo lo que había aprendido, y ya ni respeté el discurso de un niño ni volví a registrar sus palabras... Supongo que esto va cambiando poco a poco.
December 30, 2022
Puiki, labai informatyvi knyga, suteikianti gilų supratimą apie vaiko mąstymą, pavyzdžiui, minčių, daiktų vardų, sapnų, fizinių reiškinių suvokimą ir interpretavimą. 4* nes lietuviškas vertimas (o gal ir pati knyga) labai sunki skaityti - sakinių struktūros ir žodžiais sudėtingi, dažnai reikia skaityti kelis kartus, kad suprasčiau.
October 7, 2012
هل الأحلام تأت من الخارج؟ انها فعلا تأتِ من الخارج بالنسبة لكثير من الأطفال، كمخلوق غريب تراه وانت مغمض العينين، ربما يأت من الفراغ في الظلمة وربما يأت من البطانية
مع اننا نحن البالغين نعلم ان الأحلام تات من الداخل، من عقولنا
هذا أحد الاسئلة التي وجهت للاطفال في سلسلة التجربة العلمية المستعرضة في هذا الكتاب.
أود اكمال قرائته عندما افرغ يوما ما، فسيكولوجية فكر الطفل عالم غريب وممتع لي
مع اننا نحن البالغين نعلم ان الأحلام تات من الداخل، من عقولنا
هذا أحد الاسئلة التي وجهت للاطفال في سلسلة التجربة العلمية المستعرضة في هذا الكتاب.
أود اكمال قرائته عندما افرغ يوما ما، فسيكولوجية فكر الطفل عالم غريب وممتع لي
March 3, 2019
I want to read this book
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
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