Mathew Cooper's superb analysis of the association between Hitler, the German General Staff and with his generals sheds much new light on the reform of the Garman Army following WWI, Hitler's rapid increase of its power and strength on assuming leadership and on his conviction of brilliance on military matters, based on his early military successes in WWII. While the study covers the years from 1933 to Germany's surrender in 1945, most of the focus is on the situation during WWII, when Hitler's increasing interference with operational decisions and his growing distrust of his generals, particularly those from the traditional military classes and families. Such was the level of Hitler's intervention with battlefield decisions that Field Marshal Rundstedt, charged with halting the D-Day invasion, said that as commander-in-chief in the west his only authority " was to change the guard in front of my gate." A massive book and a wonderful insight into the leadership problems that confronted the German army in WWII.
It will shake up the ideas of all those who regard the staff of the Nazi-dominated German Army as paragons of military competence.--The Economist
An oldy but a goody. I enjoyed reading this one since it focused primarily on the relationship between OKW (HITLER) and the various German commanders on the front-lines. Unfortunately, you should be very well versed on campaigns in North Africa, the West, and the Russian Front before you pick up this book. There are no maps whatsoever to refresh your memory on battle specifics. These poinst are minor in nature and do not take away from the material presented. I enjoyed the numerous inclusions of commander messages to help explain the points the author was making. I also enjoyed the material from interrogations used. Overall a very good book.
What this book does is examine in detail the myth of Blitzkrieg and the inner workings of the command structures and way of waging war. Cooper lays out very clearly how the old myths were started, and describes very clinically how the German Army was a victim of its own traditions - both in its way of making war (modern "Blitzkrieg" actually can be dated back to at least 1866, as Cooper points out) and in its subversion by Hitler - obedience to a man (emperor or Führer) was the tradition by which the German Army ensured its own destruction.
Riveting reading. I can't offer any deeper insight into the accuracy of some of the discussion - the earlier reviewers may have valid points about Enigma and the Russian Archives - but certainly this is the way to open one's mind to the idea that the German Army really wasn't all that revolutionary in its warmaking concepts.
Many of the conclusions do seem to be supported by statistical "facts" such as the continuing theme of shortage of supplies, basic equipments, etc. How much this information has changed since Cooper wrote the book is open to interpretation - but it seems unlikely that the Russian archives would shed much light on German logistical requirements.
I kept looking for Cooper to lay blame for the war on the Generals, or to absolve them completely - he does neither, as far as I can tell, though a book this dense needs to be read more than once for its full impact to make itself felt.
Only point to note is that the book was written before ENIGMA was public knowledge, and is an older title now; read in conjunction with newer authors such as Overy or Ellis and you should be fine.
Quite simple one of the best books on the topic I have ever read. This book chronicles the Hitler Period in German History, with an very in-depth account of the many failures of the Heer. As I write this review, a Amateur President and and very Amateurish Cabinet are being installed in the US. They would do well to read this tome for everywhere in it is the destruction wrought by Amateurs doing the work of technocrats. Cooper shows us how the Weimar 100,000 man army was built into a strong but imperfect instrument with careful husbanding by the German General Staff. Hitler then takes this instrument, takes in on a dizzying ride of conquest, and then smashes it to pieces against Russia. We get to see how there was doctrinal confusion at the core of the army- infantry encirclements versus armoured warfare that festered all through the period. And that Hitler's incompetent but sometimes lucky meddling increased until his lunacy was costing thousands of extra casualties every day in the last year. Cooper pillories the army leadership for letting it happen and not resisting. It is a fascinating study. Hard not to see a similar disaster brewing today......
I found this to be rather a tough read. Formatted a bit like a text book, but contains the authors opinions of the interactions of Hitler and the German army. I found the first sections on Hitler's relations with the Army a bit tedious, but pushed through in the hopes that the war years would be more interesting. I did learn a bit. I found the alternate plans proposed for various operations interesting. Unfortunately the writing more or less devolved into a repetitious "the German Army wanted to do X, but Hitler wouldn't let them, and ordered no retreat, fight to the last man".
I felt the book could have used more maps to truly show the different proposals, or highlight the actions that were described in each chapter. I believe the Author discounted the fact that Hitler enjoyed a massive amount of support from the German populace, and asking the German Generals to kill or overthrow Hitler would be like deposing a president with a 90%+ approval rating.
Matthew Cooper's 1978 volume on the political history of the German Army from 1933 to 1945 is a study and analysis of the top level decision-making in the army with respect to the political leadership. The volume is also an indictment of the military leadership of the German Army which had not had the moral courage to stand up to Hitler despite being rather powerless.
The volume examined the roots of the military leadership from 1933 with the rise of NSDAP and how over a period of time, Hitler was able to erode the independence of the army leadership. Through a series of successful gambles, Hitler was able to restore Germany's military, territories and also absorbing neighbouring states, and this had resulted in the military leadership being curtailed.
In the war years, this rather incisive volume examined the role Hitler had played in limiting the operational freedom of the military leadership which frequently led to disaster. The early victories are also analysed and weakness were evident from the early days. The Eastern Front, the Western Front and also the desert campaign are also examined in detail.
Felt a bit long and kind of tedious at times, but still a solid book. I really enjoyed the first part where he examines the early relationship between Hitler and the Army and also the strategic tradition of the German army and their love of the double encirclement and battle of annihilation. It's sad to see those men slowly surrender their authority in military matters which went against the long history of the Prussian General Staff tradition.
He rightly debunks Blitzkrieg as nothing more then a myth. With the tank and airplane the German's now had the technological means to fully implement their conception of war. Which explains their early success.
Hitler's gradual usurpation of all military decisions is shown to be disastrous.
Can be tough to get through at times the paragraphs and paragraphs of lists of armaments and unit organizations, but ultimately it's a very useful book if you are after detailed knowledge of the army and its relation to Hitler and the party and to society during those years. It's a true scholarly work, exhaustively researched, and filled with, at times, excruciating detail. Well written though, and I was able to glean quite a few insights into the thoughts and actions of the major characters of the moment, and some revelations about that period in time, and some surprising comparisons to our times. If you're a serious history buff of WWII or perhaps a serious history buff of Germany, you might want to consider putting this one on your list.
Good read. detailed absorbing, shows the supply issues of a rapid expanding army facing new technology. Forget the ' big freeze" theory..supplies killed the German army.
I have to question why there is only limited reference to the Holocaust when the Wehrmacht was actively involved in the execution of the Final Solution.
Fascinating read: 'Blitzkrieg' as a revolutionary strategic ethos was an Allied misunderstanding; Hitler was a military moron, overruling his commanders in the field with nonsensical strategies of his own; supply and resource management, and the lack of, is what really defeated the Germans.
Although it was like chewing sawdust, Cooper spent many pages detailing the raw numbers involved in the supply problems, showing without the need for historical interpretation just how poorly managed the German supply considerations were. Numbers don't lie, they just get boring after awhile.
The book left me with a terrible realization: had the Germans had their sh@t together, we might be living in a different world today.
Read pretty well I think for a history book, not being the style I normally read I have nothing to compare it to. Also not being a history buff myself all the claims could be true, during the German decline there was a lot more Hitler bashing than he received praise for the beginning success. But like I said it was written entertainingly enough for me to finish, even though I started this book over 10 years ago, but that is neither here nor there.