Doing and Being: An Interpretation of Aristotle's Metaphysics Theta

by Jonathan Beere

Doing and Being confronts the problem of how to understand two central concepts of Aristotle's energeia and dunamis . While these terms seem ambiguous between actuality/potentiality and activity/capacity, Aristotle did not intend them to be so. Through a careful and detailed reading of Metaphysics Theta, Beere argues that we can solve the problem by rejecting both "actuality" and "activity" as translations of energeia , and by working out an analogical conception of energeia . This approach enables Beere to discern a hitherto unnoticed connection between Plato's Sophist and Aristotle's Metaphysics Theta, and to give satisfying interpretations of the major claims that Aristotle makes in Metaphysics Theta, the claim that energeia is prior in being to capacity (Theta 8) and the claim that any eternal principle must be perfectly good (Theta 9).

Genres: Philosophy

382 pages, Hardcover

First published October 29, 2009

Reviews

[Caleb · Rating 5 out of 5]

In this book, Beere presents a thorough and compelling reading of Metaphysics Theta. Much of the book is focused on the idea of a power, specifically an active power to cause change in another (or in oneself as other). From here, he focuses on the idea of a passive power, a power to be changed by another, as well as the notion of nature as a capacity to change oneself.

A number of highlights are worth noting. First, in his treatment of a rational capacity, Beere diverges from prominent readings of Anthony Kenny and Andrea Kern. The question is why it is that rational capacities, rather than non-rational capacities, are powers for opposites. Briefly, Kenny follows Scotus in giving pride of place to the choice (or the will) as enabling the agent to use a rational capacity (i.e., medicine) for opposing ends (i.e., to heal or to harm). Kern rejects this reading and argues that rational capacities have an intrinsic orientation to one end, and that the opposing end should be understood as a privation. Beere cuts a middle course between these readings, arguing both that choice is a decisive capacity determining how a rational capacity is used, and that rational capacities have an intrinsic orientation toward a specific aim (i.e., health) and that knowledge of how to achieve the other aim involves knowledge of the privation of the initial aim. Beere doesn't note his divergence from these other readings but it is possible to conclude that Kern's reading can be largely preserved, while adding an additional complexity such that the failure of a rational capacity to attain its intrinsic orientation can be explained either by privation, by "matter" or circumstances that are not conducive, or by a higher order reason (linked with the agent's character).

Second, Beere argues persuasively that being should not be seen as an activity. Instead to understand how it is that a house or other artifact is an energeia is to understand it as the product of a change. In this case, the relevant capacity is a capacity of the builder to make a house and a capacity of the material to be made into a house. Thu,s the change itself is the energeia. The upshot is that it is mistaken to posit an additional capacity to be a house that is realized by the house being in energeia. This links with Beere's claim that kinesis should not be understood as a opposed to energeia; instead, kinesis should be seen as a type of energeia, albeit a deficient type.

Finally, Beere offers an insightful defense of Aristotle's claim that evil should be understood as secondary to capacity. The problem comes into view if one thinks about virtue and vice. Clearly, virtue must be understood as a capacity that is posterior to acts of virtue; virtue as a capacity is only ineligible in terms of its orientation toward acts of virtue. But if this is the case then it seems that vice must be understood as a bad capacity that is posterior to its energeia, acts of vice. Beere agrees with this reading but argues that vice as a capacity must be further understood as posterior to virtue as a capacity. In other words, vice is only intelligible as a privation of the properly ordered process of habituation into virtue. This saves the idea that acts of vice are ends for vicious persons while preserving the idea that vice must ultimately be understood as a privation. Thus, evil actions are not merely a "mistake," a privation resulting from bad circumstances, instead they are consciously chosen by vicious agents. but this fact notwithstanding the apprehension of vicious actions as ends is itself ultimately the result of privation, a failure of moral education.

There are too many insights to note in the book; as such it deserves a close reading.

[Roger · Rating 4 out of 5]

Thorough chapter-by-chapter analysis of Book Theta of Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Some is gained & some is lost by treating Book Theta independently of the larger work. Overall pretty good, but there’s some room for improvement.