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The Eden Memoirs #1
Facing the Dictators
The 30s.
659 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 1962
2 people are currently reading
62 people want to read
About the author
Anthony Eden
39 books12 followersInstrumental British politician Sir Robert Anthony Eden, first earl of Avon, as foreign minister from 1935 to 1938, from 1940 to 1945, and from 1951 to 1955 founded the United Nations in 1945 and as prime minister from 1955 to 1957 supported the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt in 1956.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anthony...
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anthony...
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Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews
September 12, 2019
This covers the period 1931 to 1938 when Anthony Eden was involved in foreign affairs for Great Britain.
The book is divided in two parts – the first until 1935 when Eden was in the foreign service as advisor or as this section is titled “apprentice”. In 1936, the second part, he becomes Foreign Secretary.
He was involved in the thick of things; these were very crucial years for Europe with the rise of Hitler and Mussolini. Eden was a firm believer in the League of Nations. He met with several of the key personalities – Hitler, Stalin, Mussolini, Pierre Laval and Leon Blum. He travelled extensively in France, Germany, Italy, the Soviet Union, Switzerland (the League of Nations), Poland and Czechoslovakia. He duly keeps us informed of his impressions of these many personalities and places visited. And also, of the many meetings where a resolute stand on the dictators failed to take place.
Through all this we experience the rising tensions in Europe and the inability of the democracies to cope with the dictators. The League of Nations was slow to make decisions, particularly regarding Mussolini’s invasion of Ethiopia. Eden regarded this as a critical moment for both the League and the democracies – and by being inept during the invasion of Ethiopia they sadly failed the test. Eden wanted to impose stiffer sanctions on Italy, like stopping petroleum exports. The economic sanctions imposed on Italy were feeble. The democracies and the League were then seen as being weak. The territorial demands of the dictators continued to escalate.
Eden believed that the dictators only understood power and force. He wanted to form a strong alliance with France, especially to counter the threats from an increasingly militarizing Germany. He felt ominous about Hitler’s military occupation of the Rhineland in 1936, however, many in his own country felt otherwise.
With the onset of the Spanish Civil War in 1936-37 and the active assistance of Italy and Germany to the Fascist side (Franco) the aim of the dictatorships was becoming very clear. Spain was a testing ground for Hitler’s new weapons and tactics (i.e. air-force).
Pierre Laval gets a drubbing by Eden, and surely this is deserved, but I was also wondering if he was an easy target due to his trial and execution in France shortly after the end of World War II. After all, part of the deal Laval made on Ethiopia in December 1935 was with Samuel Hoare, the British Foreign Secretary at the time.
Stanley Baldwin was prime minister from 1935 – 1937 (his third term as prime minister) and was not much interested in foreign affairs (rather perplexing considering the state of the world!). So, Eden had essentially free reign on foreign affairs during that time. His main aim was to strengthen the alliances with the democracies, especially France – and not to give in to the incessant demands and the bullying of the dictators.
This all changed when Neville Chamberlain assumed the prime minister-ship in May of 1937. Chamberlain had definite ideas on the pursuit of foreign policy which were diametrically opposed to those of Anthony Eden.
Eden makes it quite clear that he soon clashed with the outlook of the Prime Minister who wanted to pursue a personal relationship with both the dictators. In some history books or blogs (usually general history books) they state that Eden resigned his post as Foreign Secretary due to the Munich Agreement between Neville Chamberlain and Hitler, this is entirely incorrect. Eden resigned before the Munich Agreements.
In January,1938 President Roosevelt sent a message to Chamberlain desiring a foreign conference of the major European powers and the United States to discuss the increasing world tensions and find a way to alleviate this. Prior to making this public Roosevelt wanted the input of Chamberlain’s cabinet. Roosevelt’s idea was dismissed by Chamberlain as being “woolly” and he sent a note to Roosevelt to put this planned conference “on hold” as he was planning a personal meeting with Mussolini at this time. He did this without consulting Eden, who was furious. This was exactly the opposite of Eden’s plans to strengthen the relationship between the democracies, and it was also desirable because it would have brought the United States into a closer relationship with the European democracies.
Shortly after, Chamberlain, against Eden’s wishes, met with Mussolini. At this stage Eden resigned as Foreign Secretary.
Later, under Churchill, he regained his position, but that is all in another book “The Reckoning”.
The book is divided in two parts – the first until 1935 when Eden was in the foreign service as advisor or as this section is titled “apprentice”. In 1936, the second part, he becomes Foreign Secretary.
He was involved in the thick of things; these were very crucial years for Europe with the rise of Hitler and Mussolini. Eden was a firm believer in the League of Nations. He met with several of the key personalities – Hitler, Stalin, Mussolini, Pierre Laval and Leon Blum. He travelled extensively in France, Germany, Italy, the Soviet Union, Switzerland (the League of Nations), Poland and Czechoslovakia. He duly keeps us informed of his impressions of these many personalities and places visited. And also, of the many meetings where a resolute stand on the dictators failed to take place.
Through all this we experience the rising tensions in Europe and the inability of the democracies to cope with the dictators. The League of Nations was slow to make decisions, particularly regarding Mussolini’s invasion of Ethiopia. Eden regarded this as a critical moment for both the League and the democracies – and by being inept during the invasion of Ethiopia they sadly failed the test. Eden wanted to impose stiffer sanctions on Italy, like stopping petroleum exports. The economic sanctions imposed on Italy were feeble. The democracies and the League were then seen as being weak. The territorial demands of the dictators continued to escalate.
Eden believed that the dictators only understood power and force. He wanted to form a strong alliance with France, especially to counter the threats from an increasingly militarizing Germany. He felt ominous about Hitler’s military occupation of the Rhineland in 1936, however, many in his own country felt otherwise.
With the onset of the Spanish Civil War in 1936-37 and the active assistance of Italy and Germany to the Fascist side (Franco) the aim of the dictatorships was becoming very clear. Spain was a testing ground for Hitler’s new weapons and tactics (i.e. air-force).
Pierre Laval gets a drubbing by Eden, and surely this is deserved, but I was also wondering if he was an easy target due to his trial and execution in France shortly after the end of World War II. After all, part of the deal Laval made on Ethiopia in December 1935 was with Samuel Hoare, the British Foreign Secretary at the time.
Stanley Baldwin was prime minister from 1935 – 1937 (his third term as prime minister) and was not much interested in foreign affairs (rather perplexing considering the state of the world!). So, Eden had essentially free reign on foreign affairs during that time. His main aim was to strengthen the alliances with the democracies, especially France – and not to give in to the incessant demands and the bullying of the dictators.
This all changed when Neville Chamberlain assumed the prime minister-ship in May of 1937. Chamberlain had definite ideas on the pursuit of foreign policy which were diametrically opposed to those of Anthony Eden.
Eden makes it quite clear that he soon clashed with the outlook of the Prime Minister who wanted to pursue a personal relationship with both the dictators. In some history books or blogs (usually general history books) they state that Eden resigned his post as Foreign Secretary due to the Munich Agreement between Neville Chamberlain and Hitler, this is entirely incorrect. Eden resigned before the Munich Agreements.
In January,1938 President Roosevelt sent a message to Chamberlain desiring a foreign conference of the major European powers and the United States to discuss the increasing world tensions and find a way to alleviate this. Prior to making this public Roosevelt wanted the input of Chamberlain’s cabinet. Roosevelt’s idea was dismissed by Chamberlain as being “woolly” and he sent a note to Roosevelt to put this planned conference “on hold” as he was planning a personal meeting with Mussolini at this time. He did this without consulting Eden, who was furious. This was exactly the opposite of Eden’s plans to strengthen the relationship between the democracies, and it was also desirable because it would have brought the United States into a closer relationship with the European democracies.
Shortly after, Chamberlain, against Eden’s wishes, met with Mussolini. At this stage Eden resigned as Foreign Secretary.
Later, under Churchill, he regained his position, but that is all in another book “The Reckoning”.
May 17, 2016
Anthony Eden was urbane, witty, prescient, and a wonderful writer … reading his memoirs is like being in the room at the critical times when the diplomatic conversations of 1935-38 led to so many wrong decisions and ultimately to the horrors of WWII and the Holocaust.
Eden served three periods as Foreign Secretary and then a relatively brief term as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.
SELECTED EXCERPTS ...
... It can be argued that no decision taken by Poland in 1935 would have prevented the German-Russian deal that destroyed Poland in 1939 … I am not so sure … I believe Polish leaders would have been wiser to throw in their weight wholeheartedly with the Western powers, including Russia ... This might have changed Germany's actions towards Czechoslovakia, might even have averted Munich
... The rearmament of the Rhineland (in 1936) was an example of Hitler's brazen but skillful tactics … his illegal deed was combined with assurances for the present and promises for the future … the timing was perfect, including the usual choice of a weekend … his initiative was limited, and did not show evidence of any imminent intent to attack France or Belgium ... designed to inhibit effective response ... Hitler's anticipation was that neither of the French nor the British would have any appetite for physical response ... He had paid close attention to press reports from France and Britain ... And also had spies in both countries
... in Jan 1938 ... Roosevelt communicated secretly to Neville Chamberlain … his deep concern with the deterioration of the world situation … he wished to take action along the only lines open to him, given the state of American public opinion … he proposed calling the entire diplomatic corp of Washington to the White House ... He would lay before the representatives of all countries the following suggestions: reduction of armaments; equal access to raw materials; laws of warfare ... If the response were favorable, the United States government would begin working with selected governments on the details of tentative proposals which could then be submitted to other nations ... Roosevelt was communicating with this proposal to the British only, and would proceed only if he received assurance from Chamberlain that the proposal met with the wholehearted support of his Majesty's government
... Eden's recommendation was to immediately accept Roosevelt's proposal … and to make no destructive criticisms or reservations or attempts to define issues more clearly … even if nothing concrete comes from Roosevelt's proposals in the short-term, they will bring us time and will bring the United States a little nearer to a divided Europe
... but Chamberlain dithered and Roosevelt's initiative was never made ... Eden resigned a month later
Eden served three periods as Foreign Secretary and then a relatively brief term as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.
SELECTED EXCERPTS ...
... It can be argued that no decision taken by Poland in 1935 would have prevented the German-Russian deal that destroyed Poland in 1939 … I am not so sure … I believe Polish leaders would have been wiser to throw in their weight wholeheartedly with the Western powers, including Russia ... This might have changed Germany's actions towards Czechoslovakia, might even have averted Munich
... The rearmament of the Rhineland (in 1936) was an example of Hitler's brazen but skillful tactics … his illegal deed was combined with assurances for the present and promises for the future … the timing was perfect, including the usual choice of a weekend … his initiative was limited, and did not show evidence of any imminent intent to attack France or Belgium ... designed to inhibit effective response ... Hitler's anticipation was that neither of the French nor the British would have any appetite for physical response ... He had paid close attention to press reports from France and Britain ... And also had spies in both countries
... in Jan 1938 ... Roosevelt communicated secretly to Neville Chamberlain … his deep concern with the deterioration of the world situation … he wished to take action along the only lines open to him, given the state of American public opinion … he proposed calling the entire diplomatic corp of Washington to the White House ... He would lay before the representatives of all countries the following suggestions: reduction of armaments; equal access to raw materials; laws of warfare ... If the response were favorable, the United States government would begin working with selected governments on the details of tentative proposals which could then be submitted to other nations ... Roosevelt was communicating with this proposal to the British only, and would proceed only if he received assurance from Chamberlain that the proposal met with the wholehearted support of his Majesty's government
... Eden's recommendation was to immediately accept Roosevelt's proposal … and to make no destructive criticisms or reservations or attempts to define issues more clearly … even if nothing concrete comes from Roosevelt's proposals in the short-term, they will bring us time and will bring the United States a little nearer to a divided Europe
... but Chamberlain dithered and Roosevelt's initiative was never made ... Eden resigned a month later
November 6, 2021
After reading of Eden's early life and experiences in World War I in his delightful book "Another World," I thought I'd enjoy continuing with his memoirs covering his later years. The present volume, for the years 1923-1938, dealing with the period leading up to World War II, was a disappointment. Here he has worked up his diary and other papers into an account of his years as a junior minister in the British government in a readable literary style, but with very little background information about international events, so I found it a dull story. I stuck with it for the first ten years before I put it back on the shelf.
December 8, 2021
You don’t often see accounts written this well. But, because it was written by Eden himself, 4 stars is appropriate.
Displaying 1 - 4 of 4 reviews