Deathride Hitler vs. Stalin: The Eastern Front, 1941-1945

by John Mosier

The German invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, began a war that lasted nearly four years and created by far the bloodiest theater in World War II. In the conventional narrative of this war, Hitler was defeated by Stalin because, like Napoleon, he underestimated the size and resources of his enemy. In fact, says historian John Mosier, Hitler came very close to winning and lost only because of the intervention of the western Allies. Stalin’s great triumph was not winning the war, but establishing the prevailing interpretation of the war. The Great Patriotic War, as it is known in Russia, would eventually prove fatal, setting in motion events that would culminate in the collapse of the Soviet Union.Deathride argues that the Soviet losses in World War II were unsustainable and would eventually have led to defeat. The Soviet Union had only twice the population of Germany at the time, but it was suffering a casualty rate more than two and a half times the German rate. Because Stalin had a notorious habit of imprisoning or killing anyone who brought him bad news (and often their families as well), Soviet battlefield reports were fantasies, and the battle plans Soviet generals developed seldom responded to actual circumstances. In this respect the Soviets waged war as they did everything else: through propaganda rather than actual achievement. What saved Stalin was the Allied decision to open the Mediterranean theater. Once the Allies threatened Italy, Hitler was forced to withdraw his best troops from the eastern front and redeploy them. In addition, the Allies provided heavy vehicles that the Soviets desperately needed and were unable to manufacture themselves. It was not the resources of the Soviet Union that defeated Hitler but the resources of the West. In this provocative revisionist analysis of the war between Hitler and Stalin, Mosier provides a dramatic, vigorous narrative of events as he shows how most previous histories accepted Stalin’s lies and distortions to produce a false sense of Soviet triumph. Deathride is the real story of the Eastern Front, fresh and different from what we thought we knew.

Genres: History, World War II, Military Fiction, Nonfiction, Military History, Germany, War

470 pages, Hardcover

First published June 15, 2010

Reviews

[Derek Weese · Rating 4 out of 5]

John Mosier is not an academic historian, he is instead an academic contrarian. This entire book is devoted to challenging and debunking what he see's as the myths and sacred cows brought up over the years concerning the Eastern Front. Mosier, however, sets himself an impossible task: to say the final word about the war in the East. There will possibly never be a final word and those who think they've done so are fooling themselves. Mosier and David Stahel are both guilty of this and both are diametrically opposed. Stahel is the leading academic voice in the consensus which basically takes the Soviet viewpoint (most academics do) and basically asserts that the Germans never stood a chance. Period. Mosier disagrees.
This is a good book, in fact an excellent book if nor nothing else it makes one think. Without retelling the narrative in detail Mosier basis his arguments on an excellent truth: Anything 'official' to come from Moscow was always a lie or a huge distortion of the truth. In fact it seems that the only industry the Soviet Union could run effectively was its Numbers making industry. Facts and figures abound in Soviet records...and they're all fantasy. Mosier spends a huge part of the book pointing this out, and he does so conclusively I think. He makes the excellent case that without US and British financial and material aid the Soviet Union would have fallen in 1942 at the latest and even then, with the aid, the Soviets never did match up to the Germans in terms of military capability. By late 1943 the best German formations were in the West and would remain so until the 6th SS Panzer Army would be transferred to Hungary in February 1945 for the operations to relieve Budapest. Mosier conclusively shows that although the Soviet forces did get 'better' as the war progressed, it was not enough to tip the scales in their favor. Even in defeat in 1945 the German and allied forces had a vastly favorable kill ratio in all arms. Soviet equipment was never as good as advertised and it was (in his view) only the Battle of Normandy that saved the Red Army from a war of attrition that it could never win with the kill ratio so far in the Germans favor.
Having said all that, Mosier's book is far from perfect. He skims the rest of the war following Kursk and even wrongly analyzes Kursk as a great victory thrown away by Hitler's decision to send the Panzer formations West following the Allied invasion of Sicily. Granted the battle could be seen as a tactical draw but a war winning success it was not. had he narrated in more detail the rest of the war following Kursk his stance would have been built more strongly on a firmer foundation. Also, although he rightly points out the many glaring flaws in accepting the German Generals views of events, he goes too far in his acknowledgment I think in Hitler as a superior strategist. Granted Hitler understood the economic aspects of the war better than his generals but Mosier's assertion that Hitler was a superior strategist to Stalin is not entirely justified. Even Mosier points out that Stalin was able to play both the naive Roosevelt and the impassioned Churchill like two fiddles during the war. Also Mosier is clearly anti-Communist; and seeing as how the Communist Party worldwide is responsible for so much pain and suffering this is easily understandable. (He spends a great deal of the pre-war story detailing the horror of the Soviet regime, accurately I think too.) However, Mosier allows his hatred of anything Communist to color and cloud his analytical judgment, something which detracts from the books authority.
Having said that this is an important book and should be required reading. Mosier points out the glaring flaw among more academic Military Historians and their blind acceptance of Soviet data as gospel truth as well as throwing the baby out with the bathwater and rather than presenting a balanced case they go so far in the direction of anti-Nazism that they accept without reservations the viewpoint of just as murderous and horrible a regime. The current trend of ultra-moral-ism that pervades all academic history (making moral value judgments on events of the past through today's viewpoints)has skewed the story in the opposite direction. When before the story was German centric the story is now Soviet centric, and neither is fully accurate. There needs to be a balanced case, and the only one I can think of is Alan Clark's 'Barbarossa' written in the mid 1960's. Due to the over moralizing and the hubris of historians like Stahel and David Glantz (not taking anything away from two historians who are worth reading certainly)a balanced view of the war is impossible and only makes an easy target for writers like Mosier. But writers like Mosier are necessary to try and steer the thinking back towards the center: where truth usually lies.
A good book not without its flaws. Recommended. (As are the books of David Glantz and David Stahel, balance after all is the key...)

[Tripp · Rating 3 out of 5]

John Mosier's books follow a basic formula. What you thought you knew about conflict X is wrong, what really happened is Y. Here he aims to say that the prevailing idea that the Red Army defeated the Wehrmacht thereby winning World War 2 is wrong, instead Stalin used propaganda to build up the story of the great Red Army which is false. The premise is surprising in that for much of popular culture, World War 2 = D-Day. In any case, I found the book an strange exercise overall, even though it is always interesting to read revisionist histories.

One of the authors claims is that the German Army kept on beating the Russian Army and so the Russian Army never really defeated the German Army. This is strange in many ways. It is true that the Western Allied invasions of Italy and France also defeated large German formations and that the bombing campaign, whatever the moral issues, drew much more German resources than is commonly known. It is also true that the majority of the German Army fought on the Eastern front from 1941 til the end of the war.

Mosier refers to total numbers when he wants to argue that the Soviets were closer to the breaking point than is commonly understood. This was interesting and I wish he spent more time on it. As the war progresses and the Soviets begin to expel the Germans from the East, he begins to talk about a handful of super divisions the Germans used for offensive purposes in the East. The Allied invasions drew these divisions back to the West and hence took away the German ability to conduct offensive or counter offensive operations in the East. This is strange as the Eastern front had well over 100 divisions on the German side alone. Whatever their strength, it is a bit much to argue that the German war effort hinged on such a small proportion of the Army.

Mosier does concede that the Soviets won the battle that destroyed Army Group Center in 1944, but thinks of it more as a one off. He basically views the Soviets as ineffective cannon fodder. He tends to focus on casualties in battle, noting that the Germans inflicted an far more casualties per German death than they did when facing the Western Allies. This focus feels like the body count mentality in Vietnam. In the end what matters was, where the Germans going to stay in Russia, the Ukraine and the rest. In his desire to denigrate the Russians, Mosier avoids the discussion that could help explore the relative contribution of American, British and Russian forces to Germany's defeat.

I

[Tim Mitchell · Rating 1 out of 5]

I've read three of Mosier's books and while I disagree with much of them, his earlier ones make some interesting points. Unfortunately, he's now become a polemicist or Contrarian; that means starting with the answer, then working backwards, while presenting opposing views as at best gullible dupes. This requires less effort (or 'research') but undermines the value of his views.

Most historians agree US economic power was vital to Allied victory in 1945, so nothing new in that; sometimes that contribution is given greater weight than strictly accurate but the same is true of British or Russian perspectives. However, Mosier goes further and actively denigrates the Russian contribution; that's a challenge when your topic is the Eastern Front since even American historians concede 70 - 80% of the Wehrmacht was destroyed there. Mosier meets this challenge by cherry-picking a few statistics and denouncing different views (Soviet historians are ‘pathological liars'). It's clear Russian production and casualty figures were massaged but all sides did that; as Churchill said ‘One day, the RAF tells me ‘Cologne has been destroyed.' Two months later, they tell me ‘Cologne has been destroyed.' Again.’

To emphasize the importance of US support, the other Allies need to be rescued; that logic requires the Wehrmacht to be streets ahead of their opponents. It was certainly a fine fighting machine and probably the best overall military of WWII but it’s not the whole story eg a reluctance to accept any more casualties than absolutely necessary made the British unduly cautious, particularly post 1943 when it was clear the war was won.

One of Mosier's more outlandish statements is that Hitler was a better war leader than given credit for and thus followed a logical, coherent and winnable military strategy on the Eastern Front. The 1940 Ardennes gamble worked (although if the French had been even slightly better led, it would have ended in disaster and nearly did anyway) but after that, it’s hard to think of a single example of Hitler's successful military leadership. Suggesting Barbarossa was a defensive move against the USSR is an eccentric view common in certain European Far Right circles; the Germans definitely wanted to get their blow in first but that doesn’t make it any more defensive than the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Hitler thoughtfully made life easier for historians by writing down his plans for the East in Mein Kampf but Mosier doesn't seem to have read it.

He also steers dangerously close to being an apologist for Nazi Germany and Hitler - you cannot claim as he does that Germany’s Eastern Front policy followed sensible military objectives without considering the resources devoted by the Wehrmacht to carrying out Nazi racial policies and its disastrous impact on German ability to resupply its front line troops. This turned the Ukraine into a partisan battlefield rather than an ally; with the death of millions during the 1930s famine still fresh, the Wehrmacht were initially greeted as liberators but they threw that away by policies so repressive that they were opposed even by senior Nazis.

Claiming Hitler (the key advocate of Blitzkrieg) committed himself to a war of attrition is a triumph of cognitive dissonance since all the evidence proves exactly the opposite. The Wehrmacht was ludicrously unsuited for the vastness of Russia, mechanized equipment being concentrated in a few elite Waffen-SS and Panzer divisions. This was less of a problem in France but a huge one in Russia; much of the Wehrmacht transport used in Barbarossa was captured French and British equipment and the loss of over 100,000 trucks in 1941 was never made up. Other examples of this failure to plan included the impact of the Russian winter on operational conditions eg no winter clothes, engine and gun oil that froze etc.

Hitler kept making the classic strategic mistake of dissipating his forces and his increasing urge to micro-manage tactical dispositions made his generals despair. His ‘not one step back’ strategy in the winter of 1941/1942 was fatal in the long run because it confirmed his view never to retreat - apart from the hundreds of thousands trapped or destroyed at Stalingrad & other far less famous encirclements, in May 1945, there were nearly 550,000 relatively well-equipped veteran German units shut up in the Courland Peninsula and Norway waiting for the ‘counter-offensive,’ plus several hundred thousand more sitting in isolated ‘Festung’ all over Europe eg many of the the French ports.

The other side of this argument requires Mosier to diminish Stalin and the Red Army. Stalin wasn’t someone you’d invite round for dinner. The Russian military was badly damaged by the 1930s purges. Soviet generals were hideously careless of lives throughout the war. Poor leadership, particularly in 1941-42 resulted in the entrapment of millions of Russian soldiers. I agree with all those points but that’s like using Bataan or the Kasserine Pass as yardsticks for US military performance throughout WWII.

Stalin made major mistakes but contrary to myth, he didn’t trust his own kids, let alone a volatile German who had helpfully written a book outlining his plans for the East - he miscalculated the timing. He knew his purges had weakened the Soviet military, as evidenced in the 1939-40 Winter War & had instituted an extensive program of re-equipping and re-training designed to be complete by mid-1942 - that’s why superb weapons like the T-34 tank and the Yak 9 aircraft became available in 1942. The Germans knew that and as in 1914, for the same reasons, they attacked first. Stalin learned from his mistakes and thereafter allowed his generals considerable leeway, although he retained control of overall strategic priorities.

The 1941 Wehrmacht was definitely a more effective fighting force but prior to 1936, the Soviet military were acknowledged leaders in mechanized & mobile warfare (including large numbers of paratroop forces, which ironically they never deployed in WWII because, unlike the Allies, they recognized their limited effectiveness). Many German leaders secretly trained in the Soviet Union between the wars and even though the Red Army was badly affected by the purges, at Khalkin Gol in 1939 they gave the veteran Japanese Manchurian Army such a beating that the shaken Japanese High Command avoided joining Hitler’s assault on the USSR.

Arguing that the US contribution to victory in WWII was decisive doesn’t also mean Russia would have suffered military defeat in 1943 without it. Russian historians do tend to understate the value of Lend-Lease contributions, the amounts being less significant than their timing eg the 500 tanks shipped by the UK (not the US) before end 1941 went straight into action & helped buy time for the Russians to relocate their production facilities. The vast majority of Lend-Lease equipment for the USSR arrived after mid 1943 and much of it was non-lethal aid eg trucks and jeeps. The Russians didn’t want US-designed tanks, they had plenty of their own ie the T34.

The prevailing view at OKH after Stalingrad was that the Russians could not be defeated - that’s why they considered the Kursk offensive so unwise. It was a devastating strategic defeat for the Wehrmacht that shattered their offensive capability and was largely achieved by the Red Army on its own. The resulting German retreat was definitely made worse by the relatively mobility of the Red Army using US trucks and jeeps but speeding up their advance is not the same.

None of this is intended to understate the huge contribution the US made to winning WWII or to denigrate the sacrifices of the Arctic convoys; my point is that this book seeks to downplay the Russian role and that’s also unfair. All nations have their myths; the British (1940 Blitz, standing against the world), the French (everyone was in the Resistance), the Russians (Great Patriotic War) and the US (saving the free world). Each statement contains elements of truth and each nation has their Mosier equivalents. That’s reality.

Arguing about relative production and casualty figures doesn’t change the fundamental truth. The US suffered a total of 140,000 dead and missing in the European theatre; it’s geographical area was untouched by the war and it ended as the richest, most powerful nation in the world. The wilder Soviet estimates of up to 30 million civilian and military casualties are now discounted but the Eisenhower Institute for example estimates it as 10-15 million; that’s still a whole lot more than the US or the UK and large parts of the Soviet Union, including its major pre-war agricultural and industrial areas were absolutely devastated.

The US played a vital part in achieving victory - but that doesn't require trashing the contribution of others; why’s that so hard for Mosier to accept? And the answer is because it sells books.

[Boudewijn · Rating 3 out of 5]

In this book, John Mosier settles the Russian legends of winning the war on the Eastern front and instead states that Hitler came very close of winning the war in 1942 and 1943.

In Mosier's view, Stalin was planning to attack Hilter at the first opportune moment. He contradicts a long established Stalinist legend and at the same time explains Hitler's motivation: that the attack on the Soviet Union was a preemptive strike. This explains why the Red Army was positioned so close to the border and why Germany, in the initial stages of the war, was able to destruct such a large part of the Red Army.

During the war, Stalin's orders to keep attacking prevented local commanders to establish defensive positions, while at the same time lack of communication meant that they were uncoordinated and easily beaten off.

The decision of Hitler to focus on the Southern parts of Russia, mainly the Ukraine and the Caucasus is described by Mosier as a good strategy. In Mosier's eyes Hitler was right: occupying these parts would make sure that Stalin would be deprived from the grain and oil he so deperatedly needed. The obsession of the German generals with cities such as Moscow and Leningrad is in his eyes a folly: Hitler was convinced by his generals to attack Moscow before the winter, while he actually wanted was to take on defensive positions during the winter and contine the attack in next year's summer.

In the end, Stalin was abe to convince that he largely was able to win the war mostly by himself and creating the legends that endure to this day. However, by citing the Wehmacht's monthly losses, Mosier explains that the losses never were crippling and that the reason why Russia won in the end, was not their numerical supiority but rahther the fact that the crack German (armoured) divisions were needed elsewhere.

In the end it was a Russian phyric victory: the underlying damage done to the Russian state was in the end one of the main causes for the collapse in the '80s.

[Davy Bennett · Rating 5 out of 5]

This book surprised me, and I liked it.
It didn't have Deathride in the title, on my version, I think that changed, too cutesy?

Author Mosier was convincing in his arguments about the superiority of the Germans militarily.
Also, says Schiklgruber, the murderer known as Hitler was better militarily than given credit for. Much better than the murderer Dzugavili, known as Stalin.

If nothing else, Mosier tweaks all the Red versions of history and makes you think.
Hitler was awful, read Timothy Snyders Bloodlands if you are unclear on that.
However, the fact that mass murderer Youseff Dzugavili was called Uncle Joe (Stalin) here while he was our ally is absolutely atrocious.

I guess the USSR did rot inside of 50 years after this hellish war so it turned out better than a Nazi Europe. Who knows how that would've turned out. With their efficiency its a very scary proposition..

[Armin · Rating 3 out of 5]

Mohrenwäsche mit blinden Flecken

Vier Sterne für die Tapferkeit, ein Deutscher Fachhistoriker würde mit einem derartigen Buch, selbst wenn es methodisch gründlicher durchgeführt wäre, beruflichen Selbstmord begehen und könnte sich auch sonst nirgendwo mehr sehen lassen. Rein fachlich ist das Buch eine Zickzackfahrt, die gelegentlich schon mal Ein-Stern-Niveau streift oder dieselben Schauer hervorruft, wie der eklatante Spielfehler eines Pianisten oder ein verpatzter Einsatz im Orchester.
Bei der Kritik am Stalinismus, bzw. jenen Historikern, die mangels anderem belastbaren Material, jedes statistische Potemkinsche Dorf für bare Münze nehmen, gehe ich mit Mosier. Seine These, dass die Rote Armee kaum taktische Fortschritte gemacht hat, sondern in Stalingrad einen Teilerfolg erzielt hat, der sich in erster Linie dem Unentschlossenen Paulus verdankt, hat etwas für sich.

Hurra!, Landser-Hefte schreiben doch die Wahrheit

Bei der Neubewertung der Fakten zugunsten der Wehrmacht, glaubt Mosier, meiner Ansicht nach, allerdings so gut wie alles und ziemlich unbesehen, was über die Stärke der Nazi-Armeen und ihrer Kampfkraft berichtet wird. Insbesondere was die Qualität der Panzer ab 1942 betrifft. Derart, dass ich zwischendrin das Gefühl hatte, dass es sich selbst bei den unwahrscheinlichsten Heldenliedern der Landser-Hefte von der Ostfront um einen schiere Präsentation von Fakten handelte. Auch bei der Behandlung der Faktoren, die beide Armeen beeinträchtigt haben, fehlt mir die Balance. So sind zwar sämtliche nur erdenklichen Effizienzhemmnisse für die Rote Armee aufgelistet, es gibt aber kein Kapitel, in dem quantifiziert wird, welchen Einfluss der Aufwand für den Holocaust auf die Kampfbereitschaft der Wehrmacht, die personellen Ressourcen bzw. den Nachschub gehabt hat.
In einer Fußnote geht er immerhin mit der Feigheit der Generäle ins Gericht, die zwar in militärischen Fragen mit dem GröFaZ bis aufs Blut diskutieren durften, aber Kriegsverbrechen ohne weitere Einwände ausführten. Da Stalin schon die Boten schlechter Nachrichten hinrichten und Foltern ließ, von erfolglosen Generälen ganz zu schweigen, gibt es trotzdem Bonuspunkte für das freundlichere Monster. Bei der Partisanenbekämpfung betreibt Mosier dieselbe Mohrenwäsche über Aufrechnung an Greueltaten wie bei den beiden Diktatoren.

Keine Frage, Stalin war der schlimmere Tyrann und vermutlich sogar der schlechtere Stratege, aber im Verlauf seiner Argumentation verliert Mosier immer wieder die Balance, betreibt keine nennenswerte Quellenkritik bei Faktoren zugunsten der deutschen Kampfkraft als hätte es bei den Abschusszahlen von Tigerpanzern und den zugehörigen Jubelberichten keine Propaganda-Absichten seitens der Nazis gegeben.

Gerade, wenn er meint, Hitler habe richtig gelegen und die Generäle seien auf dem falschen Dampfer oder, beim Verfassen ihrer Memoiren, schon zu sehr auf der Rechtfertigungsschiene gewesen, bleibt eine detaillierte Analyse schuldig.Die Ansicht, dass beide Diktatoren einen Abnutzungskrieg führten, den der Sowjetdiktator nur mit massiver Materialhilfe aus dem Westen gewinnen konnte, hat trotzdem was für sich. Oder taugt zumindest als Erklärungsmuster für sinnlose Haltebefehle Hitlers, zumindest für Leute, die immer noch ein Alibi für diesen Unsinn brauchen. (Meiner Ansicht nach, verhielt sich Hitler die meiste Zeit wie der Affe, der seine Hand nicht mehr aus dem Glas mit den Nüssen bekam, weil er nicht loslassen konnte.) Lediglich beim vorzeitigen Abbruch der „Schlacht von Kursk“ und der Vorgeschichte von Stalingrad (Reaktion auf den Dieppe-Raid) bekommt Hitlers Nervosität die Hauptschuld an der Niederlage in einem Krieg, der beinahe zum Sieg über den praktisch bankrotten Kommunismus geworden wäre.

Der Westen gewinnt, Stalin kreiert den Siegermythos

Die Landung der Alliierten in Italien und später in Frankreich haben dafür gesorgt, dass Stalin seinen Krieg gegen eine immer stärker ausgedünnte Wehrmacht an der Ostfront gewinnen konnte. Und mehr amerikanische Lastwagen als die Sowjetunion bis dahin produziert hatte, natürlich in einer weitaus höheren Qualität. Gleichbedeutend mit der Mobilität, Durchbrüche durch die Deutschen Linien ausnützen zu können.
Wie andernorts schon bemerkt, besteht Mosiers Strategie im Aufzeigen einer anderen Wahrheit, insofern war die Lektüre ein reizvolles intellektuelles Experiment. Auch wenn die Enttäuschung überwiegt, sobald sich der Rauch verzogen hat.
Bei der Zerstörung des Mythos von der siegreichen Roten Armee leistet er ganze Arbeit, Stalins drei Anläufe zu einem Frieden mit Nazi-Deutschland, auf die Mosier aber nicht eingeht, sprechen für seine Thesen von der kompletten wirtschaftlich-miitärischen Niederlage, die in den verspäteten Kollaps der Sowjetunion führen sollte. Wahrscheinlich war die Rote Armee nach Kursk wirklich waffentechnisch blank und profitierte von Hitlers Abzug zahlreicher Elitedivisionen in den Balkan oder den Westen. Trotzdem bleibt mir die Hitler-Analyse zu kurz(sichtig). Irgendwann hätte der wirtschaftliche Wahnsinn dieses Raubkrieges thematisiert werden müssen. Auch die Neigung des Führers, sich ein Reich zusammenzuerobern, das die Wehrmacht unter seiner Führung einfach nicht verteidigen konnten. Dasselbe gilt für Hitlers Neigung nichts loslassen zu können und dabei wertvolles Humankapital zu opfern.

Fazit: ein direktes Duell der Diktatoren hätte das besser organisierte und auch kampftechnisch effektivere Deutschland gegen das unterentwickelte und durch zahlreiche Säuberungen geschwächte Stalin-Reich mit einem noch unfähigeren Feldherren an der Spitze gewinnen können. Diesen Punkt kann man Mosier lassen, leider hat der revisionistische Hitstoriker bei Hitlers Defiziten, dessen Neigung sich auf zu vielen Schlachtfeldern gleichzeitig zu verzetteln und dessen sprunghaftes Naturell ausgelassen, das zu einem konstanten und denkbar schlecht gemanagten Mehrfrontenkrieg führen sollte. Insofern haftet dieser Darstellung, - Konzentration auf die Ostfront hin oder her -, doch eine gewissen Einseitigkeit an.
So wünschenswert eine Gegendarstellung zur immer noch gern praktizierten Nachbeterei von Erfolgsstatistiken der sowjetischen Rüstungsindustrie und der Roten Armee ist, deren Phantasiezahlen lediglich den Kopf des betreffenden retten sollten, in diesem Punkt leistet Mosiers Darstellung, die streckenweise ziemlich hobbygelehrtenhaft daher kommt, doch zu wenig
Von daher vier Sterne für die Sensation und das zeitweilige Lesevergnügen beim Verfolgen seiner Thesen, für die, streckenweise, ziemlich blauäugige Durchführung könnte man eher zweieinhalb geben.

[Keithpatton · Rating 4 out of 5]

I have like all of Mosier's books that I have read to date. Having read WWII history for about 50 years, and walked many WWII battlefields in both Europe and the Pacific, I can say that what gets on the written page often bears little resemblance to the truth, especially when the keepers of the facts and the historians have an agenda. Moiser sets out to gore sacred cows and he is quite effective at it.

Even at a youngish age, I could sense when a history didn't seem right. I read Martin Caidin's book "The Tiger's are Burning" when it came out in the 70's, upon which most common knowledge of the battle of Kursk is based. I didn't believe the book then nor now. Caidin if you don't know him was an aviation and science fiction writer. A book on the Ostfront was quite a departure and a one time thing. His most famous work, "Cyborg" is upon which the show "The Six Million Dollar Man" is based.

I found Moisers arguments on Soviet production and combat losses believable, his discussion of relative casualty figures and combat power of units telling. He makes convincing arguments. Is he right? Who knows, but as a scientist by vocation, the data seldom lies unless manipulated.

It is nearly religious dogma that the Earth's climate is warming due to man, so it is that the Soviet's won WWII single handedly. Neither is true. The data pretty much shows this.

The Soviets were club footed then as now. That they lost the horrendous casualty numbers in the face of a foe that started the war with lesser weapons (except aircraft) and fewer men, proves this. That the Soviets continued to lose hundreds of thousands of men in single offensives upto an including Berlin, when all so called experts say the Germans had been "bled white" shows something.

Whether you believe Moiser or not, his conclusions should give people food for thought, that is unless you are a dogmatist, in which case nothing will change your historical world view.

[Ina Cawl · Rating 2 out of 5]

this is not a book review but an angry response to insincere historical book.
the Author tries in this book to claim that victory in the second world was made possible by Western Allies and that if not western allies helped the soviets in stopping and turning the tide against the Wahermacht the soviets would be defeated to their unsustainable losses by in thei battles with German army
what this German author excludes intentionally si that German armies were stopped in the outskirts of Moscow by the red army.although the red army have received great losses and after each battle with the German army they were still able to sustain their losses and had great reserves to replenish their losses
what i feel angry also is that if western aid was so needed why the red army had great losses against the Wahermach even after receiving the western aid
Finally this book is historically correct in that western aid helped the soviet aid due to the reason that German army mostly destroyed or occupied Industrial Centers of the Soviet union.
but to summarize that war world 2 was won to the allies only is paying injustice to the souls of 27 million person who lost their lives in this war

[Hans · Rating 4 out of 5]

It's ironic to think that the West may have fallen victim to Russian propaganda more than Russians themselves. Stalin, like many of his Authoritarian predecessors and successors, was a master of twisting events to always make events look like they were victories and intentional. By doing this often and loud enough he even convinced the West of "Russia's Greatness' which was more smoke and mirrors than anything else because it was all made up. Stalin's successes were almost all Pyrrhic. Sadly, history is repeating itself yet again now with Putin as the West fears the toothless Russian bear, that while it might still have a bite isn't as strong as it appears (or claims to be).

[Don · Rating 3 out of 5]

After reading this book I thought it was too bad both Hitler and Stalin couldn't both lose. The total lack of concern for the lives of his Russian troops were appalling. Over 40 months of fighting the Soviets lost more men per day than the US has lost in 10 years in Afghanistan and Iraq. The author considers Hitler to a better general than normally credited. He shows how the Germans nearly won the war against the Russians and would have won had not England and America provided help to the Soviets.

[Lee · Rating 1 out of 5]

I couldn't bring myself to finish this one.

"The German generals were wrong, Hitler was right, Stalin was an idiot, here's one fact to back me up, and the survivors got to write the history." Lather, rinse, repeat. That's pretty much the theme of this book. I don't have the time to research all of this, so back it goes. I wish there had been more put into it, but I can't parse it out now.

[Mickey Mantle · Rating 4 out of 5]

Interesting to say the least. The Red Army might have won the War, but the Soviet Union was decimated. The human losses on the Soviet side were astounding. Carnage and Bloodbath on the Eastern Front. An eye opening book which pokes huge holes in the Soviet and Russian propaganda before, during and after the War.

[Scott Martin · Rating 3 out of 5]

(Audiobook) This book looks at the war on the Eastern Front between 1941 and 1945, focusing primarily on the military actions of Hitler and Stalin and their respective armies during that aspect of World War II. The key takeaways are that this work looks to dispel the notion that Stalin was a strategic genius who overcame a sluggish 1941, where he let himself get caught off-guard, but rallied after the winter of 1941 to eventually beat back the Germans and win World War II. This work also reinforces a school of thought that Hitler was justified in his attack on the USSR in 1941, as it was inevitable that Stalin would have attacked Hitler, and the USSR, assuming they could harness their considerable resources and manpower, could have been an dangerous juggernaut to counter.

Neither side could cloak themselves in glory in this fight, and if you were a combatant, you would not want to be captured alive. Yet, it feels as if this work sees Stalin as the greater villain than Hitler. Given that Stalin was on the winning side, and even after the denunciations of 1956, Stalin is still seen as the hero of the Eastern Front. Mosier holds that the USSR won almost in spite of Stalin. It is interesting that Mosier feels that the Nazis gave up too soon during Operation Citadel (the battles at Kursk). The Nazis did not have the element of surprise and had to withdrawal, especially with the Allied actions in Italy that summer. However, Mosier felt that even with the Nazis not holding air supremacy and not able to scare the USSR like they did in 1941 or 1942, if the Nazis had kept at it, their superior tank designs as well as the better overall tactics of the Germans, would have carried the day. Given the logistical struggles of the Nazis, I don’t see that as likely, but it is a contrarian view.

I don’t know if I agree with a number of points in this work, but it does offer a contrasting view with some established myths/beliefs about the Eastern Front of WWII. As more information becomes available (especially from the Russian side) it is likely that future works will challenge previous assumptions. Perhaps worth a read, but only if you have a good baseline of the events of the Eastern Front prior to reading.

[Nancy · Rating 3 out of 5]

It is always interesting reading comparative history and to read something that argues against the predominant thesis can be enlightening. I think the author came up with some fantastic evidence for his thesis, which was essentially that Germany never really lost on the Eastern Front. Stalin was so evil, corrupt and untruthful that the received history that was concocted by the Bolsheviks during and after the war cannot be taken as truth. However, I was not convinced. The author was so polarised (yes, believe it or not, it was Bolsheviks = evil, Nazis, by virtue of not being Bolsheviks = not really that evil) that even when he protested that yes, Hitler was evil, one didn't quite believe him. He seemed to admire Hitler, forgave almost all of his military decisions, exonerated him from most errors and even rewrote Stalingrad such that the Nazi's didn't really experience such as catastrophic defeat as history claimed.

This is pretty earth shattering stuff - and to be fair to the author, the assertions and conclusions are based on his analysis of casualties and loss of materiel and other economic factors. However, pitting these two adversaries against one another does seem to result in the Nazis coming out looking pretty good, which is something of a distortion of history in a way, perhaps, the author himself condemns from the other side?

[Jon · Rating 3 out of 5]

A really interesting book with some glaring flaws. In the end, it reads a bit too much like an anti-communist (socialist?) polemic that happens to use the Great Patriotic War as its principal example. I really wish the main contention--that Soviet forces were almost fatally diminished--wasn't so sloppily argued.

Mosier's point that loss ratios were disproportionate is compelling, but it's never tied to the overall force pool (other than the population comparison, which is so vast and vague as to be useless). That Kursk itself was the one "lost opportunity" is laughable, but I do think Mosier makes a solid case that Soviet tactical ineptitude would eventually create an crisis threshold. The question I still have is: when would that have occurred? 1946? 1947? 1943, given some arguments that are never fleshed out?

There is a lot of good stuff here, though. The unreliability of Soviet records is hammered home. The lend-lease impact is addressed, and I think has always been understated (in large part due to the world at large accepting the overall Soviet story).

[Tav Harling · Rating 3 out of 5]

History is written by the victors. This contrarian history seeks to debunk the effects of decades of Soviet propagandist shaping their 'great victory' on eastern front WW2. Key points:
-Brain-drain in competent generals from the 'terrors' resulted in poorly trained and organized Red Army, who were forced into suicidal attacks by Stalin decrees.
-The Germans almost forced the collapse of the Soviets, however maintained to a large extent by allied material support and Mediterranean and Normandy operations diverted significant combat power away from Eastern front.

Decent read, the author clearly anti-communist but corroborates sources to provide compelling narrative.

[Michael Salerno · Rating 4 out of 5]

John Mosier has a very interesting way of writing that makes it easy to continue reading what is dense and significant material. He also has a unique way of analyzing a historical event or series of events where he can remove 'official' opinions and present each situation with the facts.

I will definitely be trying his book on Verdun as I feel his writing style makes the reader really think and analyze the situation to put themselves in a contemporary realm of thought for where John is writing.

4/5, only wish there was some more visuals and maps spread throughout his writings to make it easier to reference the exact cities and locations that are mentioned throughout each passage.

[Paul Wesner · Rating 5 out of 5]

I listened to this book while operating a large zero-turn lawnmower. I felt like I was one of the tank drivers. This may have influenced my rating.

Mosier does a good job of debunking the Great Patriotic War. His books are very well foot marked so all the people complaining about poor research are either biased or lazy in as much as they do not provide any examples from his copious notes.

Mosier is very repetitive throughout all his works and if you liked this one then you can probably read half of any other book and not miss anything.

[Benjamin Henley · Rating 4 out of 5]

This book gives a unique perspective, a lot of which ran contrary to what I had known previously from more general outlines of the war. I think this is a subject that I will need to read more on to get a fuller grasp of. I learned a lot about the material conditions of both armies. I knew Stalin purged the red army beforehand but seeing the state of the USSR was wildly shocking. The middle of the book departs from geopolitics and political biography to get into the X’s and O’s of war. This is newer for me so it was hard to grasp, though I can’t fault the book for this. A good read overall.

[Al Berry · Rating 4 out of 5]

An interesting look at the Eastern Front, worth the read.

Postulates that Most important loss for the German chances of winning the war was Walther Wever’s death in 1936; With his death, Germany never developed the necessary strategic bombers, Ernest Udet’s philosophy of dive bombing took hold.

Author believes Paulus uniquely bungled Stalingrad, the error of putting a staff officer in charge, instead of someone who held command, believes a different officer could have effected a breakout.

Believes Kursk could have succeeded had Hitler not called it off midway and reassigned key divisions to the West.

[JW · Rating 4 out of 5]

Mosier’s thesis, that the high ratio of Russian to German casualties in World War II meant that Hitler had a good chance of winning on the Eastern Front, is novel and fascinating. Much of his argument is based on his skepticism of Soviet casualty and production statistics. Definitely an inspiration for further research.
This book cries out for the old ways of publishing, when footnotes were at the bottom of the page. Mosier’s notes are that interesting.

[Renee · Rating 3 out of 5]

It's an interesting subject, and it is indeed hard to talk about one of these dictators without referencing the other, but I really preferred Timothy Schneider's, Bloodlands, which made it hard for this one to measure up. Did a good job of addressing the role of propaganda in our understanding of Russian history, and I adored his numerous references to the Orwellian memory hole.

[Jim Statham · Rating 4 out of 5]

It's a good introduction into the Eastern front of WW2. I learned much from this.

This is a high level view of the front, so it talks a lot about general troop movements, numbers and statistics. It doesn't go into the detail of life on the front.

[Ra44 · Rating 4 out of 5]

Gives a view of the Soviet-Nazi war somewhat from an operational viewpoint. Author points out that Stalingrad and Kursk could well be considered Pyrrhic victories when each side's losses are viewed realistically, versus Stalinist propaganda.

[Ashley · Rating 1 out of 5]

couldn't finish this one.... couldn't get into.. made it to about page 175-185 before just couldn't keep trying

[Brian · Rating 3 out of 5]

I thought that the books premise was good. I had to skim over some of the book towards the end of the book because it got repetitive but the premise is valid.

[Kyle Franken · Rating 5 out of 5]

Excellent example of revisionist history, refuting the notion of Soviet military supremacy post-Stalingrad.

[Hjörvar Halldórsson · Rating 4 out of 5]

Very interesting, and realistic, view on the struggle between AH & JS.

[Kyle · Rating 1 out of 5]

A poorly argued attempt at contrarian takes on some of the perennial debates about the Eastern Front in WW2. The research is shaky and his credulity toward some of his sources borders on comical. I'm all for a book that aims to kill a bunch of sacred cows, but when it fails like this, it makes for some frustrating and tedious reading.

[Readius Maximus · Rating 5 out of 5]

I really enjoy reading John Mosier. I have read this book twice and also the Myth of the Great War and Blitzkrieg Myth and have Iron Cross being shipped to me now. When I first read his books they were my first WW2 books I had read in a while and so I was warry as far as how much to believe him but found them very entertaining. One thing that I love is he likes to overturn false narratives but it seems he gets a bit carried away especially in this book. But after reading Guderian’s and Mainstein’s memoir’s I now have firm issues.

It seems the author likes to praise Hitler for every success and blame the generals for every failure. Hitler is a very complicated figure and it’s hard to separate his madness from his genius in some areas. But in this book John Mosier credits him with everything that goes well even when it wasn’t his idea.

Tanks: The author makes a comment that the generals didn’t appreciate weapons development. Guderian was constantly demanding better tanks and had no intention of going to war with training tanks of the Pz 1 and 2.

Moscow: He blames the generals for wanting to pursue Moscow instead of take winter quarters. It is true Guderian says that OKH was at fault for the winter clothing disaster but Guderian also was constantly demanding to take up winter quarters. By all accounts Hitler is the one who demanded the taking of Moscow instead of taking winter quarters. The author also says Hitler was right to demand they hold every inch of ground instead of retreating to a better position because in the open terrain one position is as good as any. This seems to almost contradict itself. Wouldn’t partly prepared positions be way better then out in the open?

Stalingrad: The author likes to place “a great deal of blame” on Paulus. It is true if Paulus was a bolder person he may have taken the right choice and fought his was out when he could instead of obeying Hitler’s orders to hold Stalingrad. But Hitler ordered him to hold Stalingrad and he also put him in command so I would say most of the blame rests on Hitler. Hitler also order the whole operation and the taking of Stalingrad thus exposing the 6th army out on a limb. I agree with Mainstein who says for the operation of fall Blau to be successful the main Russian army would have been defeated in the area of Moscow.

Wehrmacht War crimes: He downplays their war crimes and says the partisan action was hardly a bother. I mean it obviously wasn’t decisive but the Reich Commissars turned a potential powerful ally into an enemy unnecessarily and in a game of inches every inch counts.

Overall: I would recommend this book. As with all stances that are reacting to the norm going too far, it usually overreacts itself to bring the norm more to it’s direction. The main crux of the book is correct and needs to be emphasized. The Russian’s might have ended up in Berlin but at what cost? Official numbers from the German’s is around 1.5 million dead and another roughly million missing which can be considered dead since of the 90k German survivors of Stalingrad only 2-3k saw Germany again. On the other side Stalin claimed they lost 7.5 million dead and Stalin is about as honest as today’s news media so that number is definitely higher. But even that number indicates a 3-1 ratio. Mosier says the low estimate is 27 million and the high is 35 million dead and the most accurate is probably around 30 million. These numbers seem a bit high even to my uneducated eye. Another review on here said it was 15 million which sounds more believable to me but I don’t know I am only quoting the numbers I have read but I do know with an absolute certainty that they lost more than 7.5 million. Either way the Russian’s got their asses handed to them even up to the very end.

Quotes that I liked:

Pg 326: The use of the term “fascists,” as opposed to “Hitlerites,” is perhaps unintentionally, revealing. In Bolshevik ideology, anyone actively opposed to Marxism-Leninism was a fascist, a definition that therefore included those millions of Ukrainians, Belorussians, Poles, and Lithuanians, who simply wished for national independence, and therefore resented the Stalinist state, whether they took up arms against it or not.

Helmuth von Moltke: Strategy goes barely any further then common sense.