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Barons of the Welsh Frontier: The Corbet, Pantulf, and Fitz Warin Families, 1066-1272
This analysis of three Shropshire families is another installment illustrating English baronial life from the Norman conquest through the thirteenth century.
244 pages, Hardcover
First published December 1, 1980
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September 26, 2023
I read this mainly because I am interested in the Fitz Warin family although it is worth reading if only for Part 3 (How the Marcher Baron’s used their land and their Welsh ties to build their power)
Part I: detailed genealogy and geographical sketch of each family. The family trees for each were very helpful.
Part II: Account of their lands (including how managed and mismanaged) which I didn’t find very compelling but becomes central to Part III (which was outstanding.)
Part III: Discuses each family’s relationship with the March and how that impacted their fortunes. Informative couple of paragraphs about how in the reign on Henry II knights began to think of themselves as “English” as compared to Norman and thus thought of fighting in France as “foreign wars” they did not want to get involved in, thus leading to increased use of mercenaries and the decrease in experienced knights – the most experienced fighting men were the Welsh mercenaries and those Marcher Baron armies the Welsh were continually skirmishing with. (Perhaps giving the King of England some concerns over military strength.)
Also a nice discussion of the Fitz Warin rebellion against King John, including information about his followers; who they were, ages, and why (perhaps) they might have joined Fulk’s gorilla war against King John. Chapter 8 again uses the names and their place on the list to discuss the growing importance of the Corbets and Fitz Warins.
Finally a great discussion about how current Regi-centric histories, based initially on the writings of medieval chroniclers (often religious) misunderstand the importance of the Welsh Marches on English history. Meisel believes there are 2 power centers: The King with his royal court and the other on the Welsh March. William the Conqueror recognized this and made sure to spread power all over England; however the instability along the Welsh border meant he had to give a few most trusted lieutenants more land in this area. “With the rise of Llewellyn ap Iorwerth, however, the potential power of the Marcher barons, which had remained latent for more than a century, was suddenly unleashed.” As the Marcher barons were keeping the Welsh contained, they were given lavish gifts by the King, demanded concessions against royal power, and sometimes waged private wars with their own mercenaries.
More Quotes:
What these 3 families have in common, apart from their obscurity, is the Welsh March. It dominates their lives; It determines their fortunes; and ultimately, through the Marcher barons, it dictates the course of English history in the 13th century. It was a marcher castle which caused the Fitz Warins to rebel against King John, and Marcher allies who helped ensure the rebellion’s success. It was a private Marcher army which let the Corbets live like uncrowned kings in their domain, and it was the geographical cruelty of the March which doomed the Pantulfs to ignominious decline. From a Marcher point of view, the history of the 13th century is markedly different from the versions found in modern texts. Magna Carta was an irrelevant distraction. Simon De Montfort was a nuisance whom the Marcher army affectively terminated at Evesham. Henry III was a good king who knew his place, and Edward I was a dangerous upstart who spent his entire reign trying to avoid being put in the same position in which the Marchers had placed his father.
Precisely how much of a threat Fulk’s rebellion posed to King John is difficult to determine. During the period of Fulk’s rebellion (1200-1203) King John was so preoccupied with the crisis in Normandy that nothing short of an imminent threat to the English throne would have been likely to distract him. It would seem, however, that Fulk and his followers were, if not a direct threat to the throne, at least a considerable nuisance to the king. Before John crossed to Normandy, he left Hubert de Berg and 100 knights to guard the Welsh March, and in the absence of a threat from the Welsh at this time, these 100 knights were almost certainly a response to Fulk’s rebellion.
In conclusion, the history of the Fitz Warins provides a number of contrasts with that of the Corbets and Pantulfs. The Fitz Warins arrived in England more than half a century after the Corbets and Pantulfs, and they established themselves no by following their French lords, but by supporting Matilda the Empress and then Henry II.
…
In one respect, however, the Corbets and Fitz Warins were very similar, for both families seem to have had a great interest in Wales From Robert Corbet’s marriage alliances with the Welsh princes and the Fitz Warins’ fight for Whittington to the Corbet-Fitz Warin war with Llewellyn and beyond, both families spend the vasst majority of their time on March affairs. … The Fitz Warins, however, held most of their lands in areas far removed from the turbulence of the March, and thus their concern with Wales suggest an importance in the March and in Welsh affairs which … [will be explained in Part III.]
What is clear is that that Fitz Warins obtained a number of manors before the reign of Henry II and that they held these manor of three families – the Peverels, the Fitz Alans, and the Corbets. It was the Peverels who apparent first gave the Fitz Warins their interest in Whittington, and they seem to have valued this manor above all their other holdings, for in rebelling against King Joh, Fulk III risked all his land and his life as well to regain this manor.
It was not, however, the size of the Corbets’ lands but rather their location which ultimately made I possible for the Corbets to acquire their enormous power, and it was the location of the Pantulf’s lands which made it impossible for them to compete with the Corbets. … but as the Welsh gradually began to become a serious threat to the English the location of the Corbets’ lands made their rise to power and perhaps even inevitable.
Apparently Robert’s [Corbet] primary goal in arranging these marriages was to lessen the likelihood that his lands would be attacked by the Welsh, but the marriage had 2 other important affects … First the Corbets became the natural mediators in disputes between the English and the Welsh … Second .. these marriages made the Corbets allies of the Welsh princes, and no English king would have been anxious to confront an army made up of the most important Welsh princes and a powerful Marcher baron.
(I utterly love these 2 sentences.) It is possible that some of these men joined Fulk because they were genuinely outraged at the shabby treatment he received from King John or because they did not want the Powis family to gain possession of Whittington. The age of Fulk’s companions, however, suggests the possibility that many of them may simply have been young men in search of excitement, and Fulk’s rebellion surely offered them the greatest available source of adventure in England.
More important, perhaps, Fulk’s rebellion suggests that a baron’s power was not necessarily limited to the troops he could raise from his own lands. Even in a dispute with the king, where the penalty for failure was death, it was possible for a baron to attract supporters to his cause who were not bund to him by either family of feudal allegiance.
It seems probably, however, … that the ultimate purpose of Fulke III’s rebellion was to secure a base of operations on the border from which he could expand his territory into Wales without interference from the Corbets. After all, in rebelling against King John, Fulk jeopardized the vast lands that his family had acquired over two generations, and in and of itself, the castle of Whittington was clearly not worth the risk.
Chapter 8: The Political Frontier
From the lists of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries which include the Corbets, it is clear that the clerks of this period regarded this family as the peers of some of the most powerful and influential men in the kingdom.
From the appointment on 26 July 1236 of Henry Audley, Fulk Fitz Warin, and Hervey Bagod as the three dictators of North Wales seems to represent the final stage in the Fitz Warins’ rise … from the time of this appointment, the Fitz Warins’ name was regularly included in the lists of magnates who were summoned to royal councils or who were sent letters concerning political affairs. .. Therefore while contemporary chronicler and modern historians may have largely ignored the Fitz Warins, there can be no doubt that the royal clerks of the mid-thirteenth century viewed the Fitz Warins as ranking among the most important families of the realm.
As a result of this royal failure, the power of the marcher barons gradually increased. What clearly began as special privileges soon came to be regarded as rights, and as the disintegration of the feudal army continued apace, the concentration of power on the march grew ever more menacing to the crown. This increase in the power of the marcher barons seems to have been acquired at the expense of both the English and the Welsh. By using their trained and experienced troops as an offensive weapon against the Welsh, these barons were able to extend their lands across the border into Wales. There are new lands, in turn, increase the power of these barons, and they then used this new power to demand for themselves what had long been considered royal prerogatives.
Finally it seems clear that these marcher barons understood that the ultimate source of their power was based on the continuation of hostilities between England and Wales, for whenever the king tried to arrange a peace with the Welsh the marcher barons were quick to thwart such attempts. During the 1220s and 1230s for example, when Henry III made serious attempts to arrange a peace with Llewellyn not only did the Fitz Warins and the Corbet’s fight a private war with Llewellyn but they and other marcher family so regularly violated the terms of the successive truces that no permanent peace was possible.
Perhaps because he had watched the way in which these Marcher barons had held his father hostage to their power, Edward I seems to have been determined from the time he became king to put an end to the extraordinary power of these men.
Part I: detailed genealogy and geographical sketch of each family. The family trees for each were very helpful.
Part II: Account of their lands (including how managed and mismanaged) which I didn’t find very compelling but becomes central to Part III (which was outstanding.)
Part III: Discuses each family’s relationship with the March and how that impacted their fortunes. Informative couple of paragraphs about how in the reign on Henry II knights began to think of themselves as “English” as compared to Norman and thus thought of fighting in France as “foreign wars” they did not want to get involved in, thus leading to increased use of mercenaries and the decrease in experienced knights – the most experienced fighting men were the Welsh mercenaries and those Marcher Baron armies the Welsh were continually skirmishing with. (Perhaps giving the King of England some concerns over military strength.)
Also a nice discussion of the Fitz Warin rebellion against King John, including information about his followers; who they were, ages, and why (perhaps) they might have joined Fulk’s gorilla war against King John. Chapter 8 again uses the names and their place on the list to discuss the growing importance of the Corbets and Fitz Warins.
Finally a great discussion about how current Regi-centric histories, based initially on the writings of medieval chroniclers (often religious) misunderstand the importance of the Welsh Marches on English history. Meisel believes there are 2 power centers: The King with his royal court and the other on the Welsh March. William the Conqueror recognized this and made sure to spread power all over England; however the instability along the Welsh border meant he had to give a few most trusted lieutenants more land in this area. “With the rise of Llewellyn ap Iorwerth, however, the potential power of the Marcher barons, which had remained latent for more than a century, was suddenly unleashed.” As the Marcher barons were keeping the Welsh contained, they were given lavish gifts by the King, demanded concessions against royal power, and sometimes waged private wars with their own mercenaries.
More Quotes:
What these 3 families have in common, apart from their obscurity, is the Welsh March. It dominates their lives; It determines their fortunes; and ultimately, through the Marcher barons, it dictates the course of English history in the 13th century. It was a marcher castle which caused the Fitz Warins to rebel against King John, and Marcher allies who helped ensure the rebellion’s success. It was a private Marcher army which let the Corbets live like uncrowned kings in their domain, and it was the geographical cruelty of the March which doomed the Pantulfs to ignominious decline. From a Marcher point of view, the history of the 13th century is markedly different from the versions found in modern texts. Magna Carta was an irrelevant distraction. Simon De Montfort was a nuisance whom the Marcher army affectively terminated at Evesham. Henry III was a good king who knew his place, and Edward I was a dangerous upstart who spent his entire reign trying to avoid being put in the same position in which the Marchers had placed his father.
Precisely how much of a threat Fulk’s rebellion posed to King John is difficult to determine. During the period of Fulk’s rebellion (1200-1203) King John was so preoccupied with the crisis in Normandy that nothing short of an imminent threat to the English throne would have been likely to distract him. It would seem, however, that Fulk and his followers were, if not a direct threat to the throne, at least a considerable nuisance to the king. Before John crossed to Normandy, he left Hubert de Berg and 100 knights to guard the Welsh March, and in the absence of a threat from the Welsh at this time, these 100 knights were almost certainly a response to Fulk’s rebellion.
In conclusion, the history of the Fitz Warins provides a number of contrasts with that of the Corbets and Pantulfs. The Fitz Warins arrived in England more than half a century after the Corbets and Pantulfs, and they established themselves no by following their French lords, but by supporting Matilda the Empress and then Henry II.
…
In one respect, however, the Corbets and Fitz Warins were very similar, for both families seem to have had a great interest in Wales From Robert Corbet’s marriage alliances with the Welsh princes and the Fitz Warins’ fight for Whittington to the Corbet-Fitz Warin war with Llewellyn and beyond, both families spend the vasst majority of their time on March affairs. … The Fitz Warins, however, held most of their lands in areas far removed from the turbulence of the March, and thus their concern with Wales suggest an importance in the March and in Welsh affairs which … [will be explained in Part III.]
What is clear is that that Fitz Warins obtained a number of manors before the reign of Henry II and that they held these manor of three families – the Peverels, the Fitz Alans, and the Corbets. It was the Peverels who apparent first gave the Fitz Warins their interest in Whittington, and they seem to have valued this manor above all their other holdings, for in rebelling against King Joh, Fulk III risked all his land and his life as well to regain this manor.
It was not, however, the size of the Corbets’ lands but rather their location which ultimately made I possible for the Corbets to acquire their enormous power, and it was the location of the Pantulf’s lands which made it impossible for them to compete with the Corbets. … but as the Welsh gradually began to become a serious threat to the English the location of the Corbets’ lands made their rise to power and perhaps even inevitable.
Apparently Robert’s [Corbet] primary goal in arranging these marriages was to lessen the likelihood that his lands would be attacked by the Welsh, but the marriage had 2 other important affects … First the Corbets became the natural mediators in disputes between the English and the Welsh … Second .. these marriages made the Corbets allies of the Welsh princes, and no English king would have been anxious to confront an army made up of the most important Welsh princes and a powerful Marcher baron.
(I utterly love these 2 sentences.) It is possible that some of these men joined Fulk because they were genuinely outraged at the shabby treatment he received from King John or because they did not want the Powis family to gain possession of Whittington. The age of Fulk’s companions, however, suggests the possibility that many of them may simply have been young men in search of excitement, and Fulk’s rebellion surely offered them the greatest available source of adventure in England.
More important, perhaps, Fulk’s rebellion suggests that a baron’s power was not necessarily limited to the troops he could raise from his own lands. Even in a dispute with the king, where the penalty for failure was death, it was possible for a baron to attract supporters to his cause who were not bund to him by either family of feudal allegiance.
It seems probably, however, … that the ultimate purpose of Fulke III’s rebellion was to secure a base of operations on the border from which he could expand his territory into Wales without interference from the Corbets. After all, in rebelling against King John, Fulk jeopardized the vast lands that his family had acquired over two generations, and in and of itself, the castle of Whittington was clearly not worth the risk.
Chapter 8: The Political Frontier
From the lists of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries which include the Corbets, it is clear that the clerks of this period regarded this family as the peers of some of the most powerful and influential men in the kingdom.
From the appointment on 26 July 1236 of Henry Audley, Fulk Fitz Warin, and Hervey Bagod as the three dictators of North Wales seems to represent the final stage in the Fitz Warins’ rise … from the time of this appointment, the Fitz Warins’ name was regularly included in the lists of magnates who were summoned to royal councils or who were sent letters concerning political affairs. .. Therefore while contemporary chronicler and modern historians may have largely ignored the Fitz Warins, there can be no doubt that the royal clerks of the mid-thirteenth century viewed the Fitz Warins as ranking among the most important families of the realm.
As a result of this royal failure, the power of the marcher barons gradually increased. What clearly began as special privileges soon came to be regarded as rights, and as the disintegration of the feudal army continued apace, the concentration of power on the march grew ever more menacing to the crown. This increase in the power of the marcher barons seems to have been acquired at the expense of both the English and the Welsh. By using their trained and experienced troops as an offensive weapon against the Welsh, these barons were able to extend their lands across the border into Wales. There are new lands, in turn, increase the power of these barons, and they then used this new power to demand for themselves what had long been considered royal prerogatives.
Finally it seems clear that these marcher barons understood that the ultimate source of their power was based on the continuation of hostilities between England and Wales, for whenever the king tried to arrange a peace with the Welsh the marcher barons were quick to thwart such attempts. During the 1220s and 1230s for example, when Henry III made serious attempts to arrange a peace with Llewellyn not only did the Fitz Warins and the Corbet’s fight a private war with Llewellyn but they and other marcher family so regularly violated the terms of the successive truces that no permanent peace was possible.
Perhaps because he had watched the way in which these Marcher barons had held his father hostage to their power, Edward I seems to have been determined from the time he became king to put an end to the extraordinary power of these men.
December 11, 2014
From the Conquest to late in the 13th century was the age of baronial power in England, but for the most part, historians have treated them as an anonymous mass: "The barons rebelled," etc. The Bigods, Marshalls, Mortimers, Montforts, and a few others are well known, but what about those Meisel calls the "invisible barons"? Working from the particular to the general, she investigates in detail the lives, activities, policies, landholdings, and connections among three of the lesser baronial families in northern Shropshire, on the Welsh marches. The main thing these families had in common was their position the western frontier of Norman authority, which dominated their lives. To the marcher barons, 13th century England bore little resemblance to what was recorded by the monastic chroniclers; to them, Henry III was a good king who knew his place and Edward I was a dangerous upstart. With their private army, the Corbets lived like uncrowned kings in their own domain, and it was a marcher castle that led the Fitz Warins to rebel against King John. Much of this thoroughly scholarly work concerns land ownership and politics on the frontier, but of particular interest here is the detailed genealogical history the author provides of each of these relatively obscure baronial families.
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