The Hill Fights: The First Battle of Khe Sanh

by Edward F. Murphy

While the seventy-seven-day siege of Khe Sanh in early 1968 remains one of the most highly publicized clashes of the Vietnam War, scant attention has been paid to the first battle of Khe Sanh, also known as “the Hill Fights.” Although this harrowing combat in the spring of 1967 provided a grisly preview of the carnage to come at Khe Sanh, few are aware of the significance of the battles, or even their existence. For more than thirty years, virtually the only people who knew about the Hill Fights were the Marines who fought them. Now, for the first time, the full story has been pieced together by acclaimed Vietnam War historian Edward F. Murphy, whose definitive analysis admirably fills this significant gap in Vietnam War literature. Based on first-hand interviews and documentary research, Murphy’s deeply informed narrative history is the only complete account of the battles, their origins, and their aftermath.The Marines at the isolated Khe Sanh Combat Base were tasked with monitoring the strategically vital Ho Chi Minh trail as it wound through the jungles in nearby Laos. Dominated by high hills on all sides, the combat base had to be screened on foot by the Marine infantrymen while crack, battle-hardened NVA units roamed at will through the high grass and set up elaborate defenses on steep, sun-baked overlooks.Murphy traces the bitter account of the U.S. Marines at Khe Sanh from the outset in 1966, revealing misguided decisions and strategies from above, and capturing the chain of hill battles in stark detail. But the Marines themselves supply the real grist of the story; it is their recollections that vividly re-create the atmosphere of desperation, bravery, and relentless horror that characterized their combat. Often outnumbered and outgunned by a hidden enemy—and with buddies lying dead or wounded beside them—these brave young Americans fought on.The story of the Marines at Khe Sanh in early 1967 is a microcosm of the Corps’s entire Vietnam War and goes a long way toward explaining why their casualties in Vietnam exceeded, on a Marine-in-combat basis, even the tremendous losses the Leathernecks sustained during their ferocious Pacific island battles of World War II. The Hill Fights is a damning indictment of those responsible for the lives of these heroic Marines. Ultimately, the high command failed them, their tactics failed them, and their rifles failed them. Only the Marines themselves did not fail. Under fire, trapped in a hell of sudden death meted out by unseen enemies, they fought impossible odds with awesome courage and uncommon valor.

Genres: History, Military History, Military Fiction, War, Nonfiction

364 pages, Kindle Edition

First published July 25, 2002

Reviews

[Eric_W · Rating 4 out of 5]

EDITED 8/15/2011

In 1967, Marine patrols outside of Khe Sanh airbase came under increased pressure from NVA troops and they captured substantial amounts of weaponry. This was the First Battle for Khe Sanh, the costly battle for the hills. That they were there had an interesting story.

The Army and the Marines had very different views on the proper way to win the war. General Westmoreland, overall commander in Vietnam was convinced that the way was with more pitched battles, pitting the superior firepower and strength of the United States against the poorly supplied North Vietnamese and Viet Cong. Generals Walt and Krulak, Marine commanders who had to report to Westmoreland for operational deployment maintained that only by “winning the hearts and minds” of the people (how often have we heard that) and making the local population feel safe, could the U.S. hope to prevail.

Khe Sanh was ideally located between the two Vietnams and Laos to monitor North Vietnamese traffic going south. Westmoreland had received intelligence that the NVA were moving a large force with the (he feared) intent of taking Hue which would be a military and political disaster for the U.S. Walt had flatly replied that his long range patrols had found no evidence of such a movement. Nevertheless, Westmoreland sent Marines to Khe Sanh to watch for such activity. Surrounded by hills, virtually inaccessible by any road except highway 9 which was barely a dirt cart track, it might remind some of the debacle at A Shau where and American base was totally overrun with many casualties.

Westmoreland considered Khe Sanh to be of paramount importance. Despite evidence of large bodies of troops moving south through the area and the DMZ, the Marine commanders demurred thinking it was too isolated to be of any military value. Brigadier General English is reported to have said, “When you’re at Khe Sanh, you’re not really anywhere. It’s far away from everything. You could lose it and you haven’t really lost a damn thing.”In 1967, Marine patrols outside of Khe Sabh airbase came under increased pressure from NVA troops and they captured substantial amounts of weaponry. That they were there had an interesting story.

The Army and the Marines had very different views on the proper way to win the war. General Westmoreland, overall commander in Vietnam was convinced that the way was with more pitched battles, pitting the superior firepower and strength of the United States against the poorly supplied North Vietnamese and Viet Cong. Generals Walt and Krulak, Marine commanders who had to report to Westmoreland for operational deployment maintained that only by “winning the hearts and minds” of the people (how often have we heard that) and making the local population feel safe, could the U.S. hope to prevail.

Khe Sanh was ideally located between the two Vietnams and Laos to monitor North Vietnamese traffic going south. Westmoreland had received intelligence that the NVA were moving a large force with the (he feared) intent of taking Hue which would be a military and political disaster for the U.S. Walt had flatly replied that his long range patrols had found no evidence of such a movement. Nevertheless, Westmoreland sent Marines to Khe Sanh to watch for such activity. Surrounded by hills, virtually inaccessible by any road except highway 9 which was barely a dirt cart track, it might remind some of the debacle at A Shau where and American base was totally overrun with many casualties.

Westmoreland considered Khe Sanh to be of paramount importance. Despite evidence of large bodies of troops moving south through the area and the DMZ, the Marine commanders demurred thinking it was too isolated to be of any military value. Brigadier General English is reported to have said, “When you’re at Khe Sanh, you’re not really anywhere. It’s far away from everything. You could lose it and you haven’t really lost a damn thing.”
really lost a damn thing.”

Originally defended by a battalion, it was replaced by a rifle company until the commander pleaded for more troops after multiple enemy contacts. It was spooky. Soldiers would awake in the morning on patrol only to discover their claymore mines had been turned around to face in, instead of out. Grenades would be tossed in their midst, but no one could see where they came from. They would discover evidence of encampments. Reinforcements soon poured in only to meet extraordinarily effective resistance that began to decimate the Marines. One problem was that to meet the shortage of platoon officers (the casualty rate was terrifying) the Marine Corps gave temporary commissions as 2nd lieutenants to qualifying non-commissioned officers thus losing senior NCO ranks at a time when their years of combat experience was sorely needed.

In the midst of this chaos there was a weapons change, from the very reliable but heavy M-14, to the much lighter but very unreliable M-16. Sometimes units might have both weapons and ammunition was often delivered for the wrong gun since their ammunition was not interchangeable. Sometimes they would jam after one magazine. The troops were furious. One marine gave his M-16 to a wounded soldier to help another wounded. “I found the guy who had taken my rifle, but he seemed in a daze and didn’t remember what he’d done with it. I finally found a pile of discarded M16s. The first one I picked was jammed. So were the next three I looked at. Finally I found one that worked.” Numerous Marines were found next to jammed M-16s.

Other snafus included setting out Claymore mines that had no C-4 in them. The troops had removed it to heat their rations, so the Claymores were useless. The Americans had overwhelming artillery support. On April 27th alone as they were trying to take Hill 881 they hit the NVA with “more than 382,000 pounds of bombs, including a dozen 2,000 pounders and nearly 75,000 pounds of napalm.”

After being devastated in the fighting, and believing all living Marines to be off the hill, they sent a last patrol up to be certain. This next scene epitomizes the brotherhood and bravery of all of them: “When one of his men yelled, ‘Is anyone else up there?’ a sharp response of ‘Yes’ startled Giles. Seconds later, a helmet-less black Marine came out of the darkness, Draped across his shoulder was the body of a white Marine. When the man approached, Giles asked, ‘What are you doing.” ‘This is my squad leader,’ the Marine responded evenly. ‘I couldn't leave him up there.’ Then he continued on.”

The author weaves numerous personal stories together in a very coherent view of the first battle for Hill 881 and Khe Sanh in addition to providing a general overview from the command point of view. But it’s primarily a view of the fighting from the platoon level. Of course, in the end, Westmoreland was persuaded Khe Sanh had little military value and the attacks on it represented a feint by the NVA to camouflage their plans for the Tet Offensive. His replacement, General Abrams, decided to dismantle the base and pull out. The destruction of the base cost many Marine lives since they remained under fire from the hills which they would retake and then have to abandon over and over again in a Sisyphean microcosm of the entire war.

I recommend everyone read this declassified study commissioned by President Johnson (cited earlier in my review of In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam to understand the waste. Implications of an Unfavorable Outcome in Vietnam, 11 September 1967, Folder 127, Box 09, Central Intelligence Agency Collection, The Vietnam Center and Archive, Texas Tech University. Accessed 15 Aug. 2011.

[Ralph Hammer · Rating 4 out of 5]

I Was There!

It's been forty-seven and a half years since, and this telling of the hells, tortures, wearinesses and emotions of varying types is very, very, well told.
I joined 2dBn/3dMar at Camp Carroll in the middle of Feb 67. Attached to Hdq and Supply Comm Section.
The events leading up to the departure to Okinawa were a fading bad memory until I started reading the book.
Then a floodgate opened in my mind, as I remembered that helicopter ride from the U.S.S. Tripoly to the landing pad at Khe Sahn.
Although I was never able to go on patrols with the Companies, I knew of everything happening while I worked in the Bn CP Radio hooch. There were quite a few times I wanted to be in the hills with my "brothers", lending use of my PRC-25.
I did go on Search and Rescue on Hills 881s and 861, the reek of death still haunts my mind's "nose".
After leaving that horrendous place, and continuing the missions of BLT 2/3, I learned that war is truly hell on earth.
But, all in all, I want to thank Mr. E.F.Murphy for bringing out in me, some memories that needed to be resurrected.
To others, may you now know what we lived through, and why Veterans say, "All gave some, and some gave all"

[Michael Kuehn · Rating 5 out of 5]

An unbelievable account of the Hill Fights that took place on the hills around the Khe Sanh base prior to the siege, an account of battle mismanagement, weapon failures, and incredible heroism in the face of a relentless enemy. One of the best books on small scale battle and firefights of the Vietnam War that I've read. Saddened and angered me at the same time.

[Nanto]

Bukunya Amang ini kayak angkot, main salip di rak currently reading. Mengalahkan beberapa buku yang udah masuk rak to read, bahkan untuk rak currently reading dia kategori favorit, alias sering ditenteng. Fisiknya yang pocket book, (pocket khusus baju lebaran sih :D), bikin saya gak repot untuk bawa kemana-mana.

Isinya soal Perang Vietnam. Konflik terbuka antara pasukan Amerika dan NVA di Khe Sanh. Di sini dijelaskan perbedaan pendapat antara William Westmoreland yang memimpin keseluruhan kontingen Amerika di Vietnam (MACV, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam) dengan Lewis W. Walt yang merupakan komandan Korps Marinir I di Vietnam. Westmoreland menginginkan strategi perang konvensional (Perang Atrisi), sedangkan Walt mengedepankan penduduk sebagai sasaran perlindungan yang biasanya jadi target dalam perang gerilya. Dalam strategi Westmoreland akan banyak pertempuran demi mengalahkan kemampuan tempur Vietcong dan NVA, namun dalam strategi Walt yang jadi sasaran adalah dukungan penduduk untuk mengecilkan ruang gerak Vietcong.

Perbedaan prinsip itu berlanjut pada operasi di lapangan. Di Khe Sanh yang topografinya berbukit, pasukan yang ditempatkan dari marinir awalnya adalah satu batalyon. Selain itu ada pasukan lain dari kesatuan berbeda. Buruknya adalah mereka tidak memiliki satu kunci komando yang sama. Mereka berada dalam jalur komando yang berbeda di sebuah daerah perbatasan yang jauh dari markan komando di pusat. Solusi awal adalah menunjuk seorang perwira yang bertugas sebagai koordinator administratif seluruh kesatuan.

Persoalan kedua adalah, meski Westmoreland menginginkan strategi perang atrisi, namun dia hanya memposisikan Khe Sanh sebagai pos pengamatan. Dia belum melihat arti strategis menempatkan pasukan besar di Khe Sanh. Di hubungan pasukan di lapangan dengan markas besar menjadi inti cerita sampai di sini. Bagaimana pasukan di lapangan berkali-kali menukan tanda-tanda jelas keberadaan NVA yang merupakan tentara reguler Vietnam Utara. Hal ini menambah kecemasan pasukan yang ditempatkan di sana dengan tugas patroli dan pengamatan, karena NVA secara kekuatan jauh lebih terlatih dibandingkan Viet Cong yang hanya milisi kebanyakan. Gilanya, kekuatan pasukan yang satu batalyon makin dikurangi dengan hanya menempatkan satu kompie. Dengan area pengamatan yang tidak berkurang.

Meski telah menemukan jejak jelas dan berkali-kali konflik terbuka, pihak pimpinan di markas komando pusat belum teryakinkan akan hadirnya NVA dalam jumlah yang besar. Para Jenderal itu bahkan dalam briefing dengan pasukan patroli malah balik bertanya, "yakin itu NVA, bukan Viet Cong?"

Meski baru sampai situ, saya kembali ingat buku Citizen Soldiers yang mengisahkan kunci keberhasilan Sekutu setelah berhasil mendarat di Normandy adalah kemampuan mereka mengkoordinasikan unit-unit pasukan infanteri, kaveleri, dan tentunya pesawat yang sudah menjadi raja di udara. Karena bila tidak, kemampuan Wehrmacht yang ada di bawah komando Rommel akan tidak semudah itu ditekuk Sekutu. Belum lagi koordinasi pasukan di lapangan dengan markas komando yang biasanya jauh dari lapangan. Kemampuan membaca laporan di lapangan dan menerjemahkan menjadi strategi yang solid menjadi salah satu syarat keberhasilan markas pusat.

Persoalan komunikasi yang tidak mulus membuat pesoalan identifikasi kekuatan musuh menjadi sesuatu yang lamban.

Sejauh halaman buku ini saya baca ya...

Update 20 Juli 2008,

Perang tak lain hanya kelelahan yang berlanjut bahkan bertahun sesudahnya. Apalagi menghadapi musuh yang seperti hantu, dengan senapan baru yang sering jam, dan pimpinan yang seringannya so' tau hu hu hu...

Tahukah banyak prajurit muda yang umurnya baru menginjak akhir belasan tahun dan awal 20-an harus menghadapi sengitnya perang di hutan hujan tropis? Tahukah pengarangnya selalu menyelipkan cerita tentang kampung, bagaimana dan berapa lama datang di Vietnam dari setiap nama prajurit yang baru muncul dalam lembar halaman buku ini? Tahukah betapa semua itu menunjukan banyak orang tua di DC sana telah mengobral begitu banyak jiwa muda untuk sebuah teori yang tak lain pola pikir mereka di depan meja judi? Setiap kartu berhias polkadot merah berjatuhan di meja, tak lain hanya jiwa muda mengangkasa dengan harga yang entah pantas.

Huaaa...depresi veteran Vietnam nular ke Gue
*ambil gitar, nyalakan tape, lipsing berlagak si bibir memble*

I look inside my self and see my heart is black,
I see my red door and I want it painted black.
Maybe then I'll fade away and not have to face the facts,
it's not easy facing up when your whole world is black.

No more will my green sea go turn a deeper blue,
I could not forsee this thing happening to you.
If I look hard enough into the setting sun,
my love will laugh with me before the morning comes.

I see a red door and I want it painted black,
no colours anymore I want them to turn black.
I see the girls walk by dressed in their summer clothes,
I have to turn my head until my darkness goes.

Sayup terdengar di latar suara, deru putaran baling-baling Huey menjemput jiwa-jiwa muda yang punah di perbukitan Khe Sanh.* Si bibir Memble benar adanya ketika diantara memblenya bersenandung, I have to turn my head until my darkness goes .

Have to save my last breath till it's turning to the last page.


Ket: *Dipinjam dari Mithologi Indian tentang sosok kuda putih yang selalu datang menjemput setiap satria Indian yang perlaya dengan jiwa gagah.

Update 6 Agustus 2008

Stuck karena saya cape, sementara kemaren saya coba merefresh bayangan dengan melihat film "Humburgerl Hill". Gak Persis sama, karena di Hamburger Hill itu cerita tentang 101st Airborne. Kesatuan yang sama dari Major Dick Winters dalam film Easy Company. Di buku ini adalah cerita marinir. Dan kebetulan semalam ada film "Tears of the Sun" di TransTV.

Ada adegan yang dilakukan Bruce Willis dalam film Tears of the Sun yang disanggah berdasarkan keterangan buku ini. Maju sejajar dan menembak senapan ke arah depan secara serempak, kalo kata buku ini, "nggak marinir banget!" Walaupun diceritakan itu terjadi sekali di Khe Sanh karena tidak mungkin melakukan formasi yang lebih marinir untuk bisa cepat maju.

Tapi bukan itu intinya.

Intinya adalah saya ingin memudahkan kepala ini membayangkan kengerian yang dialami marinir muda di Khe Sanh. Gambaran kengerian itu memang berhasil. Nonton filmnya bisa menjawab pertanyaan di kepala, kenapa isinya mati dan mati dalam hampir setiap lembar halamannya.

Ketika muak, dan pertanyaan dasarnya kenapa juga masih baca buku tentang perang, di ujung film "Hamburger Hill" ada puisi yang ditulis oleh Mayor Anumerta Michael Davis O'Donnell. Puisi ini ditulis dua setengah bulan sebelum ia hilang di Kamboja pada tanggal 24 Maret 1970. Bagian akhir puisi ini menjadi salah satu pijakan kenapa masih perlu menamatkan buku ini.

If you are able,
save them a place
inside of you
and save one backward glance
when you are leaving
for the places they can
no longer go.
Be not ashamed to say
you loved them,
though you may
or may not have always.
Take what they have left
and what they have taught you
with their dying
and keep it with your own.
And in that time
when men decide and feel safe
to call the war insane,
take one moment to embrace
those gentle heroes
you left behind.

Major Michael Davis O'Donnell
1 January 1970
Dak To, Vietnam

[Cary · Rating 5 out of 5]

The Hill Fights represents an outstanding tale of U.S. soldiers fighting a major series of battles with M16 rifles that wont shoot and jam. Because they government cut corners and used of stocks of gunpowder form WWI & WWII & Korea. The fact that they perserved, and won. Fighting a relentless enemy that not only out numbered them but had guns that actually worked. I was just awed by the displays of courage, and determination under conditions where beaurocrats threw away the lives of 18 year old men like they were just disposable pieces of meat. I really illuminates Washingtons irratic handling of the war. Which could be brilliant one day and idiotic the next. Of the outstanding young men & women who were mishandled, ruined, or cut short by improper government concern.

[Kim · Rating 3 out of 5]

Harrowing
Frightening
Very very sad

I cannot image the horror and terror of being engaged in battle and having your weapon jam and refuse to shoot, of having to hunker down in a hole in the ground randomly throwing grenades at anything that makes a noise outside because your fellow marines are all dead so any noise is trying to kill you, of using poor stock because the army cut corners, of running out of ammunition mid battle.
As if war is not bad enough, to be fighting a battle poorly equipped must be unfathomable.
But that is what these men did - they fought, they hung on, and they won.

That these youngster were fighting this war in the first place is horrendous, and then that they were expected to do with such rubbish support should surely be criminal.

I am glad that books like this exist, for while he war was questionable, the courage of the men sent to fight it was not.
Sadly, it will probably and up in the 'least we forget' pile of things we seem to have completely forgotten already

When will we learn?

[a.t.m. · Rating 5 out of 5]

excellent book on Khe Sanh

The author has written a compelling book based on the US Marine’s involvement on the bloody campaign to rid the North Vietnamese Army from the DMZ. This is a painful read and very intense, as American young men were slaughtered because of ineffective weapons (m16’s). So much for Marine leadership, many high ranking officers cared little for their troops, putting a priority on their careers first. To this day no one has been held accountable for this tragic situation, when lives were needlessly lost because of jammed weapons. So many wasted lives, I highly recommend. Peace to all, especially, the families affected.

[John E. · Rating 5 out of 5]

Blood, Sacrifice, and Duty

Murphy gives an accurate and well written account of the Hill Fights. You feel the terror, smell the cordite, and bleed with the Marines who were there. Semper Fi!

[Thomas J. · Rating 5 out of 5]

The best book on Khe Sanh and the POS M-16.

As a Marine Vietnam veteran, it is the best book that I have read on the Vietnam War,
Khe Sanh, and the early POS M-16 rifle. I kept my M-14 as long as possible. Read it!

[Dennis P Moore · Rating 1 out of 5]

3.

[Marcus · Rating 3 out of 5]

Another addition to the seemingly constantly growing collection of high quality books dealing with low level infantry operations during Vietnam War. This specific volume deals with actions in Khe Sanh area in late 1967, immediately prior to the famous siege of the airbase. There are three reasons why this book should be picked up by anyone interested in this conflict: a) It was one of the rare occasions when U.S. Marines clashed with regular N.V.A. in a large scale engagement stretching over extended period of time. b) The lack of understanding of the situation displayed by U.S. Marines leadership at battalion and higher level in this engagement is astounding, with horrifying losses among ground troops (regularly reaching over 50 percent in individual platoons) as direct consequence. c) Any statements regarding the initial problems with M16 not being that serious are blown out of the water by this book. Personal recollections by people who actually used those initial batches of the rifle prove over and over again that a lot of U.S. infantrymen died because of negligence of authorities while introducing this new weapon onto the battlefield.

The book itself is well-written and very engaging, but it is extremely easy to get confused while reading the narrative of actual combat, which is dealt with at platoon and squad level. Reader must absorb a lot of detailed information regarding dispositions of individual fire-teams and minor terrain features. Frequently, I suffered from information overload and found it impossible to visualize course of action during individual engagements. GoogleEarth was of some help in clarifying some of my questions, but I must nevertheless say that this book screams for a set of detailed maps of Hills 881 and 861 and clearly marked patrol and assault routes taken by the Marine units that were involved in the operations. This lack of graphical material that would be of great assistance for the reader along with complete reliance of the author on U.S. sources (wouldn't it be great to be presented with North-Vietnamese perspective in same volume?) is the main reason why I give this book only 'three stars'. I all other respects, it is an excellent read.

[James Maida · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is an excellent read that shows the disconnect that can form between the troops on the ground and those commanders in the rear. Hits home hard about the shortcomings of the M16 when it was first put into service and the tragic results. And it holds nothing back describing the hell that was the battles in the jungles of Vietnam. You feel for those men looking into the face of death and it brings those of us who have never been there closer to understanding the need to run to a buddies aid even when facing almoset certin death at the hands of the enemy. I highly reccomend this to anyone curious about the world of the American serviceman.

[Tom Nolan]

paperback 4x9