Crítica y clínica

by Gilles Deleuze, Thomas Kauf (Translator)

Barcelona. 22 cm. 211 p. Encuadernacin en tapa blanda de editorial ilustrada. Coleccin 'Coleccin Argumentos', numero coleccion(174). Deleuze, Gilles 1925-1995. Traduccin de Thomas Kauf. Traduccin Critique et clinique. Literatura. Filosofa. Comunicacin escrita. Coleccin Argumentos (Editorial Anagrama). 174 .. Este libro es de segunda mano y tiene o puede tener marcas y seales de su anterior propietario. 8433905244

Genres: Philosophy, Nonfiction, Essays, Theory, France, Literary Criticism, French Literature

216 pages, Hardcover

First published January 1, 1993

About the author

Deleuze is a key figure in poststructuralist French philosophy. Considering himself an empiricist and a vitalist, his body of work, which rests upon concepts such as multiplicity, constructivism, difference and desire, stands at a substantial remove from the main traditions of 20th century Continental thought. His thought locates him as an influential figure in present-day considerations of society, creativity and subjectivity. Notably, within his metaphysics he favored a Spinozian concept of a plane of immanence with everything a mode of one substance, and thus on the same level of existence. He argued, then, that there is no good and evil, but rather only relationships which are beneficial or harmful to the particular individuals. This ethics influences his approach to society and politics, especially as he was so politically active in struggles for rights and freedoms. Later in his career he wrote some of the more infamous texts of the period, in particular, Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus. These texts are collaborative works with the radical psychoanalyst Félix Guattari, and they exhibit Deleuze’s social and political commitment.

Gilles Deleuze began his career with a number of idiosyncratic yet rigorous historical studies of figures outside of the Continental tradition in vogue at the time. His first book, Empirisism and Subjectivity, is a study of Hume, interpreted by Deleuze to be a radical subjectivist. Deleuze became known for writing about other philosophers with new insights and different readings, interested as he was in liberating philosophical history from the hegemony of one perspective. He wrote on Spinoza, Nietzche, Kant, Leibniz and others, including literary authors and works, cinema, and art. Deleuze claimed that he did not write “about” art, literature, or cinema, but, rather, undertook philosophical “encounters” that led him to new concepts. As a constructivist, he was adamant that philosophers are creators, and that each reading of philosophy, or each philosophical encounter, ought to inspire new concepts. Additionally, according to Deleuze and his concepts of difference, there is no identity, and in repetition, nothing is ever the same. Rather, there is only difference: copies are something new, everything is constantly changing, and reality is a becoming, not a being.

He often collaborated with philosophers and artists as Félix Guattari, Michel Foucault, Guy Hocquenghem, René Schérer, Carmelo Bene, François Châtelet, Olivier Revault d'Allonnes, Jean-François Lyotard, Georges Lapassade, Kateb Yacine and many others.

Reviews

[Laurent De Maertelaer · Rating 5 out of 5]

Ik was al een tijdje op zoek naar dit boek, jaren eigenlijk. Hopeloos uitverkocht sinds lang. Ik gaf mijn zoektocht op. Tot ik 'Krank' las van Giuseppe Minervini en hij me terug op het spoor bracht van Deleuze. Opnieuw een paar weken tevergeefs gezocht, zelfs de uitgever aangeschreven. Noppes, kale reis. Tot ik in de kerstvakantie naar het Paard van Troje ging en tot mijn verbazing en jolijt een nagelnieuw exemplaar zag fonkelen bij de 'd' op de filosofieplanken. Kudos!
Deleuze bedwelmt met zijn hoogst originele stijl. Prachtige inzichten, ook. Literatuur is inderdaad een vreemde taal.

[Aslı Can]

Ben Deleuze'ün dilini çok seviyorum, edebi bir eser yazar gibi aktarıyor aklındakileri. Kafa karıştıran hallerini seviyorum. Hiç ilgimi çekmeyen konularda bile yazsa ilgimi kaybetmeden okuyabiliyorum.

Kritik ve Klinik; edebiyat üzerine, psikanaliz üzerine, filozoflar, yazarlar, onların yarattığı karakterler veya tarihi karakterler üzerine yorum-analiz tarzında bölümlerden oluşuyor. Özellikle Artaud, Kafka ya da Herman Melville severlere önerebilim kitabı, çünkü kitabın içinde bol bol bahsi geçiyor bu yazarların.

[Scott · Rating 5 out of 5]

This is probably one of my favorite literary theory books. I should first have said that the word "theory" and its connotations, not to mention all that is "literary", kind of scare the piss out of me. Deleuze writes here of Alfred Jarry, Whitman, Spinoza, Lewis Carroll, and of course Beckett, Nietzsche, and Melville, among others.

It was enough for me to read Deleuze bring Bartleby back to where it should be, a "violently comical text", but fortunately Deleuze doesn't stop there. Yes, there is the usual Deleuze openings, becomings, lines of flight, possibles, schizoid bodies, and stuttering. But here, they are treated quickly, critically (as in literary), and clinically (as in medicinal).

A few remembered highlights for me are 'What Children Say', 'Bartleby; or, The Formula', and 'The Exhausted'

I'll gladly lend or give this book to someone I've hugged or kissed in real life, so if you are a friend and are interested in reading this, let me know.

[Shakiba Shamloo · Rating 3 out of 5]

«فرسوده‌بودن بسیار بیشتر از خسته‌بودن است. خسته صرفاً تحقق را فرسوده است، درحالی‌که فرسوده تمام امر ممکن را می‌فرساید. خسته دیگر نمی‌تواند محقق سازد، ولی فرسوده دیگر نمی‌تواند ممکن کند.»

[natalia · Rating 4 out of 5]

gosto muito de revisitar esse livro e pensar em algumas passagens dele, principalmente os ensaios “a literatura e a vida” e “o que dizem as crianças” que me emocionam sempre:
“não se escreve com as próprias neuroses. a neurose, a psicose, não são passagens de vida, mas estados em que se cai quando o processo é interrompido, impedido, colmatado. a doença não é processo, mas parada de processo. o escritor, enquanto tal, não é doente, é antes médico, médico de si mesmo; escrever é um empreendimento de saúde. não que o escritos tenha uma saúde de ferro, mas ele goza de uma frágil saúde irresistível, que provêm do fato de ter visto e ouvido coisas demasiado grandes, fortes demais para ele, cuja passagem o esgota, dando-lhe contudo devires que uma gorda saúde dominante tornaria impossíveis.”

“a arte também atinge esse estado celestial que já nada guarda de pessoal nem de racional. ela é feita de trajetos e de devires, por isso faz mapas, extensivos e intensivos. à sua maneira, ela diz o que as crianças dizem. a arte é um processo impessoal, onde a obra se compõe de reuniões de trajetórias e devires. tal concepção é a única que pode arrancar a arte do processo pessoal da memória, do ideal coletivo da comemoração: a arte arqueologia [que é também a da psicanálise, com sua noção de sublimação]. ela mesma é uma viagem; ela insere-se em meios não-preexistentes, em caminhos exteriores que, dependentes das relações internas da obra, não preexistem à mesma. é como se alguns caminhos virtuais se colassem ao caminho real, que assim recebe deles novos traçados, novas trajetórias. um mapa de virtualidades, traçado pela arte, se superpõe ao mapa real cujos percursos ela transforma. toda obra comporta uma pluralidade de trajetos que são legíveis segundo aqueles que são retidos. trajetos e devires, a arte os torna presentes uns nos outros; ela torna sensível sua presença mútua, e se define assim, invocando dionísio como o deus dos lugares de passagem e das coisas do esquecimento.”

[Serhii Rafalskyi]

В останній збірці статей Дельоза на сусдініх сторінках можуть співіснувати роздуми про мову, тіло, батька-мати, сутність і форму, кольори, світло й тінь, Бога, життя й час, Кафку/Мелвілла/Бекета/Лоуренса/Арто/Керрола/Вітмена/Мазоха, а потім ще про стоїків, Ніцше і Спінозу (куди ж без цих персонажів).
Для себе ж я шукав роздуми про письменництво, і трохи знайшов.

[TL · Rating 5 out of 5]

1
Literature and Life

'To write is certainly not to impose a form (of expression) on the matter of lived experience. Literature rather moves in the direction of the ill-formed or incomplete, as Gombrowicz said as well as practiced. Writing is a question of becoming, always incomplete, always in the midst of being formed, and goes beyond the matter of any livable or lived experience. It is a process, that is, a passage of Life that traverses both the livable and the lived. Writing is inseparable from becoming: in writing, one becomes-woman, becomes-animal or vegetable, becomes-molecule to the point of becoming-imperceptible. These becomings may be linked to each other by a particular line, or they may coexist at every level, following the doorways, thresholds, and zones that make up the entire universe, as in Lovecraft's powerful oeuvre.

Becoming does not move in the other direction, and one does not become Man, insofar as man presents himself as a dominant form of expression that claims to impose itself on all matter, whereas woman, animal, or molecule always has a component of flight that escapes its own formalization. The shame of being of man—is there any better reason to write? Even when it is a woman who is becoming, she has to become-woman, and this becoming has nothing to do with a state she could claim as her own.

To become is not to attain a form (identification, imitation, Mimesis) but to find the zone of proximity, indiscernibility, or indifferentiation where one can no longer be distinguished from a woman, an animal, or a molecule—neither imprecise nor general, but unforeseen and nonpreexistent, singularized out of population rather than determined in a form. One can institute a zone of proximity with anything, on the condition that one creates the literary means for doing so.

...something passes between the sexes, the genera, or the kingdoms. Becoming is always "between" or "among": a woman between women or animal among others. But the power of the indefinite article is effected only if the term in becoming is stripped of the formal characteristics that make it say the ("the animal is in front of you...")... All writing involves an athleticism, but far from reconciling literature with sports or turning writing into an Olympic event, this athleticism is exercised in flight and in the breakdown of the organic body—an athlete in bed, as Michaux put it. One becomes animal all the more when the animal dies; and contrary to the spiritualist prejudice, it is the animal who knows how to die, who has a sense or premonition of death. Literature begins with a porcupine's death, according to Lawrence, or with the death of a mole, in Kafka...

Language must devote itself to reaching these feminine, animal, molecular detours, and every detour is a becoming-mortal. There are no straight lines, neither in things nor in language. Syntax is the set of a necessary detours that are created in each case to reveal the life in things.

To write is not to recount one's memories and travels, one's loves and griefs, one's dreams and fantasies... In this infantile conception of literature, what we seek at the end of the voyage, or at the heart of a dream, is a father... Even becoming-animal is not safe from an Oedipal reduction of the type "my cat, my dog"... But literature takes the opposite path, and exists only when it discovers beneath apparent persons the power of an impersonal—which is not a generality but a singularity at the highest point: a man, a beast, a stomach, a child... It is not the first two persons that function as the condition for literary enunciation; literature begins only when a third person is born in us that strips us of the power to say "I" (Blanchot's "neuter").

Of course, literary characters are perfectly individuated, and are neither vague nor general; but all their individual traits elevate them to a vision that carries them off in an indefinite, like a becoming that is too powerful for them: Ahab and the vision of Moby Dick... There is no literature without fabulation, but as Bergson was able to see, fabulation—the fabulating function—does not consist in imagining or projecting an ego. Rather, it attains these visions, it raises itself to these becomings and powers.

We do not write with our neuroses. Neuroses or psychoses are not passages of life, but states into which we fall when the process is interrupted, blocked, or plugged up. Illness is not a process but a stopping of the process, as in "the Nietzsche case". Moreover, the writer as such is not a patient but a physician, the physician of himself and of the world. The world is the set of symptoms whose illness merges with man. Literature then appears as an enterprise of health: not that the writer would necessarily be in good health (there would be the same ambiguity here as with athleticism), but he possesses an irresistible and delicate health that stems from what he has seen and heard of things too big for him, too strong for him, suffocating things whose passage exhausts him, while nonetheless giving him the becomings that a dominant and substantial health would render impossible.

The writer returns from what he has seen and heard with bloodshot eyes and pierced eardrums. What health would be sufficient to liberate life whenever it is imprisoned by and within man, by and within organisms and genera? It is like Spinoza's delicate health, while it lasted, bearing witness until the end to a new vision whose passage it remained open to.

Health, as literature, as writing, consists in inventing a people who are missing. It is the task of the fabulating function to invent a people. We do not write with memories, unless it is to make them the origin and collective destination of a people still ensconced in its betrayals and repudiations. American literature has an exceptional power to produce writers who can recount their own memories, but as those of a universal people composed of immigrants from all countries...

This is not exactly a people called upon to dominate the world. It is a minor people, eternally minor, taken up in a becoming-revolutionary. Perhaps it exists only in the atoms of the writer, a bastard people, inferior, dominated, always in becoming, always incomplete. Bastard no longer designates a familial state but the process or drift of the races... This is the becoming of the writer...Though it always refers to singular agents, literature is a collective assemblage of enunciation. Literature is delirium, but delirium is not a father-mother affair: there is no delirium that does not pass through peoples, races, and tribes, and that does not haunt universal history. All delirium is world-historical, a "displacement of races and continents."

Literature is delirium, and as such its destiny is played out between the two poles of delirium.Delirium is a disease, the disease par excellence, whenever it erects a race it claims is pure and dominant. But it is the measure of health when it invokes this oppressed bastard race that ceaselessly stirs beneath dominations, resisting everything that crushes and imprisons, a race that is outlined in relief in literature as process.

Here again, there is always the risk that a diseased state will interrupt the process or becoming; health and athleticism both confront the same ambiguity, the constant risk that a delirium of domination will be mixed with a bastard delirium, pushing literature toward a larval fascism, the disease against which it fights—even if this means diagnosing the fascism within itself and fighting against itself.

The ultimate aim of literature is to set free, in the delirium, this creation of a health or this invention of a people, that is, a possibility of life. To write for this people who are missing... ("for" means less "in the place of" than "for the benefit of").

We can see more clearly the effect of literature on language. Proust says, it opens up a kind of foreign language within language, which is neither another language nor a rediscovered patois, but a becoming-other language, a minorization of this major language, a delirium that carries it off, a witch's line that escapes the dominant system...

Syntactic creation or style—this is the becoming of language. The creation of words or neologisms is worth nothing apart from the effects of syntax in which they are developed. So literature already presents two aspects: through the creation of syntax, it brings about not only a decomposition or destruction of the maternal language, but also the invention of a new language within language. "The only way to defend language is to attack it... Every writer is obliged to create his or her own language..."

Language seems to be seized by a delirium, which forces it out of its usual furrows. As for the third aspect, it stems from the fact that a foreign language cannot be hollowed out in one language without language as a whole in turn being toppled or pushed to a limit, to an outside or reverse side that consists of Visions and Auditions that no longer belong to any language. These visions are not fantasies, but veritable Ideas that the writer sees and hears in the interstices of language, in its intervals. They are not interruptions of the process but breaks that form part of it, like an eternity that can only be revealed in a becoming, or a landscape that only appears in movement. They are not outside language, but the outside of language. The writer as seer and hearer, the aim of literature: it is passage of life within language that constitutes Ideas.'

'We sometimes congratulate writers, but they know that they are far from having achieved their becoming, far from having attained the limit they set for themselves, which ceaselessly slips away from them. To write is also to become something other than a writer ...

If we consider these criteria, we can see that, among all those who make books with a literary intent, even among the mad, there are very few who can call themselves writers.' (1-6)




16
Plato, the Greeks

'Platonism appears as a selective doctrine, as a selection among claimants or rivals. Every thing or every being lays claim to certain qualities. It is a question of judging the well-foundedness or legitimacy of these claims. The Idea is posited by Plato as that which possesses a quality firsthand (necessarily and universally); it then allows us to determine, after certain tests, which things possess that quality secondhand, thirdhand, and so forth, depending on the nature of their participation. Such is the doctrine of judgment.

The legitimate claimant is the participant, the one who possesses the quality secondhand and whose claim is thereby validated by the Idea. Platonism is the philosophical Odyssey, which will be continued in Neoplatonism. It confronts sophism as its enemy, but also as its limit and its double: because he lays claim to anything and everything, there is the great risk that the sophist will scramble the selection and pervert the judgment.

This problem finds its source in the City. Because they refuse any imperial or barbarian transcendence, the Greek societies or cities form fields of immanence (even in the case of the tyrannies). These fields are filled and populated by societies of friends, that is, by free rivals whose claims in each case enter into a competitive agon, and are exercised in diverse domains: love, athletics, politics, the magistratures. In such a regime, opinion obviously assumes a decisive importance.

This is particularly clear in the case of Athens and its democracy: autochthony, philia, doxa are its three fundamental traits, and constitute the conditions under which philosophy was born and developed. In spirit, philosophy can criticize these traits, surpass and correct them, but it nonetheless remains indexed to them. As Vernant has shown, the Greek philosopher invokes an order that is immanent to the cosmos. He presents himself as a friend of wisdom (and not as a wise man, as in the East). He sets out to "rectify" or secure the opinion of men. These characteristics survive in Western societies, even if they have taken on a new meaning, which explains the permanence of philosophy in the economy of our democratic world: the field of immanence of "capital"; the society of brothers or comrades, to which every revolution appeals (and the free competition among brothers); and the reign of opinion.

But what Plato criticizes in the Athenian democracy is the fact that anyone can lay claim to anything; whence his enterprise of restoring criteria of selection among rivals. It will be necessary for him to erect a new type of transcendence, one that differs from imperial or mythical transcendence (although Plato makes use of myth by giving it a special function). He will have to invent a transcendence that can be exercised and situated within the field of immanence itself. This is the meaning of the theory of Ideas.

And modern philosophy will continue to follow Plato in this regard, encountering a transcendence at the heart of immanence as such. The poisoned gift of Platonism is to have introduced transcendence into philosophy, to have given transcendence a plausible philosophical meaning (the triumph of the judgment of God). This enterprise runs up against numerous paradoxes and aporias, which concern, precisely, the status of the doxa (Theaetetus), the nature of friendship and love (Symposium), and the irreducibility of an immanence of the earth (Timaeus).

Every reaction against Platonism is a restoration of immanence in its full extension and its purity, which forbids the return of any transcendence. The question is whether such a reaction abandons the project of a selection among rivals, or on the contrary, as Spinoza and Nietzsche believed, draws up completely different methods of selection. Such methods would no longer concern claims as acts of transcendence, but the manner in which an existing being is filled with immanence (the Eternal Return as the capacity of something or someone to return eternally). Selection no longer concerns the claim, but power: unlike the claim, power is modest. In truth, only the philosophies of pure immanence escape Platonism—from the Stoics to Spinoza or Nietzsche.' (136-7)



6
Nietzsche and Saint Paul, Lawrence and John of Patmos

'...the same type of man could not have written [both] the gospel [of John] and the Apocalypse. It matters little that each of the two texts is complex or composite, and includes so many different things. The question does not concern two individuals or two authors, but two types of man, two regions of the soul, two completely different ensembles. The gospel is aristocratic, individual, soft, amorous, decadent, always rather cultivated. The Apocalypse is collective, popular, uncultivated, hateful, and savage.

...John of Patmos does not even assume the mask of the evangelist, nor that of Christ; he invents another mask, he fabricates another mask that unmasks Christ or, if you prefer, that is superimposed on Christ's mask. John of Patmos deals with cosmic terror and death, whereas the gospel and Christ dealt with human and spiritual love. Christ invented a religion of love (a practice, a way of living and not a belief), whereas the Apocalypse brings a religion of Power—a belief, a terrible manner of judging. Instead of the gift of Christ, an infinite debt.

...Nietzsche was not the first. Nor even Spinoza. A certain number of "visionaries" have opposed Christ as an amorous person to Christianity as a mortuary enterprise. Not that they have an overly accommodating attitude toward Christ, but they do feel the need to avoid confusing him with Christianity. In Nietzsche, there is the great opposition between Christ and Saint Paul: Christ, the softest, most amorous of the decadents, and kind of Buddha who frees us from the domination of priests and the ideas of fault, punishment, reward, judgment, death, and what follows death—

This bearer of glad tidings is doubled by Saint Paul, who keeps Christ on the cross, ceaselessly leading him back to it, making him rise from the dead, displacing the center of gravity toward eternal life, and inventing a new type of priest even more terrible than its predecessors. 'Paul's invention, his means to priestly tyranny, to herd formation: the belief in immortality—that is, the doctrine of "judgment."' (36-7).

[Filip Wijnings · Rating 4 out of 5]

De meest verslavende filosoof

[Rohit Lal · Rating 5 out of 5]

not done yet but many of the essays(1,6,8,11)in here gave me the impression of being the best thing i’ve ever read

[Mateus SSLL · Rating 5 out of 5]

Um livro que indica o ponto, ou a área, onde clínica, literatura, filosofia, e uma ácida psicanálise se encontram. Tratam-se de uma coletânea de artigos: tendo em geral cada capítulo o nome de um autor, dentre eles estão Carrol, Beckett, Kant, Nietzsche (duas vezes), Masoch, Bartleby, Walt Whitman, Lawrence, Platão, Spinoza, etc. Talvez esteja no primeiro capítulo o mais importante e tocante em relação à literatura de modo geral e à clinica: nesta parte do texto Deleuze fala sobre os momentos de 'tornar-se' daquele que escreve, algo de impessoal. Além disso, é neste capítulo que diz que o escrever é um ato de saúde e também um ato produtor de saúde. No campo da crítica literária exclui a primeira e a segunda pessoa do campo da literatura, destitui o poder de um eu e o passa para uma terceira pessoa, para o indefinido, para os personagens outros, impessoais. Deleuze insiste na língua estrangeira dentro da própria língua, na balbucia, na deformação.

Outro momento a ser destacado se passa no capítulo 'o que as crianças dizem', em que é falado sobre o entrelaçamento do real e do imaginário, do circuito do acontecimento (que mais se aproxima do real) e de sua imagem. Da ação e do pensamento; de como o imaginário recobre o real, de como o real necessita da cor de sua imagem virtual para não se tornar algo demasiadamente concreto, de como a imagem fantástica do pensamento precisa do suporte real dos lugares e atos para não se tornar algo demasiadamente aéreo.

A repetição é fundamental nesta obra, vemos as mesmas ideias circularem nos mesmos artigos, comprovando a consistência e a insistência das mesmas.

[Seyhan · Rating 5 out of 5]

L. Wolfson, L. Carroll, Kant, Nietzsche, Aziz Pavlus, Melville, Lawrence, Spinoza gibi devler ve eserleri hakkinda genel bir bilgi, az bucuk bir kavrayis, ilgi yahut bir ön okuma olmaksizin, Deleuze’un idiosyncratic bir sekilde ele aldigi bu deneysel metinler son derece anlamsiz olabilicegi gibi eglenceli bir okuma da olmayacaktir.

Aksine eger metinlerin iceriklerine genel bir hakimiyet varsa Deleuze‘un penceresinden bakarak son derece eglenceli bir okuma da yapilabilir bu kitapla. Mesela G. Deleuze L. Caroll‘in Alice’i icin “Alice’in Yeralti Maceralari“ diye baslar soze , yahut Bartleby icin “I’d rather not to do it“ ile Melville’in ana dilinde yabanci bir dil insa etmesindeki ustaligindan bahseder. Kant’in yapisalciligini ve 3 buyuk elestirisini Saf Aklin Elestirisi, Pratik Aklin Elestirisi, Yarginin Elestirisinde, Prusyali ahlak filozofumuzun arzu ve cogulculuk kavramina yer birakmadigindan yakinir, odev geregi yasamanin ozgurluge ve ozgur iradeye giden yollari tikadigindan bahseder. Descartes’in cogitosu temelli her turlu fenomenolojiye elestirel yaklasir. “Dusunuyorum oyleyse varim”daki ozne yani dusunen 1. Tekil “Ben “ icin “Varlik olarak olmak ,fazlasi degil” diyerek Her turlu fenomenolojik ozne- nesne iliskisine karsi cikar. Son sayfalarinda bir satirda olsa Leibnizla Spinozanin gostergeler ve isik etkileri uzerine dusuncelerini kiyaslayisi bir nevi Deluze tutarsizliginin eglenceli bir gostergesi olarak okunabilir.

[Jake Hirtenstein · Rating 5 out of 5]

An excellent collection of essays by Deleuze. While his literary prowess and knowledge is always apparent in his other works, this is an excellent example of the breadth that he possesses.

In the introduction, Michael W. Smith claims that Deleuze is attempting to draw attention to and perhaps rectify certain problems that plague the psychiatric field. Smith notes the three components in understanding a disease-its symptomatology, its etiology, and its therapy. Symptomatology is essentially the base conceptual framework that constitutes a disease, and is largely a problematic that is derived from a whole or "an ideal picture of health". Smith claims that for Deleuze literature is, in this epoch, where the aesthetic wholes that mediate a people's sense of psychological and spiritual normalcy are created. All literature, all good literature at least, should generate novel becomings for us as a people, in the creation of a people yet to come. It does this by asking us "what is it to be whole?" And following from that, we are asked in what potential ways deviations from this wholeness be problematized in such a way that we can then create a symptomatology that we can use to diagnose an illness or disease (note that the illness is a construct of the symptomatology which is also constructed). I went into the essays with this approach and expectation that the text would in some sense respond to this interesting notion, and it informed my reading as such.

With this in mind, the essays that most stood out for me were in the final third and the Kant essay. There are excellent ones other than that, of course, but these really stuck out to me more than the others. In the last third I found it impossible to not draw connections between those essays, and largely read them as an ontopoetic cycle that builds from Kant's Critique of Judgment. This cycle begins with the analysis of the eternal return as the Being of becoming in the Nietszche essay. He identifies that becoming with language in "He Stuttered", arguing that the way out is to turn a language on its head in the creation of a minor language. He continues with the positing of language qua eternal return or minor becoming as an oscillating dichotomy of shame and glory that subjectivizes a body in the Lawrence essay. Deleuze then deconstructs the judging function of language that launches it into that oscillation in "To Have Done with Judgment", and then argues that the way forward from here is, in typical Deleuzian fashion, a return to immanence whereby the selections that we make about episteme concern power instead of knowledge (an escape from Platonism). In the Spinoza essay, he outlines how this immanent power works, whereby the selections that inform our formal epistemic constructs are posited as effects, analyzing these effects as fields of power laid over various kinds of signs and relations established between signs, their eventual formation into concepts, and their becoming-essential as pure, luminous beings, free of geometric restraint, a purely immanent knowledge-power relation. Finally, this culminates in "The Exhausted" where he lays out the logical operator at the heart of this ontopoetic cycle, the inclusive disjunction. Difference and becoming do indeed occur, but they fall back into themselves. "God, who is the sum total of the possible, merges with Nothing, of which each thing is a modification". Inclusive disjunctions create images-not artistic, but rather aesthetic, in the cumulative sense of a gathering of univocal flows, essences of Life that pop in and out of Being, pure immanences that create and deconstruct subjects with their movements. This cycle is what he terms exhaustion, the process in which subjects create and destroy themselves and the fields of power they are laid across. The image that is exhausted is itself a "movement in the world of the mind." One becomes exhausted by acting as if they already are, by rendering their soul immobile. One can create new images, but it is difficult, requiring one to render themselves into an intensive indefinite that can open a new space within themselves for said image-they must eat that which has already eaten them.

The ontopoetic cycle, then, is a Deleuzian formulation of the eternal return, beginning with the eternal return and ending with a sacred image of the soul, its axis mundi, whereby the conditions of its own being are problematized into its becoming that swallows itself-the potential symptomatology derived from the base selection of metalogical orientation or vision predicates the possible therapy for its own rejuvenation. To me, this is most closely related to the Critique of Judgment, not only because of Deleuze's own essay in this book, but likewise because in that text the power of the imagination and its structuring of the schematism is laid out in a way similar to here-the vision of the imagination is ultimately responsible for the limits and structure of the understanding, as the imagination is how the understanding can come to understand the function of its own faculties and their relation, and with that itself, in a way that is similarly self reflexive and autogenerative to what Deleuze has laid out here.

[Javee]

Imposible no amarte, pequeño uñas. Feliz cumpleaños atrasado

[Molsa Roja(s) · Rating 5 out of 5]

Un llibre excel•lent, excel•lent... Deleuze gaudeix de la literatura bojament i si en fa crítica, si la comenta, és precisament per a enriquir-la, per fer-la més gran i complexe. La introducció és magnífica, i després una es troba amb Melville, Spinoza, TH Lawrence, Nietzsche, Kant... variat i esplendorós camí.

[Майя Ставитская · Rating 4 out of 5]

French poststructuralist philosopher Gilles Deleuze is not the one I was eager to read, but I heard about him as a significant figure of the modern cultural background, and I did not rule out the possibility of making an idea someday on occasion. We know that "someday on occasion" is a euphemism for "never", with Deleuze it would most likely have happened if it hadn't been for the magic pendel of a Long walk, to which I am grateful for many names. which I wouldn't have reached at all if it weren't for the quest tasks of the game. Now I have an idea about him, at least according to the latest and most criticized of the works, which he partially wrote already a patient with lung cancer (it was one lung, he lost the second one while still young due to tuberculosis) and chained to a ventilator.

"Criticism and Clinic" is his solo work, which is a significant detail for Deleuze, who worked in co-authorship for many years - this work was written after the death of his permanent co-author Felix Guattari. I will outline my far from exhaustive understanding of "Criticism and Clinic". With this book, the philosopher summed up his work in the field of literary criticism, which he approached not from the point of view of literary criticism, but considering creativity from the standpoint of philosophical categories. A writer, in his understanding, is a person who becomes a doctor, a clinician of civilization, inventing a "language within a language".

Всегда ускользай
Великий писатель — всегда как чужеземец в языке, он черпает свои силы из немого безвестного меньшинства, принадлежащего ему одному. Он кроит внутри своего языка язык иностранный, коего прежде не существовало.
Фрнцузский философ постструктуралист Жиль Делёз не тот, кого я страстно стремилась прочесть, но слышала о нем, как о значимой фигуре современного культурного бэкграунда, и не исключала возможности составить когда-нибудь при случае представление. Мы знаем, что "когда-нибудь при случае" эвфемизм для "никогда", с Делёзом скорее всего так бы и вышло, не будь волшебного пенделя Долгой прогулки, ей благодарна за многие имена, до которых нипочем не дотянулась бы, когда бы не квестовые задания игры. Теперь у меня есть о нем представление, хотя бы по самой поздней и наиболее критикуемой из работ, которую он частично писал уже больной раком легкого (именно одного легкого, второго лишился еще молодым из-за туберкулеза) и прикованный к аппарату ИВЛ.

"Критика и клиника" его сольный труд, что для Делёза, много лет работавшего в соавторстве, значимая деталь - этот труд написан после смерти его постоянного соавтора Феликса Гваттари. Я конспективно изложу свое, далеко не исчерпывающее, понимание "Критики и клиники". Этой книгой философ подвел итог своим работам в области литературной критики, к которой подходил не с точки зрения литературоведения, но рассматривая творчество с позиций философских категорий. Писатель, в его понимании - человек, который становится врачом, клиницистом цивилизации, изобретая "язык в языке", примерно как в отрывке, который вынесла в эпиграф.

Среди философов, которых мне довелось читать, Делёз один из самых непростых для понимания. Французский постструктурализм вообще в значительной степени вещь в себе, а в его случае отсутствие якорей и привязок осложняется еще полемикой с Кантом, Гегелем, Фрейдом - теми, в ком профаны, интересующиеся развитием философской мысли, обычно находят точку опоры. Канта я вспомнила не случайно, Делёз спорит с ним и критикует три его "Критики", но при этом самого его относят к неокантианцам, хотя трансцендетализм, как мне кажется, сильно не к нему. Ясность изложения и отточенные формулировки словно бы претят Делёзу, любую свою мысль он излагает предельно путаным способом, с заходом во многие смежные области, совершенно пренебрегая примерами, которыми Витгенштейн, Гуссерль, Кьеркегор достаточно ясно иллюстрируют сложные для понимания пассажи. Мысли Делёза на вольном выпасе, гуляют сами по себе, и когда удается какую-то из них ухватить за бочок - это просто праздник.

Вот смотрите, я люблю Шекспира и люблю Канта, и мне было бы очень интересно понять, каким образом Делёз соединяет их в статье "О четырех поэтических формулах, которые могли бы резюмировать философию Канта". Но я начинаю читать, и прихотливая авторская мысль зачем-то многократно ведет меня к Артюру Рэмбо, цитатами из стихов которого Делёз богато иллюстрирует предельно темную воду во облацех своих рассуждений, но практически не нахожу Шекспира, и из дважды прочитанной главы понимаю лишь, что Кант начал как Гамлет, а кончил как король Лир.Что ж, пусть этот бесценный осколок французской философской мысли пребудет со мной.

На самом деле, когда удается ловить за ускользающий кончик какую-нибудь мысль и докручивать ее до логического завершения, она оказывается подлинно драгоценной. Как например вынесенная в эпиграф и очищенная от напластований идея меньшинства, на языке которого говорят подлинно великие авторы. Меньшинства, состоящего из себя, заново переизобретающего язык, который отныне со всеми его корявостями (Платонов) и немыслимыми красотами (Набоков) становится частью общего языка. Что верно как для национального, так и для общечеловеческого.

Вообще идея меньшинства значима для Делёза. Питая огромное уважение к Марксу, от совершенно отрицает классовость, на которой зиждется марксизм. По Делёзу есть один класс - рабов, и одни рабы владеют другими. Вне этого те, кто научился ускользать, и вот это уже почти пелевинские "Затворник и Шестипалый", это я понимаю и люблю. Кстати о способах и методике ускользания - им собственно как и мироустройству по Делёзу, посвящена "Тысяча плато", и теперь я думаю, что найду возможность почитать эту вещь.Невзирая.

Резюмируя: чтение сложное даже для подготовленного читателя. Но интересное и небесполезное.

[Maksym Karpovets · Rating 5 out of 5]

Одна із моїх улюблених книжок Жиля Дельоза, до якого я ставлюсь дуже неоднозначно. З одного боку, мені подобається його "лабораторія концептів", певна інтуїтивна логіка щодо злободенності, але мені водночас дико не подобається його психоаналітичний синтез всього зі всім, тобто те, що тримало назву шизоаналізу. Однак ця збірка -- неймовірна інтелектуальна пригода! Дельоз просто нереально цікаво (водночас доволі ясно й зрозуміло, що для естетики постмодернізму взагалі є дивовижним) розповідає про Керрола, Спінозу, Ніцше, Уітмана та інших. Раджу читати як тим, хто вперше знайомиться із дивним дзеркальним світом постмодернізму, так і тим, хто просто хоче побачити улюблених письменників та філософів під незвичним кутом зору. Однозначно річ у favorites.

[Brock · Rating 4 out of 5]

I bought this book after reading some of the "plateaus" because I wanted to see how Deleuze tackles literary criticism, esp in his reading of "Bartleby." Turns out that Bartleby's famous refrain plays right into Deleuze's ideas about indeterminacy and the character without qualities, and Deleuze extends his discussion of Bartleby's "formula" to flesh out a theory of literary language and the differences between American and European fiction. Well worth the effort it often takes to read Deleuze. He's much more focused and lucid in his critical writings than he is in his philosophical "lines of flight," although from a Deleuzian point of view that might not be a compliment.

[Arno · Rating 4 out of 5]

Particularly enjoyed essays "Literature and Life", "Lewis Carroll", "Re-presentations of Masoch","What Children Say", "Bartleby; or, The Formula", "He Stuttered", "The Shame and the Glory: T.E. Lawrence", "To Have Done with Judgement", "Spinoza and the Three Ethics".

[Karl Hallbjörnsson · Rating 4 out of 5]

Some great stuff in here. The essay on Wolfson was supremely engrossing and the one on Bartleby as well, the Lewis Carroll one was good as well and The Exhausted and the one on Jarry were alright as well.

[Nate · Rating 5 out of 5]

the first essay, "literature and life," is fantabulous. and his bit on whitman is thrilling.

[Charles · Rating 5 out of 5]

A great set of essays with a magnificent introduction. Review published in Symploké 6.1-2 (1998 [published in 2000]): 192-196.

[homoness · Rating 2 out of 5]

the bartleby text i liked but a lot of this is either really naive or just needlessly affirmationist. in many ways, deleuze really didnt age well.

[Eric Phetteplace · Rating 5 out of 5]

Great set of essays mostly on literary topics, some redundancy but I didn't mind. Loved the essay on Bartleby, the Scrivener the most.

[Aylin]

"Kılıç değil, kılıcın ışıltısı, kedisiz gülümseme gibi, kılıçsız ışıltı. Hiçbir şeyi anlamdan geçirmeden, her şeyi anlamsızın içinde oynatmak Carroll'ın işidir..." s. 33
"... şeyler insanlardan daha tehlikelidir: Onlar beni algılamadan ben onları algılayamam, bu haliyle her algı, algının algısıdır. Bu ikinci durumun çözümü, hayvanları kovmaktan, aynanın, mobilyaların üstünü örtmekten, renkli taşbaskıyı söküp almaktan, fotoğrafları yırtmaktan ibarettir: Bu ikili algının yok oluşudur." s. 35
"Hamlet harekete geçmek için zamana gerçekten ihtiyacı olan ilk kahramandır, oysa öteki kahramanlar zamana, ilksel bir hareketin (Aiskhylos) ya da uygunsuz bir eylemin (Sophokles) sonucu olarak maruz kalır. Saf Aklın Eleştirisi, Kuzeyin Prensi Hamlet'in kitabıdır." s. 40
"Ben bir başkasıdır..." Rimbaud
Descartes'ın cogito'su, zamanın sekülerleşmesi, laikleşmesi: Düşünüyorum, belirlenmemiş bir varoluş içeren (varım), ve bu varoluşu, düşünen bir tözün varoluşu olarak belirleyen (ben düşünen bir şey'im) anlık bir belirleme edimidir... ...Kant, zamanın ikinci bir özgürleşmesini gerçekleştirir ve laikleşmesini tamamlar." s. 40- 41
"...Hamlet, oyuncunun ya da uyuyanın yaptığı gibi, düşüncesinin etkinliğini bir başkası ... olarak alımlayan edilgin bir varoluş gibi ortaya çıkmakla son derece Kantçı karakterini ilan eder." s. 41 "Hamlet, kuşkuculuk ya da kuşku insanı değil, Eleştiri insanıdır." s. 42 "Öznenin deliliği, zıvanasından çıkmış bir zamana tekabül eder." s. 42
"Bilinmeyen yasalarla yönetilmek ne azaptır!... Zira böylelikle, yasaların karakteri, içerikleri hakkındaki gizliliği gerektirir..." Kafka, Çin Seddi. Antik bilinç. "Yasalar, tanrıların terk ettiği bir dünyada İyinin bir temsilcisi, bir "ikinci kaynak"tır." s. 43 "...yasalar bilgi açısından, şu ve bu durumda İyinin taklidi gibidir." s. 44 Pratik Aklın Eleştirisi yorumu 44, 45, 46, 47. Yüce 46, 47
"...Kant'ın Shakespeare'vari yanı Hamlet gibi başlar ve Kral Lear olarak biter..." s.47
"İncil, aristokratik, bireysel, yumuşak, sevgi dolu, simgeci ve yeterince kültürlüdür. vahiy, kolektif, avam, kültürsüz, kin dolu ve vahşidir." s. 48

[Guilherme Smee · Rating 4 out of 5]

"A escrita é inseparável do devir: ao escrever, estamos num devir-mulher, num devir-animal ou vegetal, num devir-molécula, ate num devir-imperceptível. Esses devires encadeiam-se uns aos outras segundo uma linhagem particular, como num romance de Le Clezio, ou então coexistem em rodos os níveis, segundo portas, limiares e zonas que compõem 0 universo inteiro, como na pujante obra de Lovecraft. 0 devir não vai no sentido inverso, e não entramos num devir-Homem, uma vez que 0 homem se apresenta" como uma forma de expressão dominante que pretende impor-se a toda matéria, ao passo que mulher, animal ou molécula tem sempre um componente de fuga que se furta Ii sua própria formalização. A vergonha de ser um homem: haveria razão melhor para escrever? Mesmo quando e uma mulher que devem, ela tem de devir-mulher, e esse devir nada tem a ver com um estado que ela poderia reivindicar. Devir não e atingir uma forma (identificação, imitação, Mimese), mas encontrar a zona de vizinhança, de indiscernibilidade ou de indiferenciação tal que já não seja possível distinguir-se de urna mulher, de um animal ou de uma molécula: não imprecisos nem gerais, mas imprevistos, não-preexistentes, tanto menos determinados numa forma quanto se singularizam numa população".

[fake · Rating 5 out of 5]

I think I was able to decipher most of it correctly. Here's my interpretation:

You're saying that "Critical and Clinical" is the first book by Deleuze that you found generally accessible and readable, except maybe for the last two essays. You think it's a great introduction to his work, and perhaps it was Guattari (Deleuze's frequent collaborator) who was responsible for making some of Deleuze's other texts more difficult to read.

In this book, Deleuze explores the concept of "true reading" and "true writing." He argues that every great book is written in a kind of foreign language, and that each great book creates its own readers. Deleuze examines how language works within language by destabilizing or deteriorating the meaning of original words, allowing the meaning to shift and change. He illustrates this idea using examples from authors like Melville, Kafka, and Blake.

You're humble about discussing Deleuze's ideas, feeling that when you try to explain them, you sound "stupid and preposterous." However, when Deleuze himself writes about these concepts, it makes perfect sense to you. So, you'd rather let Deleuze speak for himself, rather than trying to elaborate further in your review.

Is that a correct interpretation of your voice-typed review?

[Alfredo Suárez Palacios · Rating 4 out of 5]

Muy Deleuze, me gusta cuando se pone crítico de literatura porque no sabe muy bien como hacerlo y a veces simplemente da vueltas sobre una frase para contar lo suyo, pero es que lo suyo es muy bueno. Es un poco lo que sucede en el ensayo sobre Kant que va hilando diferentes citas literarias para explicar el aspecto más kantiano de Hamlet y está muy bien, es un texto que he disfrutado mucho. El ensayo más literario creo que es el análisis de la obra de Melville, aquí si entra en contacto con los personajes, expone sus formas y da rienda suelta a un verdadero amor por la obra de Melville y termina por esbozar una maravillosa idea del espíritu americano que me encanta. Luego hay otros ensayos que están bien pero parecen un poco relleno, Lewis Carrol podía haber sido más y es un articulillo interesante, pero parece una introducción a otra cosa (algo que es realmente la Lógica dle Sentido donde analiza muy a fondo la obra de Carrrol).

[Noah Thellman · Rating 5 out of 5]

1. Spinoza essay (three ethics, Pure Light - Color - Shadow, Affects and Affections / Vectorial and Scalar, Signs Concepts Precepts)
2. Bartleby essay (I would prefer not to)
3. Nietzsche and Revelation essay (John v Christ, heaven as panopticon, resentment and Paul)
4. Lawrence of Arabia essay (lisan al gaib)
5. Literature and life essay (writing is a becoming imperceptible)
6. Beckett essay (language combinatorials exhaustion)
7. Whitman essay (America is minoritarian and revolutionary)
8. Artaud essay (Judgement is bad)
9. Kant essay (time is unhinged)

[heychipx · Rating 4 out of 5]

« La vitalité non-organique est le rapport du corps à des forces ou puissances imperceptibles qui s'en emparent ou dont il s'empare, comme la lune s'empare du corps d'une femme: Héliogabale anarchiste ne cessera de témoigner dans l'œuvre d'Artaud pour cet affrontement des forces et des puissances, comme autant de devenir minéraux, végétaux, animaux. Se faire un corps sans organes, trouver son corps sans organes est la manière d'échapper au jugement. »

[M de Maestro · Rating 3 out of 5]

Interesante en cuanto a la relación de la literatura y la salud, la cuestión del tercero en la literatura, pero hasta ahí. La voluntad de estilo parece decir más de lo que el contenido realmente ofrece.