The False Prison: A Study of the Development of Wittgenstein's Philosophy, Volume 1

by David Pears

This is the first of two volumes which describe the development of Wittgenstein's philosophy from the Tracatus to his later writings. Part I of this volume is a survey of the whole of his work; Part II is a detailed examination of the central ideas for his early system. The second volume will cover later philosophy. The book fills a gap in the literature on Wittgenstein between brief introductions and detailed commentaries. Although necessarily selective, the doctrines and ideas chosen for detailed discussion are those which reveal the general structure of Wittgenstein's work. David Pears has taken full account of the origins of Wittgenstein's philosophy and its relation to the philosophies of his predecessors and contemporaries. But the author's main emphasis is on the internal organization of Wittgenstein's thought. Philosophy students concentrate on the details of his work but often find it difficult to see their place in the general pattern. This book presents the general and the particular within a relatively constant framework, thereby making Wittgenstein's thought more accessible to students of philosophy and to non-specialists.

Genres: Philosophy, Nonfiction

224 pages, Paperback

First published September 3, 1987

Reviews

[Liedzeit Liedzeit · Rating 3 out of 5]

A phenomenological language is always a language for describing the world as we found it, phenomena not things in themselves. 98.
Pears wendet sich gegen beide extremen Interpretationen, wonach Gegenstände entweder sense data oder phsikalische Punkte seien.
S.100 Ishiguros und McGuinness Interpretation, nach der die Gegenstände von den Elementarsätzen abhängen. (Nur im Zusammenhang mit dem Satz hat Name Sinn). Namen sind nur Dummy-Namen.
Pears meint, objects müßten im Prinzip accessible sein (weil sie der Welt, wie wir sie finden, angehören) ??
Ishiguro: The reference of a name is fixed partly by the propositional contexts in which it makes sense. 105
Pears führt dagegen 2.02331 an. Entweder ein Ding hat Eigenschaften, die kein anderes hat... Das scheint zu zeigen, daß es doch definite decriptions von Gegenständen geben kann.