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The Untold Story Of India Partition: The Shadow Of The Great Game
Historians and political analysts have not paid enough attention to the crucial link between Indias partition and British fears about the USSR gaining control of Central Asia. Realizing that Indian nationalists would not play the Great Game against the Soviet Union, the British settled for those willing to do so, using Islam as a political tool in pursuit of their objectives. How this operation was conceived and carried out forms the theme of this untold story of India's partition.Narendra Singh Sarila unearths top-secret documents which throw new light on several prominent political figures of the era, while bringing out little-known facts about the pressure that the US exerted on Britain to grant India her independence.The author also traces the roots of the present Kashmir imbroglio in this fascinating account.
450 pages, Paperback
First published July 1, 2006
108 people are currently reading
1687 people want to read
About the author
Narendra Singh Sarila
2 books11 followersNarendra Singh Sarila was aide-de-camp to Lord Mountbatten and served in the Indian Foreign Service,1948–85. He joined the Indian delegation to the UN, and was India’s ambassador in Spain, Brazil, Libya, Switzerland, and France.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 42 reviews
May 28, 2018
Good second look at the role of cold war geopolitics in shaping the post-colonial era. The insights Singh Sarila offers here could only be offered by an Indian on the inside of things: Brit and American accounts dwell, as expected, on their own self-congratulating nobility in permitting decolonization rather than the Western advantages extracted from the process. Singh Sarila makes stark and persuasive cases: that the Congress Party's insistence on its own vanguard role drove the Muslims and Jinnah closer to the British than they might have gone; that the US was interested in India's freedom as a way to weaken Britain's postwar influence and keep the UK under American leadership; that a Nehruvian India was not seen as a trustworthy partner in the new chapter of the Great Game opening after 1945, but a separate Pakistan would be.
The outcome would have deadly repercussions beyond the trauma of Partition. The bloodbath of Bangladesh twenty-five years later is the child of the misbegotten pairing of the Punjab and Bengal, in one Pakistan on two sides of the subcontinent, with the resulting communal cleansing, neo-genocide, and war that could have made Vietnam a mere sideshow. Reading Singh Sarila along with Gary J. Bass' "The Blood Telegram" one will develop a very thorough understanding of not only the cold war Great Game, but its continuing legacy in the "War on Terror;" why Nixon and Kissinger continued their sponsorship of Pakistan despite the cost to South Asia; why the US today insists on its "friendship" with Pakistan despite much evidence to the contrary. More proof that the past is not only present, but often not truly past.
The outcome would have deadly repercussions beyond the trauma of Partition. The bloodbath of Bangladesh twenty-five years later is the child of the misbegotten pairing of the Punjab and Bengal, in one Pakistan on two sides of the subcontinent, with the resulting communal cleansing, neo-genocide, and war that could have made Vietnam a mere sideshow. Reading Singh Sarila along with Gary J. Bass' "The Blood Telegram" one will develop a very thorough understanding of not only the cold war Great Game, but its continuing legacy in the "War on Terror;" why Nixon and Kissinger continued their sponsorship of Pakistan despite the cost to South Asia; why the US today insists on its "friendship" with Pakistan despite much evidence to the contrary. More proof that the past is not only present, but often not truly past.
August 12, 2025
An excellent book which should be read by anyone whose view of India/Pakistan 'independence' is based only on the readable but ridiculous Mountbatten propaganda of 'Freedom at Midnight'. That the author of this book was an aide de camp to Mountbatten should not lead one to imagine he was at the centre of events. Viceroy's had a lot of aide de camps.
What the author offers is interesting but not entirely reliable nor solidly based speculation on how what happened in 1947 played out years later in 9/11. Of course the present is rooted in the past but simplistic counter-factual reasoning should always be approached with caution. The book is excellent though in placing India's post WWII independence within a framework of British colonial thinking. No one wants to admit it now but nonsense like the theory of the martial races coloured a great deal of thinking in Whitehall. The prejudices and delusions of Britain's colonial elite were surprisingly simplistic and blind to change. Indeed they rather enjoyed seeing India fall apart and descend into chaos in the grip of massive sulk amounting to 'I told you so' sour grapes. Mountbatten saw what was coming and shifted the timetable for independence forward to ensure it didn't blow up while still Britain's responsibility.
Very readable and very worth reading - but it isn't the whole story.
What the author offers is interesting but not entirely reliable nor solidly based speculation on how what happened in 1947 played out years later in 9/11. Of course the present is rooted in the past but simplistic counter-factual reasoning should always be approached with caution. The book is excellent though in placing India's post WWII independence within a framework of British colonial thinking. No one wants to admit it now but nonsense like the theory of the martial races coloured a great deal of thinking in Whitehall. The prejudices and delusions of Britain's colonial elite were surprisingly simplistic and blind to change. Indeed they rather enjoyed seeing India fall apart and descend into chaos in the grip of massive sulk amounting to 'I told you so' sour grapes. Mountbatten saw what was coming and shifted the timetable for independence forward to ensure it didn't blow up while still Britain's responsibility.
Very readable and very worth reading - but it isn't the whole story.
July 18, 2014
The author was an ADC to Mr Mountbatten in 1947-48. That is itself lends considerable authority to the tome. Further, the book has been extensively researched in the Oriental and Indian Collection of the British Library, Hartley Library Southampton, Public Records Office Kew, Archives Of The State Department of the USA, National Archives Washington, Library Of The US Congress...
The book traces a full-scale Anglo-Muslim league alliance with the single objective of ensuring a British and Allied presence in the event of a Russian advance. All the players in the Allies were insistent on retaining some form of control over some part of North-Western India to combat the Communist threat. This was the backdrop against which Jinnah's offer of cooperation on 4th September 1939 began to make tremendous sense; thereafter every British move was solidly in favour of Jinnah and Partition...
The book then goes on to dwell on the increasing pressure by the United States on The UK to grant India Independence. On this, the Brits were in a bad spot: until they happened upon Jinnah. They assiduously built up Jinnah, and created the impression in the eyes of the World that Hindus and Muslims were not capable of staying together, that it was the British that were keeping India from chaos. The deft way the Brits handled this and successfully turned over the Americans to their point of view reads like a lesson in ugly diplomacy and espionage
The book proves in no uncertain terms that the Brits were aware of the August 1946 riots and deliberately chose to do nothing. The Brits were informed by their own people of the massacre that would undoubtedly take place in Punjab in 1947 if they continued on their plans. This information and warnings were studiously ignored. It proves how each and every attempt by the Congress to hold onto an United India were stymied by the Brits, of how genuine but naive Congress attempts were checkmated effectively by the Brits. Playing both sides of the coin: the Brits achieved what they had set out to from the start: maintain control of North-West India. There was even a plan to hold onto Baluchistan in case India remained undivided. It showcases how Jinnah and company used the communist card and the availability of Pakistan as a base for Allied military operations in future as carrot to keep British and US interests. This is told in the backdrop of an idealist but correct Congress which was clear that India would become a republic, and would never allow foreign forces on its soil ever again...
The book traces a full-scale Anglo-Muslim league alliance with the single objective of ensuring a British and Allied presence in the event of a Russian advance. All the players in the Allies were insistent on retaining some form of control over some part of North-Western India to combat the Communist threat. This was the backdrop against which Jinnah's offer of cooperation on 4th September 1939 began to make tremendous sense; thereafter every British move was solidly in favour of Jinnah and Partition...
The book then goes on to dwell on the increasing pressure by the United States on The UK to grant India Independence. On this, the Brits were in a bad spot: until they happened upon Jinnah. They assiduously built up Jinnah, and created the impression in the eyes of the World that Hindus and Muslims were not capable of staying together, that it was the British that were keeping India from chaos. The deft way the Brits handled this and successfully turned over the Americans to their point of view reads like a lesson in ugly diplomacy and espionage
The book proves in no uncertain terms that the Brits were aware of the August 1946 riots and deliberately chose to do nothing. The Brits were informed by their own people of the massacre that would undoubtedly take place in Punjab in 1947 if they continued on their plans. This information and warnings were studiously ignored. It proves how each and every attempt by the Congress to hold onto an United India were stymied by the Brits, of how genuine but naive Congress attempts were checkmated effectively by the Brits. Playing both sides of the coin: the Brits achieved what they had set out to from the start: maintain control of North-West India. There was even a plan to hold onto Baluchistan in case India remained undivided. It showcases how Jinnah and company used the communist card and the availability of Pakistan as a base for Allied military operations in future as carrot to keep British and US interests. This is told in the backdrop of an idealist but correct Congress which was clear that India would become a republic, and would never allow foreign forces on its soil ever again...
October 25, 2014
This is a well thought out book that makes the reader rethink the causes of India's partition and the ensuing problems. While we usually blame the policy of "divide and rule" and the wiles of Indian politicians, we don't think of it as a well thought out British strategy to keep control of a part of south Asia and form a bulwark (along with the then pliant Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia) against Soviet incursions into the oil rich middle-east. What is also quite clear is the implacable hatred of the nationalists within the British bureaucracy and the desire to have a friendly presence in the sub-continent by allying with the Muslim League ruled Pakistan.
While it was natural for the colonizers to favour the Muslim League, it is quite astounding that Congress leaders did not try to establish warmer relations with the erstwhile oppressors during negotiations. In one of the many "if-only" moments, one wonders what would have happened had the Congress not abandoned the NWFP in a shameful deal with the British. Dr Khan Sahib might well have swung the referendum in India's favour and minimized (if not killed) the attractions of a separate nation for Jinnah and Britain. The author's theory on the partition being a continuation of the great game is further bolstered by the fact that Gilgit (then a part of Kashmir) was taken over by Pakistan through a coup engineered by British officers (who had sworn to serve the King of Kashmir) in October 1947.
The author argues that the British merely wanted a strategic presence in the sub-continent rather than a weak India (as is brought out by their efforts to integrate princely states like Hyderabad). I would submit that a strong India also served British interests during the Cold War - a Balkanized one would have been easy pickings for the USSR.
While the prose is slightly laboured in parts, this book is still well worth a read.
While it was natural for the colonizers to favour the Muslim League, it is quite astounding that Congress leaders did not try to establish warmer relations with the erstwhile oppressors during negotiations. In one of the many "if-only" moments, one wonders what would have happened had the Congress not abandoned the NWFP in a shameful deal with the British. Dr Khan Sahib might well have swung the referendum in India's favour and minimized (if not killed) the attractions of a separate nation for Jinnah and Britain. The author's theory on the partition being a continuation of the great game is further bolstered by the fact that Gilgit (then a part of Kashmir) was taken over by Pakistan through a coup engineered by British officers (who had sworn to serve the King of Kashmir) in October 1947.
The author argues that the British merely wanted a strategic presence in the sub-continent rather than a weak India (as is brought out by their efforts to integrate princely states like Hyderabad). I would submit that a strong India also served British interests during the Cold War - a Balkanized one would have been easy pickings for the USSR.
While the prose is slightly laboured in parts, this book is still well worth a read.
December 14, 2014
The book is unbiased and fearless.
It puts the entire partition scenario in perspective.
There are 3 main players involved in India's partition: Congress, Muslim League and the British Government.
The book provides enough context and history of all the players before reaching the climax.
I would have given it five stars but it is not a comprehensive account of what happened at that time.
The book provides only an aerial view of the story of India's partition but not the details. It successfully explains the motivations behind this tragic event and reveals that it was a necessary evil.
If you want to know why partition was unavoidable then this book is not enough but it is certainly a great introduction into the subject.
For those researching on partition, this book is a must have on their shelf, and yes, it is well written; brisk and smartly organised.
It doesn't feel like a history lesson at all, the drama and suspense around partition is superbly described by the author.
It puts the entire partition scenario in perspective.
There are 3 main players involved in India's partition: Congress, Muslim League and the British Government.
The book provides enough context and history of all the players before reaching the climax.
I would have given it five stars but it is not a comprehensive account of what happened at that time.
The book provides only an aerial view of the story of India's partition but not the details. It successfully explains the motivations behind this tragic event and reveals that it was a necessary evil.
If you want to know why partition was unavoidable then this book is not enough but it is certainly a great introduction into the subject.
For those researching on partition, this book is a must have on their shelf, and yes, it is well written; brisk and smartly organised.
It doesn't feel like a history lesson at all, the drama and suspense around partition is superbly described by the author.
March 23, 2020
I picked up this book after I came across someone's 10 best reading list in some magazine (do not remember the person nor the magazine). Another reasons were my love for history and lots of debates on Kashmir and Pakistan in our media. I must tell you, It was a good pick.
Narendra Singh has researched on this topic extensively. He has an exhaustive list of sources and he quotes most of the important conversations between important political leaders. You get to know first had accounts of conversations, letters and thoughts exchanged between people. Some of them are very shocking (in fact most of them are very shocking).
I take pride in our freedom struggle and considers Gandhi, Nehru, Bhagat Singh and Bose the front runners in our fight against Britishers. In fact I honor and appreciate the paths chosen by most of our freedom fighters for it was not easy to live a life of rebel in those days. I was aghast that these people had very limited effect on Britishers. And that our independence was largely a result of world politics than domestic freedom struggles as we are taught in our history books.
In all the letters which are quoted, it is quite easy to conclude that Indian politicians were naive and had no understanding of International politics. There was zero interest to even understand motives of other nations. There were times when US government came in support of Indian Independence, but did not get any support from Indians for Nehru detested American Capitalism.
There are lots of interesting conversations and analysis of those conversations among Indian and world Political leaders which were eye openers to me.
Let me start with Jinnah. Jinnah had no acceptance (or very limited) among the Muslims till as late as 1946. He was just a high profile Barrister who had better understanding of world politics and better negotiation skills than most Congress Ministers. It is an interesting read as to how Jinnah garnered British Support for Pakistan. There were two main reasons why Britishers supported creation of Pakistan -
1. Pakistan would act as region where British can counter Soviet Union and support their diplomacy with Middle East
2. The assumption that Hindu Majority government cannot take care of the interests of Muslims
There is a particular instance which I felt started a chain of events and changed the course of Indian independence -
'It is about a conversation between Gandhi and then viceroy of India Linlithgow in 1939 during second world war. Hitler had conquered France and was about to attack Britain. Churchil had become the PM of Britain. That was the time when British parliament was considering surrendering to Hitler. And Churchill kind of changed the course of world war. It was at this time that Gandhi told Linlithgow to allow Hitler into Britain, allow him to plunder the country, allow him to slaughter their men, women and children. Gandhi probably wanted to preach his policy of non-violence to Britishers. But such a hostile statement coming from a senior member of INC did not go well with the Viceroy. This statement started a chain of events which altered the path of our independence and our geography as well. Britishers were looking for support in world war, hearing this statement from Gandhi, made them look towards Jinnah. That was the time they started planning for Pakistan for their own strategic purpose. When US tried to create pressure on Britain for India’s independence and unity, Churchil would shut them up by pointing to Gandhi’s statement.
Another instance of importance is a conversation between Mountbatten and Gandhi after partition in 1948 when Pakistani tribal raiders had invaded Kashmir. Due to the war Pakistan was cash strapped. It had borrowed 20 crore from Nizam of Hyderbad. Pakistan also claimed right to receive 55 Crore from India as a settlement for partition. But Indian ministers did not clear this amount. Mountbatten tried convincing Gandhi for this. Gandhi was of the opinion that Indians should pay this amount. He said (quoted) “once my fast has started, they may not refuse me”. And it is only to save Gandhi’s life India agreed to pay Pakistan.
Narendra Singh has researched on this topic extensively. He has an exhaustive list of sources and he quotes most of the important conversations between important political leaders. You get to know first had accounts of conversations, letters and thoughts exchanged between people. Some of them are very shocking (in fact most of them are very shocking).
I take pride in our freedom struggle and considers Gandhi, Nehru, Bhagat Singh and Bose the front runners in our fight against Britishers. In fact I honor and appreciate the paths chosen by most of our freedom fighters for it was not easy to live a life of rebel in those days. I was aghast that these people had very limited effect on Britishers. And that our independence was largely a result of world politics than domestic freedom struggles as we are taught in our history books.
In all the letters which are quoted, it is quite easy to conclude that Indian politicians were naive and had no understanding of International politics. There was zero interest to even understand motives of other nations. There were times when US government came in support of Indian Independence, but did not get any support from Indians for Nehru detested American Capitalism.
There are lots of interesting conversations and analysis of those conversations among Indian and world Political leaders which were eye openers to me.
Let me start with Jinnah. Jinnah had no acceptance (or very limited) among the Muslims till as late as 1946. He was just a high profile Barrister who had better understanding of world politics and better negotiation skills than most Congress Ministers. It is an interesting read as to how Jinnah garnered British Support for Pakistan. There were two main reasons why Britishers supported creation of Pakistan -
1. Pakistan would act as region where British can counter Soviet Union and support their diplomacy with Middle East
2. The assumption that Hindu Majority government cannot take care of the interests of Muslims
There is a particular instance which I felt started a chain of events and changed the course of Indian independence -
'It is about a conversation between Gandhi and then viceroy of India Linlithgow in 1939 during second world war. Hitler had conquered France and was about to attack Britain. Churchil had become the PM of Britain. That was the time when British parliament was considering surrendering to Hitler. And Churchill kind of changed the course of world war. It was at this time that Gandhi told Linlithgow to allow Hitler into Britain, allow him to plunder the country, allow him to slaughter their men, women and children. Gandhi probably wanted to preach his policy of non-violence to Britishers. But such a hostile statement coming from a senior member of INC did not go well with the Viceroy. This statement started a chain of events which altered the path of our independence and our geography as well. Britishers were looking for support in world war, hearing this statement from Gandhi, made them look towards Jinnah. That was the time they started planning for Pakistan for their own strategic purpose. When US tried to create pressure on Britain for India’s independence and unity, Churchil would shut them up by pointing to Gandhi’s statement.
Another instance of importance is a conversation between Mountbatten and Gandhi after partition in 1948 when Pakistani tribal raiders had invaded Kashmir. Due to the war Pakistan was cash strapped. It had borrowed 20 crore from Nizam of Hyderbad. Pakistan also claimed right to receive 55 Crore from India as a settlement for partition. But Indian ministers did not clear this amount. Mountbatten tried convincing Gandhi for this. Gandhi was of the opinion that Indians should pay this amount. He said (quoted) “once my fast has started, they may not refuse me”. And it is only to save Gandhi’s life India agreed to pay Pakistan.
March 7, 2018
In reading this book, I got the feeling that it was written largely for Indian audiences as a way of informing them about the tangled factors that went into Indian partition. The author spins a tale of fragile egos, anti-Communist grand strategy on the part of Great Britain, anti-imperialist pressure from the United States in favor of a united independent India that was not to be, as well as bungling on the part of India's Congress Party leaders. As someone who has at least some interest in India's history and politics [1], I found a great deal of this book to be of interest, but this book is certainly one that was written by an insider and as such it tends to suffer like many books of that kind do from simply being so long in large part because the author is trying to show off his knowledge of secret or semi-secret writings from the British as well as his insight into the misguided action of India's native political elite in the period before and during and just after World War II that led to the division of India into multiple independent nations.
At more than 400 pages, this is sizable book, no doubt, with its material focused in a relatively small amount of large chapters that demand a great deal of close reading given the way that the author returns back to the same points over and over again from one chapter to another and keeps several threads active at the same time. The author begins with a preface and some friendly acknowledgements before beginning the book proper with a discussion of the Great Game, a unifying concept he returns to over and over again, even if it seems inappropriate to this reader to compare that imperial context with the fight against Communism [1]. After that the author introduces the theme of the Anglo-Muslim League alliance that was key to establishing an independent Muslim state [2]. More discussion on Jinnah's role in starting the (ultimately successful) Pakistan scheme follows [3] along with a look at the Churchill-Roosevelt clash between British desires for a continued Raj and America's consistent hostility to imperialism [4]. A couple of chapters then follow that focus on the Indian Hindu side such as Mahatma's ill-advised fury [5] and the triangulation that took place between India, the UK, and the United States [6]. A chapter follows on Wavell's successful efforts to play the "Great Game" that make him, in the author's eyes, the evil genius of partition [7], along with Atlee's smoke screens that successfully allowed them to place the responsibility for partition on the Indians themselves [8]. After this comes a look at Nehru's leadership of the postwar pre-Independence dominion of India [9] as well as a discussion of Montbatten's savvy diplomatic work in preserving good feelings between the UK and India as independence loomed [10]. After this, the book takes an increasingly melancholy look at the end of empire [11] and two chapters on the 1947-48 war in Kashmir [12, 13] before the author adds a post-script to finish the work [14] in a reflective fashion.
It is impossible for this reader to follow the writer exactly as far as his counterfactual speculations are concerned. I would have liked to have read more about the ability of Bhutan and (at least initially) Sikkim in preserving their independence from India, although the author shows no interest in talking about this. The author is clearly a patriotic Indian nationalist, albeit one who finds a great deal to be critical about concerning the attitudes of the Nationalists that encouraged the British to look to their own geopolitical interests as they faced an exit from the Indian subcontinent. The author wants Indians to know that Montbatten wasn't to blame for partition and that the United States was a faithful if somewhat awkward friend of Indian independence, two things that Indians might not be aware of before reading this immensely popular book. In reading this book I felt that the author didn't do enough to make this book accessible to American audiences, using a lot of Indian terms that were unnecessary for international consumption. Yet this book is informative, if more than a little gloomy, even though in looking at this book and its arguments that I cannot fault the British for doing what they did in the face of Indian squishiness against the spread of Soviet Communism. The British took a losing hand and turned in a surprisingly good hand, as did Pakistan, and if that is not something to be celebrated, exactly, it does not seem like an outcome worth any outrage at this point.
[1] See, for example:
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2014...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2011...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2016...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2013...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2013...
At more than 400 pages, this is sizable book, no doubt, with its material focused in a relatively small amount of large chapters that demand a great deal of close reading given the way that the author returns back to the same points over and over again from one chapter to another and keeps several threads active at the same time. The author begins with a preface and some friendly acknowledgements before beginning the book proper with a discussion of the Great Game, a unifying concept he returns to over and over again, even if it seems inappropriate to this reader to compare that imperial context with the fight against Communism [1]. After that the author introduces the theme of the Anglo-Muslim League alliance that was key to establishing an independent Muslim state [2]. More discussion on Jinnah's role in starting the (ultimately successful) Pakistan scheme follows [3] along with a look at the Churchill-Roosevelt clash between British desires for a continued Raj and America's consistent hostility to imperialism [4]. A couple of chapters then follow that focus on the Indian Hindu side such as Mahatma's ill-advised fury [5] and the triangulation that took place between India, the UK, and the United States [6]. A chapter follows on Wavell's successful efforts to play the "Great Game" that make him, in the author's eyes, the evil genius of partition [7], along with Atlee's smoke screens that successfully allowed them to place the responsibility for partition on the Indians themselves [8]. After this comes a look at Nehru's leadership of the postwar pre-Independence dominion of India [9] as well as a discussion of Montbatten's savvy diplomatic work in preserving good feelings between the UK and India as independence loomed [10]. After this, the book takes an increasingly melancholy look at the end of empire [11] and two chapters on the 1947-48 war in Kashmir [12, 13] before the author adds a post-script to finish the work [14] in a reflective fashion.
It is impossible for this reader to follow the writer exactly as far as his counterfactual speculations are concerned. I would have liked to have read more about the ability of Bhutan and (at least initially) Sikkim in preserving their independence from India, although the author shows no interest in talking about this. The author is clearly a patriotic Indian nationalist, albeit one who finds a great deal to be critical about concerning the attitudes of the Nationalists that encouraged the British to look to their own geopolitical interests as they faced an exit from the Indian subcontinent. The author wants Indians to know that Montbatten wasn't to blame for partition and that the United States was a faithful if somewhat awkward friend of Indian independence, two things that Indians might not be aware of before reading this immensely popular book. In reading this book I felt that the author didn't do enough to make this book accessible to American audiences, using a lot of Indian terms that were unnecessary for international consumption. Yet this book is informative, if more than a little gloomy, even though in looking at this book and its arguments that I cannot fault the British for doing what they did in the face of Indian squishiness against the spread of Soviet Communism. The British took a losing hand and turned in a surprisingly good hand, as did Pakistan, and if that is not something to be celebrated, exactly, it does not seem like an outcome worth any outrage at this point.
[1] See, for example:
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2014...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2011...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2016...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2013...
https://edgeinducedcohesion.blog/2013...
August 11, 2019
It is indeed a very revealing book as far as backdrop of India's partition is concerned. Uncovers many aspects which are hitherto unknown.
The book is quite well researched and tries to bring out a balanced perspective through classified documents, official telegrams, personal diary entries, etc.
Will force you to rethink India's partition story, roles of the then superpowers, roles played by various officers, Congress and Muslim League leaders etc.
The book is quite well researched and tries to bring out a balanced perspective through classified documents, official telegrams, personal diary entries, etc.
Will force you to rethink India's partition story, roles of the then superpowers, roles played by various officers, Congress and Muslim League leaders etc.
June 7, 2015
A decent book, giving a different perspective on the Indian subcontinental partition, not from the Indian or Pakistani point of view
The narrative style is almost RamGuha-esque
It gives an insight into the thinking of the upper crust of the British political and military class, on the happenings of the subcontinent in the decade of 1940s leading upto the partition and for a few years beyond. It gives their opinions and how their opinions pro-actively shaped what things happened on the ground
Although the title claims the background of the "Great Game" as a motivation for the actions of the British, details in the book are spend more on the happenings, than on explaining the correlation between the alleged motivations, and their decisions on ground. Also a few chapters or less on the relations between UK/USA and Central Asia in the 1940s/50s would have helped, provide a wider perspective
The narrative style is almost RamGuha-esque
It gives an insight into the thinking of the upper crust of the British political and military class, on the happenings of the subcontinent in the decade of 1940s leading upto the partition and for a few years beyond. It gives their opinions and how their opinions pro-actively shaped what things happened on the ground
Although the title claims the background of the "Great Game" as a motivation for the actions of the British, details in the book are spend more on the happenings, than on explaining the correlation between the alleged motivations, and their decisions on ground. Also a few chapters or less on the relations between UK/USA and Central Asia in the 1940s/50s would have helped, provide a wider perspective
February 2, 2017
If you ever wanted to read the politics and strategic calculations behind the partition of British India this is the book to read. The book follows a lucid style and is a page turner. As an Indian it is difficult for me to read the book without being emotional and deeply engrossed in it. The books paints a vivid picture of the strategic calculations done by Britain and its people in India in carving a seperate NWFP out of united India and subsequently helping in the creation of Pakistan and taking care to make sure Pakistan gets the whole of Kashmir or at least the part which they feel will fit in their grand scheme of things. The book makes wonder the intellect of Indian Congress leaders struggled for independence but did not gave a hoot to strategy often overcome by unnecessary emotionalism , idealism and living in a imaginary world
January 2, 2016
A very well researched book on one of the most important events of modern history (the partition of India). The author Narendra Sarila was Mountbatten's ADC at the end of the "Raj". This in itself makes his approach interesting - here's a military man who was very close to the political action who analyses events based on what unfolded before him and documents released years later. This is a unique combination.
I would suggest this as one of several books to read on the topic of the end of the "Raj"/partition of India. Other interesting books would be Freedom or Death by Patrick French or Indian Summers by Alex von Tunzlemann.
This book, however, is a must read though sadly not easily available.
I would suggest this as one of several books to read on the topic of the end of the "Raj"/partition of India. Other interesting books would be Freedom or Death by Patrick French or Indian Summers by Alex von Tunzlemann.
This book, however, is a must read though sadly not easily available.
Read
August 3, 2011Fascinating story of the partition of India. Makes a connection backwards between the partition of India/Pakistan and the strategic interests of Britain played out between itself and Russian since the 19th century. Makes a connection forwards between Britain's encouragement of political Islam in the 1940s and the rise of Al quaeda and the Taliban. But the behaviour of Gandhi and Nehru and the Congress Party is also severely criticised.
January 16, 2013
The book in itself is a well organized and researched historical document. It pulls no punches on British, pro-Pakistan or Indian historical figures and their contribution to the partition of India. The book is written in the language of diplomats, hence it falls short on the description of the migration, displacement (religious cleansing) and conflicts that took place at the time of Partition in Kashmir, Punjab and Bengal.
January 3, 2014
This book provides the international context for the independence of India. The author gives a diplomat's perspective on how the Great Game between the British and Russian empires affected British thinking. The book shows that ultimately history is crafted by individuals and their interactions - in this case the personalities and the interactions between the main characters like Nehru, Jinnah, Gandhi, Mountbatten, etc. had a huge impact on the course of history.
May 30, 2009
This book is a very difficult read but the information in it is unimaginable! There are parts of the history of Pakistan and India that have never been brought up until now. This book for the first time talks of how FDR pushed for India's Independence. Reading this book gives a whole new perspective on who were the perpetrators of the bloody partition.
December 31, 2010
an excellent account of this tragic period in India. the role of Mountbatten and Nehru seems to me to have been whitewashed in other accounts and to have been central to the tragedy of partition. a very fine read
November 25, 2012
This books throws light to the circumstances under which the British had to free India, though divided into two countries - Hindustan & Pakistan. A real stuff to read for those who love Indin and English history
September 3, 2015
this book is good.
July 26, 2017
One of the best Insider accounts of the second greatest geopolitical tragedy in history. Lambastes the Congress and Gandhi rightly for their sheer incompetence and stupidity.
December 21, 2017
This is one of two books that The Viceroy's House (2017) is based on. The other book is Freedom at Midnight
September 4, 2018
Finally I understand why India became a independent and permanently closed and the door of other relationship with their neighbours countries.
November 15, 2018
Hitherto hidden aspects of why the British left the sub-continent in a jiffy in 1947 are discussed threadbare
Read
December 30, 2017Eindelijk heb ik "The Shadow ..." van Sarila uit.
Het was moeilijk om te lezen na "Freedom at Midnight", maar het boek is een noodzakelijk tegengif tegen "Freedom ..." dat een romantisch beeld geeft van de onafhankelijkheid en vooral van Mountbatten en zijn vrouw. Ook in het boek van Sarila (die de eerste Indiase ADC van MB was, en daarmee ook deels model staat voor de hoofdpersoon in de film "The Viceroy's house") komt het echtpaar MB er zeer goed af, maar tegen de achtergrond van de grote Engelse politieke strategie waar de titel van dit boek naar verwijst.
The Great Game is de naam die Rudyard Kipling (van Jungle Book, niet gelezen) in het boek Kim (wel gelezen) geeft aan de schimmige strijd die Groot-Brittannië al in de negentiende eeuw voerde tegen Rusland om de invloed in de buurlanden van India. Het ging vooral om Afghanistan dat een doorgang voor Rusland naar de Indische oceaan zou kunnen betekenen.
Uit tot voor kort geheime documenten blijkt dat GB al in de jaren dertig streefde naar een gedeeld India met Pakistan voor de moslims (voor zover Engelsen zich een onafhankelijk India konden voorstellen). Hiervoor waren drie argumenten: in de eerste plaats de strategische toegang tot de Indische Oceaan en daarmee tot het Midden-Oosten en de toevoerroutes van de olie. Ten tweede de mogelijkheid om de Sovjet-Unie aan te kunnen vallen en de pas af te snijden naar de Indische Oceaan. En tenslotte de sterke voorkeur van de Britse elite voor moslims boven hindoes. Deze afkeer ging al terug op de grote opstand uit 1857. Sarila heeft enig begrip voor dit laatste standpunt voor zover het de negentiende eeuw betreft. Het hindoeïsme was zeer lokaal, terwijl elke moslim zich lid voelde (en voelt) van een wereldgodsdienst. In de twintigste eeuw heeft Engeland het geloof vooral als splijtzwam gebruikt.
Een ander terugkerend thema is het falende en zwalkende beleid van de Congrespartij. Gandhi had een verkeerd idee over de Engelsen tijdens WOII, terwijl de belangrijkste voorvechter van Pakistan de Engelsen veel beter begreep waardoor gedurende WOII de congrespartij aan de kant stond. Engeland was veel beduchter voor Bose, een politicus die de wapens had opgenomen en onder de Japanners optrok naar India. Na WOII konden de aanhangers van Bose niet veroordeeld worden uit angst voor muiterij. (Na WOII was Engeland bang voor de invloed van Gandhi op de algemene bevolking en voor de invloed van Bose (die al dood was) in het leger.) Bose wordt nog vereerd en bij een fototentoonstelling in NY kwam ik een oude man tegen die erg enthousiast was over Bose. Een terugkerend motief in de karakterzwakte van Jawaharlal Nehru. Misschien een terugkerend thema thuis bij de auteur wiens vader een belangrijke politicus in de dertiger jaren was en misschien ook later wel? Het blijkt dat hij een prins in een klein prinsdom was en waarschijnlijk was zijn vader in Londen in de vertegenwoordiging van de Maharadjis. Hij heeft ook zijn memoires over zijn jonge jaren geschreven.
In het nawoord geeft Sarila een beschouwing waarin hij aangeeft hoe succesvol de Britse strategie is geweest en zich ook afvraagt of een ingedeeld India wel de diepgaande radicalisering van de moslims had kunnen weerstaan. Pakistan is er bijna aan ten onder gegaan. In de week dat ik het boek uitlas, moest de Pakistaanse minister van Justitie aftreden onder druk van extreme klerikalen en is de leider van de groepering die verantwoordelijk werd gehouden voor de aanslagen in Mumbai in 2008 die 174 doden en 300 gewonden kosten. Beide ontwikkelingen werden in de Guardian gezien als verder verval van de (recht)staat en een oprukken van de godsdienst (ook via leger en geheime dienst).
Het was moeilijk om te lezen na "Freedom at Midnight", maar het boek is een noodzakelijk tegengif tegen "Freedom ..." dat een romantisch beeld geeft van de onafhankelijkheid en vooral van Mountbatten en zijn vrouw. Ook in het boek van Sarila (die de eerste Indiase ADC van MB was, en daarmee ook deels model staat voor de hoofdpersoon in de film "The Viceroy's house") komt het echtpaar MB er zeer goed af, maar tegen de achtergrond van de grote Engelse politieke strategie waar de titel van dit boek naar verwijst.
The Great Game is de naam die Rudyard Kipling (van Jungle Book, niet gelezen) in het boek Kim (wel gelezen) geeft aan de schimmige strijd die Groot-Brittannië al in de negentiende eeuw voerde tegen Rusland om de invloed in de buurlanden van India. Het ging vooral om Afghanistan dat een doorgang voor Rusland naar de Indische oceaan zou kunnen betekenen.
Uit tot voor kort geheime documenten blijkt dat GB al in de jaren dertig streefde naar een gedeeld India met Pakistan voor de moslims (voor zover Engelsen zich een onafhankelijk India konden voorstellen). Hiervoor waren drie argumenten: in de eerste plaats de strategische toegang tot de Indische Oceaan en daarmee tot het Midden-Oosten en de toevoerroutes van de olie. Ten tweede de mogelijkheid om de Sovjet-Unie aan te kunnen vallen en de pas af te snijden naar de Indische Oceaan. En tenslotte de sterke voorkeur van de Britse elite voor moslims boven hindoes. Deze afkeer ging al terug op de grote opstand uit 1857. Sarila heeft enig begrip voor dit laatste standpunt voor zover het de negentiende eeuw betreft. Het hindoeïsme was zeer lokaal, terwijl elke moslim zich lid voelde (en voelt) van een wereldgodsdienst. In de twintigste eeuw heeft Engeland het geloof vooral als splijtzwam gebruikt.
Een ander terugkerend thema is het falende en zwalkende beleid van de Congrespartij. Gandhi had een verkeerd idee over de Engelsen tijdens WOII, terwijl de belangrijkste voorvechter van Pakistan de Engelsen veel beter begreep waardoor gedurende WOII de congrespartij aan de kant stond. Engeland was veel beduchter voor Bose, een politicus die de wapens had opgenomen en onder de Japanners optrok naar India. Na WOII konden de aanhangers van Bose niet veroordeeld worden uit angst voor muiterij. (Na WOII was Engeland bang voor de invloed van Gandhi op de algemene bevolking en voor de invloed van Bose (die al dood was) in het leger.) Bose wordt nog vereerd en bij een fototentoonstelling in NY kwam ik een oude man tegen die erg enthousiast was over Bose. Een terugkerend motief in de karakterzwakte van Jawaharlal Nehru. Misschien een terugkerend thema thuis bij de auteur wiens vader een belangrijke politicus in de dertiger jaren was en misschien ook later wel? Het blijkt dat hij een prins in een klein prinsdom was en waarschijnlijk was zijn vader in Londen in de vertegenwoordiging van de Maharadjis. Hij heeft ook zijn memoires over zijn jonge jaren geschreven.
In het nawoord geeft Sarila een beschouwing waarin hij aangeeft hoe succesvol de Britse strategie is geweest en zich ook afvraagt of een ingedeeld India wel de diepgaande radicalisering van de moslims had kunnen weerstaan. Pakistan is er bijna aan ten onder gegaan. In de week dat ik het boek uitlas, moest de Pakistaanse minister van Justitie aftreden onder druk van extreme klerikalen en is de leider van de groepering die verantwoordelijk werd gehouden voor de aanslagen in Mumbai in 2008 die 174 doden en 300 gewonden kosten. Beide ontwikkelingen werden in de Guardian gezien als verder verval van de (recht)staat en een oprukken van de godsdienst (ook via leger en geheime dienst).
July 14, 2021
The untold story of India’s Partition (The shadow of the great game) by Narendra Singh Sarila @harpercollinsin || Cover by Shuka Jain
The author was a prince of the erstwhile princely state of Sarila in Bundelkhand and later served an a Foreign Envoy to USA. The book delves away from the religious or territorial reasons for the partition but concentrates on the Soviet menace/paranoia that the British feared most.
With a hostile India to British defence attachés and a promise of security help by the newly promised country Pakistan; the British said and did totally opposite dealings over and under the table. Fanning separatist tendencies and at the same time wheeling in dealing in the background to achieve the best result for not a 1/4 of the world population but for an empire to not loose its face, with a would that still festers in the subcontinent.
Lord Mountbatten, the exceedingly charmingly and devious viceroy of a man - misguiding the newly independent India into ceding one small step at a time and Winston Churchill, the man who had no love lost for India, missed no opportunity to belittle India on the world stage.
A charming book written by an erudite prince, with some tongue in cheek jokes and self referencing jokes that VP Menon readers will immediately recognise.
The author was a prince of the erstwhile princely state of Sarila in Bundelkhand and later served an a Foreign Envoy to USA. The book delves away from the religious or territorial reasons for the partition but concentrates on the Soviet menace/paranoia that the British feared most.
With a hostile India to British defence attachés and a promise of security help by the newly promised country Pakistan; the British said and did totally opposite dealings over and under the table. Fanning separatist tendencies and at the same time wheeling in dealing in the background to achieve the best result for not a 1/4 of the world population but for an empire to not loose its face, with a would that still festers in the subcontinent.
Lord Mountbatten, the exceedingly charmingly and devious viceroy of a man - misguiding the newly independent India into ceding one small step at a time and Winston Churchill, the man who had no love lost for India, missed no opportunity to belittle India on the world stage.
A charming book written by an erudite prince, with some tongue in cheek jokes and self referencing jokes that VP Menon readers will immediately recognise.
July 13, 2024
This book has been authored by Sri Narendra Singh Sarila, who was the heir to the princely state of Sarila, ADC to the last Viceroy Earl Louis Mountbatten of Burma and later in the Indian Foreign Service from 1948 to 1985. During his service he has been ambassador to Spain, Switzerland, France and Deputy Permanent Representative of India in the UN. His impeccable credentials mark him out as man who enjoyed the confidence of four Congress Prime Ministers Nehru, Shastri, Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi, since he served as Ambassadors in coveted UN and European posts – New York, Madrid, Geneva and Paris to name a few. This background I have place at the beginning of the review, since any criticism of Congress leaders and freedom fighters in the review should not be construed as my opinion and biased anti – Congress view, but opinion in this informative book.
WHO WERE THE PERSONS / PARTIES RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PARTITION OF INDIA? As we have all been taught in our school history lessons, it was the – British Imperial Policy of ‘Divide & Rule’ which encouraged Jinnah to demand the Partition of India on the basis of religious majority of the regions. However, when one goes through this book, it stands our known stance and recorded events on its head. The revelations are surprising, and to many an Indian it would be shocking. It would read like a book written by an anti - Congress person. The author has unearthed documents which bring to light the hitherto unexplored link between the partition and British fears about USSR gaining control of the oil wells of Middle East, and how the British used religion as a political tool in pursuit of the Great Game against the Soviet Union. He also brings out little known facts about how US exerted pressure on Britain to grant an undivided India her Independence, and how due to ignorance, cupidity and arrogance the Congress leaders Gandhi, Nehru and others were equally responsible for the Partition of India as were Sir Winston Churchill, Jinnah and Lord Wavell (the Viceroy during the War Years and Lord Louis Mountbatten’s predecessor). It will come to light that though many British leaders including Viceroys, though comfortable with him, in spite of his Anglophile tendencies and Harrow background despised Nehru as indecisive, at times a loose cannon, and felt that with him at the helm of affairs in India their plan of Dominion Status for India could be not be achieved. In the chapter entitled NEHRU IN SADDLE the following passage appears: “The nationalists’ only hope of accomplishing their goal of a united India was if they could hold the reins of government firmly in their hands and exclude Jinnah from entering it. This would encourage those Muslim leaders, opposed to Jinnah, to come to the forefront and thus weaken his hold over the Muslims. Wavell understood this, but had failed to obtain HMG’s support to block the Congress Party. He now turned to achieving his goal through his ‘Prime Minister’ Nehru! Wavell did not like Nehru – Harrow boys were not supposed to act so emotional – nor could he switch on charm from one minute to another as his successor (Louis Mountbatten) and even his predecessor (Linlithgow) could, though he did gift Nehru, in jail (in 1943), the anthology of poems he had compiled, titled ‘Other Men’s Flowers’.”
Though many Congress leaders appreciated Nehru’s enthusiasm and his dedication to achieve “Poorna Swaraj” (Full Independence) for India, the more level headed and realistic amongst them (unfortunately Gandhi ji was not one of them) realized that this may also be counter- productive in attaining the goals set forth. A letter dated 29th July 1946 from Sardar Patel to Mr. D.P.Mishra, senior Congress leader from Central Provinces, had the following passage: “He (Nehru) often acts with child-like innocence............. He has done many things recently which [have] caused us great embarrassment...... [His] acts of emotional insanity...... put tremendous strain on us to set matters right. But in spite of his innocent indiscretions, he has unparalleled enthusiasm and a burning passion for freedom which makes him restless and drives him to a pitch of impatience where he forgets himself.”
An amalgam of wrong timing of decisions by Gandhiji as well as certain wrong actions, Nehru’s impatience and dreams, the dislike of Gandhi and Nehru by the British Conservative Rulers and Jinnah’s over-riding ambition to be the PM or Governor General of a country and Jinnah’s knowledge of his terminal illness ensured the Partition of India and British withdrawal almost a year earlier than planned. These acts also ensured that the Congress leaders are as complicit as Jinnah in making the partition possible.
A peek into the progress of Indian National Congress (not part of the book) – founded in 1885 as a Party to ensure greater rights and facilities for the native Indians, the aim was to achieve this through debates, prayers, petitions and pleadings. This forum was founded by an European of British Isles – Allen Octavian Hume. The Party for the next three decades or so comprised mostly of the legal fraternity – barristers – Nehru, Jinnah, Chittaranjan Das, etc. – lawyers like Lokmanya Tilak, Madan Mohan Malaviya (though better remembered as an educatonist), etc. and a few other professionals – educationists like Gopal Krishna Gokhale, etc. The Party also had a reasonable share of presence of persons from British Isles – the most prominent and immediate recall is of the ‘Home Rue’ leader Annie Besant. Gandhiji, also a barrister, returned from South Africa in 1915 to join the Indian National Congress – but his rustic appearance and habit put up the back of Jinnah the Anglophile, sauve Indian barrister. And once Gandhi took over the leadership of Congress in 1921 – the rift widened gradually till it became an unbridgeable gulf by the end of World War II.
The British were well aware that Jinnah was not the voice of the Indian Muslims, but still cynically promoted him for their Great Game against Russia / USSR.
To add to the confusion was Gandhiji’s acts and pronouncements. A series of wrong timing of decisions by Gandhiji as well as certain wrong actions, sent the British into the arms of Jinnah at the cost of Congress. What were the decisions that Gandhiji took that were either wrong or mistimed? There is a large number of them. These wrong and mistimed decisions of the Congress created a vacuum which Jinnah adroitly exploited.
The Federal Legislature set up by the British through elections was an eye-opener. The Muslim Leauge led by Jinnah could not even get one-fourth of the seats reserved for Muslims. The North West Frontier Province gave the Congress Party led by Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan (also known as Frontier Gandhi) an overwhelming majority. In the provinces of Punjab and Bengal, non-Muslim Leauge Muslim parties formed Government. The League was a distant third after Congress. GANDHIJI’S FIRST MISTAKE - asking the Congress to resign from the Governments in the Provinces. Being out of Government greatly weakened the negotiating power of Congress. The Party had wiped out all the gains it had made. This loss of power in the strategic North West Frontier Province, led to the growth of Muslim League’s influence there. Had Congress retained power here between 1940 – 46, the Partition would never have come through.
During the First World War, Gandhiji had supported the Allied war effort. This move had created a soft corner for him in many British hearts, in spite of Churchill’s continuous jibes that he was a charlatan and a humbug. It was to Gandhiji the Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow turned first and invited him to Simla for talks on 4th September 1939. GANDHIJI’S SECOND MISTAKE - At this meeting Gandhiji assured the Viceroy of his support to the War effort and that he was ready to help with the recruitment of Indians into the Army, as he had done during the First World War. The promise was made without consultations with the other Congress leaders and hence could not mature.
The British Government received its first shock when Gandhiji failed to get these sentiments translated into Congress Policy. As mentioned earlier Nehru was Gandhiji’s blind spot – much like India was Churchill’s. The only difference the former was a blind spot of love and the latter of hate.
A few days after Gandhiji’s meeting with the Viceroy “.... the Congress leaders met to discuss their attitude to the developing situation at Wardha.... Jawahar Lal Nehru, who had been touring China and rushed back for the meeting, led with the following arguement: ‘How can a person bound in chains fight? And if Britain is indeed fighting uphold freedom should it not logically free India?’ He was not a man to knowingly think of, or attempt, blackmail. The provocation for this rhetoric was another. ....... And this was Nehru’s way of getting back at Chamberlain, forgetting that once Britain had declared war on Hitler, opposing its war effort on whatever account, in practical terms meant aiding the very fascists he so detested. .........” Gandhiji blinded by his love for Nehru delivered the decision of the Congress Working Committee to the Viceroy – GANDHIJI’S THIRD MISTAKE - that the Congress Party would support the war effort, only if Britain declared that once the war was over India would be granted independence. Such an offer to any person and more so to Congress allergic leadership, would reek of blackmail whether intended or not. This was exactly how the Neville Chamberlain Government reacted, pushing them more into the embrace of the more compliant Jinnah and Muslim League.
When Gandhiji met the Viceroy again on 26th September with the Wardah decision which sought to persuade the Viceroy to make an unequivocal declaration of British intentions to grant freedom to India as soon as the war ended and, in the meantime, to associate the Congress Party with the Central Government. “Whereas during his first meeting with the Viceroy on 4th September 1939 atmosphere had been warm, when Gandhiji saw Linlithgow on 26th September, he had turned cold. He brusquely told Gandhiji that there was no prospect of His Majesty’s Government agreeing to a declaration of British War aims as demanded by the Congress Party or yielding power at the Centre while Britain was engaged in a life – and – death struggle. ................. Something had obviously happened between 4th and 26th September 1939 and that was Mohammed Ali Jinnah. .....”
During the course of World War II the Congress continued to pass resolutions demanding Independence for India and the Conservative Government moved closer and closer to Jinnah and the Muslim League. It was around this time Gandhi made his FOURTH & MOST MOMENTOUS MISTAKE when in August 1942 Congress passed the QUIT INDIA RESOLUTION. At that juncture Britain was involved in a serious war against the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Axis. The Battle of Britain had been won about a year or so back at great cost of RAF planes and pilots and the mood, as would be obvious, was definitely against the people who did not support the War Effort or tried to exploit it for their own aims – Gandhi and Indian National Congress were in this group while Jinnah Muslim League were the blue eyed darlings of the British establishment. The timing of QUIT INDIA resolution was wrong, presenting it to the Viceroy was a greater wrong and expecting the Churchill led British Government to consider such a demand was the ultimate delusion the Indian National Congress had. This act finally sealed off any opposition in the British Establishment against Partition of India into a Hindu and Muslim nations.
The final map of Partition was drawn up Lord Wavell the penultimate Viceroy, the partition of Punjab and Bengal – West Punjab and East Bengal along with Shylet District of Assam going to Pakistan, the remaining British Provinces going to India and the Princely Territories to join either India or Pakistan depending on their proximity to the two countries. Lord Mountbatten was the next and last Viceroy and he executed the Wavell Plan.
The conclusion one has to draw lamentably shows up the Congress and its pre-Independence leaders in poor light, highlighting their lack of vision and sense of real politik, which Jinnah exhibited to a great extent – by vision I refer to their aims – Independence of undivided India and Independence with a new country Pakistan respectively. After reading this book one comes to the conclusion that more than Jinnah, it was the intransience of the Congress Leaders and the unrealistic views of Gandhiji on non-violence in the world (to the extent of declaring that an Independent India would not have defence forces) that led to the Partition of India before being granted Independence.
And the last two Chapters on Kashmir once again reveal the lack of understanding the political realities by Jawahar Lal Nehru which resulted in the KASHMIR IMBOGLIO being dragged to United Nations in 1948 and which is still there lying unsolved for well-nigh seven decades.
This book is a great and compelling read, meticulously researched, written in an easy flowing way making its reading a pleasant experience. It also breaks new grounds and challenges the conventional wisdom on India’s vivisection.
I enjoyed every page of this fascinating highly readable book.
And Mark Tully was not far from the truth when he termed this book “A meticulously researched, highly readable, fascinating version of the last days of the Raj.”
WHO WERE THE PERSONS / PARTIES RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PARTITION OF INDIA? As we have all been taught in our school history lessons, it was the – British Imperial Policy of ‘Divide & Rule’ which encouraged Jinnah to demand the Partition of India on the basis of religious majority of the regions. However, when one goes through this book, it stands our known stance and recorded events on its head. The revelations are surprising, and to many an Indian it would be shocking. It would read like a book written by an anti - Congress person. The author has unearthed documents which bring to light the hitherto unexplored link between the partition and British fears about USSR gaining control of the oil wells of Middle East, and how the British used religion as a political tool in pursuit of the Great Game against the Soviet Union. He also brings out little known facts about how US exerted pressure on Britain to grant an undivided India her Independence, and how due to ignorance, cupidity and arrogance the Congress leaders Gandhi, Nehru and others were equally responsible for the Partition of India as were Sir Winston Churchill, Jinnah and Lord Wavell (the Viceroy during the War Years and Lord Louis Mountbatten’s predecessor). It will come to light that though many British leaders including Viceroys, though comfortable with him, in spite of his Anglophile tendencies and Harrow background despised Nehru as indecisive, at times a loose cannon, and felt that with him at the helm of affairs in India their plan of Dominion Status for India could be not be achieved. In the chapter entitled NEHRU IN SADDLE the following passage appears: “The nationalists’ only hope of accomplishing their goal of a united India was if they could hold the reins of government firmly in their hands and exclude Jinnah from entering it. This would encourage those Muslim leaders, opposed to Jinnah, to come to the forefront and thus weaken his hold over the Muslims. Wavell understood this, but had failed to obtain HMG’s support to block the Congress Party. He now turned to achieving his goal through his ‘Prime Minister’ Nehru! Wavell did not like Nehru – Harrow boys were not supposed to act so emotional – nor could he switch on charm from one minute to another as his successor (Louis Mountbatten) and even his predecessor (Linlithgow) could, though he did gift Nehru, in jail (in 1943), the anthology of poems he had compiled, titled ‘Other Men’s Flowers’.”
Though many Congress leaders appreciated Nehru’s enthusiasm and his dedication to achieve “Poorna Swaraj” (Full Independence) for India, the more level headed and realistic amongst them (unfortunately Gandhi ji was not one of them) realized that this may also be counter- productive in attaining the goals set forth. A letter dated 29th July 1946 from Sardar Patel to Mr. D.P.Mishra, senior Congress leader from Central Provinces, had the following passage: “He (Nehru) often acts with child-like innocence............. He has done many things recently which [have] caused us great embarrassment...... [His] acts of emotional insanity...... put tremendous strain on us to set matters right. But in spite of his innocent indiscretions, he has unparalleled enthusiasm and a burning passion for freedom which makes him restless and drives him to a pitch of impatience where he forgets himself.”
An amalgam of wrong timing of decisions by Gandhiji as well as certain wrong actions, Nehru’s impatience and dreams, the dislike of Gandhi and Nehru by the British Conservative Rulers and Jinnah’s over-riding ambition to be the PM or Governor General of a country and Jinnah’s knowledge of his terminal illness ensured the Partition of India and British withdrawal almost a year earlier than planned. These acts also ensured that the Congress leaders are as complicit as Jinnah in making the partition possible.
A peek into the progress of Indian National Congress (not part of the book) – founded in 1885 as a Party to ensure greater rights and facilities for the native Indians, the aim was to achieve this through debates, prayers, petitions and pleadings. This forum was founded by an European of British Isles – Allen Octavian Hume. The Party for the next three decades or so comprised mostly of the legal fraternity – barristers – Nehru, Jinnah, Chittaranjan Das, etc. – lawyers like Lokmanya Tilak, Madan Mohan Malaviya (though better remembered as an educatonist), etc. and a few other professionals – educationists like Gopal Krishna Gokhale, etc. The Party also had a reasonable share of presence of persons from British Isles – the most prominent and immediate recall is of the ‘Home Rue’ leader Annie Besant. Gandhiji, also a barrister, returned from South Africa in 1915 to join the Indian National Congress – but his rustic appearance and habit put up the back of Jinnah the Anglophile, sauve Indian barrister. And once Gandhi took over the leadership of Congress in 1921 – the rift widened gradually till it became an unbridgeable gulf by the end of World War II.
The British were well aware that Jinnah was not the voice of the Indian Muslims, but still cynically promoted him for their Great Game against Russia / USSR.
To add to the confusion was Gandhiji’s acts and pronouncements. A series of wrong timing of decisions by Gandhiji as well as certain wrong actions, sent the British into the arms of Jinnah at the cost of Congress. What were the decisions that Gandhiji took that were either wrong or mistimed? There is a large number of them. These wrong and mistimed decisions of the Congress created a vacuum which Jinnah adroitly exploited.
The Federal Legislature set up by the British through elections was an eye-opener. The Muslim Leauge led by Jinnah could not even get one-fourth of the seats reserved for Muslims. The North West Frontier Province gave the Congress Party led by Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan (also known as Frontier Gandhi) an overwhelming majority. In the provinces of Punjab and Bengal, non-Muslim Leauge Muslim parties formed Government. The League was a distant third after Congress. GANDHIJI’S FIRST MISTAKE - asking the Congress to resign from the Governments in the Provinces. Being out of Government greatly weakened the negotiating power of Congress. The Party had wiped out all the gains it had made. This loss of power in the strategic North West Frontier Province, led to the growth of Muslim League’s influence there. Had Congress retained power here between 1940 – 46, the Partition would never have come through.
During the First World War, Gandhiji had supported the Allied war effort. This move had created a soft corner for him in many British hearts, in spite of Churchill’s continuous jibes that he was a charlatan and a humbug. It was to Gandhiji the Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow turned first and invited him to Simla for talks on 4th September 1939. GANDHIJI’S SECOND MISTAKE - At this meeting Gandhiji assured the Viceroy of his support to the War effort and that he was ready to help with the recruitment of Indians into the Army, as he had done during the First World War. The promise was made without consultations with the other Congress leaders and hence could not mature.
The British Government received its first shock when Gandhiji failed to get these sentiments translated into Congress Policy. As mentioned earlier Nehru was Gandhiji’s blind spot – much like India was Churchill’s. The only difference the former was a blind spot of love and the latter of hate.
A few days after Gandhiji’s meeting with the Viceroy “.... the Congress leaders met to discuss their attitude to the developing situation at Wardha.... Jawahar Lal Nehru, who had been touring China and rushed back for the meeting, led with the following arguement: ‘How can a person bound in chains fight? And if Britain is indeed fighting uphold freedom should it not logically free India?’ He was not a man to knowingly think of, or attempt, blackmail. The provocation for this rhetoric was another. ....... And this was Nehru’s way of getting back at Chamberlain, forgetting that once Britain had declared war on Hitler, opposing its war effort on whatever account, in practical terms meant aiding the very fascists he so detested. .........” Gandhiji blinded by his love for Nehru delivered the decision of the Congress Working Committee to the Viceroy – GANDHIJI’S THIRD MISTAKE - that the Congress Party would support the war effort, only if Britain declared that once the war was over India would be granted independence. Such an offer to any person and more so to Congress allergic leadership, would reek of blackmail whether intended or not. This was exactly how the Neville Chamberlain Government reacted, pushing them more into the embrace of the more compliant Jinnah and Muslim League.
When Gandhiji met the Viceroy again on 26th September with the Wardah decision which sought to persuade the Viceroy to make an unequivocal declaration of British intentions to grant freedom to India as soon as the war ended and, in the meantime, to associate the Congress Party with the Central Government. “Whereas during his first meeting with the Viceroy on 4th September 1939 atmosphere had been warm, when Gandhiji saw Linlithgow on 26th September, he had turned cold. He brusquely told Gandhiji that there was no prospect of His Majesty’s Government agreeing to a declaration of British War aims as demanded by the Congress Party or yielding power at the Centre while Britain was engaged in a life – and – death struggle. ................. Something had obviously happened between 4th and 26th September 1939 and that was Mohammed Ali Jinnah. .....”
During the course of World War II the Congress continued to pass resolutions demanding Independence for India and the Conservative Government moved closer and closer to Jinnah and the Muslim League. It was around this time Gandhi made his FOURTH & MOST MOMENTOUS MISTAKE when in August 1942 Congress passed the QUIT INDIA RESOLUTION. At that juncture Britain was involved in a serious war against the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Axis. The Battle of Britain had been won about a year or so back at great cost of RAF planes and pilots and the mood, as would be obvious, was definitely against the people who did not support the War Effort or tried to exploit it for their own aims – Gandhi and Indian National Congress were in this group while Jinnah Muslim League were the blue eyed darlings of the British establishment. The timing of QUIT INDIA resolution was wrong, presenting it to the Viceroy was a greater wrong and expecting the Churchill led British Government to consider such a demand was the ultimate delusion the Indian National Congress had. This act finally sealed off any opposition in the British Establishment against Partition of India into a Hindu and Muslim nations.
The final map of Partition was drawn up Lord Wavell the penultimate Viceroy, the partition of Punjab and Bengal – West Punjab and East Bengal along with Shylet District of Assam going to Pakistan, the remaining British Provinces going to India and the Princely Territories to join either India or Pakistan depending on their proximity to the two countries. Lord Mountbatten was the next and last Viceroy and he executed the Wavell Plan.
The conclusion one has to draw lamentably shows up the Congress and its pre-Independence leaders in poor light, highlighting their lack of vision and sense of real politik, which Jinnah exhibited to a great extent – by vision I refer to their aims – Independence of undivided India and Independence with a new country Pakistan respectively. After reading this book one comes to the conclusion that more than Jinnah, it was the intransience of the Congress Leaders and the unrealistic views of Gandhiji on non-violence in the world (to the extent of declaring that an Independent India would not have defence forces) that led to the Partition of India before being granted Independence.
And the last two Chapters on Kashmir once again reveal the lack of understanding the political realities by Jawahar Lal Nehru which resulted in the KASHMIR IMBOGLIO being dragged to United Nations in 1948 and which is still there lying unsolved for well-nigh seven decades.
This book is a great and compelling read, meticulously researched, written in an easy flowing way making its reading a pleasant experience. It also breaks new grounds and challenges the conventional wisdom on India’s vivisection.
I enjoyed every page of this fascinating highly readable book.
And Mark Tully was not far from the truth when he termed this book “A meticulously researched, highly readable, fascinating version of the last days of the Raj.”
December 20, 2012
great book!
February 13, 2021
Reads like a textbook. It’s not really a story so much as a compilation of letters between linlithgow and zetland
May 16, 2021
I was of the opinion that the partition was owing to India's own internal issues of course with the British continuing with divide and rule and leaving India, playing the game again may be for the last time.
Reading the book brought out many aspects which have never been taught / discussed.
The stages and the parties to the partition are well covered as part of the different chapters. The Soviet angle while it finds a mention has been truncated with Soviet’s indifference to a British colony that would get independent. But overall gives a great background on the partition and surely worth reading.
Some historical facts that the book brought out (keeping it short):
Different facets behind the partition like
- US pressure on UK to grant independence. Unawareness and distrust of Indian leaders towards US
- Role of WWII and need for buffer zone or a British friendly zone that can provide military bases etc. to contain the Soviet Union.
- Make it appear that the partition was owing to Indian leaders and hence India remained part of Commonwealth
While Jinnah spear headed the movement for a separate state, he could not go all the way without the British support. He was encouraged and fed enough fodder to keep this going.
Wavell had been behind the blueprint for Pakistan unlike the popular opinion which considers Mountbatten the chief villain.
While Mountbatten played helping role in getting the princely states accede to India, his policy on Kashmir played a different tune.
Reading the book brought out many aspects which have never been taught / discussed.
The stages and the parties to the partition are well covered as part of the different chapters. The Soviet angle while it finds a mention has been truncated with Soviet’s indifference to a British colony that would get independent. But overall gives a great background on the partition and surely worth reading.
Some historical facts that the book brought out (keeping it short):
Different facets behind the partition like
- US pressure on UK to grant independence. Unawareness and distrust of Indian leaders towards US
- Role of WWII and need for buffer zone or a British friendly zone that can provide military bases etc. to contain the Soviet Union.
- Make it appear that the partition was owing to Indian leaders and hence India remained part of Commonwealth
While Jinnah spear headed the movement for a separate state, he could not go all the way without the British support. He was encouraged and fed enough fodder to keep this going.
Wavell had been behind the blueprint for Pakistan unlike the popular opinion which considers Mountbatten the chief villain.
While Mountbatten played helping role in getting the princely states accede to India, his policy on Kashmir played a different tune.
November 25, 2022
This book tells the story of India's partition from a unique perspective. Sarila provides both his own perspective as the former ADC to the last Viceroy of British India and also references a large number of primary-source documents released after. In combining testimony from his personal experience and his retrospective analysis, Sarila shares a novel and comprehensive account of the events that lead to the Partition, the event itself, and its aftermath in both an immediate and eventual sense.
I thought that this book was fairly interesting and decently-written, but I do feel like Sarila did not do a very clean job of moving forward from the (very well-researched) primary source evidence and firsthand accounts he provided to the conclusions he eventually formed. This lack of synthesis was pretty distracting and took away from my ability to enjoy the book overall. With that in mind, I suppose I wouldn't necessarily dissuade someone from reading this book, but I would not go out of my way to recommend it.
I thought that this book was fairly interesting and decently-written, but I do feel like Sarila did not do a very clean job of moving forward from the (very well-researched) primary source evidence and firsthand accounts he provided to the conclusions he eventually formed. This lack of synthesis was pretty distracting and took away from my ability to enjoy the book overall. With that in mind, I suppose I wouldn't necessarily dissuade someone from reading this book, but I would not go out of my way to recommend it.
September 2, 2018
The book gives very interesting views about partition in contrary to popular belief. The book was very informative at the first half and gets repetitive in the second.
But more on how patel and Mountbatten negotiated with the princely state was missing altogether except for a few glimpses.
As author said partition was not because of communal clashes or intolerance and only the product of British political Game and few people greed is what we can take away from this fine book.
A must read for all people of former British Raj.
But more on how patel and Mountbatten negotiated with the princely state was missing altogether except for a few glimpses.
As author said partition was not because of communal clashes or intolerance and only the product of British political Game and few people greed is what we can take away from this fine book.
A must read for all people of former British Raj.
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