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Red Star Over the Pacific
Combining a close knowledge of Asia and an ability to tap Chinese-language sources with naval combat experience and expertise in sea-power theory, the authors assess how the rise of Chinese sea power will affect U.S. maritime strategy in Asia. They argue that China is laying the groundwork for a sustained challenge to American primacy in maritime Asia, and to defend this hypothesis they look back to Alfred Thayer Mahan s sea-power theories, now popular with the Chinese. The book considers how strategic thought about the sea shapes Beijing s deliberations and compares China s geostrategic predicament to that of the Kaiser s Germany a century ago. It examines the Chinese navy s operational concepts, tactics, and capabilities and appraises China s ballistic-missile submarine fleet. The authors conclude that unless Washington adapts, China will present a challenge to America s strategic position.
292 pages, Hardcover
First published October 15, 2010
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January 23, 2015
An outline and summary of some notes.
Chapter 1. Mahan’s Two Tridents
Chinese sea power and the anti-access/anti-denial debate
Delay the arrival of US and allied forces in theater
prevent US forces from using bases in the region to sustain military operations
Keep US power-projection assets as far away as possible
China assumes that “the day after Taiwan” (after they invade and occupy the island) that the US will accept the new normal.
Mahanian logic and the grammar of access - this section is an excellent primer to the language of policy papers, expanding on certain terms that hold deeper meaning that are not apparent to casual observers.
Mahan believed that nations who depend on sea trade have a national interest in building navies that can not only police the oceanic commons but can conduct fleet battles. Mahan’s “The Influence of Sea Power upon History” is very popular among China’s strategic policymakers and intellectuals, in contrast to the Mao-era when Western military writing was suspect. China’s economic develop depends on reliable sea lanes for shipping and therefore provides the rationale for projecting power outside of its peripheral waters.
Chapter 2. China engages the strategic theorists
Mahan’s writings are often misused to romanticize naval combat, to portray international relations as a zero-sum Darwinian game and to appeal to a national hunger to regain lost majesty.
China feels hemmed in by strategic passes like the Strait of Malacca and the waters between Japan, Korea and Taiwan. China’s strategic foundations are still influenced by Mao’s guerrilla tactics used during the Japanese occupation. It is very likely that Chinese naval strategy depends on ballistic anti-ship missiles to provide an umbrella for their navy to freely operate in the west Pacific without having to fight force-on-force with US carrier groups. Several dissenting views are also touched on; some Chinese scholars warn against over-reach, an unwinnable rivalry with the US, promoting maritime assets to the detriment of land forces and internal security.
China’s Naval-Intellectual Complex - The authors hold out hope that there is at least vigorous debate in China’s academies and policy circles which hopefully allow cooler heads to prevail.
Chapter 3. The German precedent for sea power
Chinese intellectuals admire Bismarckian Germany’s ability to manage relations with suspicious neighbors. They also see similarities with the China’s geographic situation and Germany’s vulnerability stemming of a limited number of seaports which could be blockaded by neighbors. Taiwan, if taken, becomes the most reliable gateway to the Pacific ocean. If the US fails to defend Taiwan, Japan will no longer see any advantage to an alliance with the US.
In a Sino-US conflict, there could be a mis-match between the political will of Chinese citizens and American voters. The US may lack the will to intervene. Rising costs of shipbuilding will drive down the size of fleets. The authors suggest America may become the Dutch republic of the 17th century, too tight-fisted to fund maritime supremacy in peacetime and thus lost to the British Royal Navy. Supporting expensive navies waxed and waned in the age of European Great Powers but the Chinese leadership seems very determined to develop the PLAN’s capabilities.
Chapter 4. Fleet tactics with Chinese characteristics
Chinese objectives in the first island chain can be covered the umbrella of fire support from the shores of the mainland. Mahan condemned the tethering of ships to island fortresses. However, stationing anti-ship ballistic missiles deep in Chinese civilian populations may dampen the US military’s willingness to strike these missile bases, which escalates a limited conflict at sea into a larger war. The authors apply concepts from Wayne Hughes’ classic 1986 “Fleet Tactics” in visualizing the distances, timeframes and other variables in an environment with US and Chinese military technology.
A Clausewitzian approach is also discussed. “War and warlike preparations are an expression of political and strategic thought..it is impossible to fully appreciate Chinese hardware and tactics without grasping the larger strategic, political and cultural considerations that impart the logic to war.”
Tactical scenarios. Considerations between massed attacks, dispersed attacks and sequential attacks. Logistics and Marine landing forces will be targets also. China could feint a conflict in the South while breaking out in the North.
Anti-ship cruise missiles: SS-N-22 and SS-N-27
Anti-ship ballistic missiles: DF-21C
Anti-radiation weapons: FT-2000 “AWACS-killer”
Undersea warfare: Diesel subs breaking out beyond the first island chain will hamper US operational freedom.
If the PLAN achieves parity, the same thinking that led Mao to intervene during the Korean War might lead Beijing to seek a decisive force-on-force battle with USN.
“Win or lose in a naval war, neighbors will have to live with a vengeful China. Tensions could dismantle the alliance system that the US depends on to operate in the Pacific.” The authors suggest that the existing US fleet should be hardened against single-shot kill weapons as a priority over projects like DDG-1000 whose expensive technology hasn’t been fully tested yet.
Chapter 5. Missile and anti-missile interactions at sea
Anti-ship ballistic missiles allow China to control events at sea from the mainland. AEGIS ships are the main platform to detect ballistic missile launches. Yokosuka, Japan is the first line of defense against ballistic missiles, followed by Pearl Harbor and San Diego. Aegis interceptors could down ballistic missiles as soon as they are launched from Hunan, Henan and Jilin. Japan’s BMD radar undermines China’s nuclear deterrent. Australia might conceivably provide early warning for submarine-launched ballistic missiles in the South Pacific. Aegis ships are unable to withstand saturation attacks from fighters and bombers. China may also use nuclear detonation as EMP attack against AEGIS. Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles might become the weapon of first resort because of highest stand-off distance.
Chapter 6. China’s emerging undersea nuclear deterrent
SSBNs are used by nations to patrol within firing range of their intended targets. Soviets kept SSBNs close to their own shores to ensure loyalty to the regime. China also very watchful of nuclear-armed India. SSBNs are also one of the most expensive naval vessels to build and support and having one will provoke neighbors to respond. The authors criticize the US attack submarine and ASW aviation assets as atrophied. A forward patrol of a Chinese SSBN or even the suggestion of one will make USN devote attack boats to track and counter. SSBNs would still have to pass through straits of neighbors.
Chapter 7. Soft power at sea
Fashioning a usable past. Public relations use the treasure fleets of Zheng He to alleviate fears of regional hegemony. Confucian pacifism and purely defensive military policy. The authors quote Peter J. Katzenstin’s Culture of National Security. As opposed to a pure realist view, traditions, attitudes and habits of mind shape societies as well as external threats. Elites want the populace to embrace a Sino-centric Pacific region. Pac Rim nations view Zheng He favorably but are wary of such campaign as a cover for Chinese exceptionalism.
China joins counter-piracy operates as a demonstration of responsible stakeholding. India wary of a Chinese Monroe Doctrine.
Chapter 8. U.S. Maritime strategy in Asia
Admiral Zuwalt suggested a smaller Navy in the short term to divert funds to invest in the long term. A large USN around the Soviet periphery forced them to try and defend everywhere and overstretch. Mearsheimer condemned attacking nuclear assets, fearing it would provoke a “use-it-or-lose-it” rationale for launching in a conventional war.
Chapter 9. Who holds the Tridents?
The PLA Navy might feel it must prove its worth to the Party leadership by demonstrating how it can influence neighbors. The Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile might dampen China’s desire for large aircraft carriers.
Chapter 1. Mahan’s Two Tridents
Chinese sea power and the anti-access/anti-denial debate
Delay the arrival of US and allied forces in theater
prevent US forces from using bases in the region to sustain military operations
Keep US power-projection assets as far away as possible
China assumes that “the day after Taiwan” (after they invade and occupy the island) that the US will accept the new normal.
Mahanian logic and the grammar of access - this section is an excellent primer to the language of policy papers, expanding on certain terms that hold deeper meaning that are not apparent to casual observers.
Mahan believed that nations who depend on sea trade have a national interest in building navies that can not only police the oceanic commons but can conduct fleet battles. Mahan’s “The Influence of Sea Power upon History” is very popular among China’s strategic policymakers and intellectuals, in contrast to the Mao-era when Western military writing was suspect. China’s economic develop depends on reliable sea lanes for shipping and therefore provides the rationale for projecting power outside of its peripheral waters.
Chapter 2. China engages the strategic theorists
Mahan’s writings are often misused to romanticize naval combat, to portray international relations as a zero-sum Darwinian game and to appeal to a national hunger to regain lost majesty.
China feels hemmed in by strategic passes like the Strait of Malacca and the waters between Japan, Korea and Taiwan. China’s strategic foundations are still influenced by Mao’s guerrilla tactics used during the Japanese occupation. It is very likely that Chinese naval strategy depends on ballistic anti-ship missiles to provide an umbrella for their navy to freely operate in the west Pacific without having to fight force-on-force with US carrier groups. Several dissenting views are also touched on; some Chinese scholars warn against over-reach, an unwinnable rivalry with the US, promoting maritime assets to the detriment of land forces and internal security.
China’s Naval-Intellectual Complex - The authors hold out hope that there is at least vigorous debate in China’s academies and policy circles which hopefully allow cooler heads to prevail.
Chapter 3. The German precedent for sea power
Chinese intellectuals admire Bismarckian Germany’s ability to manage relations with suspicious neighbors. They also see similarities with the China’s geographic situation and Germany’s vulnerability stemming of a limited number of seaports which could be blockaded by neighbors. Taiwan, if taken, becomes the most reliable gateway to the Pacific ocean. If the US fails to defend Taiwan, Japan will no longer see any advantage to an alliance with the US.
In a Sino-US conflict, there could be a mis-match between the political will of Chinese citizens and American voters. The US may lack the will to intervene. Rising costs of shipbuilding will drive down the size of fleets. The authors suggest America may become the Dutch republic of the 17th century, too tight-fisted to fund maritime supremacy in peacetime and thus lost to the British Royal Navy. Supporting expensive navies waxed and waned in the age of European Great Powers but the Chinese leadership seems very determined to develop the PLAN’s capabilities.
Chapter 4. Fleet tactics with Chinese characteristics
Chinese objectives in the first island chain can be covered the umbrella of fire support from the shores of the mainland. Mahan condemned the tethering of ships to island fortresses. However, stationing anti-ship ballistic missiles deep in Chinese civilian populations may dampen the US military’s willingness to strike these missile bases, which escalates a limited conflict at sea into a larger war. The authors apply concepts from Wayne Hughes’ classic 1986 “Fleet Tactics” in visualizing the distances, timeframes and other variables in an environment with US and Chinese military technology.
A Clausewitzian approach is also discussed. “War and warlike preparations are an expression of political and strategic thought..it is impossible to fully appreciate Chinese hardware and tactics without grasping the larger strategic, political and cultural considerations that impart the logic to war.”
Tactical scenarios. Considerations between massed attacks, dispersed attacks and sequential attacks. Logistics and Marine landing forces will be targets also. China could feint a conflict in the South while breaking out in the North.
Anti-ship cruise missiles: SS-N-22 and SS-N-27
Anti-ship ballistic missiles: DF-21C
Anti-radiation weapons: FT-2000 “AWACS-killer”
Undersea warfare: Diesel subs breaking out beyond the first island chain will hamper US operational freedom.
If the PLAN achieves parity, the same thinking that led Mao to intervene during the Korean War might lead Beijing to seek a decisive force-on-force battle with USN.
“Win or lose in a naval war, neighbors will have to live with a vengeful China. Tensions could dismantle the alliance system that the US depends on to operate in the Pacific.” The authors suggest that the existing US fleet should be hardened against single-shot kill weapons as a priority over projects like DDG-1000 whose expensive technology hasn’t been fully tested yet.
Chapter 5. Missile and anti-missile interactions at sea
Anti-ship ballistic missiles allow China to control events at sea from the mainland. AEGIS ships are the main platform to detect ballistic missile launches. Yokosuka, Japan is the first line of defense against ballistic missiles, followed by Pearl Harbor and San Diego. Aegis interceptors could down ballistic missiles as soon as they are launched from Hunan, Henan and Jilin. Japan’s BMD radar undermines China’s nuclear deterrent. Australia might conceivably provide early warning for submarine-launched ballistic missiles in the South Pacific. Aegis ships are unable to withstand saturation attacks from fighters and bombers. China may also use nuclear detonation as EMP attack against AEGIS. Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles might become the weapon of first resort because of highest stand-off distance.
Chapter 6. China’s emerging undersea nuclear deterrent
SSBNs are used by nations to patrol within firing range of their intended targets. Soviets kept SSBNs close to their own shores to ensure loyalty to the regime. China also very watchful of nuclear-armed India. SSBNs are also one of the most expensive naval vessels to build and support and having one will provoke neighbors to respond. The authors criticize the US attack submarine and ASW aviation assets as atrophied. A forward patrol of a Chinese SSBN or even the suggestion of one will make USN devote attack boats to track and counter. SSBNs would still have to pass through straits of neighbors.
Chapter 7. Soft power at sea
Fashioning a usable past. Public relations use the treasure fleets of Zheng He to alleviate fears of regional hegemony. Confucian pacifism and purely defensive military policy. The authors quote Peter J. Katzenstin’s Culture of National Security. As opposed to a pure realist view, traditions, attitudes and habits of mind shape societies as well as external threats. Elites want the populace to embrace a Sino-centric Pacific region. Pac Rim nations view Zheng He favorably but are wary of such campaign as a cover for Chinese exceptionalism.
China joins counter-piracy operates as a demonstration of responsible stakeholding. India wary of a Chinese Monroe Doctrine.
Chapter 8. U.S. Maritime strategy in Asia
Admiral Zuwalt suggested a smaller Navy in the short term to divert funds to invest in the long term. A large USN around the Soviet periphery forced them to try and defend everywhere and overstretch. Mearsheimer condemned attacking nuclear assets, fearing it would provoke a “use-it-or-lose-it” rationale for launching in a conventional war.
Chapter 9. Who holds the Tridents?
The PLA Navy might feel it must prove its worth to the Party leadership by demonstrating how it can influence neighbors. The Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile might dampen China’s desire for large aircraft carriers.
May 20, 2017
This book follows the well established pattern of what I like to call "Pentagon Big-Think Papers." Sentences were long and winding. Meaningless military buzzwords were paired with lots of adjectives. While interesting and well-researched, I found this book difficult to read and understand. Maybe I'm not as smart as I think I am, or as well versed in political-military strategy as this book assumes. In any case, I often found myself taking glances up at the top corner to remind myself what page I was on and how much pages I had left to trudge through.
In addition to the shared writing style, big think papers always focus on the soft-sciences. Despite the fact that the Pentagon is the largest purchaser of high end technology, the effect that weapons systems capability and engineering have on strategy is never discussed. The emphasis is always on the effect of politics, geography, history, and culture, e.g. the "soft" social sciences. In fact, the whole book seems to be written in a world where real world engineering and physical laws don't seem to matter as much. To illustrate this, the authors at one point state that the effectiveness of a weapon system is "in the eye of the beholder." That is a dangerously ambiguous viewpoint to take with regards to weapons, especially as they become fantastically more expensive. The effectiveness of a weapon system is the eye of its operator. To him there is only one important question to determine effectiveness: can it kill my enemy before he kills me?
A consequence of focusing on the soft sciences is that nothing definitive is ever said. All statements are hedged with qualifiers such as "maybe", "might prove", "it is possible", "could cause." In the end, I don't really know what the authors were stating about the world or what they were recommending for future action. I only have a vague idea that Chinese naval power is on the rise, something I knew before I read this book. In summary, I came away having expended a lot of mental energy to read and understand what was being said while not being able to articulate much new knowledge that I learned from it.
In addition to the shared writing style, big think papers always focus on the soft-sciences. Despite the fact that the Pentagon is the largest purchaser of high end technology, the effect that weapons systems capability and engineering have on strategy is never discussed. The emphasis is always on the effect of politics, geography, history, and culture, e.g. the "soft" social sciences. In fact, the whole book seems to be written in a world where real world engineering and physical laws don't seem to matter as much. To illustrate this, the authors at one point state that the effectiveness of a weapon system is "in the eye of the beholder." That is a dangerously ambiguous viewpoint to take with regards to weapons, especially as they become fantastically more expensive. The effectiveness of a weapon system is the eye of its operator. To him there is only one important question to determine effectiveness: can it kill my enemy before he kills me?
A consequence of focusing on the soft sciences is that nothing definitive is ever said. All statements are hedged with qualifiers such as "maybe", "might prove", "it is possible", "could cause." In the end, I don't really know what the authors were stating about the world or what they were recommending for future action. I only have a vague idea that Chinese naval power is on the rise, something I knew before I read this book. In summary, I came away having expended a lot of mental energy to read and understand what was being said while not being able to articulate much new knowledge that I learned from it.
January 5, 2022
Interesting work which provides plenty of food for thought for all individuals who care about the expanding maritime confrontation between China and the US. It is an original work as it makes use of the writings of Mahan and his doctrines to provide a frame of reference for this study. The authors describe the economic competition, the strategic issues, the naval operational capacities and the evolution of relevant doctrines. Historical precedents provide background for potential scenarios. China is on the path to be more than just assertive as a regional power, recent confrontations with neighbor states illustrate the agressive nature of China's dream. The goal of the CCP is to erase a century of humiliations against more powerful antagonist european nations and the japanese empire. How far will China go? The answer may be provided by the amount of resistance it will meet especially through the naval confrontations underway. This book is invaluable to grasp the issues at hand and understand the parameters of this on going confrontation. A sobering thought : deep internal divisions in the US may weaken its ability to focus on external threats.
April 25, 2021
This book discusses some great concepts and gives you a good run-down of China's history, which helps you understand their hesitancy in some areas and boldness in others. Overall the book is very maneuver warfare-ish; battles or wars aren't necessarily won by the number of hulls or missiles, but by having the right resources and capabilities in the right place at the right time to dissuade the enemy or defeat them with fewer resources. For example, having US or NATO forces strategically placed around the southeastern Pacific can act as a trip-switch, which can deter aggression, but ultimately leaves those forces high and dry if anything did happen.
January 14, 2023
China tiene visión estratégica marítima.
Hace un par de días termine este libro: Red Star Over The Pacific. Hoy presencie una clase magistral de su co-author: Toshi Yoshihara.
El libro expone la creciente estrategia marítima china y como su componente militar asegura su Poder Naval.
Un dato básico. Cuando Japón y Estados Unidos entraron en guerra, su diferencia en PIB era de casi un 90%. China y Estados Unidos tienen una diferencia actual de 24%.
El concepto de Mao, ante un posible conflicto con la URSS, apuntaba a la defensa activa. Yoshihara la comparaba con la pelea de Muhammad Ali vs George Foreman. Ali entregaba espacio , mientras Foreman consumía todo su energía en golpes impresisos. En otras palabras, la defensa activa busca el combate decisivo en el tiempo y lugar indicado. China “digeriría” a su enemigo.
Lo anterior ya no es posible. China se volcó al Pacífico. Las súper desarrolladas zonas de Bohai, Yangzi y Pearl ( Mar del este y sur de China) representan un 70% del GDP nacional. Entregar territorio en una defensa dilatoria no es aceptable.
China adoptó una defensa fronteriza (oceánica) basada en ataques trans horizontes, explotando todas las funciones de combate, especialmente información y fuegos, creando una súper Kill Chain.
China se percibe incómoda con la primera y segunda cadena de islas (los países en las islas se sienten acosados). Taiwán es el foco de disputa principal.
La primera cadena ya es una WEZ (weapons engagement zone) saturada por potenciales miles de misiles híper sónicos , súper sónicos y sub sónicos capaces de ser desplegados en ataques simultáneos y coordinados . En la segunda cadena de islas se estima que cortinas de submarinos servirán como medios pasivos de detección . Una vez localizados los objetivos ( portaaviones , buques anfibios y otras unidades de superficie) se activará la cadena de misiles. Anti-Access/Area Denial.
El foco no solo se concentrará en unidades militares , sino que la infraestructura que soporta la fuerza. Dado que el consumo de misiles y combustible sera tan alto,bases logísticas serán blancos prioritarios en un eventual conflicto.
Actualmente los misiles anti superficie de China (YJ-18) duplican el alcance de la mayoría de los misiles de Estados Unidos.
Ahí la importancia de la tecnología stealth. La que se ve amenazada por el desarrollo de sensores quanticos.
De la teoría naval clásica se extraen los principios que China aplicaría en un hipotético conflicto a) el primer ataque deberá ser tremendamente violento b) Quien ataque primero tendrá una ventaja competitiva importante b) masa en término de ataques coordinados c) scouting agresivo y activo para acelerar el ciclo OODA y contributor al princio de masa.
El incremento potencial de China no es casual. En la década de los 80 China pasó de una estrategia más bien continental cerrada, a una estrategia marítima de apertura.Para 1980 su PIB era de 191 billones. Hoy es la segunda economía del mundo.
Hace un par de días termine este libro: Red Star Over The Pacific. Hoy presencie una clase magistral de su co-author: Toshi Yoshihara.
El libro expone la creciente estrategia marítima china y como su componente militar asegura su Poder Naval.
Un dato básico. Cuando Japón y Estados Unidos entraron en guerra, su diferencia en PIB era de casi un 90%. China y Estados Unidos tienen una diferencia actual de 24%.
El concepto de Mao, ante un posible conflicto con la URSS, apuntaba a la defensa activa. Yoshihara la comparaba con la pelea de Muhammad Ali vs George Foreman. Ali entregaba espacio , mientras Foreman consumía todo su energía en golpes impresisos. En otras palabras, la defensa activa busca el combate decisivo en el tiempo y lugar indicado. China “digeriría” a su enemigo.
Lo anterior ya no es posible. China se volcó al Pacífico. Las súper desarrolladas zonas de Bohai, Yangzi y Pearl ( Mar del este y sur de China) representan un 70% del GDP nacional. Entregar territorio en una defensa dilatoria no es aceptable.
China adoptó una defensa fronteriza (oceánica) basada en ataques trans horizontes, explotando todas las funciones de combate, especialmente información y fuegos, creando una súper Kill Chain.
China se percibe incómoda con la primera y segunda cadena de islas (los países en las islas se sienten acosados). Taiwán es el foco de disputa principal.
La primera cadena ya es una WEZ (weapons engagement zone) saturada por potenciales miles de misiles híper sónicos , súper sónicos y sub sónicos capaces de ser desplegados en ataques simultáneos y coordinados . En la segunda cadena de islas se estima que cortinas de submarinos servirán como medios pasivos de detección . Una vez localizados los objetivos ( portaaviones , buques anfibios y otras unidades de superficie) se activará la cadena de misiles. Anti-Access/Area Denial.
El foco no solo se concentrará en unidades militares , sino que la infraestructura que soporta la fuerza. Dado que el consumo de misiles y combustible sera tan alto,bases logísticas serán blancos prioritarios en un eventual conflicto.
Actualmente los misiles anti superficie de China (YJ-18) duplican el alcance de la mayoría de los misiles de Estados Unidos.
Ahí la importancia de la tecnología stealth. La que se ve amenazada por el desarrollo de sensores quanticos.
De la teoría naval clásica se extraen los principios que China aplicaría en un hipotético conflicto a) el primer ataque deberá ser tremendamente violento b) Quien ataque primero tendrá una ventaja competitiva importante b) masa en término de ataques coordinados c) scouting agresivo y activo para acelerar el ciclo OODA y contributor al princio de masa.
El incremento potencial de China no es casual. En la década de los 80 China pasó de una estrategia más bien continental cerrada, a una estrategia marítima de apertura.Para 1980 su PIB era de 191 billones. Hoy es la segunda economía del mundo.
This entire review has been hidden because of spoilers.
March 11, 2019
In the past, China's military technology was not a real threat to U.S. or Soviet interests. As recently as the 1980s the People's Liberation Army was largely an infantry force, backed by towed artillery and using MiG-15 fighters for air cover. While it possessed nuclear weapons it maintained a modest number of missiles. Its navy was primarily concerned with shore security.
Not anymore.
The People's Liberation Army Navy today is rapidly becoming a force to be reckoned with. It is equipped with warships bristling with anti-ship missiles and new attack submarines that are hard to detect. The PLAN is also looking at how to break out of the US-lead "containment" created by the First and Second Island Chains which it sees surrounding it.
The authors do an excellent job of studying the published works of many of China's strategic thinkers and naval theorists. The development of Chinese capabilities has coincided with new ways of looking at how to use the sea weapons they now possess and how to apply historical lessons to China's strategic situation. China has not had an ocean-going fleet for centuries, and certainly not in one in the era of screw propulsion, big guns and missiles. The authors draw parallels between China's efforts to challenge the United States in the Pacific to Imperial Germany's attempt to challenge Great Britain's mastery of the Atlantic. While there are some parallels (China, like Germany, is building a fleet with technology which renders older vessels obsolete) there are differences too, that the United States ignores at its peril.
While no means an "easy read" this book is undoubtedly important for understanding where the strategic balance lays today in the Pacific. The only fault I find in it is a lack of maps and perhaps some graphics comparing Chinese and U.S.-Allied ship capabilities.
Not anymore.
The People's Liberation Army Navy today is rapidly becoming a force to be reckoned with. It is equipped with warships bristling with anti-ship missiles and new attack submarines that are hard to detect. The PLAN is also looking at how to break out of the US-lead "containment" created by the First and Second Island Chains which it sees surrounding it.
The authors do an excellent job of studying the published works of many of China's strategic thinkers and naval theorists. The development of Chinese capabilities has coincided with new ways of looking at how to use the sea weapons they now possess and how to apply historical lessons to China's strategic situation. China has not had an ocean-going fleet for centuries, and certainly not in one in the era of screw propulsion, big guns and missiles. The authors draw parallels between China's efforts to challenge the United States in the Pacific to Imperial Germany's attempt to challenge Great Britain's mastery of the Atlantic. While there are some parallels (China, like Germany, is building a fleet with technology which renders older vessels obsolete) there are differences too, that the United States ignores at its peril.
While no means an "easy read" this book is undoubtedly important for understanding where the strategic balance lays today in the Pacific. The only fault I find in it is a lack of maps and perhaps some graphics comparing Chinese and U.S.-Allied ship capabilities.
March 6, 2023
2 stars for being a book on the PLA Navy where there are so few and 1 star for the seemingly persuasive arguments, but loss of stars for the a) poor and self serving sourcing and b) the insistence on framing the discussion for a western/Mahanian perspective without doing much additional work to compare and contrast the strengths and weaknesses.
Also the stark lack of critical thinking in the weighing of evidence — why should we believe analysts from the PLA Foreign Language University or defense industry pubs that may not have knowledge of China’s internal naval thinking — or in considering historical nuance that might have made China’s naval rise less inevitable.
Someone should count the number of Mahan, Sun Tzu and Mao references. Yikes.
Also the stark lack of critical thinking in the weighing of evidence — why should we believe analysts from the PLA Foreign Language University or defense industry pubs that may not have knowledge of China’s internal naval thinking — or in considering historical nuance that might have made China’s naval rise less inevitable.
Someone should count the number of Mahan, Sun Tzu and Mao references. Yikes.
January 4, 2020
Although some what dated (published 2010) shows the progress of the PLA(N) and the potential courses of action available to deter or deny access to Chinese coastal regions, the outer or second island change and the Indian Ocean. A must read to understand the potential threat posed by an upgraded, numerous and technological 21st century navy. Also highlights potential courses of action available and limitations of the PLA(N). U.S. Navy, JMSDF, Indian Navy and other countries naval forces need to beware!
May 24, 2021
An interesting view of future foreign relations in the Far East
As a Cold War veteran and having lived through the difficulty the US Navy had with the Russians, this text puts an interesting spin on some of the same issues in dealing with the Chinese PLA Navy in the very near future. The authors provide a sound discussion based on solid research and discharged in an easy to understand manner. While not totally alarmist in nature it dose raise concerns for the future troubles our Navy may face.
As a Cold War veteran and having lived through the difficulty the US Navy had with the Russians, this text puts an interesting spin on some of the same issues in dealing with the Chinese PLA Navy in the very near future. The authors provide a sound discussion based on solid research and discharged in an easy to understand manner. While not totally alarmist in nature it dose raise concerns for the future troubles our Navy may face.
February 22, 2022
Good overview written at an intermediate level, and belongs on both the CNO and Commandant's reading list. Shows the evolution of Chinese naval strategy, and US responses. The last quarter could be substituted for To Provide and Maintain a Navy, or A Brief Guide to Maritime Strategy to be more generalized instead of just applied to China. Many of the facts were restated in different ways which might make for a better audio book than reading analog like I did.
June 9, 2015
In Red Star over the Pacific Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes argue that the best analysis of China’s maritime turn in the 21st century can be found in the writing of an American Naval Captain who died in 1914.
Holmes and Yoshihara set out to explore and detail China’s internal debates about naval strategy. Bringing many of these debates to an English speaking audience for the first time, they show how the middle kingdom is thinking about its new role and how prominent ideas are influencing national capability choices.
At the heart of this debate, the authors find the strategic grammer of the American strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan. The book begins with an exposure of his work and his significant influence on Chinese thinking and debates. The book then turns to examine key factors in Beijing’s maritime strategy. This includes chapters on fleet tactics, major capabilities such as ballistic missiles and submarines, and soft power operations.
Combined these offer a fascinating insight into how China’s maritime turn is occurring. Along the way we get discussions of US responses and force posture and the implications for regional and even global security.
The line between ‘strategic studies’ and ‘international politics’ is often blurred in the public literature. In Red Star over the Pacific Yoshihara and Holmes masterfully demonstrate why the former is an important sub-discipline that is worth preserving. They offer history (including a fascinating comparison with another Mahan inspired opponent, Germany), geography, extremely readable analysis of technical capability and balance it all with a judicious strategic analysis that grants due weight to ideational factors such as intellectual debates and culture to provide a compelling analysis.
By grounding the analysis in the strategic studies domains of concepts and capability, the authors go far beyond anything else on the shelves to detail just what China is attempting to do at sea, what it could do, how it will try to do it and what it means for the US and anyone else who may try to shape or resist Beijing’s policy.
The subject matter makes this something of a niche book, but given the quality of the analysis and writing I know many well outside my field who have picked up and enjoyed a copy (the book was published in 2010 though never feels dated). It also deserves to be read given the significance of the issues at stake. The US and China will almost assuredly avoid a land based conflict (a repeat of the 1950 crisis on the Korean Peninsula is about the only plausible exception). But a maritime clash is increasingly possible. More so, maritime strategy and coercion is already a fundamental part of the current strategic competition between the first and second largest economies of the world.
While I dismiss notions of US decline or passivity, and recognise the vast gulf between owning and effectively utilising capabilities, this book still makes for pessimistic reading. China may currently feel hemmed into the ‘first-island chain’ that connects Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines and Indonesia. But with a switch of government in Taipei and authority over the South China Sea, Beijing can flip those barriers into creating a large moat that protects rather than contains China.
That sets the current dispute about the South China Sea in a very different light. Merely grabbing a few man-made islands or small oil fields hardly seems worth the effort. But as part of an effort to fundamentally rechange the regional maritime geography to China’s benefit, it takes on a far greater order of significance. Yet it’s also not clear that current policy alternatives will effectively challenge Beijing or that now is the best time to do it.
I tend to think that Southeast Asian countries are far better placed to dissuade China from such a policy than a clumsy and ill-interpreted effort from Washington. Likewise, the extent to which this change is unacceptable to non-Chinese interests is also not clear. US and Australian safety does not depend upon the waters inside the first island chain, and if shipping and trade is protected – and there’s no good reason it won’t be – then what exactly is the threat worth going to war over? Finally, and as Yoshihara and Holmes clearly demonstrate, even if the US wanted to actively resist China’s maritime expansion, it would be extremely difficult and costly to do so. This is quite unlike Britain resisting Germany before World War 1 and the usual dribble about national character/intent and seriousness that litters these kinds of discussions has almost nothing to do with it.
This is one for the wonks, but that says more about the public’s interest than the capacity of these scholars to write for the public. It masterfully shows what strategic studies is as a discipline, and examines one of the most important global questions of the day. Along the way it helps to draw many of China’s intellectual debates on military issues out into the open, while reminding us that strategy is a domain of ideas as well as weapons. Of concepts and capabilities. Power has its material and ideational spheres and we can only understand just what we are doing, and how we may seek our security if we understand and embrace both parts.
A remarkable piece of scholarship. Give it a go if you can.
Holmes and Yoshihara set out to explore and detail China’s internal debates about naval strategy. Bringing many of these debates to an English speaking audience for the first time, they show how the middle kingdom is thinking about its new role and how prominent ideas are influencing national capability choices.
At the heart of this debate, the authors find the strategic grammer of the American strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan. The book begins with an exposure of his work and his significant influence on Chinese thinking and debates. The book then turns to examine key factors in Beijing’s maritime strategy. This includes chapters on fleet tactics, major capabilities such as ballistic missiles and submarines, and soft power operations.
Combined these offer a fascinating insight into how China’s maritime turn is occurring. Along the way we get discussions of US responses and force posture and the implications for regional and even global security.
The line between ‘strategic studies’ and ‘international politics’ is often blurred in the public literature. In Red Star over the Pacific Yoshihara and Holmes masterfully demonstrate why the former is an important sub-discipline that is worth preserving. They offer history (including a fascinating comparison with another Mahan inspired opponent, Germany), geography, extremely readable analysis of technical capability and balance it all with a judicious strategic analysis that grants due weight to ideational factors such as intellectual debates and culture to provide a compelling analysis.
By grounding the analysis in the strategic studies domains of concepts and capability, the authors go far beyond anything else on the shelves to detail just what China is attempting to do at sea, what it could do, how it will try to do it and what it means for the US and anyone else who may try to shape or resist Beijing’s policy.
The subject matter makes this something of a niche book, but given the quality of the analysis and writing I know many well outside my field who have picked up and enjoyed a copy (the book was published in 2010 though never feels dated). It also deserves to be read given the significance of the issues at stake. The US and China will almost assuredly avoid a land based conflict (a repeat of the 1950 crisis on the Korean Peninsula is about the only plausible exception). But a maritime clash is increasingly possible. More so, maritime strategy and coercion is already a fundamental part of the current strategic competition between the first and second largest economies of the world.
While I dismiss notions of US decline or passivity, and recognise the vast gulf between owning and effectively utilising capabilities, this book still makes for pessimistic reading. China may currently feel hemmed into the ‘first-island chain’ that connects Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines and Indonesia. But with a switch of government in Taipei and authority over the South China Sea, Beijing can flip those barriers into creating a large moat that protects rather than contains China.
That sets the current dispute about the South China Sea in a very different light. Merely grabbing a few man-made islands or small oil fields hardly seems worth the effort. But as part of an effort to fundamentally rechange the regional maritime geography to China’s benefit, it takes on a far greater order of significance. Yet it’s also not clear that current policy alternatives will effectively challenge Beijing or that now is the best time to do it.
I tend to think that Southeast Asian countries are far better placed to dissuade China from such a policy than a clumsy and ill-interpreted effort from Washington. Likewise, the extent to which this change is unacceptable to non-Chinese interests is also not clear. US and Australian safety does not depend upon the waters inside the first island chain, and if shipping and trade is protected – and there’s no good reason it won’t be – then what exactly is the threat worth going to war over? Finally, and as Yoshihara and Holmes clearly demonstrate, even if the US wanted to actively resist China’s maritime expansion, it would be extremely difficult and costly to do so. This is quite unlike Britain resisting Germany before World War 1 and the usual dribble about national character/intent and seriousness that litters these kinds of discussions has almost nothing to do with it.
This is one for the wonks, but that says more about the public’s interest than the capacity of these scholars to write for the public. It masterfully shows what strategic studies is as a discipline, and examines one of the most important global questions of the day. Along the way it helps to draw many of China’s intellectual debates on military issues out into the open, while reminding us that strategy is a domain of ideas as well as weapons. Of concepts and capabilities. Power has its material and ideational spheres and we can only understand just what we are doing, and how we may seek our security if we understand and embrace both parts.
A remarkable piece of scholarship. Give it a go if you can.
September 4, 2020
Nothing exceptional here. This book probably would have been much more enjoyable ten years ago. No fault of the author, but whenever you write a book about "current events" it is bound to age poorly.
July 5, 2024
Informational read but a struggle to stay engaged. The information was throughly researched, but it was like reading a long peer reviewed article. Still a great book and I do recommend it for any naval officer, enlisted, politician, or international relations major.
February 17, 2022
Dated now, which detracts from the impact, but it's interesting to see how accurately the predictions have turned out.
September 30, 2022
Such a wonderful book!
November 13, 2022
Well researched. #1 book I recommend for all officers in INDOPACOM AOR
July 21, 2024
A simple call to action for the US maritime services in the Pacific. Dry in parts but generally insightful and coherent.
July 7, 2020
This book is an appropriate read for someone who doesn't have any knowledge in naval tactics or military strategy. It talks about the fundamentals of a navy's role in a country's grand strategy, discusses how China's navy applies these concepts in the modern day, explains the current situation in the South China Sea, and describes tactics that the American navy will have to consider in response.
The book begins with an overview of grand strategy and the Mahanian approach to naval power. It's made clear that the first and overarching goal of grand strategy on the seas is to maintain unfettered access to trade and shipping routes. Diplomacy is a primary tool for the maintenance of trade, and naval power is a fallback only in the case that diplomacy fails. Even then, the diplomatic use of naval power has to be considered, meaning that a nation has to think about the optics of naval operations and how they would affect alliances both before and after armed conflict. In this sense, the purpose of a navy is not necessarily to sink other ships. For example, a navy can achieve its goal by looking intimidating, by engaging in humanitarian missions, by making extended warfare too expensive for enemy states, or by making it too politically unpopular for enemies to maintain bases in a disputed area. It all depends on what the country is currently trying to achieve.
In the first chapters I learned about how heavily China's economy depends on its port systems, and about the strategic importance of the first island chain, a collection of islands which completely surrounds China's coasts and which could be used to disrupt its trade systems during times of conflict. It explained to me why China so badly wants access to Taiwan and to the South China Sea, and why it has dedicated so many resources to building up its navy. Following chapters explained everything from the types of ships and subs in China's fleet, to the specifics of its missile systems, to how those assets would be used in warfare. There's good overviews of China's naval history from Mao to today. I liked the part where the book described how China's naval strategy changed as its strength grew. A lot of time is spent on describing China's current fortress strategy, where nearby waters can be protected by ships in conjunction with land-based missiles.
One takeaway from the book that I found really interesting was the extent to which optics plays a role in military tactics. For example, the book talks about China's use of matched force in the South China Sea, where they would meet the ships of weaker navies with their own weak boats, maybe even fishing vessels. If the navy responds with a larger ship, they send in a matched ship. In this way, the really big ships never have to be sent out, and China is able to gain territory without ever provoking strong international responses. Another example of considering optics arises when the book talks about the use of tripwire forces. These are forces which are never meant to be able to put up much of a fight. For instance, American troops placed in West Germany during the Cold War, or at the border of North and South Korea in the modern day, are not expected to be able to put up a defense in the case of an actual conflict. Rather, their purpose is to be destroyed in order to provide justification for a full counterattack. In this way, tripwire forces are able to act as deterrence against potential enemy attacks.
There's so much more material that gets covered by the book. I think overall the book was making the case that America's current fleet would have a very difficult time in actual armed conflict with China, both due to China's missiles having over twice the range as America's, and due to the fortress strategy employed in the vicinity of the first island chain. The book ends with a call to not underestimate China, and to build up America's naval capabilities.
Overall, I would say this book is a great read for anybody interested in military strategy. It describes a lot of aspects of grand strategy that I don't think most laypersons would have thought of before. It's also an excellent resource for anybody interested in knowing more about the current situation in the South China Sea.
The book begins with an overview of grand strategy and the Mahanian approach to naval power. It's made clear that the first and overarching goal of grand strategy on the seas is to maintain unfettered access to trade and shipping routes. Diplomacy is a primary tool for the maintenance of trade, and naval power is a fallback only in the case that diplomacy fails. Even then, the diplomatic use of naval power has to be considered, meaning that a nation has to think about the optics of naval operations and how they would affect alliances both before and after armed conflict. In this sense, the purpose of a navy is not necessarily to sink other ships. For example, a navy can achieve its goal by looking intimidating, by engaging in humanitarian missions, by making extended warfare too expensive for enemy states, or by making it too politically unpopular for enemies to maintain bases in a disputed area. It all depends on what the country is currently trying to achieve.
In the first chapters I learned about how heavily China's economy depends on its port systems, and about the strategic importance of the first island chain, a collection of islands which completely surrounds China's coasts and which could be used to disrupt its trade systems during times of conflict. It explained to me why China so badly wants access to Taiwan and to the South China Sea, and why it has dedicated so many resources to building up its navy. Following chapters explained everything from the types of ships and subs in China's fleet, to the specifics of its missile systems, to how those assets would be used in warfare. There's good overviews of China's naval history from Mao to today. I liked the part where the book described how China's naval strategy changed as its strength grew. A lot of time is spent on describing China's current fortress strategy, where nearby waters can be protected by ships in conjunction with land-based missiles.
One takeaway from the book that I found really interesting was the extent to which optics plays a role in military tactics. For example, the book talks about China's use of matched force in the South China Sea, where they would meet the ships of weaker navies with their own weak boats, maybe even fishing vessels. If the navy responds with a larger ship, they send in a matched ship. In this way, the really big ships never have to be sent out, and China is able to gain territory without ever provoking strong international responses. Another example of considering optics arises when the book talks about the use of tripwire forces. These are forces which are never meant to be able to put up much of a fight. For instance, American troops placed in West Germany during the Cold War, or at the border of North and South Korea in the modern day, are not expected to be able to put up a defense in the case of an actual conflict. Rather, their purpose is to be destroyed in order to provide justification for a full counterattack. In this way, tripwire forces are able to act as deterrence against potential enemy attacks.
There's so much more material that gets covered by the book. I think overall the book was making the case that America's current fleet would have a very difficult time in actual armed conflict with China, both due to China's missiles having over twice the range as America's, and due to the fortress strategy employed in the vicinity of the first island chain. The book ends with a call to not underestimate China, and to build up America's naval capabilities.
Overall, I would say this book is a great read for anybody interested in military strategy. It describes a lot of aspects of grand strategy that I don't think most laypersons would have thought of before. It's also an excellent resource for anybody interested in knowing more about the current situation in the South China Sea.
November 6, 2022
I read the second edition of this book published in 2018, meaning the authors likely updated it in 2017. A lot has happend on this front since then.
It has been updated a bit since the original version. Events of the past five years, since publication of the second edition, have demonstrated the author's prescience with regard to the modernization of China's naval fleet.
This is a good book for those interested in military strategy and naval history. I'd suggest it's too detailed and too micro an analysis for the general reader. Regardless, I found it an interesting read with an up-to-date, cogent analysis - both historical and technological - of the PLAN (People's Liberation Army Navy) as it's referred to in China. This analysis should frighten anybody who fears an aggressive, beligerent Chinese foreign policy, including one that attemps to reclaim Taiwan by force.
Alfred Thayer Mahan, the father of modern naval strategy is all over this book. Be prepared for multiple references to Mahanism, post-Mahanism and the like. It also proves the point that
Santayana made about what happens to those who forget history.
Leaders of the Chinese navy have taken those lessons of history to heart and piggybacked naval strategy on the back of Chairman Mao's strategy for guerilla warfare and created a muscular, forward-looking strategy to confront and defeat the US Navy in a short- or long-term naval war.
The authors make clear that China has designed its strategy and built its ships to defeat the United States in a naval engagement. At the time of its publication, it's not clear the US Navy has reciprocated that sentiment or designed its shipbilding plans around it.
The authors do a good job of balancing description and prescription for how to address this turn of events.
Have had this on my "to read" list for many years. Given what's happened in Europe this Summer and the Chinese move to cement its status as the biggest military power in Asia, the subject matter is more apropos than at any time since the first edition appeared.
It has been updated a bit since the original version. Events of the past five years, since publication of the second edition, have demonstrated the author's prescience with regard to the modernization of China's naval fleet.
This is a good book for those interested in military strategy and naval history. I'd suggest it's too detailed and too micro an analysis for the general reader. Regardless, I found it an interesting read with an up-to-date, cogent analysis - both historical and technological - of the PLAN (People's Liberation Army Navy) as it's referred to in China. This analysis should frighten anybody who fears an aggressive, beligerent Chinese foreign policy, including one that attemps to reclaim Taiwan by force.
Alfred Thayer Mahan, the father of modern naval strategy is all over this book. Be prepared for multiple references to Mahanism, post-Mahanism and the like. It also proves the point that
Santayana made about what happens to those who forget history.
Leaders of the Chinese navy have taken those lessons of history to heart and piggybacked naval strategy on the back of Chairman Mao's strategy for guerilla warfare and created a muscular, forward-looking strategy to confront and defeat the US Navy in a short- or long-term naval war.
The authors make clear that China has designed its strategy and built its ships to defeat the United States in a naval engagement. At the time of its publication, it's not clear the US Navy has reciprocated that sentiment or designed its shipbilding plans around it.
The authors do a good job of balancing description and prescription for how to address this turn of events.
Have had this on my "to read" list for many years. Given what's happened in Europe this Summer and the Chinese move to cement its status as the biggest military power in Asia, the subject matter is more apropos than at any time since the first edition appeared.
May 18, 2018
China is celebrating the 600 anniversary of its treasure fleets in 2005. They are tying their current naval rise to the peaceful journeys, trying to reassure their neighbors and the US that there is no reason for alarm. Yoshihara compares China's rise with Japan in the 1890-1900s and Germany in 1910-1920s.
Why I started this book: It was on the 2014 and 2017 Navy Professional Reading List.
Why I finished it: Interesting book. Looking at the strategic plans of China, this book refutes common US assumptions of superiority, reminding the reader that China doesn't have to be exactly like the US to become a naval power.
Why I started this book: It was on the 2014 and 2017 Navy Professional Reading List.
Why I finished it: Interesting book. Looking at the strategic plans of China, this book refutes common US assumptions of superiority, reminding the reader that China doesn't have to be exactly like the US to become a naval power.
March 24, 2019
Fantastic book which provides a concise and informed overview of historical, political and military developments in the Pacific. I have read numerous books and this is the absolute best single volume if you are interested in increasing your geopolitical knowledge of the region. This was a page turner and I really had to pace myself because I was enthralled and wanted to devour the contents but made myself go slowly so I could really digest and consider what I was reading in order to get the best understanding possible. Even still, this is a complex and dynamic subject, so I can easily see myself reading it again before long.
October 19, 2014
An exciting read this is not, but it works as a mostly even-handed survey of Chinese maritime expansion and naval-based power projection in the Indo-Pacific region. I appreciated the authors' explanations of their use of sources, their methodology and research methods. Their section on the Chinese government's fashioning of Zheng He's Ming Dynasty-era voyages as a "usable history" for their current claims of peaceful blue-water hegemony was illuminating, as was their chapter comparing the 1986 U.S. naval maritime strategy with the 2007 "Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower."
May 14, 2021
A very through analysis of China’s 21sr Century Navy
This text goes back through 19th, 20th and 21st Century Naval History to analyze Communist China’s Naval ambitions and how they intend to carry them out. Sea Control is important for an insecure PRC noting centuries of historical Chinese humiliation. This book explains how The PRC intends to asymmetrically stop that and how the US can respond. There is also some good discussion of modern naval technology not just strategy and history.
This text goes back through 19th, 20th and 21st Century Naval History to analyze Communist China’s Naval ambitions and how they intend to carry them out. Sea Control is important for an insecure PRC noting centuries of historical Chinese humiliation. This book explains how The PRC intends to asymmetrically stop that and how the US can respond. There is also some good discussion of modern naval technology not just strategy and history.
July 18, 2021
The book provided an overview of Chinese military, particularly Naval strategy to deter adversaries out of the East snd South China seas and Yellow Sea, as well as breaking through the 1st island chain to gain access to the blue waters of the Pacific Ocean it looked at Chinas goals from an economic, geographic, cultural and militaristic lens. Very informative and I highly recommend reading this book. Quick read and easily understandable for the non political scientist or military.
June 14, 2015
This is an excellent accessible ( some of the theory parts aside) analysis of the growth of the Chinese Navy. The focus is somewhat on capability, but mostly on the goals of the leadership. Thanks to the organization of the material, you can easily skip chapters that do not appeal.
December 20, 2020
This book is a must-read for anyone interested in current US-China relations and the East Asian region in general. A chilling call to action for the free world to oppose a growing threat from the world’s largest authoritarian regime.
February 3, 2013
Concise and well written analysis of what is now driving China in her pursuit of a naval strategy, based on following Mahan's perscription for becoming a great power in "Chinese Characters."
May 25, 2015
Not a light read and definitely more towards the wonky. But definitely worth it if you're interested in geopolitics of the Pacific.
June 9, 2017
we need to invest in the navy.
July 30, 2020
A must read to understand the PLAN threat in the West Pacific. Should be required reading for every Naval officer.
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