Exporting the Bomb: Technology Transfer and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons

by Matthew Kroenig

In a vitally important book for anyone interested in nuclear proliferation, defense strategy, or international security, Matthew Kroenig points out that nearly every country with a nuclear weapons arsenal received substantial help at some point from a more advanced nuclear state. Why do some countries help others to develop nuclear weapons? Many analysts assume that nuclear transfers are driven by economic considerations. States in dire economic need, they suggest, export sensitive nuclear materials and technology―and ignore the security risk―in a desperate search for hard currency. Kroenig challenges this conventional wisdom. He finds that state decisions to provide sensitive nuclear assistance are the result of a coherent, strategic logic. The spread of nuclear weapons threatens powerful states more than it threatens weak states, and these differential effects of nuclear proliferation encourage countries to provide sensitive nuclear assistance under certain strategic conditions. Countries are more likely to export sensitive nuclear materials and technology when it would have the effect of constraining an enemy and less likely to do so when it would threaten themselves. In Exporting the Bomb, Kroenig examines the most important historical cases, including France's nuclear assistance to Israel in the 1950s and 1960s; the Soviet Union's sensitive transfers to China from 1958 to 1960; China's nuclear aid to Pakistan in the 1980s; and Pakistan's recent technology transfers, with the help of "rogue" scientist A. Q. Khan, from 1987 to 2002. Understanding why states provide sensitive nuclear assistance not only adds to our knowledge of international politics but also aids in international efforts to control the spread of nuclear weapons.

Genres: Nonfiction

248 pages, Paperback

First published March 11, 2010

Reviews

[Craig · Rating 3 out of 5]

It was interesting, perhaps a 3.5.

For some reason I found the ideas he spent a lot of time and statistics laying out seem really quite logically obvious, though there were a few interesting points worth reiterating (India, France, Israel as potential suppliers in addition to Pak, North Korea, etc.; Russia on the downswing toward being a potential supplier again; China moving further away from such possibilities).

I'm not sure I agree with the weight he throws into power dynamics. There seems equally convincing arguments that France could have (or at least thought it could have) projected power against Israel and that China could have (or at least thought it could have) projected power against Pakistan. He kind of only outlines war plans/logistics that prove his point here.

The case with Pakistan assisting Iran gets dropped like a hot potato when it pokes a few holes in his argument, never to be heard from again.

But generally, his arguments hold a lot of merit, though again, they seem quite obvious to my mind, so I didn't need to be turned on to them or have them proven so handily.

I appreciated his newer book on nuclear weapons supremacy through numbers. It was a very different idea from many, had a ton of data to back it up, and is something I still think about quite a bit.

One Note: I know it's academic, but do things need to be laid out in an introduction, then laid out in a chapter introduction, then laid out in the meat of the chapter, then laid out again in the chapter conclusion, then laid out in the book conclusion, then further laid out in an appendix? We could perhaps trim a bit of fat on his writing style, as he does this in all his books. Again, I know it's academic, but this is academic overkill and you can write a credible academic book with its "Chapter Two Scary Math" and still keep things engaging for a more casual reader. He writes well and has many interesting and well-researched anecdotes, but DAMN sometimes things need a skim when I'd read it for the 6th time.

[Alex · Rating 3 out of 5]

Kroenig's book approaches the logic of nuclear proliferation from a "supply side" point of view -- why do states help other states get the bomb? The answer he comes up with is simple and compelling: because increased nuclear proliferation hurts strong states more than it does weak states. The book positions this argument within the existing literature on proliferation quite well, and supports its argument with both quantitative and qualitative case studies. While I think that Kroenig probably generalizes a bit too much about "states" for my pleasure (can we consider the proliferant actions of France to be governed by the same "state" logic as a country like Pakistan, where it is not clear which agency or agencies is even in charge at any given time?), overall the contribution is an important one and will no doubt be an influential one. The book is not exactly bedside reading, but is clearly written for academic work. It will be of interest almost exclusively to academics or students of nuclear issues, however.

[Viet Phuong · Rating 3 out of 5]

There are interesting ideas with solid quantitative analysis as back-up, but those ideas are presented in a quite forceful way, thus become less convincing as they should be due to the impression of evidence screening and systematic lack of discussion regarding the role of the U.S. in preventing its allies from proliferation.