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Dragon in the Tropics: Hugo Chavez and the Political Economy of Revolution in Venezuela
Since he was first elected in 1999, Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez Frias has reshaped a frail but nonetheless pluralistic democracy into a semi-authoritarian regime—an outcome achieved with spectacularly high oil income and widespread electoral support. This eye-opening book illuminates one of the most sweeping and unexpected political transformations in contemporary Latin America. Based on more than fifteen years' experience in researching and writing about Venezuela, Javier Corrales and Michael Penfold have crafted a comprehensive account of how the Chávez regime has revamped the nation, with a particular focus on its political transformation. Throughout, they take issue with conventional explanations. First, they argue persuasively that liberal democracy as an institution was not to blame for the rise of chavismo. Second, they assert that the nation's economic ailments were not caused by neoliberalism. Instead they blame other factors, including a dependence on oil,
195 pages, Paperback
First published November 1, 2010
23 people are currently reading
346 people want to read
About the author
Javier Corrales
19 books12 followersAssociate Professor of Political Science at Amherst College, Javier Corrales authored or co-authored "U.S.-Venezuela Relations since the 1990s: Coping with Midlevel Security Threats", "Dragon in the Tropics: Hugo Chávez and the Political Economy of Revolution in Venezuela" and "Presidents Without Parties", edited "The Politics of Sexuality in Latin America" and is a contributor to The Huffington Post. His research has been published in academic journals such as Comparative Politics, World Development, Political Science Quarterly, World Policy Journal, Latin American Politics and Society, Latin American Research Review, Current History, and Foreign Policy. He serves on the editorial board of Latin American Politics and Society.
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Displaying 1 - 11 of 11 reviews
July 24, 2019
An academic but readable critique of Hugo Chavez and the Bolivarian Revolution, written from a liberal/centrist perspective. Most of the book is focused on the first decade of the Chavez government, but the updated edition has two new chapters on the Maduro government. The book is unapologetically anti-chavista, and rails against everything from chavismo's economic policies, to the effects on Venezuela's political institutions, to its geopolitical actions. Some of the critiques, especially regarding foreign policy, fall quite flat; others are much more developed and interesting, like the analysis about the oil industry, the factional fights within chavismo, and how the movement has fallen short even by its own standards.
January 26, 2016
One of the best books on the political economy of chavismo. Truly a must-read for anyone interested in learning about the state of Venezuela today.
January 17, 2026
Dragon in the Tropics: The Legacy of Hugo Chávez is an excellent academic examination of the durability of chavismo and the political mechanisms that sustained it. Javier Corrales (Amherst College) and Michael Penfold (IESA, Caracas) argue that Venezuela under Chávez became a hybrid regime—blending democratic forms with increasingly autocratic practices—resulting in an “illiberal” political order that weakened checks and balances and entrenched a ruling coalition held together by redistribution and oil rents. Coupled with an antagonistic foreign policy, they contend that Chávez’s project “was nothing less than a fire-breathing dragon in the tropics.”
Corrales and Penfold trace both the conditions that enabled Chávez’s rise and the methods by which he maintained electoral dominance. They argue that Chávez capitalized on widespread disillusionment with a decentralized, fragmented party system, pairing populist appeals with an image of humanitarian concern to cultivate mass support. Once in office, he rapidly expanded presidential authority, nationalized key sectors, and built oil-funded social programs. These policies bolstered internal discipline within the governing coalition while simultaneously marginalizing, demoralizing, and excluding the opposition. In the authors’ account, opportunistic oil-financed spending, cronyism, and weakening accountability helped Chávez construct an electoral bulwark that protected his hold on power.
The authors also emphasize Chávez’s foreign policy as a tool of regime survival. They argue he employed an antagonistic international posture that provided an “impressive diplomatic shield,” even at significant long-term cost. Through “soft balancing” provocations aimed at the United States, Chávez generated publicity that also served to constrain domestic opponents. Meanwhile, he used “soft-power diplomacy” to convert oil revenue into regional and international assistance, building relationships with like-minded governments and actors—including Russia and Iran—whose interests often ran counter to Washington’s. Corrales and Penfold conclude that these international maneuvers contributed meaningfully to Chávez’s longevity, even as economic fundamentals weakened and international criticism mounted.
Because the book was published in 2015, it only follows Venezuelan politics through the early years of the transition to Nicolás Maduro—whom the authors portray as extending Chávez’s heavy state intervention and repressive political toolkit. The persistence of autocratic institutions, intensifying factionalism, and a declining ability to remain electorally competitive—alongside a state increasingly unable to deliver a functional and affordable economy—emerge as defining features of a regime clinging to power. Maduro’s tenure has underscored how difficult Chávez’s power politics were to reproduce: Chávez’s political instincts, Venezuela’s oil endowments, and his confrontational external strategy bought time and helped his regime endure longer than it otherwise might have. In the authors’ blunt summary, chavismo’s formula ultimately depended on “combining popular support and popular betrayal, together with a good dose of cheating.”
Corrales and Penfold trace both the conditions that enabled Chávez’s rise and the methods by which he maintained electoral dominance. They argue that Chávez capitalized on widespread disillusionment with a decentralized, fragmented party system, pairing populist appeals with an image of humanitarian concern to cultivate mass support. Once in office, he rapidly expanded presidential authority, nationalized key sectors, and built oil-funded social programs. These policies bolstered internal discipline within the governing coalition while simultaneously marginalizing, demoralizing, and excluding the opposition. In the authors’ account, opportunistic oil-financed spending, cronyism, and weakening accountability helped Chávez construct an electoral bulwark that protected his hold on power.
The authors also emphasize Chávez’s foreign policy as a tool of regime survival. They argue he employed an antagonistic international posture that provided an “impressive diplomatic shield,” even at significant long-term cost. Through “soft balancing” provocations aimed at the United States, Chávez generated publicity that also served to constrain domestic opponents. Meanwhile, he used “soft-power diplomacy” to convert oil revenue into regional and international assistance, building relationships with like-minded governments and actors—including Russia and Iran—whose interests often ran counter to Washington’s. Corrales and Penfold conclude that these international maneuvers contributed meaningfully to Chávez’s longevity, even as economic fundamentals weakened and international criticism mounted.
Because the book was published in 2015, it only follows Venezuelan politics through the early years of the transition to Nicolás Maduro—whom the authors portray as extending Chávez’s heavy state intervention and repressive political toolkit. The persistence of autocratic institutions, intensifying factionalism, and a declining ability to remain electorally competitive—alongside a state increasingly unable to deliver a functional and affordable economy—emerge as defining features of a regime clinging to power. Maduro’s tenure has underscored how difficult Chávez’s power politics were to reproduce: Chávez’s political instincts, Venezuela’s oil endowments, and his confrontational external strategy bought time and helped his regime endure longer than it otherwise might have. In the authors’ blunt summary, chavismo’s formula ultimately depended on “combining popular support and popular betrayal, together with a good dose of cheating.”
January 28, 2023
Why does Venezuela suffer shortages of basic goods despite enormous oil resources, and why does the government still has leftist sympathizers all over the world while, for example, malnutrition and infectious diseases of poverty have re-emerged and spread unchecked?
Part of the explanation is that Venezuelan institutions have been sidelined or taken over by regime loyalists. After a strike in 2003, Chavez sacked about 80% of the engineers, and almost all the finance department, of the PDVSA state oil company, and from then on used its revenue at his own discretion. And, although the 1999 constitution says that the military should be neutral in politics, supreme court judges ruled in 2014 that officers could participate in political activities. The two examples are related, because the military is one of the interest groups that most benefits from the current division of power. Chavez loyalists with qualms about the Maduro regime have been purged.
Another part of what the authors call hyper-statism has been expropriation of private property. For example, just before the 2013 local elections, the Daka chain of electronic shops was called out by Maduro for overcharging and waging "economic war" against Venezuela. This was a green light to loot all their branches. Needless to say, this isn't a sustainable tactic, nor does it make for a healthy retail sector.
The system of multiple official exchange rates is another policy which has caused enormous damage to Venezuela as a whole, while enriching favoured groups, such as the famous "boliburgueses" (Bolivarian bourgeoisie). They can access dollars cheaply, and then sell at a different exchange rate, pocketing the profit which they've earned only due to having the right contacts.
Maduro is often mocked for being a dopey bus driver. While he does lack Chavez's charisma, the book offers some insight into the experience and skills that he's used to stay in charge of a crisis-ridden country and a faction-riven regime. As foreign secretary he was able to channel aid to favoured political parties and leaders in other countries, and hence form an alliance that was sympathetic to Venezuela in international forums.
The authors do recognise that, at least initially, Chavez's policies led to a more equal distribution of wealth, and that for most of his presidency he was very popular. The regime is what the authors call a "hybrid" between democracy and autocracy, although with increasingly more of the latter.
The book also puts the regime in a Latin American context. For example, it describes Chavez meeting Juan Velasco Alvarado, Peru's leftist military leader, in 1974. Although not mentioned in the book, Chavez was gifted a pocket edition of Velasco's The Peruvian National Revolution, and kept it with him till it was lost during his failed 1992 coup in Venezuela.
The current book also puts its findings in the context of academic literature on hybrid regimes and petro states. This second edition was published in 2014 so describes some of the economic disaster presided over by Maduro, but not the migration and refugee crisis which began in earnest in 2015.
Part of the explanation is that Venezuelan institutions have been sidelined or taken over by regime loyalists. After a strike in 2003, Chavez sacked about 80% of the engineers, and almost all the finance department, of the PDVSA state oil company, and from then on used its revenue at his own discretion. And, although the 1999 constitution says that the military should be neutral in politics, supreme court judges ruled in 2014 that officers could participate in political activities. The two examples are related, because the military is one of the interest groups that most benefits from the current division of power. Chavez loyalists with qualms about the Maduro regime have been purged.
Another part of what the authors call hyper-statism has been expropriation of private property. For example, just before the 2013 local elections, the Daka chain of electronic shops was called out by Maduro for overcharging and waging "economic war" against Venezuela. This was a green light to loot all their branches. Needless to say, this isn't a sustainable tactic, nor does it make for a healthy retail sector.
The system of multiple official exchange rates is another policy which has caused enormous damage to Venezuela as a whole, while enriching favoured groups, such as the famous "boliburgueses" (Bolivarian bourgeoisie). They can access dollars cheaply, and then sell at a different exchange rate, pocketing the profit which they've earned only due to having the right contacts.
Maduro is often mocked for being a dopey bus driver. While he does lack Chavez's charisma, the book offers some insight into the experience and skills that he's used to stay in charge of a crisis-ridden country and a faction-riven regime. As foreign secretary he was able to channel aid to favoured political parties and leaders in other countries, and hence form an alliance that was sympathetic to Venezuela in international forums.
The authors do recognise that, at least initially, Chavez's policies led to a more equal distribution of wealth, and that for most of his presidency he was very popular. The regime is what the authors call a "hybrid" between democracy and autocracy, although with increasingly more of the latter.
The book also puts the regime in a Latin American context. For example, it describes Chavez meeting Juan Velasco Alvarado, Peru's leftist military leader, in 1974. Although not mentioned in the book, Chavez was gifted a pocket edition of Velasco's The Peruvian National Revolution, and kept it with him till it was lost during his failed 1992 coup in Venezuela.
The current book also puts its findings in the context of academic literature on hybrid regimes and petro states. This second edition was published in 2014 so describes some of the economic disaster presided over by Maduro, but not the migration and refugee crisis which began in earnest in 2015.
May 17, 2025
This book is academic, and definitely took me back to my international relations class in college, but it's fairly easy for anyone to understand. I admittedly didn't know much about Hugo Chávez or what exactly he did to Venezuela after being democratically elected, but this book traces the transformations that took place in the country prior to his election, through his regime, and a bit into the after with Maduro now in charge.
The authors call Venezuela a hybrid regime, one that has elements of both autocracy and democracy. As I read the descriptions, it started fitting into what the 🍊's regime is now doing to the United States. The transition starts with attacks on the opposition, die-hard loyalists being placed in power, the state undermining the autonomy of civic institutions, the law attacking and penalizing the opposition, the leader challenging and changing the Constitution, the leader stacking the courts to change the law in his favor, and the leader removing term limits.
As more elements of democracy fall to the side, the autocracy rises in its place. The difference between chavismo and trumpism is that one side is ok with democracy dying because they are promised socialism, while the other is ok with it because they are promised conservatism. They believe they will benefit from their supreme leader's political choices, but what Venezuela shows, is that instead, everything falls apart. Despite that, the leader is able to maintain their loyalists.
To confirm my feelings, author Javier Corrales literally compared trumpism and chavismo in a Twitter thread shortly after the election. We're not a hybrid regime just yet, but if the 🍊 gets his way, we will be
The authors call Venezuela a hybrid regime, one that has elements of both autocracy and democracy. As I read the descriptions, it started fitting into what the 🍊's regime is now doing to the United States. The transition starts with attacks on the opposition, die-hard loyalists being placed in power, the state undermining the autonomy of civic institutions, the law attacking and penalizing the opposition, the leader challenging and changing the Constitution, the leader stacking the courts to change the law in his favor, and the leader removing term limits.
As more elements of democracy fall to the side, the autocracy rises in its place. The difference between chavismo and trumpism is that one side is ok with democracy dying because they are promised socialism, while the other is ok with it because they are promised conservatism. They believe they will benefit from their supreme leader's political choices, but what Venezuela shows, is that instead, everything falls apart. Despite that, the leader is able to maintain their loyalists.
To confirm my feelings, author Javier Corrales literally compared trumpism and chavismo in a Twitter thread shortly after the election. We're not a hybrid regime just yet, but if the 🍊 gets his way, we will be
June 6, 2024
This book is probably one of the best available treatments on the topic of Venezuelan politics over the last few decades. I was looking to read something for insight into the current Venezuelan refugee crisis and this book definitely delivers in providing historical context for the country's current challenges. My only critique would be that it is quite academic, and as someone more interested in just the history itself I found myself skipping over certain passages. For example, there is quite a bit of theorizing about "hybrid regimes" as a general concept, which I found very speculative in nature and less relevant to those outside of academia.
May 19, 2023
Me gusta por como se plantean los temas, pero honestamente leer sobre Chávez es peor que vivirlo, y lo sé porque llevo 29 años viviéndolo...
May 17, 2024
Me gustó aunque quizás lo encontré algo superficial...
Quizás pudieron haberse adentrado un poco más en el tema...
Quizás pudieron haberse adentrado un poco más en el tema...
July 30, 2011
Excelente obra para todo aquel que desea introducirse en el analisis formal y no periodistico (como suele ser usual) del fenomeno del auge y consolidación de Chavez en Venezuela. A pesar de ser más divulgativo que otra cosa, la obra está repleta de referencias para el lector que desee profundizar más. Sólo extraño un poco más de anáisis de los antecendentes de Chavez y de como la dinámica anterior contribuyó a su ascenso.
March 2, 2013
The authors presented an interesting thesis on a what they view as a hybrid regime (mix of autocracy and democracy) in Venezuela, but most of it was a bit of a snooze. The most interesting chapter for me was on Venezuela's New Foreign Policy. I would only recommend this for Latin Americanists.
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April 3, 2015One of the telling insights into the oil economy and its fight with the burgeoning inflation.
Displaying 1 - 11 of 11 reviews